THE CLARENDON EDITION OF
THE WORKS OF DAVID HUME

AN ENQUIRY CONCERNING THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS

EDITED BY TOM L. BEAUCHAMP

DAVID HUME

OXFORD

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An Enquiry concerning the Principles of Morals

The Clarendon Hume (*The Philosophical Works*) is a series of critical editions of David Hume's philosophical works and essays. It is intended for scholars concerned with Hume, the history of philosophy, and intellectual history generally. Each item in the series offers a critical text, a historical introduction, a statement of editorial policies and principles, historically oriented annotations, a critical apparatus, an extensive bibliography, and a comprehensive index.

An Enquiry concerning the Principles of Morals, first published in 1751, was the third of Hume's major philosophical treatises. He presents a theory of the foundations of morality and of the nature of personal merit. In doing so, he revisits the theory of morals first presented in Book 3 of *A Treatise of Human Nature*, but makes important clarifications and revisions. Hume considered this Enquiry to be 'of all my writings, historical, philosophical or literary, incomparably the best'.

The last edition seen through the press by Hume appeared in 1772. It provides the copy-text for the present edition, but substantive changes to the text planned by Hume before his death are fully taken into account. The editor's introduction discusses the genesis, revision, publishing history, and reception of the work, which went into ten editions at the author's hand. Annotations provide information about Hume's sources, allusions, citations, and terminology. Biographical sketches of all of the individuals mentioned by Hume in the work are supplied in a separate appendix. Two bibliographies list the works cited by Hume and by the editor. Hume's original index to his text is reproduced, and a separate, comprehensive index is provided by the editor. The critical apparatus charts all substantive variations between editions and reports all editorial revisions.

This printing of the *Enquiry* is a corrected reissue of the critical edition originally published in 1998. The text has been changed by two one-word corrections. A few errors in the editorial apparatus are corrected, and small alterations are made to the bibliographical schema. Text pages now include, in the margins, corresponding page numbers of the Selby-Bigge/Nidditch edition of this work.

THE CLARENDON EDITION OF THE
WORKS OF DAVID HUME

General Editors of the
Philosophical, Political, and Literary Works

Tom L. Beauchamp David Fate Norton M. A. Stewart

DAVID HUME

An Enquiry concerning the Principles of Morals

A CRITICAL EDITION

EDITED BY
TOM L. BEAUCHAMP

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PREFACE

Hume's judgement in 'My Own Life' that *An Enquiry concerning the Principles of Morals* is 'incomparably the best' of all his writings has mystified many scholars of his philosophy. Yet the originality, depth of insight, and stylistic precision of this small treatise make it a legitimate candidate for the status Hume bestowed upon it.

Hume's enthusiasm may render it appropriate that the present volume is the first in a new critical edition of his works, the Clarendon Hume. This series adopts modern techniques of textual scholarship, including collation and bibliographical analysis, to establish authoritative texts. Works in the series record all of the numerous substantive variants arising from Hume's relentless revision of successive printings and include explanatory annotations, identifications of figures and works cited by Hume, Hume's own index, and other features not found in previous editions of his works.

Explorations of the feasibility of a new critical edition of Hume's works began a year prior to the Hume Bicentenary in 1976. Extensive consultation was conducted with Hume scholars worldwide. The editing of the present book commenced at that time. Initial formulation of the principles of the edition was undertaken in conjunction with my co-editors and friends, David Fate Norton and M. A. Stewart, two steadfast and discerning critics. Without their wisdom and advice, this volume would be far less than it is; and lacking their encouragement and foresight, it might never have been begun or completed. In the late stages of the work, a number of valuable changes in the substance and form of the manuscript were suggested by my friend Mark Box.

Published work by Peter Nidditch, W. B. Todd, and T. E. Jessop provided a vital substructure for some facets of the research. Some of Nidditch's unpublished work, delivered by the press to the co-editors of the Clarendon Hume for the preparation of a volume of Hume's Essays, has also been helpful.

I have been aided by research assistants and librarians too numerous to mention, but I must express appreciation for the faithful services of special collections librarians at the following six libraries: the British Library, the National Library of Scotland, the Library of Congress, the Beinecke Library at Yale University, the Milton S. Eisenhower Library at the Johns Hopkins University, and the Lauinger Library at Georgetown University. I also wish to acknowledge my administrative assistant, Moheba Hanif, for

her mastery of the rules of this edition and of Oxford University Press—no trivial accomplishment.

Early work on this volume was generously supported by the National Endowment for the Humanities, with supplementary funds from McGill University. Later work was supported by funds from the Graduate School, the Department of Philosophy, and the Kennedy Institute of Ethics at Georgetown University.

Tom L. Beauchamp

18 September 1997
Georgetown University
Washington, DC

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ABBREVIATIONS AND CONVENTIONS

Abstract	*An Abstract of . . . A Treatise of Human Nature*
ann.	the annotation(s) at [the following point]
Appx.	Appendix to *EPM*, designated by appendix number and paragraph number
B	The Biographical Appendix in the present edition contains a biography of this person
c.	century *or* centuries
Cat.	Catalogue of Hume's References
Dial.	'A Dialogue', designated by paragraph numbers
Dialogues	*Dialogues concerning Natural Religion*
DIS	*A Dissertation on the Passions*
EHU	*An Enquiry concerning Human Understanding*
EPM	*An Enquiry concerning the Principles of Morals*
ETSS	*Essays and Treatises on Several Subjects*
Intro.	The Editor's Introduction to the present volume
NHR	*The Natural History of Religion*
RL	Reference List
THN	*A Treatise of Human Nature*

INTRODUCTION

A HISTORY OF THE ENQUIRY ON MORALS

Hume declared *An Enquiry concerning the Principles of Morals* (*EPM*) 'incomparably the best' of his writings and revised it for nine new editions. The history and historical context of this work are discussed in the first seven sections of this Introduction. The origins of Hume's book in the moral controversies of the period, its development from his first work, *A Treatise of Human Nature*, its revisions, and its bibliographical details are all examined. The final two sections treat scholarly assessment of *EPM* in Hume's lifetime.

1. HUME'S EARLY PHILOSOPHY

Hume was born in 1711 at Edinburgh, Scotland. During the 1722–3 session, he enrolled in the College of Edinburgh, where he encountered a diverse body of learned works in the classics, literature, political theory, philosophy, natural science, mathematics, and history. In 1725 or 1726 he took up the study of law, but soon decided to pursue a career as a scholar and literary figure. In his autobiography, 'My Own Life', Hume wrote that, 'My studious Disposition, my Sobriety, and my Industry gave my Family a Notion that the Law was a proper Profession for me: But I found an unsurmountable Aversion to every thing but the pursuits of Philosophy and general Learning.'[1]

At age 23, Hume wrote a letter to an unnamed London physician that furnishes insights into the origins of his philosophy and into his early interests in moral philosophy:

> [F]rom my earliest Infancy, I found alwise a strong Inclination to Books & Letters. As our College Education in Scotland, extending little further than the Languages, ends commonly when we are about 14 or 15 Years of Age, I was after that left to my own Choice in my Reading, & found it encline me almost equally to Books of Reasoning & Philosophy, & to Poetry & the polite Authors. . . .
>
> [H]aving read many Books of Morality, such as Cicero, Seneca & Plutarch, & being smit with their beautiful Representations of Virtue & Philosophy, I undertook the Improvement of my Temper & Will, along with my Reason & Understanding. I

[1] 'My Own Life' 3 ('The Life of David Hume, Esq. Written by Himself', cited by par. no.), in *Letters of David Hume*, 1: 1–7; hereafter *Letters*.

was continually fortifying myself with Reflections against Death, & Poverty, & Shame, & Pain, & all the other Calamities of Life.

This report indicates that Hume's early interests in moral philosophy were not only practical and personal, but also erudite and theoretical. In the same letter Hume reported that

[W]hen I was about 18 Years of Age, there seem'd to be open'd up to me a new Scene of Thought, which transported me beyond Measure, & made me, with an Ardor natural to young men, throw up every other Pleasure or Business to apply entirely to it. The Law . . . appear'd nauseous to me, & I cou'd think of no other way of pushing my Fortune in the World, but that of a Scholar & Philosopher.[2]

Hume is referring to his embryonic ideas for the comprehensive philosophical system that he later published anonymously in three volumes in 1739 and 1740 as *A Treatise of Human Nature*. He had expected learned controversy after publishing the *Treatise,* and occasionally he found it; but often reviewers and commentators misunderstood his work and complained about its difficult prose and recondite arguments.[3] As a result, Hume regretted his decision to publish the *Treatise*. He consoled himself with the belief that its failures were due more to defects of style than philosophical doctrine.

In the early 1740s Hume decided not to attempt a second edition of the *Treatise.*[4] He came to the conclusion that he could correct its style while retaining its principal doctrines in new philosophical works. Late in life, between October and December 1775, he wrote a formal, but only partial disavowal of the *Treatise*, published as an 'Advertisement'.[5] His reasons for this

[2] Mar. or Apr. 1734, to a physician, *Letters*, 1: 13–14. On the origin of *THN*, see also *Letters*, 1: 187. Details about the early development of Hume's philosophy are provided by David Fate Norton in his Introduction to *THN* in the critical edition. Several parts of the present edition of *EPM* are indebted to Norton's research on *THN*.

[3] See e.g. discussions of *A Treatise of Human Nature*, vols. 1–2, in *Commonsense: or the Englishman's Journal* (5 July 1740); *The History of the Works of the Learned*, 2 (Nov. 1739), 353–90 and (Dec. 1739), 391–404; and *Bibliothèque raisonnée des ouvrages des savans de l'Europe*, 24 (Apr.–June 1740). Norton discusses these reviews in his Introduction to the *Treatise*.

[4] Hume speaks expectantly of a 2nd edn. in a letter to Francis Hutcheson, 16 Mar. 1739, *Letters*, 1: 38–40. There may have been several reasons for Hume's decision.

[5] Hume's disavowal was printed in Jan. 1776 as an advertisement to be appended to unsold and new copies of the *Essays and Treatises*. In the advertisement Hume judged *THN* a defective 'juvenile work', at least by comparison to his later philosophy. He expressed a desire 'that the following Pieces may alone be regarded as containing [my] philosophical sentiments and principles' (Advertisement, 1777 edn.). Hume's printer, William Strahan, replied to Hume's request in a letter of 30 Oct. 1775, saying the advertisement would be 'instantly printed' and annexed to remaining copies. (Hume MS RSE [Royal Society of Edinburgh], vol. 7, moved 25 May 1987 to the National Library of Scotland, NLS MS 23157.66.) ('RSE' references will be omitted hereafter in favour of NLS numbers.) Few copies have been found, perhaps because a fire consumed the warehouse of the bookseller on 2 Mar. 1776. This advertisement, as published in the 1777 edition, is explained else-

repudiation are not entirely clear, and some commentators believe that he overreacted to weaknesses and excesses in his early work. None the less, Hume's criticisms and 'repenting' of his *Treatise* were sincere, and his ambition to improve his philosophical work and literary reputation was a major motive in his decision to undertake the drafting of *EPM*.

The Transition from the Treatise

Hume's request in the Advertisement that the *Treatise* be disregarded was neither new nor precipitous. Twenty-four years earlier, in March or April of the same year in which *EPM* was published (1751), he wrote to a friend that

> By shortening & simplifying the Questions, I really render them much more complete. *Addo dum minuo*.[6] The philosophical Principles are the same in both: But I was carry'd away by the Heat of Youth & Invention to publish too precipitately. So vast an Undertaking, plan'd before I was one and twenty, & compos'd before twenty five, must necessarily be very defective. I have repented my Haste a hundred, & a hundred times.[7]

Shortly thereafter, in February 1754, Hume presented a similar appraisal in a letter to physicist John Stewart (1715?–59), who had attacked the *Treatise* in a paper on Isaac Newton[B] and the laws of motion:[8]

> Above all, the positive Air, which prevails in that Book, & which may be imputed to the Ardor of Youth, so much displeases me, that I have not Patience to review it. But what Success the same Doctrines, better illustrated & exprest, may meet with, *Ad huc sub judice lis est*.[9]

In the final sentence, Hume is apparently referring to his later philosophical writings, including *EPM*. The available evidence indicates that Hume never wavered in his dissatisfaction with the *Treatise* throughout his mature years. Although his reasons for disavowing the *Treatise* are understandably controversial, his criticisms of his early work are heartfelt and provide a point of

where in the critical edition. The printing history and variants in the advertisement are discussed in the editorial appendix to the critical edition of *EHU*.

[6] I add while I decrease in size.

[7] Mar. or Apr. 1751, to Gilbert Elliot of Minto, *Letters*, 1: 158. By the same 'philosophical principles', Hume presumably means the same general philosophical viewpoint, not an identity of philosophical content.

[8] Feb. 1754, to John Stewart, *Letters*, 1: 187. Stewart's paper, 'Some Remarks on the Laws of Motion', appeared in *Essays and Observations Physical and Literary, read before a Society in Edinburgh and published by them* (Edinburgh, 1754), published by the Philosophical Society in Edinburgh (later the Royal Society of Edinburgh).

[9] The case is not yet decided.

departure for understanding the adjustments of thought that led to his later philosophical work.[10]

Pinpointing the years and months when he first began to judge his early work defective may be impossible, but two pieces of evidence suggest that as early as 1739, before the final book of the *Treatise* had been sent to the press, Hume had reached a revised estimate of its first and third books. *Circa* October or November 1739 Hume wrote a brief monograph published as *An Abstract of a Book lately Published; Entituled, A Treatise of Human Nature, &c.*[11] Its objective was to render the *Treatise* more intelligible by sketching its central argument. Some of the philosophical views presented as the essence of the *Treatise* show a close resemblance to views found only in Hume's *next* philosophical work, his 1748 *Philosophical Essays concerning Human Understanding* (entitled after 1756, *An Enquiry concerning Human Understanding*).

Second, in the summer of 1739 Hume engaged in correspondence with Francis Hutcheson (1694–1746), who had sent comments on the soon-to-be-published manuscript of the third book of the *Treatise*. Hutcheson's commentary has been lost, but Hume's extant reply leaves clues about its content. Hutcheson must have maintained that Hume was deficient in championing the cause of virtue and failed to explain clearly the nature of virtue and how virtue is connected to motive. A comment by Hume near the end of his reply deserves note: 'I hope these Reasons will satisfy you; tho at the same time, I intend to make a new Tryal, if it be possible to make the Moralist & Metaphysician agree a little better.'[12] The 'new Tryal' may have been Hume's way of referring to his thoughts about revisions that could be made to the manuscript prior to publication[13] or to his embryonic thoughts about changes he would attempt in a second edition, or both. As there was neither a second

[10] Hume's expression of disappointment in his performance in *THN* is given in 'My Own Life' 6, 8; *Letters*, 1: 2–3:

> Never literary Attempt was more unfortunate than my Treatise of human Nature. It fell *dead-born from the Press*; without reaching such distinction as even to excite a Murmur among the Zealots. . . .
>
> I had always entertained a Notion, that my want of Success, in publishing the Treatise of human Nature, had proceeded more from the manner than the matter; and that I had been guilty of a very usual Indiscretion, in going to the Press too early. I therefore cast the first part of that work anew in the Enquiry concerning human Understanding.

The term 'manner' may refer both to literary style and to philosophical methods, procedures, and forms of argument. On the form and matter of his later recasting, see below, pp. liv–lxiii.

[11] Announced in *Gentleman's Magazine*, 10 (Mar. 1740), 152. See also Hume's letter of 4 Mar. 1740 to Hutcheson, *Letters*, 1: 36–8.

[12] 17 Sept. 1739, to Francis Hutcheson, *Letters*, 1: 33.

[13] In a later letter to Hutcheson, Hume indicates that he had made revisions based on Hutcheson's comments to the manuscript. 4 Mar. 1740, *Letters*, 1: 36–8.

edition nor an intervening moral treatise, a reasonable hypothesis is that *EPM* is a work in which Hume attempted to eliminate what he knew as early as 1739 were flaws in the *Treatise*.

After 1740 Hume progressively distanced himself from the *Treatise*, and began to 'cast anew' its three books in separate projects and publications.[14] Book 1 was recast and published in 1748 as *Philosophical Essays concerning Human Understanding*. Book 2 was revised and published in 1757 as an essay 'Of the Passions', soon changed in title to *A Dissertation on the Passions*. Book 3 was heavily modified in both style and substance and published in 1751 as *EPM*, now popularly known as Hume's *Second Enquiry*.

The Shift to Essays

In 1741, one year after publication of the *Abstract* and the final volume of the *Treatise*, Hume brought out a small edition of essays.[15] In an *Advertisement* that served as this volume's Preface, he expressed literary interests that could not have been anticipated by examining his *Treatise*:

> Most of these Essays were wrote with a View of being publish'd as Weekly-Papers, and were intended to comprehend the Designs both of the Spectators and Craftsmen. But having dropt that Undertaking, partly from Laziness, partly from Want of Leisure, and being willing to make Trial of my Talents for Writing, before I ventur'd upon any more serious Compositions, I was induced to commit these Trifles to the Judgment of the Public. Like most new Authors, I must confess, I feel some Anxiety concerning the Success of my Work. . . .
>
> The Reader must not look for any Connexion among these Essays, but must consider each of them as a Work apart.[16]

Hume's enthusiasm for these essays, the genesis of his literary fame, is apparent in a letter of 13 June 1742 to his friend Henry Home, later Lord Kames (1696–1782):[17]

> The *Essays* are all sold in London, as I am inform'd by two letters from English gentlemen of my acquaintance. . . . Innys, the great bookseller[18] in Paul's Churchyard, wonders there is not a new edition, for that he cannot find copies for his customers. I am also told that Dr Butler[19] has every where recommended them; so that I hope they will have some success. They may prove like dung with marl, and bring

[14] 'My Own Life' 9; *Letters*, 1: 3.
[15] *Essays Moral and Political* (Edinburgh, 1741).
[16] Ibid. 3–5; repeated in the 1742 edn.
[17] See below, p. lxxiii, for Kames's relationship to Hume.
[18] William or John Innys.
[19] Anglican Bishop Joseph Butler (1692–1752).

forward the rest of my Philosophy, which is of a more durable, though of a harder and more stubborn nature.[20]

A second edition of this work and a second volume of fresh essays[21] appeared within the year.

The precise ways in which the success of these volumes guided Hume in his recasting of the *Treatise* may never be known, but his words suggest that disappointment at having major figures such as Butler and the lettered audience in Britain ignore the *Treatise*, while lavishing praise on the *Essays*, was no minor consideration in his styling and organization of later publications. The successful 1741–2 model of essays, each 'a Work apart', may have been the paradigm as Hume resculpted the *Treatise*.

In 1745 Hume wrote to Henry Home that, 'I have Leizure enough for reading; but scarce for writing at present. However I intend to continue these *philosophical & moral Essays*, which I mention'd to you.'[22] Hume soon corresponded about and completed (or perhaps already had completed) a manuscript that he called 'Philosophical Essays'.[23] This designation would soon become part of the first title of his First Enquiry: *Philosophical Essays concerning Human Understanding*. The form and content together with the title given to these *Essays* indicate the influence of the essay style. Hume's objective in calling the new 1748 group of essays *philosophical* (unlike the earlier essays, whose titles included the terms *moral* and *political*—and, later, both *political* and *literary*)[24] may have been to convey publicly that he was recasting his philosophy in the more amiable essay style mentioned in the Advertisement to his 1741 essays, and also to establish a commercially important work. This genre freed him of the systematic structure and detailed argumentation that had proved strenuous and perplexing for readers of the *Treatise*.

Hume stated his resolve to compose serious work for a broad literate community, which in his time was a realistic expectation for intellectuals. In his essay on the subject of essay writing, Hume wrote that 'I cannot but consider myself as a Kind of Resident or Ambassador from the Dominions of Learning to those of Conversation'.[25] Because academic specialization was

[20] 13 June 1742, to Henry Home of Kames, in *New Letters of David Hume*, 10 (hereafter *New Letters*). See also Hume's appreciative letter to Kames of 13–15 June 1745, *New Letters*, 16–17, in which Hume describes Kames as 'the best Friend, in every respect, I ever possest'.

[21] *Essays, Moral and Political*, vol. 2 (Edinburgh, 1742).

[22] 13–15 June 1745, to Henry Home, *New Letters*, 18 (italics added).

[23] 2 Oct. 1747, to James Oswald of Dunnikier, *Letters*, 1: 106.

[24] *Essays Moral and Political* (1741–2); see also *Political Discourses* (1752) ('the second Part of my Essays, which I called Political Discourses'—'My Own Life' 9; *Letters*, 1: 3).

[25] 'Of Essay-Writing' 5.

restricted, authors could hope to reach the many educated readers who studied prominent writers in philosophy, literature, science, and history. The desire to touch a wide audience with serious philosophy was clearly one of Hume's reasons for perfecting his prose during this period.

Hume's *Philosophical Essays* was his first post-*Treatise* collection of philosophical material. *EPM* became the second. It too corrects and restyles the philosophy of the *Treatise*. Hume referred to the contents of *EPM* as 'these Essays' in the first edition (1751, p. 110 n.); he then changed this wording (in the 1751 errata) to 'this Enquiry'. His original words were no slip of the pen. In the only other self-reference to the contents of *EPM* in the first edition, Hume refers to the book as containing 'Essays' rather than 'Sections' (1751, p. 55 n., also changed in the errata). Hume seems to have originally conceived *EPM*, like *EHU*, as an integrated sequence of essays. Although never called 'Essays' in the title, *EPM* was written under the same model as *EHU*.

To understand the work as a series of discrete pieces helps explain why 'A Dialogue' does not appear to be an anomaly in its position as a final essay published together with the other essays that constitute *EPM*. 'A Dialogue' is one among a series of self-standing units. Two of the appendices in *EPM* were originally written and published as integrated parts of the main essays (in later editions detached and styled 'appendices'). It seems likely that all of the appendices were originally written as parts of the main essays. It would make no sense to publish discrete, numbered essays, then appendices, and then a dialogue. But once Hume decided to make a coherent, integrated work, he appears to have changed the nomenclature, moved some parts of some sections to the back of the work, and left the free-standing dialogue situated at the end. He may have conceived *EPM* as an integrated enquiry only after he wrote it, and perhaps after he delivered it to the public. He apparently then forgot that he had two footnotes calling it a volume of 'essays'. When he spotted the two references to essays in the footnotes, it was too late to make changes at the press, hence the changes in the errata.

Five or six years after the publication of *EPM*, Hume reconsiderd the nature and title of *Philosophical Essays*, also changing it in title to an *Enquiry*. These changes follow the same reconception that occurred in the later stages of *EPM*.[26] These changes in the conception and title of the First and Second Enquiries in effect returned Hume to the more systematic and organized

[26] The title *Philosophical Essays concerning Human Understanding* was used through the 3rd edn. of 1756. As late as 5 Nov. 1755, Hume was still freely using the title *Philosophical Essays* and referring to its contents as 'essays' in his correspondence. See the following letters: 12 Sept. 1754, to the Abbé le Blanc, *Letters*, 1: 191–4; 5 Nov. 1755, to the Abbé le Blanc, *Letters*, 1: 225–7. I am indebted to M. A. Stewart for a number of observations about *EPM* and the essay genre.

structure of the *Treatise*. As early as 1752 or 1753, Hume may have decided that both enquiries were individual *treatises*; he suggested as much by calling the first collected edition of his works, *Essays and Treatises on Several Subjects*.

An unduly heavy burden can easily be placed on the words *essay*, *enquiry*, and *treatise*, but Hume's choice of these terms was not idle. The words reflect shifting directions in his conception of his work. In the 1740s he set out to be an essayist, rather than a philosopher with a grand and elaborate system like the *Treatise*'s. This frame of mind still prevailed when he wrote *EPM*. In effect, he had evolved from the author of a systematic treatise to the author of groups of essays, and then to the author of short essay-treatises that amounted to sustained enquiries.

2. THE INTELLECTUAL CONTEXT

We have seen that Hume was impressed with the essay style and that just prior to writing *EPM* he had 'Leizure enough for reading; but scarce for writing'. Who had he been reading and who might have influenced his thoughts about the style and substance of *EPM*? On the matter of style, we have Hume's explicit statement, cited above, that the model of those who wrote in the *Spectator* and *Craftsman* (and presumably the *Tatler* and the *Guardian*) had influenced his conception of the essay. Hume often expressed an admiration for Addison, who, along with Steele and other talented writers, Hume seems to have thought brought the essay to a summit of stylistic correctness. On the matter of substantive influence, the available evidence suggests that many figures in moral philosophy who influenced Hume in writing the *Treatise* likewise influenced his work on *EPM*. Nevertheless, new sources appear in *EPM*, in both the text and the footnotes, and Hume incorporated a wider and more consistent pattern of citing classical Greek and Roman sources.

The views that Hume accepted and rejected in moral philosophy typically grew out of the philosophical, psychological, and theological controversies of his period. As the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries unfolded, several leading types of moral philosophy emerged. They can be grouped, using later terminology, into four categories: (1) *natural law theory*, (2) *rationalism*, (3) *egoism*, and (4) *moral sense theory*. The disputes that emerged from these types of philosophy—'general system and established theory', as Hume calls them[27]—provide the intellectual background of *EPM*. However,

[27] *EPM* 9.5.

Hume also read well beyond these sources in a broad array of classical and modern materials, as his footnotes and textual references attest.

Many scholars have aspired to discover which philosopher or set of philosophers had the most significant influence on Hume. Some have argued that a single figure such as Locke,[B] Hutcheson, Pyrrho, or Cicero[B] had the deepest influence. However, it has proved difficult to track the precise influence of particular figures without descending into overly speculative hypotheses that do more to distort than to illuminate Hume's intellectual development. This introduction cannot engage these interpretative and historical controversies, and therefore only a modest characterization pertaining to the influences on Hume's moral philosophy is attempted.[28]

Natural Law Theories

Twice in *EPM* (3.29 and Appx. 3.6) Hume refers to writers on the laws of nature, and in other passages he appears to assume some aspect of natural law theory. Most likely to have influenced his thought are Dutch jurist and statesman Hugo Grotius[B] and German jurist and historian Samuel Pufendorf (1632–94), both of whom Hume cited in at least one edition of *EPM*. Various of Hume's friends, including Lord Kames, were also proponents of some version of natural law theory.

Rationalism

In the first few pages of *EPM* Hume discusses a major controversy:

> There has been a controversy started of late . . . concerning the general foundation of MORALS; whether they be derived from REASON, or from SENTIMENT; whether we attain the knowledge of them by a chain of argument and induction, or by an immediate feeling and finer internal sense; whether, like all sound judgment of truth and falsehood, they should be the same to every rational intelligent being; or whether, like the perception of beauty and deformity, they be founded entirely on the particular fabric and constitution of the human species. (1.3)

Although Hume never explicitly dates the controversy, his references indicate that he is thinking of developments that occurred between 1625 and 1750. The rationalists, or partisans of the powers of reason, defended a rational apprehension of eternal standards of right and wrong. Those who appear to have been uppermost in Hume's reflections included Samuel Clarke,[B]

[28] Additional details about influences on particular passages in *EPM* are explored in the editor's annotations to this volume.

William Wollaston (1659–1724), Ralph Cudworth,[B] Nicolas Malebranche[B] (who is mentioned in *EPM* in this connection), and possibly Baron de Montesquieu[B] and John Balguy (1686–1748). All but Balguy are cited in Hume's writings.

Egoism

The 'selfish system of morals', as Hume called it, or psychological egoism in today's terminology, is a system often attributed to Thomas Hobbes[B] and, in a different version, to Bernard de Mandeville (1670–1733). In *EPM*, Hume cites Hobbes and Locke[B] as espousing 'the selfish system' on the grounds that they endorse the principle that 'no passion is, or can be disinterested; that the most generous friendship, however sincere, is a modification of self-love' (Appx. 2.2).[29] Hume also cites Epicurus,[B] Atticus,[B] and Horace[B] as espousing this selfish system,[30] leaving Mandeville an unmentioned background figure.[31] These philosophers were a near inescapable point of departure in moral theory in the eighteenth century.

Moral Sense Theories

Another group of philosophers defended an innate human moral faculty. The third earl of Shaftesbury,[B] Anthony Ashley Cooper, was an early and major figure. He explained moral discernment and judgement by appeal to 'the moral sense'.[32] When criticism mounted against various features of his views, philosopher and Presbyterian preacher Francis Hutcheson (1694–1746) arose in their defence. Shaftesbury and Hutcheson were influential in the development of Hume's thinking in the *Treatise*, and their influence continued, in a modestly diluted form, in *EPM*. However, by the time Hume completed *EPM*, he had been disappointed by Hutcheson's

[29] Hume was not idiosyncratic in this interpretation of Hobbes and Locke. Shaftesbury, for example, depicts them as explaining 'all the social passions and natural affections as to denominate them of the selfish kind. Thus, civility, hospitality, humanity towards strangers or people in distress, is only a more deliberate selfishness'. *Characteristics*, 'Sensus Communis' 3.3 (79). Hutcheson notes that 'Mr. Hobbes' and the 'Christian Moralists' who appeal to 'subtle selfish Motives' are his opponents. *An Essay on the Nature and Conduct of the Passions and Affections*, Treatise 2, introduction, 207–9.

[30] *EPM* Appx. 2.3.

[31] As Hume notes in his essay, 'Of Refinement in the Arts', n. 2. See Mandeville, *Fable of the Bees*, 18–24, 39–41, 324.

[32] *Characteristics*, 'Inquiry concerning Virtue' 1.2.3, 1.3.1–3 (251–4; 258–66). Shaftesbury condemned inferences to the conclusion that the capacity for moral judgement is not natural. Letter to Michael Ainsworth, 3 June 1709, in *The Life, Unpublished Letters, and Philosophical Regimen of Anthony, Earl of Shaftesbury*, 403–5.

opposition to his candidacy for the chair of moral philosophy at Edinburgh. There is no explicit mention of Hutcheson in *EPM*, and only a single reference to Shaftesbury (1.4).

Statements made by Hume just before writing *EPM* none the less suggest that his later philosophy retained an indebtedness to Hutcheson. The first two editions of his first *Enquiry* (1748 and 1750) acknowledge contributions to his moral thinking by both Hutcheson and Butler. Hutcheson, Hume says, 'has taught us, by the most convincing Arguments, that Morality is nothing in the abstract Nature of Things, but is entirely relative to the Sentiment or mental Taste of each particular being; in the same Manner as the Distinctions of sweet and bitter, hot and cold, arise from the particular Feeling of each Sense or Organ. Moral Perceptions therefore, ought not to be class'd with the Operations of the Understanding, but with the Tastes or Sentiments.' In the next paragraph, Hume expresses an indebtedness to Butler's *Sermons* for pointing to the impropriety of a simple division of the passions 'into two Classes, the selfish and the benevolent' and for the view that 'even the Passions, commonly esteem'd selfish, carry the Mind beyond Self, directly to the Object; that tho' the Satisfaction of these Passions gives us Enjoyment, yet the Prospect of this Enjoyment is not the Cause of the Passion'.[33]

Acknowledged and Unacknowledged Sources

In *A Letter from a Gentleman to his Friend in Edinburgh*, Hume named the major parties to the 'controversy' about the foundation of morality mentioned previously. Clarke[B] and Wollaston are named as opponents, and Hume says that he concurs 'with all the antient Moralists' and Hutcheson on the place of the passions.[34] These figures are among Hume's several *acknowledged* sources, and reading his work in light of their writings can be illuminating.[35] However, the precise ways in which Hume agreed with and departed from Hutcheson or any other philosopher—and the ways in which he changed his views about his intellectual debts after the *Treatise*—are difficult matters of

[33] *EHU*, 1748 edn. (*Philosophical Essays*), 15–16. See Francis Hutcheson, *An Essay on the Nature and Conduct of the Passions and Affections*; Joseph Butler, *Fifteen Sermons preached at the Rolls Chapel*.

[34] *A Letter from a Gentleman to his Friend in Edinburgh*, response 6.

[35] In the first three editions of *EPM* (1751–8), Hume refers in the first paragraph of his Appendix 'Of Some Verbal Disputes' to 'all antient Moralists, (the best Models)'. This reference to the ancients was dropped in the 1760 and all later editions. In this Appendix Hume shows an interest in Aristotle on intellectual and moral virtues; in Cicero on the virtues of friendliness, beneficence, justice, generosity, fidelity, courage, wisdom, and greatness of intellect; and in the Stoics.

interpretation. The history of scholarship about influences on Hume's thought illustrates how easy it is to exaggerate Hume's indebtedness and to overlook sources, positive and negative, that influenced specific parts of his work.

Hume's formal education, his large correspondence, and the references and footnotes in his works indicate that he came to his doctrines, ideas, illustrations, and stories from his reading of many philosophers and non-philosophers, including several with whom he unmistakably disagreed. They all influenced his thought in the sense of motivating or propelling his thinking. As the annotations in this volume indicate, it is often difficult to pinpoint the precise sources of a passage or to determine the extent of a known source's influence. In accordance with the customs and genre constraints of the period, Hume often obliquely points to a source or a type of source, while omitting the name of the source and giving no hint of how to trace it. In *EPM* Hume never explicitly discusses any figure, theory, or philosophical work at length, excepting egoism. The figures with whom he is conversing often remain in the background.

To grasp the lines of influence on Hume's writing adequately would require that we consider a diverse group of writers—for example, relatively well-known figures such as Addison, La Fontaine,[B] Pascal,[B] Lucian,[B] Aristotle,[B] Plutarch,[B] Seneca,[B] Montaigne,[B] Bacon,[B] Boileau,[B] Malebranche,[B] Bayle,[B] Montesquieu,[B] and Bolingbroke. Hume also cites historians, and he partially developed his moral theory from his historical interests. He read widely in the Greek and Roman classical literatures, and in college had been educated in philosophy, history, science, and literature. His correspondence indicates that he read in several fields and followed the relevant literature in the Latin, French, Italian, and English languages.

In *EPM* Hume most often cites Plutarch,[B] Cicero,[B] Plato,[B] Polybius,[B] and Horace.[B] In the major treatises that he grouped with *EPM* in *Essays and Treatises* (*EHU*, *DIS*, and *NHR*), he most often cites Plutarch, Cicero, Homer,[B] Lucian,[B] and Suetonius.[B] However, nothing follows about the actual influence on his philosophy of these or any other cited figures. Many cited authors appear to have had no deep substantive philosophical influence on him. They are mentioned for reasons such as: (1) Their works contain particularly apt examples, sayings, reports on culture, or classification schemes that Hume adapts to his views; (2) they occupy an important historical position or authority; (3) their writings contain documents or some form of documentation; (4) their style evokes a comment; or (5) Hume reproves the author. How an acknowledged source influenced Hume's thought therefore requires careful analysis beyond the acknowledgement itself and beyond the quantity of acknowledgements of any single author.

3. THE EDITIONS FROM 1751 TO 1758

Hume's personal, scholarly, and career interests explain *why* he wrote *EPM*. But *when*, *where*, and *under what conditions* did he author it?

Drafting the Manuscript

Hume drafted *EPM* largely in 1749 and 1750. In 'My Own Life' he recalls the circumstances:

> I went down in 1749 and lived two Years with my Brother at his Country house: For my Mother was now dead. I there composed the second Part of my Essays, which I called Political Discourses; and also my Enquiry concerning the Principles of Morals, which is another part of my Treatise, that I cast anew.[36]

From his statements about recasting the *Treatise* and other hints in his correspondence, it appears that Hume had been rethinking the revision of Book 3 of the *Treatise* before 1749. None the less, the available evidence, which is not ample, suggests that he wrote most or all of *EPM* quickly in 1749–50, and that he wrote it without relying heavily on the *Treatise*'s wording or structural framework of parts and sections.[37]

Throughout the spring of 1749 Hume was in London, making literary contacts and deepening his relationship with his bookseller. He left London by early summer to return to Scotland and his home at Ninewells, where he retreated from social activities and turned to an intense period of writing and revising *EPM*, *Political Discourses* (1752), and *Dialogues concerning Natural Religion* (a posthumous publication). Little remains of his correspondence during this period, perhaps because his writing projects left him no time for correspondence.

On 10 February 1751 Hume wrote to Gilbert Elliot that six weeks earlier, near the last day of December 1750, he had sent the manuscript of 'A Dialogue' by way of a mutual friend for examination and critique by Elliot. *EPM* was published as including this short work, which has usually been treated as if it were a final appendix to *EPM*. This dialogue drew a cryptic comment from Hume: 'It is pretty usual for People to be pleas'd with their own Performance, especially in the Heat of Composition; but I have scarcely wrote any thing more whimsical, or whose Merit I am more diffident of.'[38]

It seems likely that Hume had completed *EPM* by late December 1750. If

[36] 'My Own Life' 9; *Letters*, 1: 3. The *Political Discourses* was published in 1752.
[37] See the textual evidence for this claim on pp. liv–lxiii below.
[38] 10 Feb. 1751, to Gilbert Elliot of Minto, *Letters*, 1: 145.

so, he had put no more than a year and a half into producing it and 'A Dialogue'. These years were formative in the development and maturation of Hume's work, both stylistically and substantively. He was composing part of his *Political Discourses*,[39] and no later than March 1751 he was well into composing his *Dialogues concerning Natural Religion* (probably completing a first draft), of which he had already forwarded a 'sample' to Elliot.[40] He may have finished a full draft of the *Dialogues* this year. Thus, the period from the summer of 1749 to the publication of *Political Discourses* in 1752 was a concentrated and active period in Hume's post-*Treatise* manuscript development:[41] he wrote *EPM*, laboured over the *Dialogues*, and wrote the *Political Discourses*.

The First and Second Editions in 1751 and 1753

In 'My Own Life' Hume incorrectly recalls the *date* of publication of *EPM*:

> In 1752, were published at Edinburgh, where I then lived, my Political Discourses, the only work of mine, that was successful on the first Publication: It was well received abroad and at home. In the same Year was published at London my Enquiry concerning the Principles of Morals, which, in my own opinion (who ought not to judge on that subject) is of all my writings, historical, philosophical, or literary, incomparably the best.[42]

Hume's recollection of a 1752 date is perhaps explained by the lateness of the publication in 1751 and the likely delay in copies reaching Scotland. Although 1,500 copies of *An Enquiry concerning the Principles of Morals* were printed in July 1751 with a 1751 publication date on the title-page, it was not advertised until late November of that year. Assuming that the advertisement was not premature, the book was therefore marketed in late November or early December; but even then Hume's last revisions had not quite been incorporated.[43] A cancel leaf containing a revised conclusion (at Appx. 3.11 in the present numbering) was printed and inserted in January 1752. *Political Discourses* was printed later in 1752.[44]

[39] A work of 304 printed pages, published immediately after *EPM*.

[40] 10 Mar. 1751, to Gilbert Elliot of Minto, *Letters*, 1: 153–7.

[41] Hume's *History of England* represents a similar period of productivity. Each two-volume set was written in approximately two years.

[42] 'My Own Life' 10; *Letters*, 1: 3–4.

[43] See documentation below, pp. xlii–xliv, based on the *General Advertiser*, *Gentleman's Magazine*, and the like.

[44] Hume's ten editions of *EPM* present only one cancel and one inserted title: a Jan. 1752 inserted leaf and a 1753 reissue of the 1st edn. See below, pp. xliii–xlv.

By March 1753 Hume began to consider publishing a second edition of his Second Enquiry.[45] On 3 May 1753 he wrote to Sir David Dalrymple[46] requesting criticisms and corrections:[47]

> I shall think myself much obligd to you, if you will run over my Enquiry, & remark what you think amiss either in Language or Argument. Besides, that I am extremely anxious to obtain some Degree of Correctness in all my Attempts; I must confess, that I have a Partiality for that Work, & esteem it the most tolerable of anything I have composd. I have sent off some Sheets for the Press; but it is to be return'd to me Sheet by Sheet, or what they call the Proof Sheet; & therefore it will still be in my Power to reap Benefit from your Corrections.

A year later Hume said he regarded the second edition as a significant improvement over the first and recommended only the second to a French translator: 'The best Edition of the Enquiry concerning the Principles of Morals is the Second.'[48] Shortly thereafter, to the same correspondent, he commented that 'My Enquiry concerning the Principles of Morals wou'd probably be more popular [than the *Philosophical Essays*, had they been translated]; and indeed, it is my favourite Performance, tho' the other has made more Noise.'[49]

The Early Collected Editions: 1753 and 1753–6

The publication of the fourth edition of *Essays Moral and Political* in 1753 marked the inauguration of a new conception of Hume's post-*Treatise* writings. While retaining their individual identities, these writings were brought together under the overall title of *Essays and Treatises on Several Subjects*. In the longer term, new editions of all of these collected writings would be grouped under this title. However, in the short term, the title was used as a device to clear the bookseller's stock of existing editions. In April 1753 Hume's printer, William Strahan, recorded printing the new edition of Hume's *Essays* (*Essays Moral and Political*) and also 500 copies of 'titles for 4 vols. of D°', that is, new title-pages for the pre-1753 stock of all the works that were henceforth to be constituents of the collected *Essays and Treatises*. Along with the new (fourth) edition of *Essays Moral and Political*, which was designated Volume 1, the bookseller reissued the third edition, with the same volume number and date, but also erroneously called the 'Fourth' edition.

[45] See 3 May 1753, to Sir David Dalrymple, *Letters*, 1: 174.
[46] Lord Hailes, Scottish historian and judge of the Court of Session, 1726–92.
[47] *Letters*, 1: 174–5.
[48] 12 Sept. 1754, to the Abbé le Blanc, *Letters*, 1: 192.
[49] 5 Nov. 1755, to the Abbé le Blanc, *Letters*, 1: 227.

The editions were more carefully distinguished for the other works. The reissue of the *Philosophical Essays* as Volume 2 was correctly designated the second edition; that of the *Political Discourses* as Volume 4, the third edition. The reissue of *EPM* as Volume 3, being still the first edition, was unnumbered.

It is probable that copies of old and new editions of the individual volumes coexisted in the bookseller's stock for some time, as first one and then another work was revised and reset. Between 1753 and 1758 a bookseller might have had on the shelves any of the various combinations of the 1753, 1754, and 1756 issues and editions of the individual works. By 1756 the whole of the first collected edition of *Essays and Treatises* of 1753 had evolved into a new, revised edition consisting of the following components: *Essays Moral and Political*, the true fourth edition (1753); *Philosophical Essays*, third edition (1756); *EPM*, second edition (1753); *Political Discourses*, third edition (1754). In the intervening years, and probably beyond, purchasers might acquire different permutations of the individual editions. Those who read their title-pages carefully could work out the various possible combinations, except for the misnumbered *Essays*. There is no evidence that the coexistence of different editions led to any serious mixing of the sheets for each.

The first collected edition was therefore created from a miscellany. The first edition of *EPM* was retained without alteration except for a newly inserted volume title-page: volume 3 of the *Essays and Treatises on Several Subjects*. The second edition was not printed until August 1753.[50] In schematic form, the make-up of the first collected edition was as shown in Table 1.[51]

Table 1

Volume	Title	Edition
1	*Essays Moral and Political*	3rd [1748]
2	*Philosophical Essays concerning Human Understanding*	2nd [1750]
3	*An Enquiry concerning the Principles of Morals*	1st [1751]
4	*Political Discourses*	2nd [1752]

[50] *Essays Moral and Political* and the *Political Discourses* were handled similarly: the first '1753' issue of *Political Discourses* was a reissue of the 2nd edn. of 1752; and the first '1753' issue of *Essays Moral and Political* was a reissue of the 3rd edn. of 1748.

[51] This accounting was in part established by A. Wayne Colver, 'The "First" Edition of Hume's Essays and Treatises', 39–44.

POST-TREATISE PHILOSOPHICAL PUBLICATIONS

ETSS *Essays and Treatises on Several Subjects*
DIS *A Dissertation on the Passions*
NHR *The Natural History of Religion*



Note: In 1758 the first full Collected Edition was published in a single volume. This edition brought all previous writings in this schema into a collected unit. At this time *Philosophical Essays . . .* was changed in title to *An Enquiry concerning Human Understanding*. In the 1758 edition and thereafter, the 1753–7 works are collected in two primary parts—the *essays* and the *treatises*—whether the editions were issued as 1, 2, or 4 volumes. These unit parts are presented above in brackets because Hume never explicitly divided his Contents by using terms such as 'part' and 'treatise'.

Table 2

Volume	Title	Editions
1	*Essays Moral and Political*	4th [1753]
2	*Philosophical Essays concerning Human Understanding*	3rd [1756]
3	*An Enquiry concerning the Principles of Morals*	2nd [1753]
4	*Political Discourses*	3rd [1754]

After piecemeal replacement, the new collected edition that emerged is given in Table 2.[52]

These 'first' *Essays and Treatises* collections contained roughly 1,000 pages of philosophical, political, and literary material. In 1758 other works were added, and this collection continued to meet Hume's approval from at least 1758 until the last edition he revised (published with the date 1777). The chart 'Post-Treatise Philosophical Publications' presents the evolution of Hume's works, from the first individually published volumes (1741–57) to the collected editions of *Essays and Treatises* (1758–77).[53]

4. THE EDITIONS FROM 1758 TO 1777

The 1758 edition constitutes both a permanent combining of Hume's writings produced after 1740, other than his *History* and posthumous works, and a return (in the second half of the collection) to the order and arrangement of topics in the three books of the *Treatise*.[54] This structure for Hume's philosophy remained through two decades of revisions. *EPM* always appeared after *A Dissertation on the Passions* and before *The Natural History of Religion*.

Throughout his later editions (1758 and following), Hume was meticulous and dogged in altering his punctuation, spelling, and choice of words to make his work stylistically agreeable. Most of his changes, other than deletions, are

[52] Libraries throughout the world have been confused about the above histories of dating and printing. These libraries have often miscatalogued their collections—mistaking 2nd editions for 3rd editions, and the like. Many libraries also have understandably mixed early volumes with late volumes, under the assumption that *only one* set of 1753–6 (or merely one set published in 1753) volumes was published.

[53] The full collection included both the *essays* and the *treatises*. The *essays* are displayed in the schematic depiction 'Post-Treatise Philosophical Publications' as Part 1, the *treatises* as Part 2. In fact, Hume never so clearly distinguished essays from treatises. Lesser modifications (such as heavily edited, added, or deleted essays) are suppressed in this chart.

[54] See pp. xlv–lii below for a precise comparison.

clarifications of wordings and stylistic improvements, although he also attempted to improve his judgement and impartiality.[55] In these endeavours Hume exhibits the qualities of a compulsive author, copy editor, and proofreader. He viewed his revisions as introducing a polish that would be appreciated by future generations, if not his own. The spirit of his alterations is captured in one of his several descriptions of his revisions (in this instance, a comment on his *History*):

> [O]ne reason of my remaining in London is the correcting a new Edition of my History, which I oversee as anxiously, as if any body were concern'd about it, or ever woud perceive the Pains I take in polishing it and rendering it as accurate as possible. I can only say, that I do it for myself and that it amuses me.[56]

Despite a persistent fussiness in perfecting his works, Hume made a relatively small number of significant substantive changes across the many editions of *EPM*. Most of the corrections improve formal features of the work. Although precise dates usually cannot be placed on the types of change he introduced, some types can be pinpointed. For example, he made a concerted effort in 1770 to shed his many uses of ' 'tis' in favour of 'it is'—a change he hesitantly began to introduce a decade earlier. As we will see, the 1768 edition is especially interesting because a large number of changes in that edition were subsequently mislaid in 1770 and then lost to the later editions.

The 'New Method of Spelling' and other Innovations in 1758

In the 1758 edition Hume and his printer adopted the 'new spelling'—now often called the American spelling—in which the form '-or' displaced '-our' in the suffix of words like 'honour', 'endeavour', 'colour', and 'labour', and also in words such as 'flourish' and 'favourite'. Hume began to use this spelling intermittently in his writing and rigidly in his editing—perhaps under the assumption that this practice would soon become the preferred style.[57] He had already begun to initiate these changes in his *History* prior to the 1758 edition of *Essays and Treatises*, and he began in 1757 to use *both* '-or' *and* '-our' forms, virtually alternating them, in his correspondence. He did not use these new forms in his *Four Dissertations*, which appeared for sale in

[55] 24 Sept. 1752, to Adam Smith, *Letters*, 1: 167–9; 15 Mar. 1753, to James Balfour, *Letters*, 1: 172–4; 4 Sept. 1771, to William Strahan, *Letters*, 2: 249–50; 18 Sept. 1771, to William Strahan, *Letters*, 2: 250; 2 Jan. 1772, to William Strahan, *Letters*, 2: 251–2.

[56] 18 Oct. 1768, to Baron Mure of Caldwell, *Letters*, 2: 187–9. Less than a year before this letter, Hume had completed changes for the 7th edn. of *EPM*.

[57] See 20 June 1758, to Andrew Millar, *Letters*, 1: 282–3.

early February 1757. In June 1758, after the 1758 edition had been printed, he wrote to his bookseller:

> I have read a small Pamphlet call'd Sketches.[58] . . . I find the ingenious Author, whoever he be, ridicules the new Method of Spelling, as he calls it: But that Method of spelling, Honor, instead of Honour, was Lord Bolingbrokes,[59] Dr Middletons,[60] & Mr Pope's;[61] besides many other eminent Writers. However, to tell truth, I hate to be any way particular in a Trifle; and therefore, if Mr Strahan has not printed off above ten or twelve Sheets [for a volume of Hume's *History*], I shoud not be displeas'd, if you told him to follow the usual, that is, his own, way of Spelling throughout. We shall make the other Volumes conformable to it. If he be advancd farther, there is no great Matter.[62]

A month later Hume recommended 'this new Method of Spelling' to his printer for a new edition of his *History*.[63] However, in a year or so Hume changed his mind and rejected the new spelling. By late 1759 he was no longer using it in correspondence or in the preparation of new editions.

By contrast, he retained in later editions many other changes that he introduced in 1758. In this edition Hume and his compositors began to shed one of his oldest (albeit inconsistent)[64] practices, namely the forms ''d' rather than 'ed' on words such as 'influenc'd', 'attain'd', 'good-humour'd', and 'prais'd'. Hume and his compositors also changed to capitals from their long-standing preference for italics, as a way of displaying nations, cities, countries, and the like—for example, they went from *Greek* to GREEK, *Ireland* to IRELAND, and *Spenser* to SPENSER (later SPENCER). Other favoured forms, such as 'betwixt' and 'amongst', were also on the chopping block in the 1758 edition. This edition is a starting point for many changes of form, but most of the reforms that he had initiated were gradually phased in over several subsequent editions. Some forms were never phased out completely, and many were retained in Hume's correspondence. Others (such as the 1758 spellings) were systematically terminated in a single edition. In introducing or allowing these stylistic changes, Hume showed a willingness to innovate in order to improve the appeal of the work.

[58] *Sketches, or, Essays on Various Subjects* (London, 1758). Published under the pseudonym 'Launcelot Temple, Esq.', but written (as Hume guessed) by Dr John Armstrong (1709–79), British physician, poet, and essayist.

[59] Henry Saint John, 1st viscount, Bolingbroke, politician and writer, 1678–1751.

[60] Conyers Middleton, English clergyman and theologian, 1683–1750.

[61] Alexander Pope, English poet and satirist, 1688–1744.

[62] 20 June 1758, to Andrew Millar, *Letters*, 1: 282–3.

[63] July 1758, to William Strahan, *Letters*, 1: 283.

[64] In earlier years he had, in print (but not in MSS), moved freely in and out of contractions such as 'shou'd', 'cou'd', 'engag'd', 'allow'd', and 'fortify'd' and their non-contraction forms.

The Loss of the 1767 and 1768 Changes in the 1770 Edition

In preparing for the 1760 and 1764 editions, Hume occasionally informed his printer or bookseller that he intended to 'make some considerable Alterations on some Parts' of his works.[65] However, collation of the editions indicates that the changes he introduced in these two editions were modest and relatively insignificant. More important were changes in the 1767 and 1768 editions and the subsequent loss of many of those changes.

The 1768 edition was based on an extensive stylistic revision of the 1767 edition. In both editions Hume apparently made a concentrated attempt to reduce inconsistent usage. That is, he rendered several conventions of spelling, punctuation, and capitalization more consistent than in previous editions. As it turned out, these efforts were more often than not wasted: when Hume prepared the 1770 edition, he apparently based his changes on a copy of the 1764 edition rather than a copy of the carefully revised 1768 edition. Collation of the editions indicates a direct transition from 1764 to 1770 and a large loss of 1767–8 changes.

However, some statements in Hume's correspondence throw the hypothesis that he used the 1764 edition into question. When he began to prepare the 1770 edition after the publication of the 1768 edition, he indicated that he was reading the 1768 edition at the precise time he would have been correcting proof sheets of the 1770 edition. Hume then wrote to his printer about a serious error that he had discovered in the 1768 *EPM*:

> There is a notable Error of the Press in this last Quarto of my Essays, which confounds and perplexes the Sense; and being so easily corrected, I wish you woud give orders for that purpose. It is Vol. 2. p. 395. l[ine] 1. for *useful* read *usual*. A boy with his pen in half an hour coud go thro all the Copies. It is the very first Line of the third Appendix [ultimately the fourth Appendix to *EPM*]. I beg of you not to forget this Request. I have writ to Cadel[66] to the same purpose. It is in the second Page of Sheet E.e.e.[67]

Despite Hume's awareness of the 1768 text, most of the changes introduced in 1767 and 1768 were omitted in 1770, and various pre-1768 confusions and inconsistencies were thereby reintroduced. For example, in the 1768 edition Hume would: (1) combine two words into one or reduce two

[65] 15 Mar. 1762, to Andrew Millar, *Letters*, 1: 353. See the near identical wording in the letter of 10 Mar. 1763, to Andrew Millar, *Letters*, 1: 378. After publication of the 1764 edition, Hume expressed satisfaction with the edition, which he found 'very correct'. 3 Sept. 1764, to Andrew Millar, *Letters*, 1: 465.

[66] Thomas Cadell (1742–1802), bookseller.

[67] 5 June 1770, to William Strahan, *Letters*, 2: 225. See also 21 June 1770, to Strahan, *Letters*, 2: 227–8.

words to one, achieving an economy of style (of the sort he was known to admire); (2) replace a word with a more precise, correct, or stylistically preferable term ('or' for 'and', 'on' for 'in', 'became' for 'becomes', 'have had' for 'have', 'most' for 'more', 'set' for 'give', 'on' for 'to', etc.); (3) introduce commas faithful to his style; (4) clean up inconsistencies in singular and plural terms; and (5) make stylistic improvements to allow the prose to flow more smoothly ('are we' to 'we are', 'us to' to 'to', 'towards' to 'toward', 'manner of purpose' to 'purpose', etc.). These changes were as precise and comprehensive in the 1768 edition as any other, although the same types of changes are found in virtually all editions.

Because many of these changes were not transmitted to the 1772 or 1777 editions, the 1768 edition has been given a special authority for a few emendations made in the present edition. Unfortunately, the proper explanation of the wording in the 1770 edition and its basis remains uncertain. Did Hume pick up the wrong volume and never notice the difference? This hypothesis seems unlikely, in light of his awareness of the 1768 edition. Could Hume have intentionally revised from the 1764, while only consulting the 1768? Did Hume even do what he intended to do? Answers are not available.

Satisfaction with the 1772 Copytext

No sooner had Hume received copies of the 1770 edition than he began to read and correct it for the edition of 1772,[68] which proved to be the last edition that he saw through the press. After hearing from Strahan in a letter of 1 March 1771 that supplies of the small octavo edition of the *Essays and Treatises* (1770) were exhausted, Hume replied that his corrections would be conveyed 'in a few weeks' and related that he had 'perusd them ["my philosophical Pieces corrected"] carefully *five times over*'.[69] On 25 March 1771 he reported to Strahan that a letter will be 'deliver'd to you, along with a corrected Copy of my philosophical Pieces by Dr Robertson'.[70] In this letter he remarked on the quality, and likely the finality, of his corrections:

> This is the last time I shall probably take the pains of correcting that work, which is now brought to as great a degree of accuracy as I can attain; and is probably much more labour'd . . . than any other production in our Language. This Power, which Printing gives us, of continually improving and correcting our Works in successive Editions, appears to me the Chief Advantage of that Art.[71]

[68] 21 Jan. 1771, to William Strahan, *Letters*, 2: 233–5: 'I shall read over several times this new Edition; and send you a corrected Copy by some safe hand.'

[69] 11 Mar. 1771, to William Strahan (italics added), *Letters*, 2: 235.

[70] William Robertson, Scottish clergyman and historian, 1721–93.

[71] 25 Mar. 1771, to William Strahan, *Letters*, 2: 239.

Hume immediately settled into a period of revising for a new edition of his *History*, on which he later reported that he had 'taken incredible pains'.[72] He apparently believed that this period in 1771 and 1772 would be 'the last time' he would be able to manage a thorough correction and supervision of a revised edition of his works. It turned out that he was correct.

Hume's correspondence suggests intensive concentration on—'I dedicate my time entirely to it'[73]—and satisfaction with the 1772 edition. The known facts about his parallel work on the new (and to him cherished) edition of his *History* indicate that, during this period, Hume may have produced the most diligent set of corrections in his life, and the most gratifying. In the midst of his correcting the sheets of the 1772 edition, he wrote one of his most memorable comments about his revisions:

> I thank you for your Corrections, which are very judicious; and you see that I follow them for the greatest part. I shall be obligd to you for continuing them as far as your Leizure will permit. For tho' I know, that a man might spend his whole Life in correcting one small Volume, and yet have inaccuracies in it, I think however that the fewer the better, and it is a great Amusement to me to pick them out gradually in every Edition.[74]

Upon the publication of the 1772 edition, Hume wrote a note of appreciation to his bookseller for a 'very correct' edition:

> I have receivd a Copy of the new Edition of my Essays and the four first Volumes of my History, with both which I am very well pleasd with regard to the Paper and Print. I have carefully perusd the Essays, and find them very correct, with fewer Errors of the Press, than I almost ever saw in any book; and I give you, as well as Mr Strahan, thanks for the care that has been taken of them.[75]

Restructuring in the 1777 Edition

Despite his satisfaction with the 1772 edition, Hume prepared corrections for a final edition, published posthumously in 1777. Strahan asked Hume for corrections in a letter of 12 April 1776,[76] and on 20 April 1776—four months before his death—Hume informed Strahan that 'I bring up my philosophical Pieces corrected, which will be safe, whether I dye by the Road or not'.[77] Sensitive to Hume's declining health and worried about incompleteness in the

[72] 25 June 1771, to William Strahan, *Letters*, 2: 243.
[73] 4 Sept. 1771, to William Strahan, *Letters*, 2: 250.
[74] 18 Sept. 1771, to William Strahan, *Letters*, 2: 250. Strahan was sending to Hume up to five proof sheets, or 80 pages, per week during the period when the *History* was printed.
[75] 3 June 1772, to Thomas Cadell, *Letters*, 2: 262.
[76] Hume NLS MS 23157.67.
[77] 20 Apr. 1776, to William Strahan, *Letters*, 2: 315.

revisions, Strahan worked on the volume almost immediately. On 3 June 1776 he wrote to Hume: 'I am now hard at work both with your *History* and *Essays*, having, with some difficulty, got a good paper to print them on. When shall I have the additional Essay?'[78]

Hume was understandably less organized in putting together his corrections for this edition. In late July he sent additional corrections, the first of which demanded a major structural change in his arrangement of the sections and appendices of *EPM*:

> I must give you the trouble of making a new Correction, which however will be easily done. It is in the second Volume of my philosophical Pieces: That whole Passage from Page 231 till Page 239 line 3 [of the 1772 edition] must be thrown into an Appendix under the Title *Of Self-love*: It must be the second Appendix; consequently the second Appendix becomes the third, and the third Appendix, the fourth. In like manner, what is called in Page 239, Part 2 must be Part 1, as also that in Page 241 must be Part 2. Let the Printer observe this Alteration with regard to the Appendixes in the Table of Contents.[79]

Sensing that the final hours were near for Hume, Strahan replied on 1 August 1776 that work was progressing on the editions (the *History*, in particular). He then reassured Hume about the reward in store for the labours of revising: 'I see clearly your reputation is gradually rising in the public esteem. A flattering circumstance this, even in the decline of life, and when, by the unalterable course of nature, nothing will soon be left of us but a *name*.'[80]

Then, on 12 August 1776, thirteen days before his death, Hume sent yet another significant change to Strahan for *EPM*:

> Please to make with your Pen the following Correction. In the second Volume of my philosophical Pieces, p. 245, l[ine] 1, and 2, eraze these words, *that there is such a sentiment in human nature as benevolence*.
>
> This, Dear Sir, is the last Correction I shall probably trouble you with: For Dr Black[81] has promised me, that all shall be over with me in a very little time.[82]

Hume's posthumous *Essays and Treatises* was not printed for more than a year after his death. A compositor or proof-reader apparently exercised more discretion in formal changes in this edition than in the editions corrected by Hume himself. The 1777 edition introduced various uses of accidentals and modest word shifts (chiefly commas, spelling, verb-adverb order, and sub-

[78] Burton (ed.), *Letters of Eminent Persons Addressed to David Hume*, 102–3. The additional essay was 'Of the Origin of Government', which appeared only in the 1777 edn.

[79] 30 July 1776, to William Strahan, *Letters*, 2: 329–30.

[80] Burton (ed.), *Letters of Eminent Persons*, 104.

[81] Joseph Black, Edinburgh professor, chemist, and physician, 1728–99.

[82] 12 Aug. 1776, to William Strahan, *Letters*, 2: 331–2.

junctive verb-forms) that are atypical of Hume's previous editions. Hume's friend Adam Smith (1723–90), in a letter to Strahan, had offered a year earlier to 'revise the sheets' of Hume's 1777 edition.[83] Given Smith's closeness to Hume and his one-time position as literary executor for Hume's posthumous *Dialogues*, it seems likely that Strahan—first in line, as literary executor[84]—would have accepted the offer. However, no evidence indicates that Smith in fact attended to the 1777 corrections.

5. PRINTER AND BOOKSELLERS

The polished editions of *EPM* that appeared in the 1770s were the products of over two decades of collaboration between Hume and his printer and booksellers. Hume was in frequent contact with his printer, William Strahan (1715–85), and with his bookseller until 1767, Andrew Millar (1707–68). His relationship with both began in 1748. The three collaborated to bring out new editions rapidly, sometimes in less than a year from the date of a previous edition. Strahan served as Hume's printer for all editions of the works in *Essays and Treatises* after 1748, and Millar as bookseller for all these editions until 1767.

Strahan's meticulously maintained ledgers[85] and much of his correspondence with Hume and Smith provide a documentary trail from which details of Hume's publishing history and collaboration with Strahan can be reconstructed. According to these ledgers, Hume's *Philosophical Essays* was printed in April 1748. Millar then brought it to sale in late April. As he

[83] See 22 Aug. 1776, to David Hume, and 5 Sept. 1776, to William Strahan, in Smith, *Correspondence of Adam Smith*, 206, 211.

[84] See Hume's will (dated 4 Jan. 1776, *Register of Testaments*, HM Register House, Edinburgh), which left charge of all manuscripts to Smith. See also the letter of 3 May 1776 to Adam Smith, *Letters*, 2: 317–18, affirming the designation of Smith and granting him discretionary authority. By a codicil added to his will on 7 Aug. 1776, Hume cancelled the clause designating Smith and left all his manuscripts in the possession of Strahan (NLS MS 23152.58; see also Hume's letter to Strahan of 8 June 1776). Hume added another codicil leaving the right to his nephew to publish the *Dialogues* if they had not been published two years after his death. See also 15 Aug. 1776, to Adam Smith, *Letters*, 2: 334, and the letter of John Home, Hume's brother, to Strahan, 2 Sept. 1776 (in which he transmits the MSS of the *Dialogues*), reprinted in Birkbeck Hill, *Letters of David Hume to William Strahan*, 345–6, 351. See also Appendix M, *Letters*, 2: 453–4.

[85] These printing-account ledgers are housed in the British Library, London. BL Add. MS 48800–48801 are vols. 1 and 2 of the Receipts and Payments Accounts. Vol. 1 starts in 1739 (roughly Mar.) and retains a full record until 1768 (with credits and payments running until 1773). The file for Hume's publisher, Andrew Millar, continues until Sept. 1769. Vol. 2 begins in 1768 and runs to 1785. For other details of these ledgers, see Hernlund, 'William Strahan's Ledgers', esp. 90–3 and 'William Strahan's Ledgers II', and Cochrane, *Dr. Johnson's Printer*, 7–12. My interpretation of these ledgers does not always agree with the interpretations of these scholars.

worked with Strahan, Hume's manuscript habits and preferences became intermixed with print-shop practices. A rotating set of compositors brought different conventions, which shifted across the editions. Hume's text progressively became the joint and evolving product of the writing-printing-bookselling industries.

Today's distinction between *publishing* and *bookselling* was blurred in the eighteenth century. Booksellers might be involved in acquiring manuscripts, guiding them through production, and also engaging in wholesale and retail sales. Marketing, distribution, and sales were the province of the bookseller. They placed advertisements in leading newspapers, which were inexpensively and efficiently distributed by the Post Office. London newspapers in the eighteenth century functioned as both local papers and national media. They allowed an advertisement of a new work by Hume to be transmitted quickly throughout the country. Monthly and annual catalogues of new books, together with reviews, supplemented these advertisements.[86]

Some booksellers only ran book stores, whereas others served a function now associated with *publishers*, a term that first came into vogue in the eighteenth century but with a different sense than it carries today.[87] In the eighteenth century a single person might own a bookshop and also purchase copyrights, arrange financing, issue books, and distribute the books to proprietors of other bookshops. Although printers were sometimes booksellers—Strahan occasionally ventured into all of these operations—the trend was toward specialization and a concentration on either printing or bookselling (bookbinding being a separate speciality).[88] Millar was a bookseller in the broad sense.

Strahan's Printing House at 10 Little New Street

Strahan was an eminent Scot, his own master printer, and owner of what became the largest print shop in London. He was born in Edinburgh almost four years after Hume's birth. Following an apprenticeship in Edinburgh, he

[86] See Feather, *A History of British Publishing*, 98–109; House of Commons, *Parliamentary Papers*, 101–292; and John Feather, 'The Merchants of Culture', esp. 15–16.

[87] 'Publishers' referred to a small part of the book trade, particularly the part concerned with pamphlets and periodicals. Publishers would vend the products and property of other booksellers. 'Bookseller' was a broad term used to refer to persons who engaged in various parts of the three industries we now think of as wholesaling, retailing, and publishing. Michael Treadwell accepts as the 'best-known contemporary definition of "publisher"' that given in Dyche's *Dictionary* (3rd edn., 1740), which is as follows: a publisher is 'among the *Booksellers* . . . one that has his name put at the bottom of pamphlets, news-papers, &c tho' the property is in another person, to whom he is accountable for the sale'. 'London Trade Publishers 1675–1750', 99–100.

[88] See Marjorie Plant, *The English Book Trade*, 62–71.

set up as a master printer in London, possibly as early as 1737. Soon thereafter he was printing for several well-known booksellers, including Millar, also a Scot. By 1748 Strahan had moved his operations to New Street from an earlier location off Fleet Street. The new print shop contained several wooden, hand-pulled presses, the style of which had been only modestly altered in the previous two hundred years. These presses transferred an image from the type to the paper by pressure created through a system of levers.

More money was invested in the metal type than in the wood presses, and often it was worn or broken. Moreover, the type was tied up until an author returned corrected proof, thus making it important that proofs be read and returned efficiently. After corrections and printing, the type was 'dissed' (separated and arranged for reuse) as quickly as possible. In some cases, type used earlier in producing a book was reused for later parts of the same book. Therefore, if authorial changes were slow or dribbled in over a long period of time, the changes might not be made before the printing occurred. Rarely was type kept standing from one edition to the next,[89] but Strahan had as many as nine presses that could function at the same time, making his shop London's largest.[90]

Strahan and Hume met initially in autumn 1758, by which time Strahan had become a major printer with approximately fifty men in his shop. Their association soon became personal, and for both men it was financially profitable: they made small fortunes from Hume's *History*. Hume many times gratefully acknowledged Strahan's assistance in proper composition, correcting proofs, supplying an index, and the like. Hume also ranked Strahan among the most helpful and competent figures in the history of printing:

As we are drawing near a Conclusion,[91] I cannot forbear giving you many and hearty thanks, both for your submitting to so troublesome a Method of printing and for the many useful Corrections you have sent me. I suppose, since the days of Aldus, Reuchlin, and Stevens,[92] there have been no Printers who could have been useful to their Authors in this particular. I shall scarcely ever think of correcting any more;

[89] Alvin Kernan, *Printing Technology, Letters, & Samuel Johnson*, 55–62; John Feather, *The Provincial Book Trade in Eighteenth-Century England*, 98–102.

[90] Cochrane, *Dr. Johnson's Printer*, 13–19.

[91] Hume is probably referring to the end of several volumes of his *History*.

[92] Aldus Manutius (Teobaldo Mannucci, 1450–1515), Italian printer and founder of the Aldine Press in Venice (1490); Johann Reuchlin (1455–1522), German patron of Hebrew and Greek studies and producer of editions of classical works; and (probably) the French family Estienne, in Latin Stephanus: Henricus Stephanus (Henri Estienne I, d. 1520), founder of the business, and his three sons, all major printers.

tho' I own that the receiving of the Sheets regularly by the post has been an Amusement and Occupation to me.[93]

This letter, written near the time of publication of the copytext of the present edition of *EPM*, is but one example of several letters in which Hume praised Strahan for his invaluable assistance and constant attention to detail. He valued Strahan's opinions in many matters, especially political affairs, and felt supremely confident about Strahan's competence and trustworthiness. For his part, Strahan was uncommonly devoted to Hume. His feelings are unmistakable in the closing sentences of a letter to Hume of 11 January 1765: 'Your reputation, I do assure you, rises every day. For my own part, I cannot express how highly I love and esteem you in all respects'.[94]

Late in life Hume appointed Strahan his literary executor, and it was Strahan to whom Adam Smith wrote a well-known letter in which he described the death of Hume and appraised Hume's character as warm, wise, and virtuous.[95] Strahan subsequently wrote to Smith suggesting that the group of letters from Hume to Strahan be published together with Hume's letters to Smith, Robertson, and others. However, Smith objected that it would be improper to publish the material in light of Hume's known wishes and because other people, including Hume's family members, would be encouraged to publish the less distinguished letters, a possibility Hume had envisioned and resolutely rejected.[96]

Millar's Shop Opposite Catherine Street in the Strand

Born four years before Hume, reportedly in Scotland, Andrew Millar moved to London and set up shop in the Strand in 1728, probably after an appren-

[93] 22 Feb. 1772, to William Strahan, *Letters*, 2: 259.

[94] In Burton (ed.), *Letters of Eminent Persons*, 86.

[95] 9 Nov. 1776, Adam Smith to William Strahan, *Letters*, 2: 450–2, and *Correspondence of Adam Smith*, 221. Smith praised Hume as follows: 'His temper, indeed, seemed to be more happily balanced . . . than that perhaps of any other man I have ever known. . . . I have always considered him . . . as approaching as nearly to the idea of a perfectly wise and virtuous man, as perhaps the nature of human frailty will permit.' The public was shocked at this praise of an atheist and sceptic, and Smith was shocked by the public dismay: 'A single, and as, I thought a very harmless Sheet of paper, which I happened to Write concerning the death of our late friend Mr Hume, brought upon me ten times more abuse than the very violent attack I had made upon the whole commercial system of Great Britain.' 26 Oct. 1780, *Correspondence of Adam Smith*, 251. Smith's letter drew a response from the Bishop of Norwich, George Horne, *A Letter to Adam Smith*. Horne criticized Smith's assessment and praised Beattie's interpretation and criticism of Hume. (See below, p. lxxi.) Horne, in turn, was criticized by Courtney Melmouth (pseud. for Samuel Jackson Pratt) in a work entitled *An Apology for the Life and Writings of David Hume.* Melmouth was then sharply criticized in a published reply and in an anonymous review: see *Scots Magazine*, 39 (Sept. 1777), 497–8.

[96] See *Letters of David Hume to William Strahan*, 350–2, and the account in *Letters*, 2: Appendix M, 453–4.

ticeship in Edinburgh. Hume said that his booksellers had made him 'not only independant, but opulent' by the sale of the *History*.[97] Millar's energetic promotion of the work appears to have been a major part of its success, and Hume felt indebted to him for his efforts. Millar expressed a personal satisfaction with the success of Hume's *History*, which he regarded as a distinguished work that had succeeded in the face of fierce prejudice.[98]

Friendships with authors were often important for sustaining relationships over time, and Hume and Millar enjoyed an enduring friendship. Though their steady correspondence had its moments of conflict, antagonistic feelings promptly subsided and negative sentiments turned from anger or disappointment to admiration and renewal of friendship. For example, Hume once proposed taking the manuscript of his dispute with Rousseau to another bookseller on the grounds that it was too trivial to be of interest to a major bookseller like Millar. Piqued, Millar wrote to Hume, asking, 'Can you imagine anything however so trifling in which your name is concerned, not worth my while?'[99] Hume was quick to apologize and reassure Millar. Hume also occasionally quarrelled with Strahan, only to apologize for his behaviour.[100] None the less, Hume's relationships with both his printer and his bookseller were highly successful, personally and professionally, and in his will Millar generously left a financial legacy to Hume.[101]

Early in their relationship Millar had salvaged the first volume of Hume's *History* from a rocky start in the London market,[102] and eventually Hume became so confident in his relationship with Millar that he did not hesitate to forward his own bookselling ideas. As he began to lay plans for his first unified comprehensive edition of 1758, he wrote to Millar:

I had a Conversation yesterday with Messrs Kincaid & Donaldson,[103] where I made them a Proposal, which I hope will be for both your Advantage. They told me, that you had only about 400 compleat Sets of my philosophical Writings [*Essays and Treatises*, 1753–6]. I am extremely desirous to have these four Volumes, with that which you will publish this Winter [*Four Dissertations*], brought into a Quarto Volume. They said, that the small Size was rather more proper for their Sale; and therefore, they woud gladly take at present 200 Sets of the four Volumes, to be pay'd for by so many of their Shares in the Quarto Edition as woud be an Equivalent.[104]

[97] 'My Own Life' 17; *Letters*, 1: 5.

[98] Correspondence, BL Add. MSS 4314, 6190; Norrie, *Publishing and Bookselling*, 153–4.

[99] 2 Nov. 1766, NLS MS 23156.35.

[100] A particularly serious problem erupted in Mar. 1773. See Hume's letter to Strahan, in *Letters*, 2: 277–80, and Strahan's letter to Hume, *Letters*, 2: 359–61.

[101] Wilbur L. Cross, *History of Henry Fielding*, 3: 117.

[102] See A. S. Collins, *Authorship in the Days of Johnson*, ch. 1, sect. 4.

[103] Two Edinburgh booksellers.

[104] 4 Dec. 1756, to Andrew Millar, *Letters*, 1: 236.

Shortly thereafter Hume was back in contact with Millar and, as was typical of him, presented plans and projected his involvement in the editions:

> I have sent off to day by the Stage Coach the other two Volumes of my Works. Please to order the Printer to keep this Copy of all the four Volumes, that, in case you print an Edition in Twelves, it may be done from them, and any Errata of the Quarto Edition be avoided. If you think proper, I shall make an Index to the Quarto Edition; and for that Reason desire that a Copy of it be soon sent me, either by the Post or the Stage Coach.[105]

Less than two weeks later, he wrote to Strahan for help in improving his new edition:

> I cannot think of troubling you so far in this new Edition as I did in my History; but I woud be extremely oblig'd to you, as you go along to mark any Doubts that occur to you, either with regard to Style or Argument. Mr Millar thinks of making very soon another Edition in Twelves [eventually the 4-volume, duodecimo edition of *Essays and Treatises* published in 1760], and these Observations woud then serve me in good Stead. These Writings have already undergone several Editions, and have been very accurately examind every Impression; yet I can never esteem them sufficiently correct.[106]

Interactions with Printer and Bookseller

During the years in which he was revising his works for Strahan and Millar, Hume sometimes travelled to London to oversee the processes of printing and correction. He corresponded about corrections and composition, regularly examined proofs, and compiled errata.[107] In 1763 he remarked to a friend that '[T]here is no End of correcting' the editions,[108] but he usually undertook these duties without complaint.

Hume undertook no new major *philosophical* work after the middle 1750s, preferring to perfect his philosophy through revision. His correspondence indicates that by 1763 he knew that he would write no more books and that he thought his reputation would rest on the quality of his revisions of his earlier work. He spent the last twenty to twenty-five years of his life writing his history of England and making corrections in his earlier work. This employment of his talents was modestly frustrating to Strahan, Millar, and the later

[105] 18 Jan. 1757, to Andrew Millar, *Letters*, 1: 239.

[106] 1 Feb. 1757, to William Strahan, *Letters*, 1: 241. See also the follow-up letter of 15 Feb. 1757, to William Strahan, *Letters*, 1: 245.

[107] Formal errata were published in three editions of *EPM*: as front matter in 1751, and as back matter in 1753 and 1758.

[108] 12 Mar. 1763, to Gilbert Elliott of Minto, *New Letters*, 71.

bookseller, Thomas Cadell. Each attempted for the final twelve to fifteen years of Hume's life to convince him to move into new historical territory, where he had a ready audience. But Hume insisted on correcting and recorrecting his existing work rather than undertaking new projects.

In July 1771 Hume wrote a revealing letter to Strahan:

> I know not whether the former purchasers may complain of my frequent Corrections; but I cannot help it, and they run mostly upon Trifles; at least they will be esteemd such by the Generality of Readers, who little attend to the extreme Accuracy of Style. It is one great advantage that results from the Art of printing, that an Author may correct his works, as long as he lives.[109]

Hume's correspondence and the collation of Hume's works in the present edition leave no doubt that he attentively revised his books and carefully corrected proof sheets, although he less earnestly checked quoted sources. The evidence also indicates that Hume paid some editions more attention than others. For example, it appears that Hume took special precautions to ensure the quality of the 1758 edition. He carefully read the page proofs and prepared an index, title-page, and preface. The following report indicates his active role in correcting proofs and sending instructions to his printer:

> The Errata are many of them small Alterations, which I coud not forbear making myself in the Style.
>
> There are only two Errata which are material, those in page 455 and 459 [of *EPM*, Sections 8 and 9], where your Compositor has made me say the direct contrary to my meaning. I know, that such Mistakes are altogether unavoidable; but yet, if it were not too much Trouble, I coud wish, that they were corrected with the Pen, before publication.[110]

Hume would send very particular instructions to Strahan such as, 'Please only to tell the Compositor, that he always employ a Capital after the Colons. Here follow a few Alterations, which I desire you to make on the last published Volume.'[111] Although Hume sometimes praised the printer—'I am extremely pleased with the Correctness of this Edition of my philosophical Writings'[112]—he also would occasionally criticize the printing work.

Millar died in 1768, one year after he left his business to his partner Cadell, who then became Hume's bookseller and eventually became, by some accounts, the most successful bookseller in Britain. Shortly before his death,

[109] 22 July 1771, to William Strahan, *Letters*, 2: 246–7.

[110] 3 Sept. 1757, to William Strahan, *Letters*, 1: 267. No evidence indicates that corrections were entered in hand.

[111] 18 Apr. 1757, to William Strahan, *Letters*, 1: 247.

[112] 25 May 1757, to William Strahan, *Letters*, 1: 250–1.

Hume wrote to Strahan that 'There will no Books of Reputation now be printed in London but through your hands and Mr Cadel's.'[113]

6. A BIBLIOGRAPHICAL SCHEMA OF THE EDITIONS

The texts of ten 'editions' of *EPM* were authorized by Hume up to and including the posthumous edition of 1777, but his bookseller discontinued the numbering of the editions after the second edition of 1753, once the work had been permanently assimilated into *ETSS*. The bookseller never numbered the successive 'new' editions of that collection. The following schema of bibliographical data supplies details of the printing and publishing histories of *EPM* as a single volume, and of the relevant volumes of each of the collected editions of *ETSS* in which *EPM* appeared. Known foreign-language editions in Hume's lifetime are included at the end of this section.[114]

All the primary editions are printed on laid paper, unwatermarked, with the exception of 1770, for which separate details are provided below. The chain lines in the octavo volumes are vertical, and in the duodecimo and quarto horizontal. In all editions there are catchwords on each text page except the last, with minor inconsistencies of practice on Contents pages, and on pages immediately preceding the titles of major divisions. In the transcriptions of the title-pages, lower-case 's', whether roman or italic, is to be read as long 's' if it is not the last letter of a word, and as long 's' within a ligature if it occurs in the combination 'st'.

1751

Title. AN | ENQUIRY | CONCERNING THE | PRINCIPLES | OF | MORALS. | (Rule) | By DAVID HUME, Esq; | (Rule) | (Floral ornament) | (Double rule) | *LONDON:* | Printed for A. Millar, over-against *Catherine-street* | in the *Strand*. 1751.

[113] 8 Apr. 1776, to William Strahan, *Letters*, 2: 313–14.

[114] I am indebted to Jane Roscoe and Mark Box for some tracking of advertisements in British newspapers and periodicals. The bibliographical descriptions below are drawn largely from the research of M. A. Stewart. Useful sources that confirm some parts of the bibliographical information are W. B. Todd, 'David Hume, A Preliminary Bibliography'; and Chuo University, *David Hume and the Eighteenth Century British Thought*. Where our descriptions diverge from theirs, they are the result of independent checks.

Collation. 12°: π^2 A^2 B–K^{12} L^{12}(±L3) M^8 [$6 (–E6, M5–6) signed]; 144 leaves; pp. *i–viii* 1–253 *254–256* (64 misnumbered 4, 86 misnumbered 68 in some copies).

Contents. π1^r half-title, verso blank; π2^r title, verso blank; *A*1^r CONTENTS, verso blank; *A*2^r ERRATA, verso blank; B1^r–M7^r text (B5^v, C4^v, D7^v, G11^v, H8^v, K2^v blank); M7^v–M8^v bookseller's announcements.

Text: *EPM*, Sect. I, Of the general principles of morals (pp. 1–9); II, Of benevolence (pp. 11–31); III, Of justice (pp. 33–61); IV, Of political society (pp. 63–72); V, Why utility pleases (pp. 73–104); VI, Of qualities useful to ourselves (pp. 105–41); VII, Of qualities immediately agreeable to ourselves (pp. 143–59); VIII, Of qualities immediately agreeable to others (pp. 161–70); IX, Conclusion of the whole (pp. 171–95); Appx. I, Concerning moral sentiment (pp. 197–212); II, Some farther considerations with regard to justice (pp. 213–22); A dialogue (pp. 223–53).

Variant states. 1. Leaf L3 (pp. 221–2) is found in both uncancelled and cancelled states; the cancellandum has catchword 'than' at L3^r, the cancellans 'ty'. The cancel adds a further final paragraph (beginning 'We may just observe') to Appx. II. The printer ran as many copies of the cancel as of the original edition. Although it was printed a few weeks after the initial publication, that is not sufficient to designate a new issue.[115]

2. A copy has been found in which the four opening leaves have the formation *A*^{4}, although their order of contents is the same as above.[116] It has not so far been possible to correlate this with any other data that might establish a separate issue.[117] Two other copies for which the same collation has been claimed have been misreported.[118]

3. Some of the copies whose opening leaves have chain lines consistent with an original collation of π^2 A^2 have had these leaves reordered prior to binding. Sometimes π1 has been folded back (*a*) behind π2, or (*b*) behind *A*2, or (*c*) has disappeared entirely.[119] At least one copy exists with *A*1 and *A*2

[115] Philip Gaskell, *A New Introduction to Bibliography* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1972, corr. 1974), 316.

[116] Bodleian Library (8° I. 252(2) BS). This discovery is due to John Stephens.

[117] There is variation in the density of the inking on different copies of the title-page, which may have given rise to the claim that there are two distinct title-pages (Chuo University, *David Hume and the Eighteenth Century British Thought*, 76–9).

[118] *The Rothschild Library* (Cambridge: privately printed, 1954), 296, recording copies now in the library of Trinity College Cambridge.

[119] Representative examples are, respectively, (*a*) National Library of Scotland: NF. 754. c. 17; (*b*) Edinburgh University Library: Ha. 8. 12; St John's College Library, Cambridge: 10/W. 24. 32; (*c*) National Library of Scotland: F. 5. b. 21; King's College Library, Cambridge: F. 15. 19^1.

interchanged;[120] one with *A*2 folded forward to precede π1 and one lacking *A*2 with the errata pasted on to the verso of *A*1.[121] These variations are not indicative of separate issues.

Production. 1,500 copies, printed July 1751 (11 sheets at £1. 15*s*., total £19. 5*s*.). L3 cancel: 1,500 copies, printed January 1752 (15*s*.).[122]

Publication. Around 26–30 November 1751. Price 3*s*. bound.[123]

Note. The deposit copy formerly held by the Faculty of Advocates has the ownership inscribed in Hume's hand: 'Ex Libris Bibliothecæ Facultatis Juridicæ Edinburgi' (National Library of Scotland: ♀. 8. 9).

1753 (reissue)

Title. ESSAYS | AND | TREATISES | ON | SEVERAL SUBJECTS. | By DAVID HUME, Esq; | VOL. III. | CONTAINING | An ENQUIRY concerning the Principles of | MORALS. | LONDON: | Printed for A. MILLAR, in the Strand. | M DCC LIII.

Collation. 12°: π1 *A*^{2} B–K^{12} L^{12}(±L3) M^{8} [$6 (–E6, M5–6) signed]; 143 leaves; pp. *i–vi* 1–253 *254–256* (64 misnumbered 4, 86 misnumbered 68 in some copies).

Contents. π1 title, verso blank; then *A*1 to M8 as 1751.

Variant states. 1. Since this is no more than a reissue of 1751 stock with a new title leaf and without the half-title, leaf L3 (pp. 221–2) continues to be found in both uncancelled and cancelled states.

2. In some copies the half-title and title leaf of 1751 were not cancelled when the new title leaf was added, so these copies carry two title leaves.[124]

3. There are copies with only the 1751 title, *bound* as Volume III of the *ETSS* set.[125]

[120] Dr Williams's Library, London: 5602. D. 4.

[121] Bishop Hurd's Library, Hartlebury Castle: Eb. 3; British Library: 527. g. 28.

[122] See Strahan Ledgers, British Library, Add. MS 48800, fo. 81. In this and all further references to the Strahan ledgers, the foliation follows Strahan's own numbering, which assigns to *facing* debit and credit sides the number recorded on the recto. Costs supplied in parentheses are the production costs (Strahan's charges to the bookseller).

[123] *Whitehall Evening-Post*, 19–21, 21–3, 23–6, 26–8, 28–30 Nov. 1751; *London Evening-Post*, 14–16, 21–3, 23–6, 26–8 Nov. 1751; *General Advertiser*, 26–30 Nov. 1751; *General Evening-Post*, 21–3, 23–6, 26–8 Nov. 1751; *Scots Magazine*, 13 (Nov. 1751), 552; *Gentleman's Magazine*, 21 (Dec. 1751), 574; *London Magazine*, 20 (Nov. 1751), 528.

[124] e.g. National Library of Scotland: RB. s. 1723. In a copy in King's College Library, Cambridge: F. 13. 10^{3}, the title-page has been changed, but the original half-title retained, tipped in after *A*2.

[125] e.g. King's College Library, Cambridge: F. 13. 11^{3}; St John's College Library, Cambridge: 10/W. 24. 32, with displaced half-title; Bishop Hurd's Library: Eb. 3.

Production. 500 copies of the cancel title leaves for the four volumes reissued under the *ETSS* title, printed April 1753 (12*s*. 6*d*.).[126]

Publication. Around 18 April 1753. Price 12*s*. bound (4 vols.). Volumes were also 'to be had separate to complete Gentlemens Sets'.[127]

1753 (2nd edn.)

Title. ESSAYS | AND | TREATISES | ON | SEVERAL SUBJECTS. | By DAVID HUME, Esq; | VOL. III. | CONTAINING | An Enquiry concerning the Principles of | Morals. | The Second Edition. | LONDON: | Printed for A. Millar, in the Strand. | M DCC LIII.

Collation. 12°: A^2 B–L^{12} M^{10} [$6 (–M6) signed]; 132 leaves; pp. *i–iv* 1–257 *258–260*.

Contents. $A1^r$ title, verso blank; $A2^r$ CONTENTS, verso blank; $B1^r$–$M9^r$ text; $M9^v$ ERRATA; $M10^{r–v}$ bookseller's announcements.

Text: *EPM*, Sect. I, Of the general principles of morals (pp. 1–9); II, Of benevolence (pp. 11–31); III, Of justice (pp. 33–65); IV, Of political society (pp. 67–76); V, Why utility pleases (pp. 77–108); VI, Of qualities useful to ourselves (pp. 109–44); VII, Of qualities immediately agreeable to ourselves (pp. 145–61); VIII, Of qualities immediately agreeable to others (pp. 163–72); IX, Conclusion of the whole (pp. 173–97); Appx. I, Concerning moral sentiment (pp. 199–214); II, Some farther considerations with regard to justice (pp. 215–26); A dialogue (pp. 227–57).

Production. 1,000 copies, printed August 1753 (11 sheets at £1. 10*s*., total £16. 10*s*.).[128]

Publication. No information. The price remained at 12*s*. bound (4 vols.) throughout the evolution of this edition, and volumes could still be purchased individually.[129]

1758

Title. ESSAYS | AND | TREATISES | ON | SEVERAL SUBJECTS. | BY | DAVID HUME, Esq; | (Rule) | A NEW EDITION. | (Rule) | (Floral ornament) | (Double rule) | LONDON: | Printed for A. Millar, in the

[126] Add. MS 48800, fo. 84.
[127] *Public Advertiser*, 18–21, 23–6 Apr. 1753.
[128] Add. MS 48800, fo. 84.
[129] *Whitehall Evening-Post*, 12–14 Dec. 1754; *London Evening-Post*, 10–12 Feb. 1757.

STRAND; | AND | A. KINCAID and A. DONALDSON, at EDINBURGH. | (Short rule) | M.DCC.LVIII.

Collation. 4°: A^4 B–3Y^4 3Z^2 [$2 (–*A*1–2, 3E2, 3Z2) signed; sig 2R2 misnumbered R2]; 274 leaves; pp. *i–v* vi–viii *1–2* 3–539 *540* (96 misnumbered 6 in some copies, 184 misnumbered 182).

Contents. *A*1^r title, verso blank; *A*2^r ADVERTISEMENT; *A*2^v bookseller's announcement; *A*3^r–*A*4^v THE CONTENTS; B1^r half-title, verso blank; B2^r–U1^v text; U2^r half-title, verso blank; U3^r–2N4^v text; 2O1^r half-title, verso blank; 2O2^r–3E1^v text; 3E2^r half-title, verso blank; 3E3^r–3Y1^r text (3R1^v blank); 3Y1^v blank; 3Y2^r–3Z2^r INDEX; 3Z2^v ERRATA (15½ lines).

Text: *Essays* (pp. 3–280); *EHU* (pp. 283–375); *DIS* (pp. 376–94); *EPM*, Sect. I, Of the general principles of morals (pp. 397–400); II, Of benevolence (400–7); III, Of justice (408–19); IV, Of political society (pp. 420–3); V, Why utility pleases (pp. 423–34); VI, Of qualities useful to ourselves (pp. 435–48); VII, Of qualities immediately agreeable to ourselves (pp. 448–54); VIII, Of qualities immediately agreeable to others (pp. 454–7); IX, Conclusion of the whole (pp. 458–66); Appx. I, Concerning moral sentiment (pp. 467–72); II, Some farther considerations with regard to justice (pp. 473–7); A dialogue (pp. 478–89); *NHR* (pp. 491–529).

Variant issue. An additional sheet (*^{4}) was printed in March 1760, to make available to purchasers of the 1758 edition two new essays which Hume was adding to the 1760 edition of *ETSS*. It is paginated to duplicate the numbers 187–9, 265–9, with the impracticable advice that the new pp. 187–9 (*1^r–*2^r) are to be placed after the existing p. 186, and the new pp. 265–9 (*2^v–*4^v) after p. 264. In copies in which it survives it is more often bound at the end of the *Essays*, after p. 280, between gatherings N and O.

Production. 750 copies, printed October 1757 (68½ sheets at £1. 1*s*., total £71. 18*s*. 6*d*.; index, 9*s*.). 750 copies of the two new essays, printed March 1760 (1 sheet at £1. 1*s*.).[130]

Publication. Around 13–15 April 1758. Price 15*s*. bound.[131]

[130] Add. MS. 48800, fos. 102, 108.

[131] *Whitehall Evening-Post*, 13–15, 15–18, 20–2, 25–7 Apr., 29 Apr.–4 May 1758, all p. 4 (see earlier announcement, 23–5 Mar. 1758, p. 3); *Public Advertiser*, 13–15, 17–18 Apr. 1758; *London Evening-Post*, 23–5, 28–30 Mar., 8–11 Apr. 1758; *Scots Magazine*, 20 (Apr. 1758), 222; *Edinburgh Magazine*, 2 (May 1758), 84.

1760

Title. ESSAYS | AND | TREATISES | ON | SEVERAL SUBJECTS. | By DAVID HUME, Esq; | VOL. IV. | Containing an ENQUIRY concerning | the PRINCIPLES of MORALS. | (Rule) | A NEW EDITION. | (Double rule) | LONDON: | Printed for A. MILLAR, in the Strand; | AND | A. KINCAID and A. DONALDSON, at Edinburgh. | M DCC LX.

Collation. 12°: A^4 B–P^{12} Q^8 [$6 (–*A*1–4, Q5–6) signed; $1 (–*A*1) VOL. IV]; 180 leaves; pp. *i–viii 1–2* 3–352.

Contents. $A1^{r–v}$ blank; $A2^r$ title, verso blank; $A3^r$–$A4^r$ THE CONTENTS OF THE FOURTH VOLUME; $A4^v$ blank; $B1^r$ half-title, verso blank; $B2^r$–$Q8^v$ text ($D7^v$, $D12^v$, $F3^v$, $G10^v$, $H7^v$, $I12^v$, $K8^v$, $L3^v$, $M6^v$ blank).

Text: *EPM*, Sect. I, Of the general principles of morals (pp. 3–10); II, Of benevolence (pp. 11–30); III, Of justice (pp. 31–61); IV, Of political society (pp. 63–71); V, Why utility pleases (73–101); VI, Of qualities useful to ourselves (pp. 103–39); VII, Of qualities immediately agreeable to ourselves (pp. 141–57); VIII, Of qualities immediately agreeable to others (pp. 159–68); IX, Conclusion of the whole (pp. 169–91); Appx. I, Concerning moral sentiment (pp. 193–207); II, Some farther considerations with regard to justice (pp. 209–21); A dialogue (pp. 223–51); *NHR* (pp. 253–352).

Production. 1,000 copies, printed March 1760 (4 vols., 61 sheets at £1. 10*s*., total £91. 10*s*.).[132]

Publication. Around 19–22 April 1760. Price 12*s*. bound (4 vols.).[133]

1764

Title. ESSAYS | AND | TREATISES | ON | SEVERAL SUBJECTS. | By DAVID HUME, Esq; | VOL. II. | CONTAINING | An ENQUIRY concerning HUMAN | UNDERSTANDING. | An ENQUIRY concerning the PRINCIPLES of | MORALS. | AND | The NATURAL HISTORY of RELIGION. | (Rule) | A NEW EDITION. | (Double rule) | LONDON: | Printed for A. MILLAR, in the Strand; | AND | A. KINCAID and A. DONALDSON, at Edinburgh. | MDCCLXIV.

[132] Add. MS 48800, fo. 108.

[133] *Whitehall Evening-Post*, 1–3, 5–8, 10–12, 17–19, 19–22, 22–4, 26–9 Apr., 29 Apr.–1 May, 1–3 May 1760; *London Evening-Post*, 22–4, 24–6, 26–9 Apr., 29 Apr.–1 May 1760; *London Chronicle*, 17–19 Apr. 1760, p. 384.

Collation. 8°: *A*⁴ B–2I⁸ 2K⁴ [$4 (–*A*1–4, 2K3–4) signed; $1 VOL. II]; 256 leaves; pp. *i–viii 1–2* 3–503 *504* (89 unnumbered in some copies, 99 misnumbered 29, 469 misnumbered 699).

Contents. *A*1ʳ half-title, verso blank; *A*2ʳ title as above, verso blank; *A*3ʳ–*A*4ʳ THE CONTENTS OF THE SECOND VOLUME; *A*4ᵛ blank; B1ʳ half-title, verso blank; B2ʳ–P7ʳ text (C3ᵛ, F1ᵛ, I2ᵛ, I5ᵛ, L2ᵛ blank); P7ᵛ blank; P8ʳ half-title, verso blank; Q1ʳ–2I3ʳ text (Q4ᵛ, R4ᵛ, S8ᵛ, T4ᵛ, U7ᵛ, 2A3ᵛ, 2B1ᵛ, 2B6ᵛ blank); 2I3ᵛ blank; 2I4ʳ–2K4ʳ INDEX; 2K4ᵛ blank.

Text: *EHU* (pp. 3–184); *DIS* (pp. 185–221); *EPM*, Sect. I, Of the general principles of morals (pp. 225–31); II, Of benevolence (pp. 233–47); III, Of justice (pp. 249–71); IV, Of political society (pp. 273–9); V, Why utility pleases (pp. 281–301); VI, Of qualities useful to ourselves (pp. 303–20); VII, Of qualities immediately agreeable to ourselves (pp. 321–32); VIII, Of qualities immediately agreeable to others (pp. 333–40); IX, Conclusion of the whole (pp. 341–57); Appx. I, Concerning moral sentiment (pp. 359–69); II, Some farther considerations with regard to justice (pp. 371–79); III, Of some verbal disputes (pp. 381–92); A dialogue (pp. 393–414); *NHR* (pp. 415–85).

Production. 1,000 copies, printed May 1764 (2 vols., 68 sheets at £1. 10*s*., total £102; index, 10*s*. 6*d*.).[134]

Publication. 29 May to 4 June 1764. Price 12*s*. bound (2 vols.).[135]

Note. This edition is the first to print the Appendix 'Of some verbal Disputes'; it had hitherto been Pt. I of Section IV of *EPM*.

1767

Title. ESSAYS | AND | TREATISES | ON | SEVERAL SUBJECTS. | By DAVID HUME, Esq; | VOL. II. | CONTAINING | An ENQUIRY concerning HUMAN | UNDERSTANDING. | An ENQUIRY concerning the PRINCIPLES of | MORALS. | AND | The NATURAL HISTORY of RELIGION. | (Rule) | A NEW EDITION. | (Double rule) | LONDON: | Printed for A. MILLAR, in the Strand; | AND | A. KINCAID, and A. DONALDSON, at Edinburgh. | M DCC LXVII.

[134] Add. MS 48800, fo. 128.

[135] *London Chronicle*, 24–6, 29–31 May, 2–5 June 1764; *Edinburgh Advertiser*, 1 (5–8 June 1764); *Public Advertiser*, 30 May, 5–7 June 1764; *London Evening-Post*, 3–5, 26–9, 29–31 May, 2–5 June 1764. A Letter from Andrew Millar to Hume of 26 Nov. 1764 (*Letters*, 2: 354) states that the edition was 'published in May'.

Collation. 8°: A^4 B–2I^8 2K^4 [$4 (–*A*1–4, 2K3–4) signed; $1 VOL. II]; 256 leaves; pp. *i–viii 1–2* 3–503 *504*.

Contents. *A*1^r half-title, verso blank; *A*2^r title as above, verso blank; *A*3^r–*A*4^r THE CONTENTS OF THE SECOND VOLUME; *A*4^v blank; B1^r half-title, verso blank; B2^r–P7^r text (C3^v, F1^v, I2^v, I5^v, L2^v blank); P7^v blank; P8^r half-title, verso blank; Q1^r–2I3^r text (Q4^v, R4^v, S8^v, T4^v, U7^v, 2A3^v, 2B1^v, 2B6^v blank); 2I3^v blank; 2I4^r–2K4^r INDEX; 2K4^v blank.

Text: *EHU* (pp. 3–184); *DIS* (pp. 185–221); *EPM*, Sect. I, Of the general principles of morals (pp. 225–31); II, Of benevolence (pp. 233–47); III, Of justice (pp. 249–71); IV, Of political society (pp. 273–9); V, Why utility pleases (pp. 281–301); VI, Of qualities useful to ourselves (pp. 303–20); VII, Of qualities immediately agreeable to ourselves (pp. 321–32); VIII, Of qualities immediately agreeable to others (pp. 333–40); IX, Conclusion (pp. 341–57); Appx. I, Concerning moral sentiment (pp. 359–69); II, Farther considerations with regard to justice (pp. 371–9); III, Of some verbal disputes (pp. 381–92); A dialogue (pp. 393–414); *NHR* (pp. 415–85).

Variant states. In at least one copy, *A*1 has been folded back behind *A*4.[136]

Watermarks. Sheets *A* and 2K have been found with fleur-de-lys watermark; countermark (initials) not identified.

Production. 1,000 copies, printed September 1766 (2 vols., 67 sheets at £1. 10*s*., total £100. 10*s*.).[137]

Publication. Around January 1767. Price 12*s*. bound (2 vols.).[138]

1768

Title. ESSAYS | AND | TREATISES | ON | SEVERAL SUBJECTS. | BY DAVID HUME, ESQ. | VOL. II. | CONTAINING | An ENQUIRY concerning HUMAN | UNDERSTANDING. | An ENQUIRY concerning the PRINCIPLES of | MORALS. | AND | The NATURAL HISTORY of RELIGION. | (Rule) | A NEW EDITION. | (Double rule) | LONDON: | Printed for A. MILLAR, | A. KINCAID, J. BELL, and A. DONALDSON, in Edinburgh. | And sold by T. CADELL, in the Strand. | M DCC LXVIII.

Collation. Royal 4°: A^2 B–3U^4 3X^2 [$2 (–*A*1–2, 3X2) signed; $1 (–*A*1) VOL. IV]; 264 leaves; pp. *i–iv 1–2* 3–509 *510–524*.

[136] e.g. Edinburgh University Library: E.B. .1924.

[137] Add. MS 48800, fo. 137.

[138] A 'New Edition' of *ETSS* is announced, immediately after and together with a new announcement for Hume's *History*, in *London Evening-Post*, 24–7 Jan. 1767, 2; and also 30 Apr.–2 May 1767, 3.

Contents. *A*1^{r} title, verso blank; *A*2$^{r–v}$ THE CONTENTS OF THE SECOND VOLUME; B1^{r} half-title, verso blank; B2^{r}–2G4^{r} text; 2G4^{v} blank; 2H1^{r} half-title, verso blank; 2H2^{r}–3T2^{v} text; 3T3^{r}–3X2^{v} INDEX.

Text: *EHU* (pp. 3–191); *DIS* (pp. 192–231); *EPM*, Sect. I, Of the general principles of morals (pp. 235–42); II, Of benevolence (pp. 243–58); III, Of justice (pp. 259–83); IV, Of political society (pp. 284–91); V, Why utility pleases (pp. 292–314); VI, Of qualities useful to ourselves (pp. 315–32); VII, Of qualities immediately agreeable to ourselves (pp. 333–45); VIII, Of qualities immediately agreeable to others (pp. 346–54); IX, Conclusion (pp. 355–73); Appx. I, Concerning moral sentiment (pp. 374–85); II, Farther considerations with regard to justice (pp. 386–94); III, Of some verbal disputes (pp. 395–407); A dialogue (pp. 408–31); *NHR* (pp. 432–508).

Production. 500 copies, printed January 1768 (2 vols., 139½ sheets at 15*s*., total £104. 12*s*. 6*d*.; index, 15*s*. 6*d*.).[139]

Publication. No information on date. Price £1. 16*s*. bound (2 vols.).[140]

1770

Title. ESSAYS | AND | TREATISES| ON | SEVERAL SUBJECTS. | By DAVID HUME, Esq; | VOL. IV. | CONTAINING | An ENQUIRY concerning the PRINCIPLES | of MORALS; | AND | The NATURAL HISTORY of RELIGION. | (Rule) | A NEW EDITION. | (Double rule) | LONDON: | Printed for T. Cadell (Successor to Mr. Millar) | in the Strand; and | A. Kincaid and A. Donaldson, at Edinburgh. | (Short rule) | M DCC LXX.

Collation. Sm. 8^{o}: *A*^{2} B–2A^{8} 2B^{2} [$4 (–*A*1–2, 2B2) signed; $1 (–*A*1) Vol. IV]; 188 leaves; pp. *i–iv 1–2* 3–371 *372*.

Contents. *A*1^{r} title, verso blank; *A*2$^{r–v}$ THE CONTENTS OF THE FOURTH VOLUME; B1^{r} half-title, verso blank; B2^{r}–Y5^{r} text; Y5^{v} blank; Y6^{r}–2A1^{r} NOTES; 2A1^{v} blank; 2A2^{r}–2B2^{r} INDEX; 2B2^{v} blank.

Text: *EPM*, Sect. I, Of the general principles of morals (pp. 3–11); II, Of benevolence (pp. 12–31); III, Of justice (pp. 32–59); IV, Of political society (pp. 60–8); V, Why utility pleases (pp. 69–95); VI, Of qualities useful to ourselves (pp. 96–118); VII, Of qualities immediately agreeable to ourselves (pp. 119–34); VIII, Of qualities immediately agreeable to others (pp. 135–44);

[139] Add. MS 48800, fo. 138.

[140] Price information from *London Evening-Post*, 27 Feb.–1 Mar. 1770; *General Evening-Post*, 7 Nov. 1771, 30 Mar.–1 Apr. 1773, and 10–13 May 1777; *Gazetteer and New Daily Advertiser*, 5 Mar. 1770.

IX, Conclusion (pp. 145–67); Appx. I, Concerning moral sentiment (pp. 168–82); II, Some farther considerations with regard to justice (pp. 183–91); III, Of some verbal disputes (pp. 192–206); A Dialogue (pp. 207–36); *NHR* (pp. 237–329).

Watermarks. Sheets B–M, 2B: Garden of Holland ('Maid of Dort'); countermark LVG. Sheets *A*, N–2A: Lion; countermark GR, crowned.

Production. 1,000 copies, printed October 1770 (4 vols., 87½ sheets at £1. 3*s*., total £100. 12*s*. 6*d*.; index, £1. 1*s*.).[141]

Publication. Between 23 January and 3 July 1771. Price 14*s*. bound (4 vols.).[142]

1772

Title. ESSAYS | AND | TREATISES | ON | SEVERAL SUBJECTS. | By DAVID HUME, Esq; | VOL. II. | CONTAINING | An ENQUIRY concerning HUMAN | UNDERSTANDING; | A DISSERTATION on the PASSIONS; | An ENQUIRY concerning the PRINCIPLES | of MORALS; | AND | The NATURAL HISTORY of RELIGION. | (Rule) | A NEW EDITION. | (Double rule) | LONDON: | Printed for T. CADELL, in the Strand: and | A. KINCAID, and A. DONALDSON, at Edinburgh. | M DCC LXXII.

Collation. 8°: A^4 B–2L^8 2M^4 [$4 (–*A*1–4, 2M3–4) signed; $1 (–*A*1), VOL. II]; 272 leaves; pp. *i–viii 1–2* 3–533 *534–536*.

Contents. *A*1^r half-title, verso blank; *A*2^r title, verso blank; *A*3^r–*A*4^r THE CONTENTS OF THE SECOND VOLUME; *A*4^v blank; B1^r half-title, verso blank; B2^r–P6^v text (B8^v, D1^v, E2^v, I3^v, I6^v, N4^v blank); P7^r half-title, verso blank; P8^r–2H6^r text (Q3^v, R3^v, S6^v, T2^v, X5^v, Z8^v, 2A6^v, 2B2^v, 2B8^v blank); 2H6^v blank; 2H7^r–2L2^r NOTES TO THE SECOND VOLUME; 2L2^v blank; 2L3^r–2M3^r INDEX; 2M3^v blank; 2M4$^{r–v}$ bookseller's announcements.

Text: *EHU* (pp. 3–183); *DIS* (pp. 185–220); *EPM*, Sect. I, Of the general principles of morals (pp. 223–9); II, Of benevolence (pp. 231–45); III, Of justice (pp. 247–67); IV, Of political society (pp. 269–75); V, Why utility pleases (pp. 277–96); VI, Of qualities useful to ourselves (pp. 297–313); VII, Of qualities immediately agreeable to ourselves (pp. 315–26); VIII, Of qualities immediately agreeable to others (pp. 327–34); IX, Conclusion

[141] Add. MS 48801, fo. 35.
[142] *Gazetteer and New Daily Advertiser*, 9 May 1771, p. 1.

(pp. 335–51); Appx. I, Concerning moral sentiment (pp. 353–63); II, Some farther considerations with regard to justice (pp. 365–71); III, Of some verbal disputes (pp. 373–83); A dialogue (pp. 385–406); *NHR* (pp. 407–75).

Production. 1,000 copies, printed November 1771 (2 vols., 69½ sheets at £1. 10*s*., total £104. 5*s*.).[143]

Publication. No later than May 1772. Price 12*s*. (2 vols.).[144]

1777

Title. ESSAYS | AND | TREATISES | ON | SEVERAL SUBJECTS. | By DAVID HUME, Esq; | VOL. II. | CONTAINING | An ENQUIRY concerning HUMAN | UNDERSTANDING; | A DISSERTATION on the PASSIONS; | An ENQUIRY concerning the PRINCIPLES | of MORALS; | AND | The NATURAL HISTORY of RELIGION. | (Rule) | A NEW EDITION. | (Double rule) | LONDON: | Printed for T. CADELL, in the Strand: and | A. DONALDSON, and W. CREECH, at Edinburgh. | MDCCLXXVII.

Collation. 8°: A⁴ B–2L⁸ [$4 (–A1, A3–4) signed; $1 (–A1), VOL. II]; 268 leaves; pp. *i–viii 1–2* 3–527 *528* (92 misnumbered 2 in some copies, 191 misnumbered 189, 192 misnumbered 129).

Contents. A1ʳ title, verso blank; A2ʳ ADVERTISEMENT, verso blank; A3ʳ–A4ʳ THE CONTENTS OF THE SECOND VOLUME; A4ᵛ blank; B1ʳ half-title; verso blank; B2ʳ–P2ᵛ text (B8ᵛ, C5ᵛ, D6ᵛ, H7ᵛ, I2ᵛ, M8ᵛ blank); P3ʳ half-title, verso blank; P4ʳ–2C7ᵛ text (P7ᵛ, Q3ᵛ, R6ᵛ, S2ᵛ, U5ᵛ, Y8ᵛ, Z6ᵛ, 2A6ᵛ, 2B4ᵛ blank); 2C8ʳ half-title, verso blank; 2D1ʳ–2H3ʳ text; 2H3ᵛ blank; 2H4ʳ–2K7ʳ NOTES TO THE SECOND VOLUME; 2K7ᵛ blank; 2K8ʳ–2L8ʳ INDEX; 2L8ᵛ bookseller's announcement.

Text: *EHU* (pp. 3–175); *DIS* (pp. 177–212); *EPM*, Sect. I, Of the general principles of morals (pp. 215–21); II, Of benevolence (pp. 223–9); III, Of justice (pp. 231–51); IV, Of political society (pp. 253–9); V, Why utility pleases (pp. 261–80); VI, Of qualities useful to ourselves (pp. 281–97); VII, Of qualities immediately agreeable to ourselves (pp. 299–310); VIII, Of qualities immediately agreeable to others (pp. 311–18); IX, Conclusion (pp. 319–35); Appx. I, Concerning moral sentiment (pp. 337–47); II, Of self-love (pp. 349–56); III, Some farther considerations with regard to justice (pp.

[143] Add. MS 48801, fo. 52.

[144] See Hume to Thomas Cadell, 3 June 1772, *Letters* 2: 262. Price information from *London Chronicle*, 25–7 Feb. 1773; *General Evening-Post*, 30 Mar.–1 Apr. 1773.

357–63); IV, Of some verbal disputes (pp. 365–75); A dialogue (pp. 377–98); *NHR* (pp. 401–69).

Production. 1,000 copies, printed September 1777 (2 vols., 69½ sheets at £1. 10*s*., total £104. 5*s*.).[145]

Publication. January or early February 1778. Price 12*s*. (2 vols.).[146]

Note. This edition is the first to print the Appendix 'Of Self-Love'; it had hitherto been Pt. I of Section II of *EPM*.

French Translations in Hume's Lifetime[147]

1758–60 *Oeuvres philosophiques de Mr. D. Hume*, 5 Volumes (8°). Amsterdam: J. H. Schneider. Only volumes III–IV bear *Oeuvres philosophiques de Mr. D. Hume* on the half-title, as this title was added after the publication of volumes I–II. Vol. V bears the half-title *Oeuvres de Mr. Hume*.

Contents:

I and II (1758). *Essais philosophiques sur l'entendement humain, par Mr. Hume, avec les quatres philosophes du même auteur*. Trans. J.-B. Mérian. Preface by J. H. S. Formey. 'Les quatre philosophes' are essays 6–9 of *Essays Moral and Political*, vol. II of the 1742 edition.

III (1759). *Histoire naturelle de la religion traduit de l'Anglois de Mr. D. Hume, avec un examen critique et philosophique de cet ouvrage*. Trans. J.-B. Mérian.

IV (1759). *Dissertations sur les passions, sur la tragédie, sur la règle du goût*. Trans. J.-B. Mérian.

V (1760). *Essais de morale ou recherches sur les principes de la morale* (with 'A Dialogue'). Trans. J.-B.-R. Robinet.

1759 *Oeuvres philosophiques de M. Hume*, 2 vols. in 1 (8°). Same bookseller and identical to vols. III and IV (both published 1759) in the 1758–60 edn. above. Volume I (vol. III in 1758–60) includes a preface by J. H. S. Formey.

1764 *Oeuvres philosophiques de M. D. Hume*. Nouvelle édition. 6 vols. (tomes) (8°). London: David Wilson.

[145] Add. MS 48815, fo. 8.

[146] Registered, Stationers' Hall, 10 Jan. 1778; advertised, *Public Advertiser*, 5–7 Feb. 1778. See also *Edinburgh Advertiser*, 29 (3–7 Apr. 1778), p. 222.

[147] Additional historical and bibliographical detail on early French translations is provided in Chuo University, *David Hume and the Eighteenth Century British Thought*; Jessop, *A Bibliography of David Hume and of Scottish Philosophy*, 10–11; and *Letters*, 2, appendix B. However, Jessop often appears to be incorrect.

I. Les huits premiers Essais sur l'entendement humain.
II. Essais philosophiques sur l'entendement humain [continued] et les quatre philosophes.
III. L'histoire naturelle de la religion.
IV. Les dissertations sur les passions, sur la tragédie & sur la règle du goût.
V. Les Recherches sur les principes de la morale.
VI. Les essais moraux & politiques.

1767 *Pensées philosophiques, morales, critiques, littéraires et politiques de M. Hume*. London . . . Paris: Veuve Duschesne (12°). Selections trans. J. A. Jullien de Boulmiers.

1770 *Le génie de M. Hume*. London . . . Paris: Vincent (12°). Selections from various works.

German Translations in Hume's Lifetime

1754–6 Herrn David Hume, Esq. *Vermischte Schriften*. 4 Vols. Hamburg & Leipzig.

I (1754). *Ueber die Handlung, die Manufacturen . . . und die andern Quellen des Reichtums und der Macht eines Staates*. Trans. H. A. Pistorius.
II (1755). *Philosophische Versuche über die menschliche Erkenntnis von David Hume, Ritter. Als dessen vermischter Schriften zweyter Theil*. Trans. J. G. Sulzer.
III (1756). *Sittenlehre der Gesellschaft. Als dessen vermischter Schriften dritter Theil*.
IV (1756). *Moralische und politische Versuche. Als dessen vermischter Schriften vierter und letzter Theil*.

1774 *Das Genie des Hrn. Hume. Oder: Sammlung der vorzüglichsten Grundsätze dieses Philosophen*. Ed. and trans. Johann Gottfried Bremer. Leipzig.

7. THE REMNANTS OF THE *TREATISE*

After Hume's consolidation of his writings in the collected editions of the 1750s, the titles of the first three treatises in his table of contents showed a resemblance to the titles of the three books of the *Treatise*. Their major divisions are (with introductory words such as 'Book', 'Enquiry', and 'Dissertation' stripped out) as shown in Table 3.

TABLE 3

In the *Treatise*	In *Essays and Treatises* (second half)
Of the *Understanding*	. . . concerning Human *Understanding*
Of the *Passions*	. . . on the *Passions*
Of *Morals*	. . . concerning . . . *Morals*

After 'A Dissertation on the Passions' was published (1757) and then assimilated in the collected edition of 1758, Hume retained this structure in his titles and organization throughout all his editions. Thus, the major divisions and the order of presentation in the treatises portion of the 1758–77 *Essays and Treatises*[148] were essentially identical to those in the *Treatise*. Whatever the exact revisions that occurred in Hume's writings, and whatever the reasons for them, the similarities in topics and many doctrines that were transported from the *Treatise* to the *Essays and Treatises* are evident.

EPM is perhaps the most heavily rewritten of the three 'recast' Books of the *Treatise*, even if not the most distant in doctrine. Shorter and more graceful than the *Treatise*, *EPM* pruned, simplified, and compacted the complex doctrines of the earlier work. The process of contraction sometimes sacrificed the fuller and richer views in the *Treatise* for the sake of readability and elegance, and many doctrines were imported in full from the *Treatise* to *EPM*. On the one hand, Hume's philosophical views closely approximate many of those in the *Treatise*. On the other hand, the wealth of new material, the massive amount of deleted material, and Hume's distress about his early work suggest that he moved well beyond the *Treatise*.

These two perspectives cannot be brought to satisfactory resolution unless data are available about the number and type of changes that Hume made. To obtain informative data, scholars need, at a minimum, (1) a comparison of the contents of the sections and appendices of *EPM* with the contents of the corresponding parts and sections of the *Treatise*, and (2) a sentence-by-sentence comparison of the overlapping sentences and sentence fragments directly carried from the *Treatise* to *EPM*. The first of these two tasks is too vast and too interpretative for this Introduction, but the second is manageable.

[148] *DIS* first appeared in 1757, after *EHU* and *EPM* were bound together in the 1753–6 edition(s) of *ETSS*. *NHR* may have been added to the *treatises* side of the arrangement (rather than to the *essays*) because of its length and because of a need to equalize the size of part 1 and part 2 of *ETSS*.

A Sentence-by-Sentence Comparison of EPM *and the* Treatise

EPM carries over 74 sentences and partial sentences or sentence fragments from *Treatise* 2 and 3. These sentences—the preserved remnants of the *Treatise*—appear in eleven sections of *Treatise* 2–3 and in seven of the nine sections, as well as one appendix, of *EPM*. All changes in the text are shown below by strike-out and shading (redline). Deletions from the *Treatise* appear in strike-out mode; additions in the 1751 text of *EPM* appear as shaded text; italics are represented by '/' for the beginning and '\' for the end. Text common to both works remains free of both strike-out and shading.[149] The order of the passages follows the pagination in the 1751 edition.

1. *THN* 3.1.1.4—*EPM* 1.4 [1751: 3]

~~Those who~~ The antient philosophers . . . often affirm, that virtue is nothing but ~~a~~ conformity to reason. . . .

2. *THN* 3.2.2.17—*EPM* 3.4 [1751: 35]

We see, even ~~The same effect arises from any alteration~~ in the present necessitous condition ~~circumstances~~ of mankind~~;~~, that, wherever any benefit is bestow'd by nature in ~~as when there is such a plenty of any thing~~ an unlimited abundance, we leave it always ~~as satisfies all the desires of men: In which case the distinction of property is entirely lost, and every thing remains~~ in common~~.~~ amongst the whole human race, and make no subdivisions of right and property. ~~This we may observe with regard to~~ Water and air ~~and water~~, tho' the most ~~valuable~~ necessary of all ~~external~~ objects~~;~~,, . . .

3. *THN* 3.2.2.15—*EPM* 3.14 [1751: 42]

The seasons, in that first ~~age~~ period of nature, were so temperate, if we ~~may believe the poets~~ credit these agreeable fictions, that there was no necessity for men to provide themselves with cloaths and houses, as a security against the violence of heat and cold~~.~~: The rivers flow'd with wine and milk: The oaks yielded honey; and nature spontaneously produc'd her greatest delicacies. Nor were these the chief advantages of that happy age. The storms and tempests were not alone remov'd from nature; but those more furious tempests were unknown to human breasts, which now cause such uproar, and engender such confusion. Avarice, ambition, cruelty, selfishness~~,~~

[149] In this comparison, capitals in the 1751 edition have been converted to lower-case forms, just as they appeared in all editions after 1751. Contractions that were changed by Hume in later editions, in ways corresponding to *Treatise* practices, are presented as they appear in the editions after 1751. Finally, uses of 'amongst' and ''tis' in 1751, changed by Hume in later editions to 'among' and 'it is' in ways corresponding to *Treatise* practices, appear here as 'among' and 'it is'.

were never heard of: Cordial affection, compassion, sympathy~~,~~ were the only movements, with which the ~~human~~ mind was yet acquainted. Even the punctilious distinction of /mine\ and /thine\ was banish'd from amongst that happy race of mortals, and carry'd with ~~them~~ it the very ~~notions~~ notion of property and obligation, justice and injustice.

~~. . . This /state of nature\, therefore, is to be regarded as a mere~~ This /poetical\ fiction~~, not unlike that~~ of the /golden age\~~, which poets have invented; only with this difference,~~ is, in some respects, of a piece with the /philosophical\ fiction of the /state of nature\; only that the former is ~~deserib'd as full of war, violence and injustice; whereas the latter is painted out to us,~~ represented as the most charming and most peaceable condition, that can possibly be imagin'd; whereas the latter is painted out as a state of mutual war and violence, attended with the most extreme necessity.

4. *THN* 3.2.5.13—*EPM* n. 13 [1751: 59–60, note]

'Tis evident, that the will or consent alone ~~is~~ never ~~suppos'd to~~ transfers property, nor ~~cause~~ causes the obligation of a promise (for the same reasoning extends to both)~~,~~ but the will must be express'd by words or signs, in order to impose a tye upon any man. The expression, being once brought in as subservient to the will, soon becomes the principal part of the promise; nor will a man be less bound by his word, tho' he secretly give a different direction to his intention, and with-hold ~~himself both from a resolution, and from willing an obligation~~ the assent of his mind. But tho' the expression makes, on most occasions, the whole of the promise, yet it does not always so; and one, who ~~shou'd~~ should make use of any expression, of which he knows not the meaning, and which he uses without any ~~intention of binding himself,~~ sense of the consequences, would ~~wou'd~~ not certainly be bound by it. Nay, tho' he ~~knows~~ know its meaning, yet if he uses it in jest only, and with such signs as ~~shew~~ show evidently, he has no serious intention of binding himself, he ~~wou'd~~ would not lie under any obligation of performance; but 'tis necessary, that the words be a perfect expression of the will, without any contrary signs. Nay, even this we must not carry so far as to imagine, that one, whom, by our quickness of understanding, we conjecture, from certain signs, to have an intention of deceiving us, is not bound by his expression or verbal promise, if we accept of it; but must limit this conclusion to those cases, where the signs are of a different ~~kind~~ nature from those of deceit.

5. *THN* 3.2.11.1—*EPM* 4.2 [1751: 64]

~~But tho' nations . . . give rise to~~ When a number of political societies are erected, and maintain a great entercourse together, a new set of rules are

immediately discover'd to be /useful\ in that particular situation; and accordingly take place, under the title of~~, which we call /the~~ laws of nations~~\~~. ~~Under this head we may comprize~~ Of this kind are, the sacredness of the person of ambassadors, ~~the declaration of war, the~~ abstaining from poison'd arms, quarter in war, with ~~other duties~~ others of that kind~~,~~; which are ~~evidently~~ plainly calculated for the ~~commerce, that is peculiar to different societies~~ /advantage\ of states and kingdoms, in their entercourse with each other.

6. *THN* 3.2.12.7—*EPM* 4.7 [1751: 66–7, note]

~~And tho' all~~ These rules ~~maxims~~ have all a ~~plain~~ reference to generation~~,~~; and yet women past child-bearing ~~have~~ are no more ~~privilege in this respect,~~ suppos'd to be exempted from them than those ~~who are~~ in the flower of their youth and beauty.~~. . . . yet the~~ /Ggeneral rules\ ~~rule~~ are often extended ~~carries us~~ beyond the~~ original~~ principle . . .

7. *THN* 3.3.1.8, note—*EPM* n. 21 [1751: 93, note]

/Decentior equus cujus astricta sunt ilia; sed idem velocior. Pulcher aspectu sit athleta, cujus lacertos ~~exercitatio~~ exercitatis[150] expressit; idem certamini paratior. Nunquam ~~vero~~ enim\ ~~/~~species~~\~~ /ab\ ~~/~~utilitate~~\~~ /dividitur. Sed hoc quidem discernere~~,~~ modici judicii est\. ~~/Quinct\~~ Quintilian Inst. lib. 8. cap. 3.

8. *THN* 3.3.3.2—*EPM* 5.42 [1751: 99–100]

~~In like manner, tho' sympathy~~, we shall allow, is ~~be~~ much fainter than our concern for ourselves, and ~~a~~ sympathy with persons, remote from us, much fainter than that with persons, near and contiguous; but for this very reason, 'tis necessary for us, in our calm judgments and discourse concerning the characters of men, to ~~yet we~~ neglect all these differences ~~in our calm judgments~~, and render our sentiments more public and social. Besides, that we ourselves often change our situation in this particular, we every day meet with persons, who are in a different situation from ~~ourselves~~ us, and who ~~cou'd~~ could never converse with us on any reasonable terms, were we to remain constantly in that ~~situation~~ position and point of view, which is peculiar to ~~us.~~ ourself. The intercourse of sentiments, therefore, in society and conversation~~,~~ makes us form some general, inalterable standard, by which we may approve or disapprove of characters and manners. And tho'

[150] '[E]xercitatis' is a misprint for 'exercitatio'. It was corrected in subsequent editions.

the ~~/~~heart~~\ does~~ takes not ~~always take~~ part entirely with those general notions, ~~or regulate~~ nor regulates all its love and hatred by~~ them~~, the universal, abstract differences of vice and virtue, without regard to self or the persons, with whom we are more immediately connected; yet ~~are they~~ have these moral differences a considerable influence, and being sufficient, at least, for discourse, ~~and~~ serve all our purposes in company, in the pulpit, on the theatre, and in the schools.

9. *THN* 3.3.4.1—*EPM* Appx. 4.5 [1751: 108]

~~In short, the~~ figure a man makes in ~~the world~~ life, the reception he meets with in company, the esteem paid him by his acquaintance; all these advantages depend ~~almost~~ as much upon his good sense and judgment~~,~~ as upon any other part of his character. ~~Let~~ Had a man ~~have~~ the best intentions in the world, and ~~be~~ were the farthest remov'd from all injustice and violence, he ~~will~~ would never be able to make himself be much regarded, without a moderate share, at least, of parts and understanding.

10. *THN* 3.3.4.4; 3.3.4.2—*EPM* Appx. 4.6 [1751: 109–10]

~~It belongs to /Grammarians\ to examine what qualities~~ . . . / [I]s there any reason for being so extremely scrupulous about a /word\, or doubting whether they are entitled to the denomination of ~~/~~virtue~~\~~;~~?~~ . . . It may, indeed, be pretended, that the sentiment of approbation, which those ~~qualities~~ accomplishments produce, besides its being /inferior\, is also somewhat /different\ from that, which attends the ~~other~~ virtues of justice and humanity. But this~~, in my opinion, is~~ seems not a sufficient reason for ~~excluding~~ ranking them~~ from the catalogue of virtues. . . .~~ entirely under different classes and appellations. The~~ characters~~ character of /Caesar\ and that of /Cato\, as drawn by /Sallust\, are both of them virtuous, in the strictest sense of the word; but in a different way: Nor are the sentiments entirely the same, which arise from them. The one produces love; the other, esteem: The one is amiable; the other awful: We ~~cou'd~~ could wish to meet ~~with~~ the one character in a friend; the other ~~character~~ we ~~wou'd~~ should be ambitious of in ourselves. In like manner~~,~~ the approbation, which attends natural abilities or temperance or industry, may be somewhat different ~~to the feeling~~ from that~~,~~ which ~~arises from~~ is paid to the ~~other~~ social virtues, without making them entirely of a different species. And indeed, we may observe, that the natural abilities, no more than the other virtues, produce not, all of them, the same kind of approbation. Good sense and genius beget esteem and regard: Wit and humour excite love and affection.

11. *THN* 3.3.4.2, note—*EPM* n. 67 [1751: 110–11, note]

Love and esteem are ~~at~~ nearly the ~~bottom the~~ same ~~passions~~ passion, and arise from ~~like~~ similar causes. The qualities, ~~that~~ which produce both, are ~~agreeable, and give~~ such as communicate pleasure. But where this pleasure is severe and serious; or where its object is great~~,~~ and makes a strong impression~~;~~, or where it produces any degree of humility and awe: In all these cases, the passion, which arises from the pleasure, is more properly denominated esteem than love. Benevolence attends both: But is connected with love in a more eminent degree.~~ . . . That there is~~ There seems to be still a stronger mixture of pride in contempt~~, and~~ than of humility in esteem; ~~respect, is, I think, too evident, from their very feeling or appearance, to require any particular proof~~ and the reason would not be difficult to one, who study'd accurately the passions.

12. *THN* 3.3.4.6—*EPM* 6.17 [1751: 127–8]

When it is ask'd, whether a quick or a slow apprehension be most valuable? Whether one, that, at first view, penetrates far into a subject, but can perform nothing upon study; or a contrary character, which must work out every thing by dint of application? Whether a clear head~~,~~ or a copious invention? Whether a profound genius~~,~~ or a sure judgment? In short, what character, or peculiar turn of understanding~~,~~ is more excellent than another? 'Tis evident, we can answer none of these questions, without considering which of those qualities capacitates a man best for the world, and carries him farthest in any of his undertakings.

13. *THN* 3.3.5.3—*EPM* 6.25 [1751: 133]

Broad shoulders, a lank belly, firm joints, taper legs; all these are beautiful in our species, because ~~they are~~ signs of force and vigour~~,~~.

14. *THN* 2.2.5.19—*EPM* 6.28 [1751: 135]

There is no rule in painting or statuary more ~~reasonable~~ indispensible than that of ballancing the figures, and placing them with the greatest exactness on their proper ~~centers~~ center of gravity. A figure, which is not justly ballanc'd~~,~~ is ~~disagreeable~~ ugly~~; and that~~ because it conveys the disagreeable ideas of ~~its~~ fall, ~~of~~ harm~~,~~ and ~~of~~ pain~~:~~.

15. *THN* 3.3.5.2—*EPM* (deleted in later editions) [1751: 135, note]

To ~~begin with the advantages of the /body\;~~ the same purpose, we may observe a phaenomenon, which might appear somewhat trivial and ludicrous~~,~~; if any thing ~~cou'd~~ could be trivial, which fortified~~ a conclusion~~

conclusions of such importance~~,~~; or ludicrous, which was employ'd in a philosophical reasoning. 'Tis a general remark, that those we call good /women's men\, who have either signaliz'd themselves by their amorous exploits, or whose make of body or other symptoms promise ~~promises~~ any extraordinary vigour of that kind, are well received by the fair sex, and naturally engage the affections even of those~~,~~ whose virtue or situation prevents any design of ever giving employment to those talents.

16. *THN* 2.2.5.9—*EPM* 6.30 [1751: 137–8]

~~. . . we must suppose a friendship and~~ Where no good-will or friendship appears, ~~to be conjoin'd with the riches. Without that circumstance~~ 'tis difficult to conceive on what we can found our hope of advantage from the riches of others~~,~~; tho' ~~there is nothing more certain, than that~~ we naturally esteem and respect the rich, even before ~~we~~ they discover ~~in them~~ any such favourable disposition towards us.

~~But I carry this farther, and observe, not only that we respect the rich and powerful, where they shew no inclination to serve us, but also~~ We are affected with the same sentiments, when we lie so much out of the sphere of their activity, that they cannot even be suppos'd to possess ~~be endow'd with that~~ the power of serving us. ~~Prisoners~~ A prisoner of war, in all civiliz'd nations, is ~~are always~~ treated with a ~~respect~~ regard, suited ~~suitable~~ to ~~their~~ his condition; and riches, 'tis evident, ~~certain riches~~ go ~~very~~ far towards fixing the condition of any person. If birth and quality enter for a share, this still affords us an argument ~~of the same kind~~ to our present purpose. For what is it we call a man of birth, but one, who is descended from a long succession of rich and powerful ancestors, and who acquires our esteem by his ~~relation to~~ connexion with persons, whom we esteem? His ancestors, therefore, tho' dead, are respected, in some measure, on account of their riches~~,~~; and consequently, without any kind of expectation.

But not to go so far as prisoners of war ~~and~~ or the dead, to find instances of this disinterested ~~esteem~~ regard for riches~~, let us~~; we may only observe, with a little attention, those phaenomena, that occur ~~to us~~ in common life and conversation. A man, who is himself, we shall suppose, of a competent fortune, ~~upon~~ and of no profession, coming into a company of strangers, naturally treats them with different degrees of respect and deference, as he is inform'd of their different fortunes and conditions; tho' 'tis impossible he can ~~ever~~ so suddenly propose, and perhaps ~~wou'd~~ would not accept of, any pecuniary advantage from them. A traveller is always admitted into company, and meets with civility, in proportion as his train and equipage speak him a man of great or moderate fortune. In short, the different ranks of ~~men~~ man

are, in a great measure, regulated by riches~~,~~; and that with regard to superiors as well as inferiors, strangers as well as acquaintance.

17. *THN* 3.3.2.12—*EPM* 7.6 [1751: 147]

/Go\! cries~~, says /Alexander\~~ the ~~Great~~ same hero to his soldiers, when they refus'd to follow him to the /Indies, go tell your countrymen, ~~that~~ you left\ Alexander /compleating the conquest of the world\. ~~This passage was always particularly admir'd by~~ '/Alexander\', said the prince of /Conde\, ~~as we learn from /St. Evremond\. '/Alexander\', said that prince~~ who always admir'd the passage, 'abandon'd by his soldiers, among barbarians, not yet fully subdu'd, felt in himself such a dignity and right of empire, that he ~~cou'd~~ could not believe it possible any one ~~cou'd~~ would refuse to obey him. Whether in /Europe\ or in /Asia\, among /Greeks\ or /Persians\, all was indifferent to him: Wherever he found men, he fancied he ~~had found~~ would find subjects'.

18. *THN* 3.3.4.10—*EPM* 8.13 [1751: 169]

~~In this view,~~ Amongst the other virtues, we may also give ~~/~~cleanliness~~\ is also to be regarded as a virtue~~ a place; since it naturally renders us agreeable to others, and is ~~a very considerable~~ no inconsiderable source of love and affection. No one will deny, that a negligence in this particular is a fault; and as faults are nothing but smaller vices, and this fault can have no other origin than the uneasy sensation, which it excites in others~~,~~; we may, in this instance, seemingly so trivial, clearly discover the origin of ~~the~~ moral distinctions, ~~distinction of vice and virtue in other instances~~ about which the learned have involved themselves in such mazes of perplexity and error.

19. *THN* 3.3.1.13—*EPM* Appx. 3.3 [1751: 214–15]

~~Now~~ But the benefit, resulting from [justice and fidelity], is not the consequence of every individual single ~~particular~~ act ~~of justice is not beneficial to society,~~; but arises from the whole scheme or system~~: And it may not, perhaps, be any individual person, for whom we are concern'd, who receives benefit from justice, but~~ concur'd in by the whole, or the greatest part of the society ~~alike~~.

20. *THN* 3.2.2.10—*EPM* Appx. 3.8 [1751: 218]

~~Two~~ Thus two men~~, who~~ pull the oars of a boat, by common ~~do it by an agreement or~~ convention, for common interest, without any promise or contract: Thus gold and silver are made the ~~tho' they have never given promises to each other. . . . In like manner do gold and silver become the~~

~~common~~ measures of exchange~~, and are esteem'd sufficient payment for what is of a hundred times their value~~. . . .

This comparison indicates that Hume recast more than *Treatise* 3 in *EPM*; he twice incorporated parts of *Treatise* 2 (both passages drawn from the section entitled 'Of our esteem for the rich and powerful'). Although not apparent above, he was also drawing, in spots, from his previously published *Essays*. In a passage on Euclid[B] in *EPM* (Appx. 1.14), Hume took a five-sentence paragraph verbatim from 'The Sceptic' 16. In other places he drew from both *Treatise* 2–3, and the *Essays*, then reconstructed the passages to suit the needs of *EPM* without using material verbatim.

Substantive Changes in the Treatise's Doctrines

Scholars of Hume's writings have long been interested in the substantive shift of doctrine that occurred during the recasting of the *Treatise*. These problems are also too interpretative for this Introduction, but a short quantitative analysis that samples the shifts *in language* can be offered and is consis-

Principal Terms	Number of Occurrences		
	EPM	*THN* 3	*THN* 2
sympath*	30	83	89
benevolen*	42	20	24
beneficen*	16	2	0
utilit*	62	14	9
social virtue(s)	29	2	0
natural virtue(s)	0	14	1
artificial virtue(s)	0	6	0
justice	96	156	13
injustice	10	47	1
self-love	30	4	2
selfish system	2	0	0
selfish*	23	2	0
humanity	60	11	0
universal*	30	21	12
sentiment(s)	199	143	45
Total No. of Words	55,098	63,226	61,827

tent with the aims of this Introduction. On the left are a few central terms in Hume's moral philosophy. Some are central in both works, others only in the one or the other.

This table includes footnotes and considers 'A Dialogue' to be part of *EPM*; it does not distinguish different senses of the terms listed and does not exclude equivocal terms. The asterisk (*) stands for a wild card. More than one ending can be affixed to the root—for example, sympath* takes the forms sympathy, sympathies, and sympathetic. The 'total number of words' is the total for each text and is unrelated to the figures in the columns.

8. RECEPTION IN REVIEWS AND CRITIQUES

Several hundred discussions of Hume's writings were published between the date of the *Treatise* (1739–40) and the end of the eighteenth century.[151] These responses appeared in books, monographs, reviews, notices, and parts of articles and books. Scholarly assessment of *EPM* in Hume's lifetime appeared in several forms, including periodical reviews, criticisms in monographs, and publications by influential philosophers and literary figures. In light of this attention, Hume may be overreacting when he says in 'My Own Life' that *EPM* went largely unnoticed upon publication.[152] However, this comment should be interpreted in the light of his report, a paragraph earlier, that at the time he published *EPM*,

> my Bookseller, A. Millar, informed me, that my former Publications (all but the unfortunate Treatise) were beginning to be the Subject of Conversation, that the sale of them was gradually encreasing, and that new Editions were demanded. Answers, by Reverends and Right Reverends, came out two or three in a Year: And I found by Dr Warburtons Railing[153] that the Books were beginning to be esteemed in good Company. However, I had fixed a Resolution, which I inflexibly maintained, never to reply to any body; and not being very irascible in my Temper, I have easily kept myself clear of all literary Squabbles. These symptoms of a rising Reputation gave me Encouragement.[154]

It is true that immediate scholarly assessment of *EPM* was meagre. The book did not even yield Hume the esteem that accompanied the publications

[151] Based on data compiled independently by James Fieser, David Fate Norton, and the present editor.

[152] 'My Own Life' 10; *Letters*, 1: 4.

[153] William Warburton (1698–1779), English theologian and Bishop of Gloucester. Warburton was a contentious figure who directed sustained gibes at deists, Methodists, Hume, Voltaire, Bolingbroke, and many others.

[154] 'My Own Life' 9; *Letters*, 1: 3.

of some of his friends. For example, Adam Smith's *The Theory of Moral Sentiments*, published eight years later, received more extensive attention. However, *EPM* was more noticed than Hume suggests, and his replies to critics were more frequent than he acknowledged, though he made private rather than public responses.

Two major reviews of *EPM* appeared in journals, and two major monographs on *EPM* were issued by leading booksellers. All four were published anonymously. At least two are substantial performances by the standards of the period. In addition to these scholarly assessments, Hume's views became a standard source for commentary in the philosophical writing of the period, as we will see in examining Lord Kames, Richard Price (1723–91), Thomas Reid (1710–96), and Adam Smith.

Reviews in Periodicals

William Rose in the Monthly Review. An informative, but unimaginative review appeared in the widely circulated *Monthly Review*. The January 1752 issue was largely devoted to Hume's thought. The first article of nineteen pages reviewed *EPM*, and the second article of twenty-five pages reviewed (pre-publication) Hume's *Political Discourses*.[155] Both were favourable, anonymously published reviews. We now know that they were written by William Rose, the co-founder of the *Monthly Review* in 1749.

Rose's review of *EPM* presented a comprehensive and accurate account of the work.[156] Every section and appendix, as well as 'A Dialogue', was condensed to create what amounts to an abridged text, with a few reviewer comments as transitions. These summary-transitions are faithful—often close paraphrases of the text—but the bulk of the review consists of lengthy quotations pulled directly from the text. The review offered no criticism and showed no originality in interpreting and assessing the text.

Rose's reviews presuppose that Hume enjoyed an established literary reputation. In the opening line of the first review, Rose opined that 'The reputation this ingenious author has acquir'd as a fine and elegant writer, renders it unnecessary for us to say any thing in his praise' (p. 1). In the opening line of the second review, he asserted that 'Few writers are better qualified, either to instruct or entertain readers, than Mr. *Hume*' (p. 19).

[155] [William Rose], *The Monthly Review; or, Literary Journal*, 6 (London: R. Griffiths, Jan. 1752), 1–19, 19–43. Rose continued his review of *Political Discourses* in the Feb. issue, pp. 81–90. Pages in parentheses in the text refer to these reviews.

[156] It might be argued that Rose overemphasized the notion of an 'obligation to virtue' (p. 13) in Hume, but such objections would be quibbles.

An Anonymous Review in the Bibliothèque raisonnée des ouvrages des savans de l'Europe. A review journal, the *Bibliothèque raisonnée*, provided in 1752 an anonymous, six-page review in French of Hume's recent works, with the lead commentary devoted to *EPM*. The review was primarily interpretative, but included a modest endorsement of and no unfavourable comments regarding *EPM*.[157] The reviewer focused on philosophical controversies about the foundations of morality and on Hume's definitions of 'virtue'.[158] Hume was interpreted as holding that the foundation of morals is a disposition of human nature to disapprove what is harmful to fellow-creatures and to approve what is helpful. The reviewer decreed that Hume explains 'with much clarity, precision, and force' how natural human sentiments such as compassion elicit moral responses, even though competing passions such as 'ambition, avarice, and hatred' sometimes overrule these moral sentiments.

The reviewer applauded Hume for not relying on an abstract theory that is inattentive to concrete moral practice and for constructing accounts of virtue and vice that are grounded in moral experience. Most of the commentary was devoted to a single page of *EPM* (p. 8 of the 1751 edition), with particular attention to the two definitions of virtue found on that page and to the role of the 'sentiment' of benevolence and its universality. The reviewer abruptly concluded, without analysis or argument, that Hume 'clearly proves that there is a sentiment of disinterested benevolence in human nature'.

Monographs on Hume's Moral Philosophy

By contrast to these favourable journal reviews, *EPM* received two generally unfavourable assessments in published monographs on Hume's moral philosophy.

James Balfour's (Anonymous) Monograph. In 1745 Hume had lost the appointment of Professor of Moral Philosophy at Edinburgh to William Cleghorn, whose successor in the Chair (in 1754) was James Balfour of Pilrig (1705–95), a well-connected laird, advocate, and committed Presbyterian. Just prior to this appointment, and straightaway upon reading *EPM*, Balfour authored a stern criticism of its contents. The Balfour family's publishing firm issued this monograph anonymously as *A Delineation of the*

[157] *Bibliothèque raisonnée des ouvrages des savans de l'Europe*, 49, pt. 1 (1752), under 'De la Grange-Bretagne et d'Irlande', pp. 228–33.

[158] These topics were recurrent topics of interest in critical assessments of Hume's ethics. See e.g. the later 'Character of the Works of David Hume Esq', *Weekly Magazine, or Edinburgh Amusement*, 22 (1773), 233–4.

Nature and Obligation of Morality. With Reflexions upon Mr. Hume's Book, intitled, An Inquiry concerning the Principles of Morals.[159]

Balfour criticized several central themes in Hume's moral philosophy, occasionally scolding Hume for *obviously* incorrect claims.[160] First, although Balfour did not reject the moral sense tradition (he often sided with Shaftesbury[B] and Hutcheson), he did defend 'our reflecting faculty', 'intellectual faculty', and 'deliberate principle' against Hume's defence of moral sentiments and attack on reason. Balfour viewed the faculty of reflection as a 'monitor and censor' or 'conscience' that 'upbraids' us for incorrect judgements (pp. 15 f.).[161]

Second, Balfour criticized both what he saw as Hume's reduction of virtue, especially the virtue of justice, to utility and what he saw as Hume's thesis that all virtue is merely a moral sentiment *in the observer*. Balfour attempted to demonstrate that virtue, including justice, exists in natural principles of the actor whose moral action is observed, not in the observer. He insisted that the grounding and standard for morality transcends the standard of utility.[162]

Third, Balfour had an interest in preserving the place of religion as an institution that reinforces and improves the natural sense of moral right and wrong. Although Hume rarely addresses or criticizes religion in *EPM*,[163] he does establish morality on universal sentiment and social convention independent of religion and theological doctrine. Balfour thought that Hume thereby severed morality from divine authority, and Balfour laboured to re-establish the connection.[164]

Fourth, Balfour challenged what he saw as Hume's solution to the problem of self-love in conflict with virtue. Balfour maintained that Hume failed to transcend self-love as the foundational principle in his moral philosophy: 'Thus it appears, from the whole of our author's reasonings, as well as from his direct assertions and inferences, that he deduces his idea of justice solely

[159] Published no later than 15 Mar. 1753.

[160] I omit mention of lengthy criticisms of Hume's views on chastity, which occupy a portion of section 3 in Balfour's book.

[161] *A Delineation*, 14–16, 70, 173.

[162] Ibid. 45 ff., 54, 64 f., 82, 105–9.

[163] The bulk of the uses of the term 'religion' in *EPM* appear in contexts in which religious institutions or beliefs are approved (by some person or group) rather than disapproved. Hume criticizes some aspects of religion or religious belief on four occasions: 'And is not a Monk and Inquisitor enrag'd, when we treat his Rank and Order as useless or pernicious to Mankind?' (2.11); 'the delusive Glosses of Superstition and false Religion . . . and the whole Train of monkish Virtues . . . are . . . rejected by Men of Sense' (9.3); 'Religion had, in antient Times, very little Influence on common Life' (Dial. 53); 'The most ridiculous Superstitions directed *Pascal*'s Faith and Practice' (Dial. 55). These quotations are from the 1751, 1st edn. that Balfour read and evaluated.

[164] *A Delineation*, 27, 33 ff., 79, 137 ff., 159, 162, 174.

from the private source of immediate self-interest; this narrow principle is made its alone [sole] measure and standard.'[165]

Hume, as noted above, had adopted a policy of not reacting to criticisms of his work, but he made a modest exception in Balfour's case. He reacted with characteristic generosity in the face of this detailed, but at times hard-hitting and unpleasant, monograph.[166] Without knowing the anonymous author, Hume wrote a letter to the author's bookseller in appreciation of the effort. Hume called for an atmosphere of tolerance in which diverse views could be openly debated, as in the days of Atticus,[B] Cassius,[B] Cicero,[B] and Brutus.[B] He complained only about the fact that Balfour's interpretation rendered him a sceptic:

> I must only complain of you a little for ascribing to me the sentiments which I have put into the mouth of the Sceptic in the Dialogue.[167] I have surely endeavoured to refute the Sceptic with all the force of which I am master; and my refutation must be allowed sincere, because drawn from the capital principles of my system. But you impute to me both the sentiments of the Sceptic and the sentiments of his antagonist, which I can never admit of. In every Dialogue, no more than one person can be supposed to represent the author.[168]

Protecting his anonymity, Balfour responded through the bookseller.[169] He accepted the principle of tolerance, but reiterated that Hume had failed to understand or to support virtue and concluded that they differed substantially 'in point of sentiment and opinion'. He acknowledged only that they were in close agreement on 'the Principle which recommends the extensive exercise of Humanity, and a mutual exchange of all good Offices'.[170]

After assuming the position of Professor of Moral Philosophy, Balfour pursued these interests in lectures at Edinburgh College. His student Thomas Somerville said that Balfour's only well-received lectures in his moral philosophy class were on central doctrines in Hume's *Essays and Treatises*, which, Somerville reported, were 'then universally read'.[171] These lectures, published in 1782 as *Philosophical Dissertations*, presented a set of sharp criticisms intended, Somerville related, to refute Hume's doctrines. Balfour again objected to Hume's account of virtue and vice, the

[165] *A Delineation*, 53 f.; see 75. [166] Ibid. 103–5, 123, 161–2.

[167] The reference is to 'A Dialogue', which is appended to *EPM*.

[168] 15 Mar. 1753, to the [Anonymous] Author, *Letters*, 1: 172–4 (quotation, 173).

[169] Barbara Balfour-Melville reports that she located in the chest of the Balfour records 'a rough scroll of the answer sent by James Balfour to . . . [Hume's] letter'. *The Balfours of Pilrig*, 113.

[170] Ibid. 114–15. Balfour continued his criticism of Hume in his *Philosophical Essays* (anonymous, Edinburgh 1768), which dealt with many of the themes in Hume's general philosophy.

[171] Thomas Somerville, *My own Life and Times: 1741–1814*, 16–17. Somerville was an historian, minister of Jedburgh, and one of his majesty's chaplains in ordinary.

roles given to sentiment and approbation, and the characterization of moral qualities.[172]

An Anonymous Monograph. An anonymous monograph-review was published in London in 1753 under the title *Some Late Opinions Concerning the Foundation of Morality, Examined. In a Letter to a Friend*.[173] This review is philosophical and critical, rather than exegetical. The first stated opinion gives a foretaste of the remainder:

> [T]he author is a very agreeable writer, and discovers an uncommon genius. . . . But . . . I am afraid, the love of simplicity has betrayed him. . . . Utility is his favourite and capital principle, to which he reduces all the several branches of morals. . . . [W]ith regard to justice, his notions are very singular.[174]

Continuing in his view that utility is the 'capital principle' to which Hume reduces all of morals, the reviewer argued that Hume's philosophy is ill-founded and 'even of dangerous tendency': Hume has degraded justice 'in a dishonourable manner' to the point that it has no power to determine how social resources should be justly distributed. The reviewer maintained that 'utility cannot possibly be any part of the foundation of morals' and that 'justice has a deeper foundation in our nature than . . . [Hume's basis in] utility'. Even if Hume showed that 'justice and public good coincide', this conclusion 'will never prove, that we have no sentiment of justice but what arises from a reflection on public good'. The reviewer also maintained, against Hume, that justice 'can never be an artificial virtue'.[175]

> [Hume] has endeavoured to invert human nature, by assigning that as the cause which is truly the effect. 'Utility', he says, 'is the foundation of justice, and justice of property': whereas, in truth, property, and the natural sentiments which give it birth, are the foundation of justice, as well as of all the utility we ascribe to it.[176]

Hume's account of moral approbation was likewise judged to be vague and 'a capital error'. This critic interpreted Hume, as did Balfour and others, as holding that 'whatever, in character or conduct, is approved as useful, is virtue', thereby 'reducing morality into the same class in which we place some very trifling qualities', and thus including within morality some purely

[172] James Balfour, *Philosophical Dissertations*, 159–74. In his earlier *Philosophical Essays*, 36–53, 73–80, 120–2, Balfour criticized Hume's scepticism, but said little about his moral philosophy.

[173] This review begins with an appraisal of Lord Kames's moral theory, and then provides approximately 35 pages on Hume. The monograph was itself reviewed in the *Monthly Review* (June 1753), 400.

[174] *Some Late Opinions*, 12–13. Similarly, this reviewer says, Hutcheson had reduced all of morals to benevolence.

[175] Ibid. 13–14, 17, 20, 33, 37, 43–4. [176] Ibid. 42–3.

intellectual qualities, such as industry and secrecy. The root of the problem is that *moral* approbation effectively means 'whatever we take pleasure in; whatever we consider useful or agreeable', and that even 'the greatest villain' and 'inanimate things' can possess these traits. This critic also held that Hume grounds the 'obligation to virtue' on the motive of self-interest—a 'false bottom' for morality—and criticized him for a passage on the utilitarian basis of the virtues of female chastity.[177]

The author of this measured, probing, and stylistically polished review may have overemphasized the role of utility in Hume's account, underemphasized the role of universal sentiment, and underestimated the importance of Hume's objections to the motive of self-interest.[178] However, such oversights and overemphases are common flaws in philosophical controversy, and this unsympathetic reading of Hume was based on an attentive reading of the text of *EPM*.

Critiques in Philosophical Treatises

We have now examined the complete set of known discussions of *EPM* that appeared within two years of its publication. From 1751 to 1753 these sources, together with newspaper advertisements, publicized Hume's 'new' moral philosophy. Subsequently, many commentators discussed Hume's philosophy and historical work, but only a small number examined his later moral theory. Major commentators are discussed in the final section below. In this section brief attention will be given to three less prominent, yet influential critics of various aspects of Hume's moral theory: Bishop Robert Clayton, Alexander Gerard, and James Beattie.

A Monograph by Bishop Robert Clayton. In 1753 Robert Clayton (1695–1758), Bishop of Clogher, published a rambling but readable 66-page tract entitled *Some Thoughts on Self-Love, Innate-Ideas, Free-Will, Taste, Sentiment, Liberty and Necessity, etc. Occasioned by reading Mr. Hume's Works . . .*[179] This assessment was polemical throughout and argued that 'Mr. *Hume* seems to be mistaken in several Points: first, in making Virtue to consist in that which is thought praise-worthy. . . . [again] in his Notions about Liberty. . . . [and] again wrong in supposing Reason to precede Sentiment.' Clayton argued

[177] *Some Late Opinions*, 24–6, 29–31, 34.

[178] Ibid. 19 (on compassion), 22 (on benevolence), 31–2 (on the motive of self-interest).

[179] Clayton reviewed the 1751 (1st) edn., as reissued in 1753 as vol. 3 of *Essays and Treatises on Several Subjects*. Clayton's performance was reviewed by Roger Flexman in *Monthly Review*, 9 (1754), 216–22.

that Hume confuses *ideas* with *the objects of ideas* and does not appreciate the importance of self-love as the foundation of moral obligations.[180] Clayton also presented what would become a widely voiced criticism. If Hume's account were true, he argued,

> the Action of a Savage, torturing his Captive in cool Blood, amidst the Acclamations of his barbarous Companions, is *Virtue*; . . . Whereas this is no more the Definition of Virtue, than that of a two-legged unfeathered Animal is the Definition of a Man. For though true it is, that all virtuous Actions merit, and generally do meet with, Approbation; yet it is not equally true that every Thing which meets with Approbation is *Virtue*.[181]

A Sermon by Alexander Gerard. On 8 April 1760 Alexander Gerard (1728–95), Professor of Philosophy and of Divinity at Aberdeen, preached a sermon before the synod of Aberdeen that was published almost immediately by Millar and two booksellers in Scotland under the title *The Influence of the Pastoral Office on the Character Examined; with a View, especially, to Mr. Hume's Representation of the Spirit of that Office*.[182] This publication centred not on Hume's moral theory as such, but on statements that Hume had made in his writings about the moral character of the clergy—for example, Hume's sharp rebuke in his essay 'Of National Characters'. Gerard's project was to assess the adequacy of Hume's representation and moral assessment. He found Hume's account wanting in virtually every respect. The subject of the virtues of the ministerial office led Gerard into a more general discussion of Hume's moral theory. Gerard argued that Hume failed to appreciate the qualities in ministers that command moral approbation of the very sort that Hume himself acknowledged to be the backbone of morals. He also maintained that Hume had a defective account of true virtue and its connection to moral character.

The Essay *by James Beattie.* James Beattie (1735–1803), Professor of Moral Philosophy and Logic at Marischal College, Aberdeen, published his *Essay on the Nature and Immutability of Truth; In Opposition to Sophistry and Scepticism* in 1770. Beattie argued that humans possess a faculty of common sense that perceives truth and leads to first principles that are protected from

[180] *Some Thoughts on Self-Love*, 2–7, 18–20. [181] Ibid. 4.

[182] Gerard's performance received a lengthy and favourable assessment in *Monthly Review*, 24 (1761), 22–33; the reviewer frequently commented on shortcomings in Hume's philosophy. A year prior to this sermon, Gerard published his best-known work, *Essay on Taste*. In the 3rd edn. he added a fourth part, 'Of the Standard of Taste', in which he commented often, and negatively, on Hume's account of taste.

sceptical assault. He interpreted Hume as an arch-sceptic and attacked Hume's philosophy and character. The bulk of the criticism was directed at Hume's metaphysics and epistemology, but Beattie also addressed his moral theory, including the contents of *EPM*.

Beattie argued that Hume had confused different types of virtue (the mental, the intellectual, and the moral) and had such a decidedly 'liberal turn' of mind that he sneered at devotional works such as *The Whole Duty of Man*.[183] When he appraised the broader dimensions of Hume's moral theory, Beattie was content to present a sarcastic and scornful summary intended to show Hume's 'absurd' thinking. The following, he says, is what we learn from the moral theory of the *Treatise*:

> That if thieves, cheats, and cut-throats, deserve to be hanged, cripples, idiots, and diseased persons, should be not permitted to live; because the imperfections of the latter, and the faults of the former, are on the very same footing, both being disapproved by those who contemplate them: . . . That man ought to believe nothing, and yet that man's belief ought to be influenced by certain principles.[184]

Beattie's book was lavishly praised and Hume's philosophy spiritedly denounced in an unusually lengthy, two-part review in the *Monthly Review*.[185] However, the reviewer broke no new ground, preferring to quote Beattie and paraphrase his criticisms of Hume.

9. RECEPTION IN MAJOR PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS

Several distinguished writers who criticized Hume from within their own moral philosophies had a more enduring impact than the commentators treated above in Section 8. Four writers proved to be of lasting importance: Kames, Price, Reid, and Smith. Each relevant work of these authors was produced within thirteen years of the publication of *EPM*. Each author criticized the *Treatise* and, excepting Kames, examined arguments in *EPM*. It is noteworthy that Hume's friends and enemies alike chose, after 1751, to direct arguments against the moral philosophy in *both* the *Treatise* and *EPM*, emphasizing the former. Their criticisms may be one reason Hume thought that *EPM* had been ignored, and they seem to have been a motivating reason for Hume's decision to disavow the *Treatise* in his

[183] *Essay on the Nature and Immutability of Truth*, 444–7. For further discussion of the nature and relevance of *The Whole Duty of Man*, see the annotation on n.72.

[184] *Essay on the Nature and Immutability of Truth*, 456.

[185] Vol. 42, article 7, pp. 450–7; vol. 43, article 5, pp. 268–83, esp. pp. 277–80.

Advertisement (judging from a famous statement that he made about Beattie and Reid).[186]

Henry Home, Lord Kames

Hume's distant relative, Lord Kames, was a Scottish lawyer and legal historian who was raised to the bench (as Lord Ordinary of the Court of Session) a year after Hume published *EPM*.[187] Kames and Hume were intimate companions for two decades in their youth. Kames watched Hume write the *Treatise*, forwarded a copy to Francis Hutcheson, and once formulated a strategy to increase sales of the *Treatise* in Scotland.[188] None the less, in his *Essays on the Principles of Morality and Natural Religion* (1751),[189] Kames spiritedly attacked what he took to be Hume's moral and epistemological scepticism. Although Kames often adopted the categories that Hume had used, especially principles of self-love, benevolence, sympathy, and utility, he argued that Hume's theory destroys the firmness of the distinction between right and wrong.

Among his several objectives, Kames proposed to examine the account of justice espoused in the philosophy of 'the author of a treatise upon human nature', whom Kames declared a 'deservedly' large figure 'in the learned world'.[190] Kames devoted a chapter to Hume's theory of justice, emphasizing Hume's view that justice is artificial and conventional. Kames thought justice natural and adopted a theory of 'the laws of nature' as the rightful basis of conduct and the standard of duty.[191] He imputed several errors to Hume, the

[186] Hume told Strahan that the 'Advertisement' he appended to his works in 1776 was 'a compleat Answer to Dr Reid and to that bigotted silly Fellow, Beattie' (26 Oct. 1775, to William Strahan, *Letters*, 2: 301). It is not a complete answer in the ordinary sense, but rather a way of deflecting criticisms of *THN*. By this point in life Hume had tired of the constant accusations against him and was irritated that critics had concentrated their attacks on *THN*. For a comprehensive view of the subtleties of Hume's comment to Strahan and its historical consequences, see James Somerville, *The Enigmatic Parting Shot*, esp. chs. 3–5.

[187] Henry Home became Lord Kames upon his appointment to the bench; in the discussion below he is referred to as Kames rather than Home. He was elevated to the High Court of Justiciary in 1763, where he served until his death.

[188] See letters of 2 Dec. 1737, to Henry Home, *New Letters*, 1–3; see also 4 June 1739 and 1 July 1739, to Henry Home, *New Letters*, 5–7; 6 Apr. 1739, to Pierre Desmaizeaux, *Letters*, 1: 29–30; Apr. 1739, Hutcheson to Henry Home, in the Abercairny Collection [GD24] 553, HM Register House, Edinburgh. For the dating of the letter from Hutcheson, see Ross, 'Hutcheson on Hume's *Treatise*', 69–72.

[189] Kames, *Essays*. A 2nd edn. appeared in 1758, and a 3rd edn. in 1779. In part 2, on epistemology, metaphysics, and natural religion, Kames attacks Hume's accounts of belief, the causal relation and the idea of power, the external senses, and the self and personal identity; see esp. 282–97. Some scholars believe that Hume's relationship with Kames soured, or at least declined, in 1748 when Hume published 'Of Miracles' as a chapter in his *Philosophical Essays*.

[190] *Essays*, 103. [191] Ibid. 33–102, 136–49.

most important being that Hume reduced moral rules of right and wrong to rules of social acceptability as a result of his doctrines of the artificiality of justice and property. Against this conventionalism, Kames held that 'property is established by the constitution of our nature, antecedent to all human conventions'.[192]

Kames also argued that Hume erred in attempting to reduce moral capacities entirely to human nature. Like other philosophers of the period, including Hutcheson and Reid, Kames maintained that the 'Author of our nature' ultimately gives morality its authority. He regarded moral capacities as God-given and, for this reason, trustworthy guides. Hume's failure to incorporate this providential guarantee is a major weakness from Kames's point of view, and another reason for viewing Hume as a sceptic.

Kames did not examine the arguments in *EPM*, which was published just after he completed his manuscript. However, because his book was published in the same year as *EPM*, Kames's views added a layer of interest to Hume's new moral philosophy. Hume evidently valued at least some aspects of Kames's effort. He commented to Michael Ramsay soon after its publication that 'our Friend Harrys Essays . . . are well wrote; and are an unusual instance of an obliging method of answering a Book'.[193]

Richard Price

Richard Price, a Welsh Dissenting minister and philosopher, published *A Review of the Principal Questions and Difficulties in Morals* in 1758.[194] Price criticized Hutcheson and Hume for an overly subjective account of morals and a weak account of reason. Price broadly criticized Hume's theories of impressions and ideas, the self and personal identity, physical causation, divine causation, scepticism, and the use of feelings in isolation from understanding.[195]

Though often more engaged with Hutcheson's moral thought than Hume's, Price's criticisms are important because of his careful arguments and wholesale rejection of 'taste' as a basis for ethics. His thesis that Hume *reduced* morals to taste has dogged Hume to the present day. Price maintained that Hume saw morals as merely 'an affair of taste' so that 'Moral right

[192] *Essays*, 108.

[193] 22 June 1751, to Michael Ramsay, *Letters*, 1: 162. Hume did not always express admiration for Kames's philosophical performances. See his letter of Feb. 1754, to John Stewart, *Letters*, 1: 186.

[194] *A Review of the Principal Questions and Difficulties in Morals* is the title on the 1st (1758) and 2nd (1769) editions. The 3rd edn. of 1787, cited below, carried the title *A Review of the Principal Questions in Morals*.

[195] *A Review of the Principal Questions in Morals*, 14 f., 25, 29, 42 f., 56, 62 f., 96, 212, 264 f.

and wrong signify nothing *in the objects themselves* . . . but only *certain effects in us*'.[196] Adopting an 'agreeable emotion' interpretation of Hume, Price pointed to unacceptable conclusions that could be drawn from Hume's account.

It is true that observing virtue brings us pleasure, Price says, but it is improper to infer that the discernment of virtue is not distinct from the reception of this pleasure. He regarded morality as fixed and unalterable, and therefore not reducible to a set of human responses or dispositions of mind. Like Clarke[B] and other figures whose vision of reason Hume opposed, Price saw moral ideas as deriving not from sentiments or a moral sense but from the faculty of understanding. When we know an act of beneficence to be right, it is not because we have an impression from a sense (the moral sense), but because we understand the act and know our judgement to be true.[197]

Price may be the only thinker among Hume's early critics to enter directly into what Hume regarded as the central moral controversy of the period. Price appreciated the power of Hume's arguments on one side of this controversy, but his respect did not prevent him from advancing an overwhelmingly negative appraisal of Hume's philosophy, and one that eventually proved to be highly influential. For his part, Hume seems to have responded favourably to Price's fairness and philosophical abilities.[198]

Thomas Reid

Scottish Presbyterian minister and philosopher Thomas Reid was a near perfect contemporary of Hume and, like Kames, a philosopher who deeply opposed Hume's alleged moral scepticism. He was among the founders of the Aberdeen Philosophical Society, which made the philosophy of Hume a major topic of discussion.[199]

Reid located the deepest problems in Hume's philosophy in a tradition that preceded him: Reid thought Hume relied on principles and ideas that were shared by Descartes, Locke,[B] Berkeley, and many previous philosophers. He found Hume the most consistent in his identification of the implications of their shared premisses about ideas—premisses and implications

[196] Ibid. 15. [197] Ibid. 41–8, 61–8, 128–9, 212, 225.

[198] 18 Mar. 1767, to Richard Price, *New Letters*, 233 f.

[199] 18 Mar. 1763, Reid to Hume, in Burton (ed.), *Letters of Eminent Persons Addressed to David Hume*, 154–6. The Society had been established 12 Jan. 1758 with six members, including Reid, George Campbell, David Skene, John Stewart, Robert Trail, and John Gregory. Alexander Gerard and James Beattie joined the Society by 1760. The Society lasted until 1773. See Holcomb, 'Reid in the Philosophical Society', 413–20. David Fate Norton has pointed out to me that Reid acknowledged that Hume believed the distinction between virtue and vice a real distinction.

that Reid believed to conflict with the beliefs of common sense. Their chief mistake, Reid thought, came in believing that we know only ideas (*perceptions*, in Hume's vocabulary) and not the objects that the ideas represent. Reid also thought that many previous philosophers had attempted to model their accounts of the mind on the successes found in mechanistic and materialistic accounts of the physical world; Hume's theory of human nature (like physician David Hartley's physicalistic *Observations on Man*, 1749) seemed to Reid to start from this incorrect assumption about mind and matter. Hume, then, represented to Reid the sceptical consummation of the dominant trend in a century of failed epistemology.

Reid's system is an analysis of the central intellectual and active principles in human nature. Though his objectives are similar to Hume's, Reid thought their philosophies very different. In moral philosophy in particular, he was convinced that *rational* principles of action exist in people; that Hume had confused functions of the passions with functions of reason; that we can *know* and do not merely *feel* the difference between right and wrong; that justice is natural and not merely artificial; that public utility is not the foundation of justice; that all moral reasoning is grounded in first principles that are self-evident; that Hume had a mistaken account of the influence of motives and of how one motive overrides another when they conflict; and that people can act from a sense of moral rightness that does not depend on the circumstances of utility.[200]

Reid also faulted Hume for not distinguishing between sentiments as *feelings* (passions without judgement) and sentiments as *judgements*. He thought that Hume had unjustifiably diminished the role of the faculty of understanding (judgement) by making sentiment entirely a form of feeling. Reid similarly upbraided Hume for making virtue and vice 'feelings of the spectator', when they should be considered qualities of persons. Reid therefore maintained that Hume came to absurd conclusions, and that the only remedy was to recognize the principles of common sense that Reid developed.[201]

After examining a draft manuscript of sizeable parts of Reid's *Inquiry*, Hume wrote a letter of appreciation:

I must do you the justice to own, that when I enter into your ideas, no man appears to express himself with greater perspicuity than you do; . . . I shall only say, that if you have been able to clear up these abstruse and important subjects, instead of being mortified, I shall be so vain as to pretend to a share of the praise; and shall think

[200] *Active Powers* 3.3.1–2, 6; 4.4; 5.4, 6–7. In 5.7, Reid specifically attacks *EPM*. All references to Reid are to his collected *Works*; but see also various of his lectures and papers in *Practical Ethics*.

[201] *Active Powers* 5.7.

that my errors, by having at least some coherence, had led you to make a more strict review of my principles, which were the common ones, and to perceive their futility.[202]

Reid, in a congenial response, expressed his indebtedness and said that he had once found Hume's *principles* thoroughly plausible:

I shall always avow myself your Disciple in Metaphysicks. I have learned more from your writings in this kind than from all others put together. Your system appears to me not onely coherent in all its parts, but likeways justly deduced from principles commonly received among Philosophers: Principles, which I never thought of calling in question, until the conclusions you draw from them in the Treatise of human Nature made me suspect them. If these principles are solid your system must stand.[203]

Thus perplexed by a system of plausible principles with implausible conclusions, Reid felt driven to a rival philosophy.

Adam Smith

Scottish philosopher and economist Adam Smith began to study ethics during his college experience in Glasgow, where he attended Hutcheson's lectures. After Smith met Hume, probably in Edinburgh, *circa* 1749, they formed a lifelong friendship. Smith instructed his Glasgow students in Hume's philosophy, and occasionally sent visitors to Edinburgh to discuss philosophy with Hume.

Smith published *The Theory of Moral Sentiments* in 1759, when he held the chair of moral philosophy at Glasgow. This book drew attention to sentiment theory, including Hume's. Smith's moral theory had developed in large measure through his evaluation of the theories of Hutcheson and Hume. He adopted an outlook, similar to Hume's in *EPM,* that the rules of morality are formed on the basis of what we approve and disapprove. He also argued that we experience different forms of approbation for different types of virtue and that the moral sense is not a simple, homogeneous faculty. Consequently, Smith viewed his work as a theory of moral sentiments, and not as a moral sense theory.

Smith declared that he did not rely on the category of utility as Hume had done. He inquired whether the utility of actions is the basis of our approval,

[202] 25 Feb. 1763, to Thomas Reid, *Letters*, 1: 375–6.

[203] 18 Mar. 1763, Reid to Hume, in Burton (ed.), *Letters of Eminent Persons Addressed to David Hume*, 154–6. In the 'Dedication' to his *An Inquiry into the Human Mind*, Reid states that Hume provoked him to think about how to rescue the principles of the human understanding from the consequences of sceptical assumptions. *Works*, 1: 95.

and answered that it is not usefulness, but what is right and accurate that we approve. We are more concerned with the motives of others, in Smith's account, than with the utility and consequences of their actions. Motives of gratitude, resentment, and the like are independent of considerations of utility. Smith agreed with Hume that we approve as virtuous what is useful, but he denied that utility is the motive or source of the approbation. We do not, he insisted, praise people for the same reason that we praise a chest of drawers.[204]

> [Against Hume] I affirm, that it is not the view of this utility or hurtfulness which is either the first or principal source of our approbation and disapprobation. These sentiments are no doubt enhanced and enlivened by the perception of the beauty or deformity which results from this utility or hurtfulness. But still, I say, they are originally and essentially different from this perception. . . .
>
> It seems impossible that the approbation of virtue should be a sentiment of the same kind with that by which we approve of a convenient and well-contrived building. . . .
>
> The usefulness of any disposition of mind is seldom the first ground of our approbation. . . . The sentiment of approbation always involves in it a sense of propriety quite distinct from the perception of utility . . . [including the] qualities which are approved of as virtuous, both those which, according to this system [of Hume's], are originally valued as useful to ourselves, as well as those which are esteemed on account of their usefulness to others.[205]

Though Smith distanced himself from Hume's reliance on utility, in other respects he adopted a Humean perspective. He began his *Moral Sentiments* with a chapter on sympathy, a pivotal notion in Hume's *Treatise*.[206] Smith's well-known impartial spectator shows similarities to Hume's account of universality in morals in *EPM* and to Hume's dispositional thesis about spectators—namely, that right and wrong acts and beliefs are determined by the ways in which a dispassionate or impartial person would react in the circumstances. Smith argued that when we become spectators of our own behaviour, we are like a second self looking at its first self.[207] This theory supplemented Hume's, but in other parts of his book—for example, his account of the

[204] See *Moral Sentiments*, 4.1–2 (179, 188). William Rose noted, in a review in the *Monthly Review*, 21 (July 1759), 1–18, that Smith's theory was, in this part, aimed directly at Hume.

[205] *Moral Sentiments*, 188 f. Hume discusses utility in buildings in *EPM* 5.1. He appended a lengthy footnote to this paragraph that could be taken as a response to the criticism of his theory here registered by Smith. This footnote appears in all editions of *EPM*, and therefore was published eight years before Smith's book. Hume argues that 'The sentiments, excited by utility, are, in the two cases, very different', the one involving approbation and affection, the other not.

[206] However, Smith distinguished between his account of sympathy and Hume's. See *Moral Sentiments*, 327, for a summary statement.

[207] Ibid. 110–13, 134 ff., 158 f.

utility of rules of justice and the grounds of their enforcement—Smith reflects Hume's accounts.[208]

The success of Smith's book led Hume to needle Smith that his bookseller was only out for a greedy profit and that the approbation of the multitude is more likely to indicate falsity than truth.

My dear Mr Smith, . . . Nothing, indeed, can be a stronger presumption of falsehood than the approbation of the multitude: . . .

I proceed to tell you the melancholy news, that your book has been very unfortunate; For the public seem disposed to applaud it extremely. It was looked for by the foolish people with some impatience; and the mob of literati are beginning already to be very loud in its praises. Three bishops calld yesterday at Millar's shop in order to buy copies, and to ask questions about the author. The Bishop of Peterborough[209] said, he had passed the evening in a company where he heard it extolled above all books in the world. . . . Millar exults and brags that two-thirds of the edition are already sold, and that he is now sure of success. You see what a son of the earth that is, to value books only by the profit they bring him. In that view, I believe it may prove a very good book.[210]

As Hume was preparing his 1760 edition of *Essays and Treatises*, he paused to send Smith suggestions for a projected second edition of *Moral Sentiments* (published in 1761). His recommendations centred on sympathy:

I am told that you are preparing a new Edition, & propose to make some Additions & Alterations, in order to obviate Objections. I shall use the Freedom to propose one, which, if it appears to be of any Weight, you may have in your Eye. I wish you had more particularly and fully prov'd, that all kinds of Sympathy are necessarily Agreeable. This is the Hinge of your System, & yet you only mention the Matter cursorily in p. 20. Now it woud appear that there is a disagreeable Sympathy, as well as an agreeable. . . .

It is always thought a difficult Problem to account for the Pleasure, receivd from the Tears & Grief & Sympathy of Tragedy; which would not be the Case, if all Sympathy was agreeable. An Hospital woud be a more entertaining Place than a Ball. I am afraid that in p. 99 and 111 this Proposition has escapd you, or rather is interwove with your Reasonings in that place. You say expressly, *it is painful to go along with Grief & we always enter into it with Reluctance*. It will probably be requisite for you to modify or explain this Sentiment, & reconcile it to your System.[211]

Whatever the philosophical differences that separated Smith and Hume, their friendship did not suffer. In August 1776, a few days before his death, Smith called on Hume. When Smith mentioned his 'faint hopes' that Hume

[208] Ibid. 87–8. [209] Richard Terrick, DD, d. 1777.
[210] 12 Apr. 1759, to Adam Smith, *Letters*, 1: 305–6.
[211] 28 July 1759, to Adam Smith, *Letters*, 1: 312–13.

might recover, Hume reportedly said, 'Your hopes are groundless'. In the ensuing conversation Hume recalled the excuses that are recounted in Lucian's *Dialogues of the Dead* for why one might refuse to enter Charon the boatman's ferry bound for Hades. These excuses did not correspond to his situation, Hume ventured, because he had no house to finish, no daughter to raise, and no enemies to seek revenge against. Smith then related how Hume diverted them in conversation by

> inventing several jocular excuses, which he supposed he might make to Charon, and with imagining the very surly answers which it might suit the character of Charon to return to them. 'Upon further consideration', said [Hume], 'I thought I might say to him, "Good Charon, I have been correcting my works for a new edition. Allow me a little time, that I may see how the Public receives the alterations". But Charon would answer, "When you have seen the effect of these, you will be for making other alterations. There will be no end of such excuses; so, honest friend, please step into the boat". But I might still urge, "Have a little patience, good Charon, I have been endeavouring to open the eyes of the Public. If I live a few years longer, I may have the satisfaction of seeing the downfal of some of the prevailing systems of superstition". But Charon would then lose all temper and decency. "You loitering rogue, that will not happen these many hundred years. Do you fancy I will grant you a lease for so long a term? Get into the boat this instant, you lazy loitering rogue".'[212]

This story has been cited for what it reveals of Hume's character and composure in confronting death as well as his interest in the practical implications of a moral theory. It says no less about the importance to him of the final revisions of his works and of what he hoped those revisions might accomplish. Hume's drollery is centred on his literary perfectionism and personal aspirations. He had some idea of what he and Smith had achieved, but probably no conception that his reputation as a philosopher would later far surpass the standing to which he had aspired all his life.

[212] See 9 Nov. 1776, to William Strahan, and 22 Aug. 1776, to David Hume, *Correspondence of Adam Smith*, 218–21, 206.

A NOTE ON THE TEXT

An Enquiry concerning the Principles of Morals was first published in 1751. From 1758 to 1777, this work appeared in the collection published under the title *Essays and Treatises on Several Subjects* (*ETSS*). The last edition seen through the press with Hume's supervision, published in 1772, is the copytext in the present edition. The posthumous edition of 1777 has been consulted for evidence of late authorial changes and generally has been followed when the changes are substantive, but not when they are purely formal. The order of sections, parts, and appendices also follows the 1777 edition. A history of Hume's editions of *EPM*, with pertinent bibliographical data, is provided in the 'Introduction'. The rationale behind the choice of copytext and the acceptance of substantive changes in the 1777 edition is found in the 'Editorial Appendix'.

The text was initially prepared from a photocopy of the 1772 edition of *ETSS* in the Hume collection of the Department of Rare Books and Special Collections, McGill University Libraries.[1] This copy has been inspected for printing or photocopying vagaries by comparison with three originals of the 1772 edition privately acquired by the editor. Two of the privately acquired copies and seven additional copies obtained from libraries[2] were optically (or 'mechanically') collated against the other privately acquired copy using a McLeod Portable Collator.[3] David Fate Norton and his associates performed these collations of the ten 1772 copies either at his office or at the Colgate Collection of the Department of Rare Books and Special Collections, McGill University Libraries in Montreal. Several variants were discovered by these collations, but none proved to be significant. All differences appear to have been generated by small repairs made to the type or by slippage in the position of the type during printing. In addition, no cancels were discovered in a physical examination by the editor of six bound copies.

[1] Shelf Mark: B1455 1772 v.2 c.1.

[2] From Special Collections Divisions of the following Libraries: Chuo University, Tokyo (Vault); Folger-Shakespeare Library, Washington, DC (Shelf Mark: B1455 1772 Cage); the New York State Library, the University of the State of New York, Albany, NY (Shelf Mark: B1455, 1772); the Bancroft Library, the University of California, Berkeley (Shelf Mark: B1455, 1772); Guy W. Bailey/David W. Howe Library, the University of Vermont (Shelf Mark: B1455, 1772); the Harry Ransom Humanities Research Center, the University of Texas at Austin (Shelf Mark: B1455, 1772); McGill University, copy 2 (Shelf Mark: B1455 1772 v.2 c.2). The editor has inspected, but not collated, additional copies of the 1772 edition from the National Library of Scotland, the British Library, and the Honnold Library, Claremont.

[3] McLeod Randall, 'Collator in a Handbag' (Toronto: Graduate Department of English, University of Toronto, 1986).

Variant readings among the several editions of *EPM*, reported here for the first time, were collected by the editor over a ten-year period by both manual collation and computer collation. At least two independent, complete visual collations against the copytext and multiple complete computer collations were performed for each edition published from 1751 to 1777. All apparent variants were verified by consulting the original printed texts, and computer files were corrected whenever mistakes of entry were detected. Using this procedure, each file of each edition was checked for accuracy at least three times after the initial collation was completed. The accuracy of the computer file of the copytext was corroborated by twenty independent computer comparisons with the corrected computer files of the other editions. After this work was completed and a full critical apparatus constructed, all texts of all editions were independently collated (for both formal and substantive variants) using the program *Collate* developed by Peter Robinson at the Oxford Computing Center. All variants discovered by this method were compared against the variants produced by the previous methods, and all discrepancies eliminated after consulting the original printed texts.

The methods used in converting the copytext into the definitive or 'critical' text of the present edition are more fully explained in the 'Editorial Appendix'. This appendix also contains an account of editorial policy with regard to substantive emendation, choice of punctuation, correction of errors, and the like. A record of all substantive variants in editions prepared for the press by Hume is included. Editorial annotation is contained in a separate appendix.

All references made by Hume in his footnotes (and endnotes in the 1770–7 editions) have been checked against appropriate early modern editions of the sources cited and have been corrected whenever Hume or his compositor introduced errors in the citation of units such as page, book, and chapter numbers. The numbers that warrant these corrections appear in the works listed in the Catalogue or in the Reference List. Occasionally Hume's numbering is correct for the editions of his day, but the numbering system is no longer standard. Whenever a conflict of numbering systems occurs, the numbering in *both* editions is cited by the editor, with the older numbering system in parentheses. All emendations to the notes are reported in the Editorial Appendix.

Editorial augmentation of Hume's footnotes is found in the annotations. This material provides more complete information on the works cited by Hume. Precise volumes, books, chapters, sections, lines, verses, and the like

have been supplied, wherever feasible.[4] Titles in classical languages have generally been translated, whereas non-classical languages are not translated in reports of Hume's footnote references (but are translated in commentary in the annotations).[5] No editorial intrusions appear in the text itself, but numbers are placed in the margin at the head of each paragraph in order to establish a universal reference system that allows precise citation without use of page numbers.

[4] Many editions of the works cited in Hume's footnotes and in the Catalogue and Reference List vary from edition to edition in their organization and numbering, especially by comparison with 20th-c. editions. These variations can be subtle and confusing. For example, Locke's numbering in his 5th and final edition of the *Essay* (the most widely reprinted edition) is different from the numbering in the 4th edition, on which the critical edition of Locke and references in the present edition of Hume are based.

[5] Exceptions are allowed to the rule on classical languages when the standard title in English-language scholarship is other than English (for example, Seneca's *De beneficiis* and Bacon's *Novum organum*). If a title has no standard English rendering, the foreign-language title is presented rather than an English translation (for example, Vegetius' *De re militari*). If a modern work was first published in Latin (for example, Descartes's *Meditations*), suitable English-language titles for these works are generally preferred in the bracketed portion of footnotes to the text. Details on editions in Latin are found in the Catalogue.

AN ENQUIRY CONCERNING THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS

SECTION 1

SBN 169

Of the General Principles of Morals

1 DISPUTES with men, pertinaciously obstinate in their principles, are, of all others, the most irksome; except, perhaps, those with persons, entirely disingenuous, who really do not believe the opinions they defend, but engage in the controversy, from affectation, from a spirit of opposition, or from a desire of showing wit and ingenuity, superior to the rest of mankind. The same blind adherence to their own arguments is to be expected in both; the same contempt of their antagonists; and the same passionate vehemence, in enforcing sophistry and falsehood. And as reasoning is not the source, whence either disputant derives his tenets; it is in vain to expect, that any logic, which speaks not to the affections, will ever engage him to embrace sounder principles.

2 Those who have denied the reality of moral distinctions, may be ranked among the disingenuous disputants; nor is it conceivable, that any human creature could ever seriously believe, that all characters and actions were alike entitled to the affection and regard of every one. The difference, which *SBN 170* nature has placed between one man and another, is so wide, and this difference is still so much farther widened, by education, example, and habit, that, where the opposite extremes come at once under our apprehension, there is no scepticism so scrupulous, and scarce any assurance so determined, as absolutely to deny all distinction between them. Let a man's insensibility be ever so great, he must often be touched with the images of RIGHT and WRONG; and let his prejudices be ever so obstinate, he must observe, that others are susceptible of like impressions. The only way, therefore, of converting an antagonist of this kind, is to leave him to himself. For, finding that no body keeps up the controversy with him, it is probable he will, at last, of himself, from mere weariness, come over to the side of common sense and reason.

3 There has been a controversy started of late, much better worth examination, concerning the general foundation of MORALS; whether they be derived from REASON, or from SENTIMENT; whether we attain the knowledge of them by a chain of argument and induction, or by an immediate feeling and finer internal sense; whether, like all sound judgment of truth and falsehood, they should be the same to every rational intelligent being; or whether, like

the perception of beauty and deformity, they be founded entirely on the particular fabric and constitution of the human species.

4 The ancient philosophers, though they often affirm, that virtue is nothing but conformity to reason, yet, in general, seem to consider morals as deriving their existence from taste and sentiment. On the other hand, our modern enquirers, though they also talk much of the beauty of virtue, and deformity of vice, yet have commonly endeavoured to account for these distinctions by metaphysical reasonings, and by deductions from the most abstract principles of the understanding. Such confusion reigned in these subjects, that an opposition of the greatest consequence could prevail between one *SBN 171* system and another, and even in the parts of almost each individual system; and yet no body, till very lately, was ever sensible of it. The elegant Lord Shaftesbury, who first gave occasion to remark this distinction, and who, in general, adhered to the principles of the ancients, is not, himself, entirely free from the same confusion.

5 It must be acknowledged, that both sides of the question are susceptible of specious arguments. Moral distinctions, it may be said, are discernible by pure *reason*: Else, whence the many disputes that reign in common life, as well as in philosophy, with regard to this subject: The long chain of proofs often produced on both sides; the examples cited, the authorities appealed to, 20 the analogies employed, the fallacies detected, the inferences drawn, and the several conclusions adjusted to their proper principles. Truth is disputable; not taste: What exists in the nature of things is the standard of our judgment; what each man feels within himself is the standard of sentiment. Propositions in geometry may be proved, systems in physics may be controverted; but the harmony of verse, the tenderness of passion, the brilliancy of wit, must give immediate pleasure. No man reasons concerning another's beauty; but frequently concerning the justice or injustice of his actions. In every criminal trial the first object of the prisoner is to disprove the facts alleged, and deny the actions imputed to him: The second to prove, that, even if these 30 actions were real, they might be justified, as innocent and lawful. It is confessedly by deductions of the understanding, that the first point is ascertained: How can we suppose that a different faculty of the mind is employed in fixing the other?

6 On the other hand, those who would resolve all moral determinations into *sentiment*, may endeavour to show, that it is impossible for reason ever to draw conclusions of this nature. To virtue, say they, it belongs to be *amiable*, and vice *odious*. This forms their very nature or essence. But can reason *SBN 172* or argumentation distribute these different epithets to any subjects, and pronounce before-hand, that this must produce love, and that hatred? Or 40

what other reason can we ever assign for these affections, but the original fabric and formation of the human mind, which is naturally adapted to receive them?

7 The end of all moral speculations is to teach us our duty; and, by proper representations of the deformity of vice and beauty of virtue, beget correspondent habits, and engage us to avoid the one, and embrace the other. But is this ever to be expected from inferences and conclusions of the understanding, which of themselves have no hold of the affections, nor set in motion the active powers of men? They discover truths: But where the truths which they discover are indifferent, and beget no desire or aversion, they can have no influence on conduct and behaviour. What is honourable, what is fair, what is becoming, what is noble, what is generous, takes possession of the heart, and animates us to embrace and maintain it. What is intelligible, what is evident, what is probable, what is true, procures only the cool assent of the understanding; and gratifying a speculative curiosity, puts an end to our researches.

8 Extinguish all the warm feelings and prepossessions in favour of virtue, and all disgust or aversion to vice: Render men totally indifferent towards these distinctions; and morality is no longer a practical study, nor has any tendency to regulate our lives and actions.

9 These arguments on each side (and many more might be produced) are so plausible, that I am apt to suspect, they may, the one as well as the other, be solid and satisfactory, and that *reason* and *sentiment* concur in almost all moral determinations and conclusions. The final sentence, it is probable, which pronounces characters and actions amiable or odious, praise-worthy or blameable; that which stamps on them the mark of honour or infamy, approbation or censure; that which renders morality an active principle, and constitutes virtue our happiness, and vice our misery: It is probable, I say, that this final sentence depends on some internal sense or feeling, which nature has made universal in the whole species. For what else can have an influence of this nature? But in order to pave the way for such a sentiment, and give a proper discernment of its object, it is often necessary, we find, that much reasoning should precede, that nice distinctions be made, just conclusions drawn, distant comparisons formed, complicated relations examined, and general facts fixed and ascertained. Some species of beauty, especially the natural kinds, on their first appearance, command our affection and approbation; and where they fail of this effect, it is impossible for any reasoning to redress their influence, or adapt them better to our taste and sentiment. But in many orders of beauty, particularly those of the finer arts, it is requisite to employ much reasoning, in order to feel the proper sentiment; and a false

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relish may frequently be corrected by argument and reflection. There are just grounds to conclude, that moral beauty partakes much of this latter species, and demands the assistance of our intellectual faculties, in order to give it a suitable influence on the human mind.

But though this question, concerning the general principles of morals, be curious and important, it is needless for us, at present, to employ farther care in our researches concerning it. For if we can be so happy, in the course of this enquiry, as to discover the true origin of morals, it will then easily appear how far either sentiment or reason enters into all determinations of this nature.[1] In order to attain this purpose, we shall endeavour to follow a very simple method: We shall analyze that complication of mental qualities, which form what, in common life, we call PERSONAL MERIT: We shall consider *SBN 174* every attribute of the mind, which renders a man an object either of esteem and affection, or of hatred and contempt; every habit or sentiment or faculty, which, if ascribed to any person, implies either praise or blame, and may enter into any panegyric or satire of his character and manners. The quick sensibility, which, on this head, is so universal among mankind, gives a philosopher sufficient assurance, that he can never be considerably mistaken in framing the catalogue, or incur any danger of misplacing the objects of his contemplation: He needs only enter into his own breast for a moment, and consider whether or not he should desire to have this or that quality ascribed to him, and whether such or such an imputation would proceed from a friend or an enemy. The very nature of language guides us almost infallibly in forming a judgment of this nature; and as every tongue possesses one set of words which are taken in a good sense, and another in the opposite, the least acquaintance with the idiom suffices, without any reasoning, to direct us in collecting and arranging the estimable or blameable qualities of men. The only object of reasoning is to discover the circumstances on both sides, which are common to these qualities; to observe that particular in which the estimable qualities agree on the one hand, and the blameable on the other; and thence to reach the foundation of ethics, and find those universal principles, from which all censure or approbation is ultimately derived. As this is a question of fact, not of abstract science, we can only expect success, by following the experimental method, and deducing general maxims from a comparison of particular instances. The other scientifical method, where a general abstract principle is first established, and is afterwards branched out into a variety of inferences and conclusions, may be more perfect in itself, but suits less the imperfection of human nature, and is a common source of illu-

[1] See Appendix 1. *SBN 173*

sion and mistake in this as well as in other subjects. Men are now cured of their passion for hypotheses and systems in natural philosophy, and will *SBN 175* hearken to no arguments but those which are derived from experience. It is full time they should attempt a like reformation in all moral disquisitions; and reject every system of ethics, however subtile or ingenious, which is not founded on fact and observation.

11 We shall begin our enquiry on this head by the consideration of the social virtues, benevolence and justice. The explication of them will probably give us an opening by which the others may be accounted for.

SECTION 2

SBN 176

Of Benevolence

PART 1

1 It may be esteemed, perhaps, a superfluous task to prove, that the benevolent or softer affections are ESTIMABLE; and wherever they appear, engage the approbation, and good-will of mankind. The epithets *sociable*, *good-natured*, *humane*, *merciful*, *grateful*, *friendly*, *generous*, *beneficent*, or their equivalents, are known in all languages, and universally express the highest merit, which *human nature* is capable of attaining. Where these amiable qualities are attended with birth and power and eminent abilities, and display themselves in the good government or useful instruction of mankind, they seem even to raise the possessors of them above the rank of *human nature*, and make them approach in some measure to the divine. Exalted capacity, undaunted courage, prosperous success; these may only expose a hero or politician to the envy and ill-will of the public: But as soon as the praises are added of humane and beneficent; when instances are displayed of lenity, tenderness, or friendship; envy itself is silent, or joins the general voice of approbation and applause.

2 When PERICLES, the great ATHENIAN statesman and general, was on his death-bed, his surrounding friends, deeming him now insensible, began to indulge their sorrow for their expiring patron, by enumerating his great qualities and successes, his conquests and victories, the unusual length of his administration, and his nine trophies erected over the enemies of the republic. "You forget," cries the dying hero, who had heard all, "you forget the most eminent of my praises, while you dwell so much on those vulgar advantages, in which fortune had a principal share. You have not observed, that no citizen has ever yet worne mourning on my account."[2]

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3 In men of more ordinary talents and capacity, the social virtues become, if possible, still more essentially requisite; there being nothing eminent, in that case, to compensate for the want of them, or preserve the person from our severest hatred, as well as contempt. A high ambition, an elevated courage, is apt, says CICERO, in less perfect characters, to degenerate into a turbulent ferocity. The more social and softer virtues are there chiefly to be regarded. These are always good and amiable.[3]

[2] PLUTARCH. in PERICLE. [3] CIC. de officiis, lib. 1.

4 The principal advantage, which JUVENAL discovers in the extensive capacity of the human species is, that it renders our benevolence also more extensive, and gives us larger opportunities of spreading our kindly influence than what are indulged to the inferior creation.[4] It must, indeed, be confessed, that by doing good only, can a man truly enjoy the advantages of being eminent. His exalted station, of itself, but the more exposes him to danger and tempest. His sole prerogative is to afford shelter to inferiors, who repose themselves under his cover and protection.

5 But I forget, that it is not my present business to recommend generosity and benevolence, or to paint, in their true colours, all the genuine charms of the social virtues. These, indeed, sufficiently engage every heart, on the first apprehension of them; and it is difficult to abstain from some sally of panegyric, as often as they occur in discourse or reasoning. But our object here being more the speculative, than the practical part of morals, it will suffice *SBN 178* to remark, (what will readily, I believe, be allowed) that no qualities are more entitled to the general good-will and approbation of mankind, than beneficence and humanity, friendship and gratitude, natural affection and public spirit, or whatever proceeds from a tender sympathy with others, and a generous concern for our kind and species. These, wherever they appear, seem to transfuse themselves, in a manner, into each beholder, and to call forth, in their own behalf, the same favourable and affectionate sentiments, which they exert on all around.

PART 2

6 We may observe, that, in displaying the praises of any humane, beneficent man, there is one circumstance which never fails to be amply insisted on, namely, the happiness and satisfaction, derived to society from his intercourse and good offices. To his parents, we are apt to say, he endears himself by his pious attachment and duteous care, still more than by the connexions of nature. His children never feel his authority, but when employed for their advantage. With him, the ties of love are consolidated by beneficence and friendship. The ties of friendship approach, in a fond observance of each obliging office, to those of love and inclination. His domestics and dependents have in him a sure resource; and no longer dread the power of fortune, but so far as she exercises it over him. From him the hungry receive food, the naked cloathing, the ignorant and slothful skill and industry. Like the sun, an

[4] Sat. 15. 139. & seq. *SBN 177*

inferior minister of providence, he cheers, invigorates, and sustains the surrounding world.

7 If confined to private life, the sphere of his activity is narrower; but his influence is all benign and gentle. If exalted into a higher station, mankind and posterity reap the fruit of his labours.

8 As these topics of praise never fail to be employed, and with success, where we would inspire esteem for any one; may it not thence be concluded, that the UTILITY, resulting from the social virtues, forms, at least, a *part* of their merit, and is one source of that approbation and regard so universally paid to them? *SBN 179*

9 When we recommend even an animal or a plant as *useful* and *beneficial*, we give it an applause and recommendation suited to its nature. As, on the other hand, reflection on the baneful influence of any of these inferior beings always inspires us with the sentiment of aversion. The eye is pleased with the prospect of corn-fields and loaded vineyards; horses grazing, and flocks pasturing: But flies the view of briars and brambles, affording shelter to wolves and serpents. 10

10 A machine, a piece of furniture, a vestment, a house well contrived for use and conveniency, is so far beautiful, and is contemplated with pleasure and approbation. An experienced eye is here sensible to many excellencies, which escape persons ignorant and uninstructed. 20

11 Can any thing stronger be said in praise of a profession, such as merchandize or manufacture, than to observe the advantages which it procures to society? And is not a monk and inquisitor enraged when we treat his order as useless or pernicious to mankind?

12 The historian exults in displaying the benefit arising from his labours. The writer of romance alleviates or denies the bad consequences ascribed to his manner of composition.

13 In general, what praise is implied in the simple epithet *useful*! What reproach in the contrary!

14 Your gods, says CICERO,[5] in opposition to the EPICUREANS, cannot justly claim any worship or adoration, with whatever imaginary perfections you may suppose them endowed. They are totally useless and unactive. Even the EGYPTIANS, whom you so much ridicule, never consecrated any animal but on account of its utility. 30 *SBN 180*

15 The sceptics assert,[6] though absurdly, that the origin of all religious worship was derived from the utility of inanimate objects, as the sun and moon, to the support and well-being of mankind. This is also the common

[5] De nat. Deor. lib. 1. [6] SEXT. EMP. adversus mathem. lib. 9. *SBN 179–80*

reason assigned by historians, for the deification of eminent heroes and legislators.[7]

16 To plant a tree, to cultivate a field, to beget children; meritorious acts, according to the religion of ZOROASTER.

17 In all determinations of morality, this circumstance of public utility is ever principally in view; and wherever disputes arise, either in philosophy or common life, concerning the bounds of duty, the question cannot, by any means, be decided with greater certainty, than by ascertaining, on any side, the true interests of mankind. If any false opinion, embraced from appearances, has been found to prevail; as soon as farther experience and sounder reasoning have given us juster notions of human affairs; we retract our first sentiment, and adjust anew the boundaries of moral good and evil.

18 Giving alms to common beggars is naturally praised; because it seems to carry relief to the distressed and indigent: But when we observe the encouragement thence arising to idleness and debauchery, we regard that species of charity rather as a weakness than a virtue.

19 *Tyrannicide*, or the assassination of usurpers and oppressive princes, was highly extolled in ancient times; because it both freed mankind from many of these monsters, and seemed to keep the others in awe, whom the sword or poinard could not reach. But history and experience having since convinced us, that this practice encreases the jealousy and cruelty of princes, a TIMOLEON and a BRUTUS, though treated with indulgence on account of the prejudices of their times, are now considered as very improper models for imitation.

20 Liberality in princes is regarded as a mark of beneficence: But when it occurs, that the homely bread of the honest and industrious is often thereby converted into delicious cates for the idle and the prodigal, we soon retract our heedless praises. The regrets of a prince, for having lost a day, were noble and generous: But had he intended to have spent it in acts of generosity to his greedy courtiers, it was better lost than misemployed after that manner.

21 Luxury, or a refinement on the pleasures and conveniencies of life, had long been supposed the source of every corruption in government, and the immediate cause of faction, sedition, civil wars, and the total loss of liberty. It was, therefore, universally regarded as a vice, and was an object of declamation to all satirists, and severe moralists. Those, who prove, or attempt to prove, that such refinements rather tend to the encrease of industry, civility, and arts, regulate anew our *moral* as well as *political* sentiments, and

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[7] DIOD. SIC. passim.

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represent, as laudable and innocent, what had formerly been regarded as pernicious or blameable.

22 Upon the whole, then, it seems undeniable, *that* nothing can bestow more merit on any human creature than the sentiment of benevolence in an eminent degree; and *that* a *part*, at least, of its merit arises from its tendency to promote the interests of our species, and bestow happiness on human society. We carry our view into the salutary consequences of such a character and disposition; and whatever has so benign an influence, and forwards so desirable an end, is beheld with complacency and pleasure. The social virtues are never regarded without their beneficial tendencies, nor viewed as barren 10
and unfruitful. The happiness of mankind, the order of society, the harmony of families, the mutual support of friends, are always considered as the result *SBN 182*
of their gentle dominion over the breasts of men.

23 How considerable a *part* of their merit we ought to ascribe to their utility, will better appear from future disquisitions;[8] as well as the reason, why this circumstance has such a command over our esteem and approbation.[9]

[8] Section 3d and 4th. [9] Section 5th. *SBN 182*

SECTION 3

SBN 183

Of Justice

PART 1

1 THAT justice is useful to society, and consequently that *part* of its merit, at least, must arise from that consideration, it would be a superfluous undertaking to prove. That public utility is the *sole* origin of justice, and that reflections on the beneficial consequences of this virtue are the *sole* foundation of its merit; this proposition, being more curious and important, will better deserve our examination and enquiry.

2 Let us suppose, that nature has bestowed on the human race such profuse *abundance* of all *external* conveniencies, that, without any uncertainty in the event, without any care or industry on our part, every individual finds himself fully provided with whatever his most voracious appetites can want, or luxurious imagination wish or desire. His natural beauty, we shall suppose, surpasses all acquired ornaments: The perpetual clemency of the seasons renders useless all cloaths or covering: The raw herbage affords him the most delicious fare; the clear fountain, the richest beverage. No laborious occupation required: No tillage: No navigation. Music, poetry, and contemplation form his sole business: Conversation, mirth, and friendship his sole amusement.

3 It seems evident, that, in such a happy state, every other social virtue would flourish, and receive tenfold encrease; but the cautious, jealous virtue *SBN 184* of justice would never once have been dreamed of. For what purpose make a partition of goods, where every one has already more than enough? Why give rise to property, where there cannot possibly be any injury? Why call this object *mine*, when, upon the seizing of it by another, I need but stretch out my hand to possess myself of what is equally valuable? Justice, in that case, being totally USELESS, would be an idle ceremonial, and could never possibly have place in the catalogue of virtues.

4 We see, even in the present necessitous condition of mankind, that, wherever any benefit is bestowed by nature in an unlimited abundance, we leave it always in common among the whole human race, and make no subdivisions of right and property. Water and air, though the most necessary of all objects, are not challenged as the property of individuals; nor can any man commit

injustice by the most lavish use and enjoyment of these blessings. In fertile extensive countries, with few inhabitants, land is regarded on the same footing. And no topic is so much insisted on by those, who defend the liberty of the seas, as the unexhausted use of them in navigation. Were the advantages, procured by navigation, as inexhaustible, these reasoners had never had any adversaries to refute; nor had any claims ever been advanced of a separate, exclusive dominion over the ocean.

5 It may happen, in some countries, at some periods, that there be established a property in water, none in land;[10] if the latter be in greater abundance than can be used by the inhabitants, and the former be found, with difficulty, 10 and in very small quantities.

6 Again; suppose, that, though the necessities of human race continue the same as at present, yet the mind is so enlarged, and so replete with friendship and generosity, that every man has the utmost tenderness for every man, and *SBN 185* feels no more concern for his own interest than for that of his fellows: It seems evident, that the USE of justice would, in this case, be suspended by such an extensive benevolence, nor would the divisions and barriers of property and obligation have ever been thought of. Why should I bind another, by a deed or promise, to do me any good office, when I know that he is already prompted, by the strongest inclination, to seek my happiness, and would, of 20 himself, perform the desired service; except the hurt, he thereby receives, be greater than the benefit accruing to me? In which case, he knows, that, from my innate humanity and friendship, I should be the first to oppose myself to his imprudent generosity. Why raise land-marks between my neighbour's field and mine, when my heart has made no division between our interests; but shares all his joys and sorrows with the same force and vivacity as if originally my own? Every man, upon this supposition, being a second self to another, would trust all his interests to the discretion of every man; without jealousy, without partition, without distinction. And the whole human race would form only one family; where all would lie in common, and be used 30 freely, without regard to property; but cautiously too, with as entire regard to the necessities of each individual, as if our own interests were most intimately concerned.

7 In the present disposition of the human heart, it would, perhaps, be difficult to find compleat instances of such enlarged affections; but still we may observe, that the case of families approaches towards it; and the stronger the mutual benevolence is among the individuals, the nearer it approaches; till all distinction of property be, in a great measure, lost and confounded

[10] Genesis, chap. 13. and 21. *SBN 184*

among them. Between married persons, the cement of friendship is by the laws supposed so strong as to abolish all division of possessions; and has often, in reality, the force ascribed to it. And it is observable, that, during the *SBN 186* ardour of new enthusiasms, when every principle is enflamed into extravagance, the community of goods has frequently been attempted; and nothing but experience of its inconveniencies, from the returning or disguised selfishness of men, could make the imprudent fanatics adopt anew the ideas of justice and of separate property. So true is it, that this virtue derives its existence entirely from its necessary *use* to the intercourse and social state of mankind.

8 To make this truth more evident, let us reverse the foregoing suppositions; and carrying every thing to the opposite extreme, consider what would be the effect of these new situations. Suppose a society to fall into such want of all common necessaries, that the utmost frugality and industry cannot preserve the greater number from perishing, and the whole from extreme misery: It will readily, I believe, be admitted, that the strict laws of justice are suspended, in such a pressing emergence, and give place to the stronger motives of necessity and self-preservation. Is it any crime, after a shipwreck, to seize whatever means or instrument of safety one can lay hold of, without regard to former limitations of property? Or if a city besieged were perishing with hunger; can we imagine, that men will see any means of preservation before them, and lose their lives, from a scrupulous regard to what, in other situations, would be the rules of equity and justice? The USE and TENDENCY of that virtue is to procure happiness and security, by preserving order in society: But where the society is ready to perish from extreme necessity, no greater evil can be dreaded from violence and injustice; and every man may now provide for himself by all the means, which prudence can dictate, or humanity permit. The public, even in less urgent necessities, opens granaries, without the consent of proprietors; as justly supposing, that the authority of magistracy may, consistent with equity, extend so far: But were any number *SBN 187* of men to assemble, without the tye of laws or civil jurisdiction; would an equal partition of bread in a famine, though effected by power and even violence, be regarded as criminal or injurious?

9 Suppose likewise, that it should be a virtuous man's fate to fall into the society of ruffians, remote from the protection of laws and government; what conduct must he embrace in that melancholy situation? He sees such a desperate rapaciousness prevail; such a disregard to equity, such contempt of order, such stupid blindness to future consequences, as must immediately have the most tragical conclusion, and must terminate in destruction to the greater number, and in a total dissolution of society to the rest. He, mean

while, can have no other expedient than to arm himself, to whomever the sword he seizes, or the buckler, may belong: To make provision of all means of defence and security: And his particular regard to justice being no longer of USE to his own safety or that of others, he must consult the dictates of self-preservation alone, without concern for those who no longer merit his care and attention.

10 When any man, even in political society, renders himself, by his crimes, obnoxious to the public, he is punished by the laws in his goods and person; that is, the ordinary rules of justice are, with regard to him, suspended for a moment, and it becomes equitable to inflict on him, for the *benefit* of society, 10 what, otherwise, he could not suffer without wrong or injury.

11 The rage and violence of public war; what is it but a suspension of justice among the warring parties, who perceive, that this virtue is now no longer of any *use* or advantage to them? The laws of war, which then succeed to those of equity and justice, are rules calculated for the *advantage* and *utility* of that particular state, in which men are now placed. And were a civilized nation engaged with barbarians, who observed no rules even of war; the former must also suspend their observance of them, where they no longer serve *SBN 188* to any purpose; and must render every action or rencounter as bloody and pernicious as possible to the first aggressors. 20

12 Thus, the rules of equity or justice depend entirely on the particular state and condition, in which men are placed, and owe their origin and existence to that UTILITY, which results to the public from their strict and regular observance. Reverse, in any considerable circumstance, the condition of men: Produce extreme abundance or extreme necessity: Implant in the human breast perfect moderation and humanity, or perfect rapaciousness and malice: By rendering justice totally *useless*, you thereby totally destroy its essence, and suspend its obligation upon mankind.

13 The common situation of society is a medium amidst all these extremes. We are naturally partial to ourselves, and to our friends; but are capable of 30 learning the advantage resulting from a more equitable conduct. Few enjoyments are given us from the open and liberal hand of nature; but by art, labour, and industry, we can extract them in great abundance. Hence the ideas of property become necessary in all civil society: Hence justice derives its usefulness to the public: And hence alone arises its merit and moral obligation.

14 These conclusions are so natural and obvious, that they have not escaped even the poets, in their descriptions of the felicity, attending the golden age or the reign of SATURN. The seasons, in that first period of nature, were so

temperate, if we credit these agreeable fictions, that there was no necessity for men to provide themselves with cloaths and houses, as a security against the violence of heat and cold: The rivers flowed with wine and milk: The oaks yielded honey; and nature spontaneously produced her greatest delicacies. Nor were these the chief advantages of that happy age. Tempests were not alone removed from nature; but those more furious tempests were unknown *SBN 189* to human breasts, which now cause such uproar, and engender such confusion. Avarice, ambition, cruelty, selfishness, were never heard of: Cordial affection, compassion, sympathy, were the only movements with which the mind was yet acquainted. Even the punctilious distinction of *mine* and *thine* was banished from among that happy race of mortals, and carried with it the very notion of property and obligation, justice and injustice.

15 This *poetical* fiction of the *golden age* is, in some respects, of a piece with the *philosophical* fiction of the *state of nature*; only that the former is represented as the most charming and most peaceable condition, which can possibly be imagined; whereas the latter is painted out as a state of mutual war and violence, attended with the most extreme necessity. On the first origin of mankind, we are told, their ignorance and savage nature were so prevalent, that they could give no mutual trust, but must each depend upon himself, and his own force or cunning for protection and security. No law was heard of: No rule of justice known: No distinction of property regarded: Power was the only measure of right; and a perpetual war of all against all was the result of men's untamed selfishness and barbarity.[11]

16 Whether such a condition of human nature could ever exist, or if it did, *SBN 190* could continue so long as to merit the appellation of a *state*, may justly be doubted. Men are necessarily born in a family-society, at least; and are trained up by their parents to some rule of conduct and behaviour. But this

[11] This fiction of a state of nature, as a state of war, was not first started by Mr. Hobbes, as is com- *SBN 189* monly imagined. Plato endeavours to refute an hypothesis very like it in the 2d, 3d, and 4th books de republica. Cicero, on the contrary, supposes it certain and universally acknowledged in the following passage. "Quis enim vestrum, judices, ignorat, ita naturam rerum tulisse, ut quodam tempore homines, nondum neque naturali, neque civili jure descripto, fusi per agros, ac dispersi vagarentur tantumque haberent quantum manu ac viribus, per cædem ac vulnera, aut eripere, aut retinere potuissent? Qui igitur primi virtute & consilio præstanti extiterunt, ii perspecto genere humanæ docilitatis ac ingenii, dissipatos, unum in locum congregarunt, eosque ex feritate illa ad justitiam ac mansuetudinem transduxerunt. Tum res ad communem utilitatem, quas publicas appellamus, tum conventicula hominum, quæ postea civitates nominatæ sunt, tum domicilia con- 10 juncta, quas urbes dicamus, invento & divino & humano jure, mœnibus sepserunt. Atque inter hanc *SBN 190* vitam, perpolitam humanitate, & illam immanem, nihil tam interest quam Jus atque Vis. Horum utro uti nolimus, altero est utendum. Vim volumus extingui? Jus valeat necesse est, id est, judicia, quibus omne jus continetur. Judicia displicent, aut nulla sunt? Vis dominetur necesse est. Hæc vident omnes." Pro Sext. lib. 42.

must be admitted, that, if such a state of mutual war and violence was ever real, the suspension of all laws of justice, from their absolute inutility, is a necessary and infallible consequence.

17 The more we vary our views of human life, and the newer and more unusual the lights are, in which we survey it, the more shall we be convinced, that the origin here assigned for the virtue of justice is real and satisfactory.

18 Were there a species of creatures, intermingled with men, which, though rational, were possessed of such inferior strength, both of body and mind, that they were incapable of all resistance, and could never, upon the highest provocation, make us feel the effects of their resentment; the necessary consequence, I think, is, that we should be bound, by the laws of humanity, to give gentle usage to these creatures, but should not, properly speaking, lie under any restraint of justice with regard to them, nor could they possess any right or property, exclusive of such arbitrary lords. Our intercourse with them could not be called society, which supposes a degree of equality; but absolute command on the one side, and servile obedience on the other. Whatever we covet, they must instantly resign: Our permission is the only tenure, by which they hold their possessions: Our compassion and kindness the only check, by which they curb our lawless will: And as no inconvenience ever *SBN 191* results from the exercise of a power, so firmly established in nature, the restraints of justice and property, being totally *useless*, would never have place in so unequal a confederacy.

19 This is plainly the situation of men, with regard to animals; and how far these may be said to possess reason, I leave it to others to determine. The great superiority of civilized EUROPEANS above barbarous INDIANS, tempted us to imagine ourselves on the same footing with regard to them, and made us throw off all restraints of justice, and even of humanity, in our treatment of them. In many nations, the female sex are reduced to like slavery, and are rendered incapable of all property, in opposition to their lordly masters. But though the males, when united, have, in all countries, bodily force sufficient to maintain this severe tyranny; yet such are the insinuation, address, and charms of their fair companions, that women are commonly able to break the confederacy, and share with the other sex in all the rights and privileges of society.

20 Were the human species so framed by nature as that each individual possessed within himself every faculty, requisite both for his own preservation and for the propagation of his kind: Were all society and intercourse cut off between man and man, by the primary intention of the Supreme Creator: It seems evident, that so solitary a being would be as much incapable of justice, as of social discourse and conversation. Where mutual regards and forbear-

ance serve to no manner of purpose, they would never direct the conduct of any reasonable man. The headlong course of the passions would be checked by no reflection on future consequences. And as each man is here supposed to love himself alone, and to depend only on himself and his own activity for safety and happiness, he would, on every occasion, to the utmost of his power, challenge the preference above every other being, to none of which he *SBN 192*
is bound by any ties, either of nature or of interest.

21 But suppose the conjunction of the sexes to be established in nature, a family immediately arises; and particular rules being found requisite for its subsistence, these are immediately embraced; though without comprehending the rest of mankind within their prescriptions. Suppose, that several families unite together into one society, which is totally disjoined from all others, the rules, which preserve peace and order, enlarge themselves to the utmost extent of that society; but becoming then entirely useless, lose their force when carried one step farther. But again suppose, that several distinct societies maintain a kind of intercourse for mutual convenience and advantage, the boundaries of justice still grow larger, in proportion to the largeness of men's views, and the force of their mutual connexions. History, experience, reason sufficiently instruct us in this natural progress of human sentiments, and in the gradual enlargement of our regards to justice, in proportion as we become acquainted with the extensive utility of that virtue.

PART 2

22 If we examine the *particular* laws, by which justice is directed, and property determined; we shall still be presented with the same conclusion. The good of mankind is the only object of all these laws and regulations. Not only it is requisite, for the peace and interest of society, that men's possessions should be separated; but the rules, which we follow, in making the separation, are such as can best be contrived to serve farther the interests of society.

23 We shall suppose, that a creature, possessed of reason, but unacquainted with human nature, deliberates with himself what RULES of justice or property would best promote public interest, and establish peace and security *SBN 193*
among mankind: His most obvious thought would be, to assign the largest possessions to the most extensive virtue, and give every one the power of doing good, proportioned to his inclination. In a perfect theocracy, where a being, infinitely intelligent, governs by particular volitions, this rule would certainly have place, and might serve to the wisest purposes: But were mankind to execute such a law; so great is the uncertainty of merit, both from

its natural obscurity, and from the self-conceit of each individual, that no determinate rule of conduct would ever result from it; and the total dissolution of society must be the immediate consequence. Fanatics may suppose, *that dominion is founded on grace*, and *that saints alone inherit the earth*; but the civil magistrate very justly puts these sublime theorists on the same footing with common robbers, and teaches them by the severest discipline, that a rule, which, in speculation, may seem the most advantageous to society, may yet be found, in practice, totally pernicious and destructive.

24 That there were *religious* fanatics of this kind in ENGLAND, during the civil wars, we learn from history; though it is probable, that the obvious *tendency* of these principles excited such horror in mankind, as soon obliged the dangerous enthusiasts to renounce, or at least conceal their tenets. Perhaps, the *levellers*, who claimed an equal distribution of property, were a kind of *political* fanatics, which arose from the religious species, and more openly avowed their pretensions; as carrying a more plausible appearance, of being practicable in themselves, as well as useful to human society.

25 It must, indeed, be confessed, that nature is so liberal to mankind, that, were all her presents equally divided among the species, and improved by art and industry, every individual would enjoy all the necessaries, and even most of the comforts of life; nor would ever be liable to any ills, but such as might accidentally arise from the sickly frame and constitution of his body. It *SBN 194* must also be confessed, that, wherever we depart from this equality, we rob the poor of more satisfaction than we add to the rich, and that the slight gratification of a frivolous vanity, in one individual, frequently costs more than bread to many families, and even provinces. It may appear withal, that the rule of equality, as it would be highly *useful*, is not altogether *impracticable*; but has taken place, at least in an imperfect degree, in some republics; particularly that of SPARTA; where it was attended, it is said, with the most beneficial consequences. Not to mention, that the AGRARIAN laws, so frequently claimed in ROME, and carried into execution in many GREEK cities, proceeded, all of them, from a general idea of the utility of this principle.

26 But historians, and even common sense, may inform us, that, however specious these ideas of *perfect* equality may seem, they are really, at bottom, *impracticable*; and were they not so, would be extremely *pernicious* to human society. Render possessions ever so equal, men's different degrees of art, care, and industry will immediately break that equality. Or if you check these virtues, you reduce society to the most extreme indigence; and instead of preventing want and beggary in a few, render it unavoidable to the whole community. The most rigorous inquisition too is requisite to watch every inequality on its first appearance; and the most severe jurisdiction, to punish

and redress it. But besides, that so much authority must soon degenerate into tyranny, and be exerted with great partialities; who can possibly be possessed of it, in such a situation as is here supposed? Perfect equality of possessions, destroying all subordination, weakens extremely the authority of magistracy, and must reduce all power nearly to a level, as well as property.

27 We may conclude, therefore, that, in order to establish laws for the regulation of property, we must be acquainted with the nature and situation of man; must reject appearances, which may be false, though specious; and must search for those rules, which are, on the whole, most *useful* and *beneficial*. Vulgar sense and slight experience are sufficient for this purpose; where men give not way to too selfish avidity, or too extensive enthusiasm. *SBN 195*

28 Who sees not, for instance, that whatever is produced or improved by a man's art or industry ought, for ever, to be secured to him, in order to give encouragement to such *useful* habits and accomplishments? That the property ought also to descend to children and relations, for the same *useful* purpose? That it may be alienated by consent, in order to beget that commerce and intercourse, which is so *beneficial* to human society? And that all contracts and promises ought carefully to be fulfilled, in order to secure mutual trust and confidence, by which the general *interest* of mankind is so much promoted?

29 Examine the writers on the laws of nature; and you will always find, that, whatever principles they set out with, they are sure to terminate here at last, and to assign, as the ultimate reason for every rule which they establish, the convenience and necessities of mankind. A concession thus extorted, in opposition to systems, has more authority, than if it had been made in prosecution of them.

30 What other reason, indeed, could writers ever give, why this must be *mine* and that *yours*; since uninstructed nature, surely, never made any such distinction? The objects, which receive those appellations, are, of themselves, foreign to us; they are totally disjoined and separated from us; and nothing but the general interests of society can form the connexion.

31 Sometimes, the interests of society may require a rule of justice in a particular case; but may not determine any particular rule, among several, which are all equally beneficial. In that case, the slightest *analogies* are laid hold of, in order to prevent that indifference and ambiguity, which would be the source of perpetual dissention. Thus possession alone, and first possession, is supposed to convey property, where no body else has any preceding claim and pretension. Many of the reasonings of lawyers are of this analogical nature, and depend on very slight connexions of the imagination. *SBN 196*

32 Does any one scruple, in extraordinary cases, to violate all regard to the

private property of individuals, and sacrifice to public interest a distinction, which had been established for the sake of that interest? The safety of the people is the supreme law: All other particular laws are subordinate to it, and dependent on it: And if, in the *common* course of things, they be followed and regarded; it is only because the public safety and interest *commonly* demand so equal and impartial an administration.

33 Sometimes both *utility* and *analogy* fail, and leave the laws of justice in total uncertainty. Thus, it is highly requisite, that prescription or long possession should convey property; but what number of days or months or years should be sufficient for that purpose, it is impossible for reason alone to determine. *Civil laws* here supply the place of the natural *code*, and assign different terms for prescription, according to the different *utilities*, proposed by the legislator. Bills of exchange and promissory notes, by the laws of most countries, prescribe sooner than bonds, and mortgages, and contracts of a more formal nature.

34 In general, we may observe, that all questions of property are subordinate to the authority of civil laws, which extend, restrain, modify, and alter the rules of natural justice, according to the particular *convenience* of each community. The laws have, or ought to have, a constant reference to the constitution of government, the manners, the climate, the religion, the commerce, the situation of each society. A late author of genius, as well as learning, has prosecuted this subject at large, and has established, from these principles, a system of political knowledge, which abounds in ingenious and brilliant thoughts, and is not wanting in solidity.[12] *SBN 197*

[12] The author of *L'Esprit des Loix*. This illustrious writer, however, sets out with a different theory, and supposes all right to be founded on certain *rapports* or relations; which is a system, that, in my opinion, never will be reconciled with true philosophy. Father Malebranche, as far as I can learn, was the first that started this abstract theory of morals, which was afterwards adopted by Cudworth, Clarke, and others; and as it excludes all sentiment, and pretends to found every thing on reason, it has not wanted followers in this philosophic age. See Section 1. and Appendix 1. With regard to justice, the virtue here treated of, the inference against this theory seems short and conclusive. Property is allowed to be dependent on civil laws; civil laws are allowed to have no other object, but the interest of society: This therefore must be allowed to be the sole foundation of property and justice. Not to mention, that our obligation itself to obey the magistrate and his laws is founded on nothing but the interests of society. *SBN 197*

If the ideas of justice, sometimes, do not follow the dispositions of civil law; we shall find, that these cases, instead of objections, are confirmations of the theory delivered above. Where a civil law is so perverse as to cross all the interests of society, it loses all its authority, and men judge by the ideas of natural justice, which are conformable to those interests. Sometimes also civil laws, for useful purposes, require a ceremony or form to any deed; and where that is wanting, their decrees run contrary to the usual tenor of justice; but one who takes advantage of such chicanes, is not commonly regarded as an honest man. Thus, the interests of society require, that contracts be fulfilled; and there is not a more material article either of natural or civil justice: But the omission of a trifling circumstance will often, by law, invalidate a contract, *in foro humano*, but not *in foro conscientiæ*, as

35 *What is a man's property?* Any thing, which it is lawful for him, and for him alone, to use. *But what rule have we, by which we can distinguish these objects?* Here we must have recourse to statutes, customs, precedents, analogies, and a hundred other circumstances; some of which are constant and inflexible, some variable and arbitrary. But the ultimate point, in which they all profess- *SBN 198*
edly terminate, is, the interest and happiness of human society. Where this enters not into consideration, nothing can appear more whimsical, unnatural, and even superstitious, than all or most of the laws of justice and of property.

36 Those, who ridicule vulgar superstitions, and expose the folly of particular regards to meats, days, places, postures, apparel, have an easy task; while they consider all the qualities and relations of the objects, and discover no adequate cause for that affection or antipathy, veneration or horror, which have so mighty an influence over a considerable part of mankind. A SYRIAN would have starved rather than taste pigeon; an EGYPTIAN would not have approached bacon: But if these species of food be examined by the senses of sight, smell, or taste, or scrutinized by the sciences of chymistry, medicine, or physics; no difference is ever found between them and any other species, nor can that precise circumstance be pitched on, which may afford a just foundation for the religious passion. A fowl on Thursday is lawful food; on Friday abominable: Eggs, in this house, and in this diocese, are permitted during Lent; a hundred paces farther, to eat them is a damnable sin. This earth or building, yesterday was profane; to-day, by the muttering of certain words, it has become holy and sacred. Such reflections as these, in the mouth of a philosopher, one may safely say, are too obvious to have any influence; because they must always, to every man, occur at first sight; and where they prevail not, of themselves, they are surely obstructed by education, prejudice, and passion, not by ignorance or mistake.

37 It may appear to a careless view, or rather, a too abstracted reflection, that there enters a like superstition into all the sentiments of justice; and that, if a man expose its object, or what we call property, to the same scrutiny of sense and science, he will not, by the most accurate enquiry, find any foundation for *SBN 199*
the difference made by moral sentiment. I may lawfully nourish myself from this tree; but the fruit of another of the same species, ten paces off, it is criminal for me to touch. Had I worne this apparel an hour ago, I had merited the severest punishment; but a man, by pronouncing a few magical syllables, has

divines express themselves. In these cases, the magistrate is supposed only to withdraw his power of enforcing the right, not to have altered the right. Where his intention extends to the right, and is conformable to the interests of society; it never fails to alter the right; a clear proof of the origin of justice and of property, as assigned above.

now rendered it fit for my use and service. Were this house placed in the neighbouring territory, it had been immoral for me to dwell in it; but being built on this side the river, it is subject to a different municipal law, and, by its becoming mine, I incur no blame or censure. The same species of reasoning, it may be thought, which so successfully exposes superstition, is also applicable to justice; nor is it possible, in the one case more than in the other, to point out, in the object, that precise quality or circumstance, which is the foundation of the sentiment.

38 But there is this material difference between *superstition* and *justice*, that the former is frivolous, useless, and burdensome; the latter is absolutely requisite to the well-being of mankind and existence of society. When we abstract from this circumstance (for it is too apparent ever to be overlooked) it must be confessed, that all regards to right and property, seem entirely without foundation, as much as the grossest and most vulgar superstition. Were the interests of society nowise concerned, it is as unintelligible, why another's articulating certain sounds, implying consent, should change the nature of my actions with regard to a particular object, as why the reciting of a liturgy by a priest, in a certain habit and posture, should dedicate a heap of brick and timber, and render it, thenceforth and for ever, sacred.[13]

[13] It is evident, that the will or consent alone never transfers property, nor causes the obligation of a promise, (for the same reasoning extends to both) but the will must be expressed by words or signs, in order to impose a tye upon any man. The expression being once brought in as subservient to the will, soon becomes the principal part of the promise; nor will a man be less bound by his word, though he secretly give a different direction to his intention, and with-hold the assent of his mind. But though the expression makes, on most occasions, the whole of the promise, yet it does not always so; and one who should make use of any expression, of which he knows not the meaning, and which he use without any sense of the consequences, would not certainly be bound by it. Nay, though he know its meaning, yet if he use it in jest only, and with such signs as evidently show, that he has no serious intention of binding himself, he would not lie under any obligation of performance; but it is necessary, that the words be a perfect expression of the will, without any contrary signs. Nay, even this we must not carry so far as to imagine, that one, whom, by our quickness of understanding, we conjecture, from certain signs, to have an intention of deceiving us, is not bound by his expression or verbal promise, if we accept of it; but must limit this conclusion to those cases where the signs are of a different nature from those of deceit. All these contradictions are easily accounted for, if justice arise entirely from its usefulness to society; but will never be explained on any other hypothesis. *SBN 199* *SBN 200*

It is remarkable, that the moral decisions of the Jesuits and other relaxed casuists, were commonly formed in prosecution of some such subtilties of reasoning as are here pointed out, and proceeded as much from the habit of scholastic refinement as from any corruption of the heart, if we may follow the authority of Mons. Bayle. See his *Dictionary*, article Loyola. And why has the indignation of mankind risen so high against these casuists; but because every one perceived, that human society could not subsist were such practices authorized, and that morals must always be handled with a view to public interest, more than philosophical regularity? If the secret direction of the intention, said every man of sense, could invalidate a contract; where is our security? And yet a metaphysical schoolman might think, that, where an intention was supposed to be requisite, if that intention really had not place, no consequence ought to follow, and no obligation be imposed. The casuistical subtilties may not be greater than the subtilties of lawyers, hinted at above; but as the

39 These reflections are far from weakening the obligations of justice, or diminishing any thing from the most sacred attention to property. On the contrary, such sentiments must acquire new force from the present reasoning. For what stronger foundation can be desired or conceived for any duty, than to observe, that human society, or even human nature could not subsist, without the establishment of it; and will still arrive at greater degrees of happiness and perfection, the more inviolable the regard is, which is paid to that duty? SBN 200 SBN 201

40 The dilemma seems obvious: As justice evidently tends to promote public utility and to support civil society, the sentiment of justice is either derived from our reflecting on that tendency, or like hunger, thirst, and other appetites, resentment, love of life, attachment to offspring, and other passions, arises from a simple original instinct in the human breast, which nature has implanted for like salutary purposes. If the latter be the case, it follows, that property, which is the object of justice, is also distinguished by a simple, original instinct, and is not ascertained by any argument or reflection. But who is there that ever heard of such an instinct? Or is this a subject, in which new discoveries can be made? We may as well expect to discover, in the body, new senses, which had before escaped the observation of all mankind.

41 But farther, though it seems a very simple proposition to say, that nature, by an instinctive sentiment, distinguishes property, yet in reality we shall find, that there are required for that purpose ten thousand different instincts, and these employed about objects of the greatest intricacy and nicest discernment. For when a definition of *property* is required, that relation is found to resolve itself into any possession acquired by occupation, by industry, by prescription, by inheritance, by contract, *&c*. Can we think, that nature, by an original instinct, instructs us in all these methods of acquisition? SBN 202

42 These words too, *inheritance* and *contract*, stand for ideas infinitely complicated; and to define them exactly, a hundred volumes of laws, and a thousand volumes of commentators, have not been found sufficient. Does nature,

former are *pernicious*, and the latter *innocent* and even *necessary*, this is the reason of the very different reception they meet with from the world.

It is a doctrine of the church of Rome, that the priest, by a secret direction of his intention, can invalidate any sacrament. This position is derived from a strict and regular prosecution of the obvious truth, that empty words alone, without any meaning or intention in the speaker, can never be attended with any effect. If the same conclusion be not admitted in reasonings concerning civil contracts, where the affair is allowed to be of so much less consequence than the eternal salvation of thousands, it proceeds entirely from men's sense of the danger and inconvenience of the doctrine in the former case: And we may thence observe, that however positive, arrogant, and dogmatical any superstition may appear, it never can convey any thorough persuasion of the reality of its objects, or put them, in any degree, on a balance with the common incidents of life, which we learn from daily observation and experimental reasoning. SBN 201

whose instincts in men are all simple, embrace such complicated and artificial objects, and create a rational creature, without trusting any thing to the operation of his reason?

43 But even though all this were admitted, it would not be satisfactory. Positive laws can certainly transfer property. Is it by another original instinct, that we recognize the authority of kings and senates, and mark all the boundaries of their jurisdiction? Judges too, even though their sentence be erroneous and illegal, must be allowed, for the sake of peace and order, to have decisive authority, and ultimately to determine property. Have we original, innate ideas of prætors and chancellors and juries? Who sees not, that all these institutions arise merely from the necessities of human society?

44 All birds of the same species, in every age and country, build their nests alike: In this we see the force of instinct. Men, in different times and places, frame their houses differently: Here we perceive the influence of reason and custom. A like inference may be drawn from comparing the instinct of generation and the institution of property.

45 How great soever the variety of municipal laws, it must be confessed, that their chief outlines pretty regularly concur; because the purposes, to which they tend, are every where exactly similar. In like manner, all houses have a roof and walls, windows and chimneys; though diversified in their shape, figure, and materials. The purposes of the latter, directed to the conveniencies of human life, discover not more plainly their origin from reason and reflection, than do those of the former, which point all to a like end. *SBN 203*

46 I need not mention the variations, which all the rules of property receive from the finer turns and connexions of the imagination, and from the subtilties and abstractions of law-topics and reasonings. There is no possibility of reconciling this observation to the notion of original instincts.

47 What alone will beget a doubt concerning the theory, on which I insist, is the influence of education and acquired habits, by which we are so accustomed to blame injustice, that we are not, in every instance, conscious of any immediate reflection on the pernicious consequences of it. The views the most familiar to us are apt, for that very reason, to escape us; and what we have very frequently performed from certain motives, we are apt likewise to continue mechanically, without recalling, on every occasion, the reflections, which first determined us. The convenience, or rather necessity, which leads to justice, is so universal, and every where points so much to the same rules, that the habit takes place in all societies; and it is not without some scrutiny, that we are able to ascertain its true origin. The matter, however, is not so obscure, but that, even in common life, we have, every moment, recourse to the principle of public utility, and ask, *What must become of the world, if such*

practices prevail? How could society subsist under such disorders? Were the distinction or separation of possessions entirely useless, can any one conceive, that it ever should have obtained in society?

48 Thus we seem, upon the whole, to have attained a knowledge of the force of that principle here insisted on, and can determine what degree of esteem or moral approbation may result from reflections on public interest and utility. The necessity of justice to the support of society is the SOLE foundation of that virtue; and since no moral excellence is more highly esteemed, we *SBN 204* may conclude, that this circumstance of usefulness has, in general, the strongest energy, and most entire command over our sentiments. It must, 10 therefore, be the source of a considerable part of the merit ascribed to humanity, benevolence, friendship, public spirit, and other social virtues of that stamp; as it is the SOLE source of the moral approbation paid to fidelity, justice, veracity, integrity, and those other estimable and useful qualities and principles. It is entirely agreeable to the rules of philosophy, and even of common reason; where any principle has been found to have a great force and energy in one instance, to ascribe to it a like energy in all similar instances. This indeed is NEWTON's chief rule of philosophizing.[14]

[14] Principia, lib. 3. *SBN 204*

SECTION 4

SBN 205

Of Political Society

1 HAD every man sufficient *sagacity* to perceive, at all times, the strong interest, which binds him to the observance of justice and equity, and *strength of mind* sufficient to persevere in a steady adherence to a general and a distant interest, in opposition to the allurements of present pleasure and advantage; there had never, in that case, been any such thing as government or political society, but each man, following his natural liberty, had lived in entire peace and harmony with all others. What need of positive law, where natural justice is, of itself, a sufficient restraint? Why create magistrates, where there never arises any disorder or iniquity? Why abridge our native freedom, when, in every instance, the utmost exertion of it is found innocent and beneficial? It is evident, that, if government were totally useless, it never could have place, and that the SOLE foundation of the duty of ALLEGIANCE is the *advantage*, which it procures to society, by preserving peace and order among mankind.

2 When a number of political societies are erected, and maintain a great intercourse together, a new set of rules are immediately discovered to be *useful* in that particular situation; and accordingly take place under the title of LAWS of NATIONS. Of this kind are, the sacredness of the person of ambassadors, abstaining from poisoned arms, quarter in war, with others of that kind, which are plainly calculated for the *advantage* of states and kingdoms, in their intercourse with each other.

3 The rules of justice, such as prevail among individuals, are not entirely *SBN 206* suspended among political societies. All princes pretend a regard to the rights of other princes; and some, no doubt, without hypocrisy. Alliances and treaties are every day made between independent states, which would only be so much waste of parchment, if they were not found, by experience, to have *some* influence and authority. But here is the difference between kingdoms and individuals. Human nature cannot, by any means, subsist, without the association of individuals; and that association never could have place, were no regard paid to the laws of equity and justice. Disorder, confusion, the war of all against all, are the necessary consequences of such a licentious conduct. But nations can subsist without intercourse. They may even subsist, in some degree, under a general war. The observance of justice, though useful among them, is not guarded by so strong a necessity as among individuals; and the

moral obligation holds proportion with the *usefulness*. All politicians will allow, and most philosophers, that REASONS of STATE may, in particular emergencies, dispense with the rules of justice, and invalidate any treaty or alliance, where the strict observance of it would be prejudicial, in a considerable degree, to either of the contracting parties. But nothing less than the most extreme necessity, it is confessed, can justify individuals in a breach of promise, or an invasion of the properties of others.

4 In a confederated commonwealth, such as the ACHÆAN republic of old, or the SWISS Cantons and United Provinces in modern times; as the league has here a peculiar *utility*, the conditions of union have a peculiar sacredness and authority, and a violation of them would be regarded as no less, or even as more criminal, than any private injury or injustice.

5 The long and helpless infancy of man requires the combination of parents for the subsistence of their young; and that combination requires the virtue of CHASTITY or fidelity to the marriage bed. Without such a *utility*, it will readily be owned, that such a virtue would never have been thought of.[15] *SBN 207*

6 An infidelity of this nature is much more *pernicious* in *women* than in *men*. Hence the laws of chastity are much stricter over the one sex than over the other.

7 These rules have all a reference to generation; and yet women past child-bearing are no more supposed to be exempted from them than those in the flower of their youth and beauty. *General rules* are often extended beyond the principle, whence they first arise; and this in all matters of taste and sentiment. It is a vulgar story at PARIS, that, during the rage of the MISSISSIPPI, a hump-backed fellow went every day into the RUE DE QUINCEMPOIX, where the stock-jobbers met in great crowds, and was well paid for allowing them to make use of his hump as a desk, in order to sign their contracts upon it. Would the fortune, which he raised by this expedient, make him a handsome fellow; though it be confessed, that personal beauty arises very much from ideas of utility? The imagination is influenced by associations of ideas; which, though they arise at first from the judgment, are not easily altered by

[15] The only solution, which PLATO gives to all the objections that might be raised against the community of women, established in his imaginary commonwealth, is, Κάλλιστα γὰρ δὴ τοῦτο καὶ λέγεται καὶ λελέξεται, ὅτι τὸ μὲν ὠφέλιμον καλόν, τὸ δὲ βλαβερὸν αἰσχρόν. "Scite enim istud & dicitur & dicetur, Id quod utile sit, honestum esse: quod autem inutile sit, turpe esse." De rep. lib. 5. p. 457. ex edit. Serr. And this maxim will admit of no doubt, where public utility is concerned; which is PLATO's meaning. And indeed to what other purpose do all the ideas of chastity and modesty serve? "Nisi utile est quod facimus, stulta est gloria," says PHÆDRUS. Καλὸν τῶν βλαβερῶν οὐδέν, says PLUTARCH, de vitioso pudore. "Nihil eorum quæ damnosa sunt, pulchrum est." The same was the opinion of the STOICS. Φασὶν οὖν οἱ Στωικοὶ ἀγαθὸν εἶναι ὠφέλειαν ἧοὐχ ἕτερον ὠφελείας, ὠφελεῖν μὲν λέγοντες τὴν ἀρετὴν καὶ τὴν σπουδαίαν πρᾶξιν. SEXT. EMP. lib. 3. cap. 20. *SBN 207*

every particular exception that occurs to us. To which we may add, in the present case of chastity, that the example of the old would be pernicious to *SBN 208* the young; and that women, continually foreseeing that a certain time would bring them the liberty of indulgence, would naturally advance that period, and think more lightly of this whole duty, so requisite to society.

8 Those who live in the same family have such frequent opportunities of licence of this kind, that nothing could preserve purity of manners, were marriage allowed among the nearest relations, or any intercourse of love between them ratified by law and custom. INCEST, therefore, being *pernicious* in a superior degree, has also a superior turpitude and moral deformity annexed to it.

9 What is the reason, why, by the ATHENIAN laws, one might marry a half-sister by the father, but not by the mother? Plainly this: The manners of the ATHENIANS were so reserved, that a man was never permitted to approach the women's apartment, even in the same family, unless where he visited his own mother. His step-mother and her children were as much shut up from him as the women of any other family, and there was as little danger of any criminal correspondence between them. Uncles and nieces, for a like reason, might marry at ATHENS; but neither these, nor half-brothers and sisters, could contract that alliance at ROME, where the intercourse was more open between the sexes. Public utility is the cause of all these variations.

10 To repeat, to a man's prejudice, any thing that escaped him in private conversation, or to make any such use of his private letters, is highly blamed. The free and social intercourse of minds must be extremely checked, where no such rules of fidelity are established.

11 Even in repeating stories, whence we can foresee no ill consequences to result, the giving of one's author is regarded as a piece of indiscretion, if not of immorality. These stories, in passing from hand to hand, and receiving all the usual variations, frequently come about to the persons concerned, and produce animosities and quarrels among people, whose intentions are the *SBN 209* most innocent and inoffensive.

12 To pry into secrets, to open or even read the letters of others, to play the spy upon their words and looks and actions; what habits more inconvenient in society? What habits, of consequence, more blameable?

13 This principle is also the foundation of most of the laws of good manners; a kind of lesser morality, calculated for the ease of company and conversation. Too much or too little ceremony are both blamed, and every thing, which promotes ease, without an indecent familiarity, is useful and laudable.

14 Constancy in friendships, attachments, and familiarities, is commendable, and is requisite to support trust and good correspondence in society. But in

places of general, though casual concourse, where the pursuit of health and pleasure brings people promiscuously together, public conveniency has dispensed with this maxim; and custom there promotes an unreserved conversation for the time, by indulging the privilege of dropping afterwards every indifferent acquaintance, without breach of civility or good manners.

15 Even in societies, which are established on principles the most immoral, and the most destructive to the interests of the general society, there are required certain rules, which a species of false honour, as well as private interest, engages the members to observe. Robbers and pirates, it has often been remarked, could not maintain their pernicious confederacy, did they 10 not establish a new distributive justice among themselves, and recall those laws of equity, which they have violated with the rest of mankind.

16 *I hate a drinking companion*, says the GREEK proverb, *who never forgets*. The follies of the last debauch should be buried in eternal oblivion, in order to give full scope to the follies of the next.

17 Among nations, where an immoral gallantry, if covered with a thin veil of *SBN 210* mystery, is, in some degree, authorized by custom, there immediately arise a set of rules, calculated for the conveniency of that attachment. The famous court or parliament of love in PROVENCE formerly decided all difficult cases of this nature. 20

18 In societies for play, there are laws required for the conduct of the game; and these laws are different in each game. The foundation, I own, of such societies is frivolous; and the laws are, in a great measure, though not altogether, capricious and arbitrary. So far is there a material difference between them and the rules of justice, fidelity, and loyalty. The general societies of men are absolutely requisite for the subsistence of the species; and the public conveniency, which regulates morals, is inviolably established in the nature of man, and of the world, in which he lives. The comparison, therefore, in these respects, is very imperfect. We may only learn from it the necessity of rules, wherever men have any intercourse with each other. 30

19 They cannot even pass each other on the road without rules. Waggoners, coachmen, and postilions have principles, by which they give the way; and these are chiefly founded on mutual ease and convenience. Sometimes also they are arbitrary, at least dependent on a kind of capricious analogy, like many of the reasonings of lawyers.[16]

[16] That the lighter machine yield to the heavier, and, in machines of the same kind, that the *SBN 210* empty yield to the loaded; this rule is founded on convenience. That those who are going to the capital take place of those who are coming from it; this seems to be founded on some idea of the dignity of the great city, and of the preference of the future to the past. From like reasons, among foot-walkers, the right-hand entitles a man to the wall, and prevents jostling, which peaceable people find very disagreeable and inconvenient.

20 To carry the matter farther, we may observe, that it is impossible for men so much as to murder each other without statutes, and maxims, and an idea of justice and honour. War has its laws as well as peace; and even that sportive *SBN 211* kind of war, carried on among wrestlers, boxers, cudgel-players, gladiators, is regulated by fixed principles. Common interest and utility beget infallibly a standard of right and wrong among the parties concerned.

SECTION 5

SBN 212

Why Utility Pleases

PART 1

1 It seems so natural a thought to ascribe to their utility the praise, which we bestow on the social virtues, that one would expect to meet with this principle every where in moral writers, as the chief foundation of their reasoning and enquiry. In common life, we may observe, that the circumstance of utility is always appealed to; nor is it supposed, that a greater eulogy can be given to any man, than to display his usefulness to the public, and enumerate the services, which he has performed to mankind and society. What praise, even of an inanimate form, if the regularity and elegance of its parts destroy not its fitness for any useful purpose! And how satisfactory an apology for any disproportion or seeming deformity, if we can show the necessity of that particular construction for the use intended! A ship appears more beautiful to an artist, or one moderately skilled in navigation, where its prow is wide and swelling beyond its poop, than if it were framed with a precise geometrical regularity, in contradiction to all the laws of mechanics. A building, whose doors and windows were exact squares, would hurt the eye by that very proportion; as ill adapted to the figure of a human creature, for whose service the fabric was intended. What wonder then, that a man, whose habits and conduct are hurtful to society, and dangerous or pernicious to every one who has an intercourse with him, should, on that account, be an object of disapprobation, and communicate to every spectator the strongest sentiments of disgust and hatred?[17]

SBN 213

[17] We ought not to imagine, because an inanimate object may be useful as well as a man, that therefore it ought also, according to this system, to merit the appellation of *virtuous*. The sentiments, excited by utility, are, in the two cases, very different; and the one is mixed with affection, esteem, approbation, *&c.* and not the other. In like manner, an inanimate object may have good colour and proportions as well as a human figure. But can we ever be in love with the former? There are a numerous set of passions and sentiments, of which thinking rational beings are, by the original constitution of nature, the only proper objects: And though the very same qualities be transferred to an insensible, inanimate being, they will not excite the same sentiments. The beneficial qualities of herbs and minerals are, indeed, sometimes called their *virtues*; but this is an effect of the caprice of language, which ought not be regarded in reasoning. For though there be a species of approbation attending even inanimate objects, when beneficial, yet this sentiment is so weak, and so different from that which is directed to beneficent magistrates or statesmen, that they ought not to be ranked under the same class or appellation.

SBN 213

2 But perhaps the difficulty of accounting for these effects of usefulness, or its contrary, has kept philosophers from admitting them into their systems of ethics, and has induced them rather to employ any other principle, in explaining the origin of moral good and evil. But it is no just reason for rejecting any principle, confirmed by experience, that we cannot give a satisfactory account of its origin, nor are able to resolve it into other more general principles. And if we would employ a little thought on the present subject, we need be at no loss to account for the influence of utility, and to deduce it from principles, the most known and avowed in human nature.

3 From the apparent usefulness of the social virtues, it has readily been *SBN 214* inferred by sceptics, both ancient and modern, that all moral distinctions arise from education, and were, at first, invented, and afterwards encouraged, by the art of politicians, in order to render men tractable, and subdue their natural ferocity and selfishness, which incapacitated them for society. This principle, indeed, of precept and education, must so far be owned to have a powerful influence, that it may frequently encrease or diminish, beyond their natural standard, the sentiments of approbation or dislike; and may even, in particular instances, create, without any natural principle, a new sentiment of this kind; as is evident in all superstitious practices and observances: But that *all* moral affection or dislike arises from this origin, will never surely be 20 allowed by any judicious enquirer. Had nature made no such distinction, founded on the original constitution of the mind, the words, *honourable* and *shameful*, *lovely* and *odious*, *noble* and *despicable*, had never had place in any language; nor could politicians, had they invented these terms, ever have been able to render them intelligible, or make them convey any idea to the audience. So that nothing can be more superficial than this paradox of the sceptics; and it were well, if, in the abstruser studies of logic and metaphysics, we could as easily obviate the cavils of that sect, as in the practical and more intelligible sciences of politics and morals.

4 The social virtues must, therefore, be allowed to have a natural beauty and 30 amiableness, which, at first, antecedent to all precept or education, recommends them to the esteem of uninstructed mankind, and engages their affections. And as the public utility of these virtues is the chief circumstance, whence they derive their merit, it follows, that the end, which they have a tendency to promote, must be some way agreeable to us, and take hold of some natural affection. It must please, either from considerations of self-interest, *SBN 215* or from more generous motives and regards.

A very small variation of the object, even where the same qualities are preserved, will destroy a sentiment. Thus, the same beauty, transferred to a different sex, excites no amorous passion, where nature is not extremely perverted.

5 It has often been asserted, that, as every man has a strong connexion with society, and perceives the impossibility of his solitary subsistence, he becomes, on that account, favourable to all those habits or principles, which promote order in society, and ensure to him the quiet possession of so inestimable a blessing. As much as we value our own happiness and welfare, as much must we applaud the practice of justice and humanity, by which alone the social confederacy can be maintained, and every man reap the fruits of mutual protection and assistance.

6 This deduction of morals from self-love, or a regard to private interest, is an obvious thought, and has not arisen wholly from the wanton sallies and sportive assaults of the sceptics. To mention no others, POLYBIUS, one of the gravest and most judicious, as well as most moral writers of antiquity, has assigned this selfish origin to all our sentiments of virtue.[18] But though the solid, practical sense of that author, and his aversion to all vain subtilties, render his authority on the present subject very considerable; yet is not this an affair to be decided by authority, and the voice of nature and experience seems plainly to oppose the selfish theory.

7 We frequently bestow praise on virtuous actions, performed in very distant ages and remote countries; where the utmost subtilty of imagination would not discover any appearance of self-interest, or find any connexion of our present happiness and security with events so widely separated from us. *SBN 216*

8 A generous, a brave, a noble deed, performed by an adversary, commands our approbation; while in its consequences it may be acknowledged prejudicial to our particular interest.

9 Where private advantage concurs with general affection for virtue, we readily perceive and avow the mixture of these distinct sentiments, which have a very different feeling and influence on the mind. We praise, perhaps, with more alacrity, where the generous, humane action contributes to our particular interest: But the topics of praise, which we insist on, are very wide of this circumstance. And we may attempt to bring over others to our sentiments, without endeavouring to convince them, that they reap any advantage from the actions which we recommend to their approbation and applause.

10 Frame the model of a praise-worthy character, consisting of all the most amiable moral virtues: Give instances, in which these display themselves

[18] Undutifulness to parents is disapproved of by mankind, *προορωμένους τὸ μέλλον, καὶ συλλογιζομένους ὅτι τὸ παραπλήσιον ἑκάστοις αὐτῶν συγκυρήσει*. Ingratitude for a like reason (though he seems there to mix a more generous regard) *συναγανακτοῦντας μὲν τῷ πέλας, ἀναφέροντας δ' ἐπ' αὐτοὺς τὸ παραπλήσιον ἐξ ὧν ὑπογίγνεταί τις ἔννοια παρ' ἑκάστῳ τῆς τοῦ καθήκοντος δυνάμεως καὶ θεωρίας*. Lib. vi. cap. 4. Perhaps the historian only meant, that our sympathy and humanity was more enlivened, by our considering the similarity of our case with that of the person suffering; which is a just sentiment. *SBN 215*

after an eminent and extraordinary manner: You readily engage the esteem and approbation of all your audience, who never so much as enquire in what age and country the person lived, who possessed these noble qualities: A circumstance, however, of all others, the most material to self-love, or a concern for our own individual happiness.

11 Once on a time, a statesman, in the shock and contest of parties, prevailed so far as to procure, by his eloquence, the banishment of an able adversary; whom he secretly followed, offering him money for his support during his exile, and soothing him with topics of consolation in his misfortunes. "Alas!" cries the banished statesman, "with what regret must I leave my friends in this city, where even enemies are so generous!" Virtue, though in an enemy, *SBN 217* here pleased him: And we also give it the just tribute of praise and approbation; nor do we retract these sentiments, when we hear, that the action passed at ATHENS, about two thousand years ago, and that the persons' names were ÆSCHINES and DEMOSTHENES.

12 *What is that to me?* There are few occasions, when this question is not pertinent: And had it that universal, infallible influence supposed, it would turn into ridicule every composition, and almost every conversation, which contain any praise or censure of men and manners.

13 It is but a weak subterfuge, when pressed by these facts and arguments, to say, that we transport ourselves, by the force of imagination, into distant ages and countries, and consider the advantage, which we should have reaped from these characters, had we been contemporaries, and had any commerce with the persons. It is not conceivable, how a *real* sentiment or passion can ever arise from a known *imaginary* interest; especially when our *real* interest is still kept in view, and is often acknowledged to be entirely distinct from the imaginary, and even sometimes opposite to it.

14 A man, brought to the brink of a precipice, cannot look down without trembling; and the sentiment of *imaginary* danger actuates him, in opposition to the opinion and belief of *real* safety. But the imagination is here assisted by the presence of a striking object; and yet prevails not, except it be also aided by novelty, and the unusual appearance of the object. Custom soon reconciles us to heights and precipices, and wears off these false and delusive terrors. The reverse is observable in the estimates, which we form of characters and manners; and the more we habituate ourselves to an accurate scrutiny of morals, the more delicate feeling do we acquire of the most minute distinctions between vice and virtue. Such frequent occasion, indeed, *SBN 218* have we, in common life, to pronounce all kinds of moral determinations, that no object of this kind can be new or unusual to us; nor could any *false* views or prepossessions maintain their ground against an experience, so

common and familiar. Experience being chiefly what forms the associations of ideas, it is impossible, that any association could establish and support itself, in direct opposition to that principle.

15 Usefulness is agreeable, and engages our approbation. This is a matter of fact, confirmed by daily observation. But, *useful?* For what? For some body's interest, surely. Whose interest then? Not our own only: For our approbation frequently extends farther. It must, therefore, be the interest of those, who are served by the character or action approved of; and these we may conclude, however remote, are not totally indifferent to us. By opening up this principle, we shall discover one great source of moral distinctions. 10

PART 2

16 Self-love is a principle in human nature of such extensive energy, and the interest of each individual is, in general, so closely connected with that of the community, that those philosophers were excusable, who fancied, that all our concern for the public might be resolved into a concern for our own happiness and preservation. They saw, every moment, instances of approbation or blame, satisfaction or displeasure towards characters and actions; they denominated the objects of these sentiments, *virtues* or *vices*; they observed, that the former had a tendency to encrease the happiness, and the latter the misery of mankind; they asked, whether it were possible that we could have any general concern for society, or any disinterested resentment of the 20
welfare or injury of others; they found it simpler to consider all these sentiments as modifications of self-love; and they discovered a pretence, at least, for this unity of principle, in that close union of interest, which is so observable between the public and each individual. *SBN 219*

17 But notwithstanding this frequent confusion of interests, it is easy to attain what natural philosophers, after Lord Bacon, have affected to call the *experimentum crucis*, or that experiment, which points out the right way in any doubt or ambiguity. We have found instances, in which private interest was separate from public; in which it was even contrary: And yet we observed the moral sentiment to continue, notwithstanding this disjunction of interests. 30
And wherever these distinct interests sensibly concurred, we always found a sensible encrease of the sentiment, and a more warm affection to virtue, and detestation of vice, or what we properly call, *gratitude* and *revenge*. Compelled by these instances, we must renounce the theory, which accounts for every moral sentiment by the principle of self-love. We must adopt a more public affection, and allow, that the interests of society are not, even on their

own account, entirely indifferent to us. Usefulness is only a tendency to a certain end; and it is a contradiction in terms, that any thing pleases as means to an end, where the end itself nowise affects us. If usefulness, therefore, be a source of moral sentiment, and if this usefulness be not always considered with a reference to self; it follows, that every thing, which contributes to the happiness of society, recommends itself directly to our approbation and good-will. Here is a principle, which accounts, in great part, for the origin of morality: And what need we seek for abstruse and remote systems, when there occurs one so obvious and natural?[19]

18 Have we any difficulty to comprehend the force of humanity and benevo- *SBN 220*
lence? Or to conceive, that the very aspect of happiness, joy, prosperity, gives pleasure; that of pain, suffering, sorrow, communicates uneasiness? The human countenance, says HORACE,[20] borrows smiles or tears from the human countenance. Reduce a person to solitude, and he loses all enjoyment, except either of the sensual or speculative kind; and that because the movements of his heart are not forwarded by correspondent movements in his fellow-creatures. The signs of sorrow and mourning, though arbitrary, affect us with melancholy; but the natural symptoms, tears and cries and groans, never fail to infuse compassion and uneasiness. And if the effects of misery touch us in so lively a manner; can we be supposed altogether insensible or indiffer- 20
ent towards its causes; when a malicious or treacherous character and behaviour are presented to us?

19 We enter, I shall suppose, into a convenient, warm, well-contrived apart-
ment: We necessarily receive a pleasure from its very survey; because it presents us with the pleasing ideas of ease, satisfaction, and enjoyment. The hospitable, good-humoured, humane landlord appears. This circumstance surely must embellish the whole; nor can we easily forbear reflecting, with pleasure, on the satisfaction which results to every one from his intercourse *SBN 221*
and good offices.

20 His whole family, by the freedom, ease, confidence, and calm enjoyment, 30
diffused over their countenances, sufficiently express their happiness. I have

[19] It is needless to push our researches so far as to ask, why we have humanity or a fellow-feeling *SBN 219*
with others. It is sufficient, that this is experienced to be a principle in human nature. We must stop somewhere in our examination of causes; and there are, in every science, some general principles, *SBN 220*
beyond which we cannot hope to find any principle more general. No man is absolutely indifferent to the happiness and misery of others. The first has a natural tendency to give pleasure; the second, pain. This every one may find in himself. It is not probable, that these principles can be resolved into principles more simple and universal, whatever attempts may have been made to that purpose. But if it were possible, it belongs not to the present subject; and we may here safely consider these principles as original: Happy, if we can render all the consequences sufficiently plain and perspicuous!

[20] "Uti ridentibus arrident, ita flentibus adflent 10
Humani vultus." HOR. *SBN 220*

a pleasing sympathy in the prospect of so much joy, and can never consider the source of it, without the most agreeable emotions.

21 He tells me, that an oppressive and powerful neighbour had attempted to dispossess him of his inheritance, and had long disturbed all his innocent and social pleasures. I feel an immediate indignation arise in me against such violence and injury.

22 But it is no wonder, he adds, that a private wrong should proceed from a man, who had enslaved provinces, depopulated cities, and made the field and scaffold stream with human blood. I am struck with horror at the prospect of so much misery, and am actuated by the strongest antipathy against its author.

23 In general, it is certain, that, wherever we go, whatever we reflect on or converse about, every thing still presents us with the view of human happiness or misery, and excites in our breast a sympathetic movement of pleasure or uneasiness. In our serious occupations, in our careless amusements, this principle still exerts its active energy.

24 A man, who enters the theatre, is immediately struck with the view of so great a multitude, participating of one common amusement; and experiences, from their very aspect, a superior sensibility or disposition of being affected with every sentiment, which he shares with his fellow-creatures.

25 He observes the actors to be animated by the appearance of a full audience, and raised to a degree of enthusiasm, which they cannot command in any solitary or calm moment.

26 Every movement of the theatre, by a skilful poet, is communicated, as it were by magic, to the spectators; who weep, tremble, resent, rejoice, and are enflamed with all the variety of passions, which actuate the several personages of the drama. *SBN 222*

27 Where any event crosses our wishes, and interrupts the happiness of the favourite characters, we feel a sensible anxiety and concern. But where their sufferings proceed from the treachery, cruelty, or tyranny of an enemy, our breasts are affected with the liveliest resentment against the author of these calamities.

28 It is here esteemed contrary to the rules of art to represent any thing cool and indifferent. A distant friend, or a confident, who has no immediate interest in the catastrophe, ought, if possible, to be avoided by the poet; as communicating a like indifference to the audience, and checking the progress of the passions.

29 Few species of poetry are more entertaining than *pastoral*; and every one is sensible, that the chief source of its pleasure arises from those images of

a gentle and tender tranquillity, which it represents in its personages, and of which it communicates a like sentiment to the reader. SANNAZARIUS, who transferred the scene to the sea-shore, though he presented the most magnificent object in nature, is confessed to have erred in his choice. The idea of toil, labour, and danger, suffered by the fishermen, is painful; by an unavoidable sympathy, which attends every conception of human happiness or misery.

30 When I was twenty, says a FRENCH poet, OVID was my favourite: Now I am forty, I declare for HORACE. We enter, to be sure, more readily into sentiments, which resemble those we feel every day: But no passion, when well represented, can be entirely indifferent to us; because there is none, of which every man has not, within him, at least the seeds and first principles. It is the business of poetry to bring every affection near to us by lively imagery and representation, and make it look like truth and reality: A certain proof, that, *SBN 223* wherever that reality is found, our minds are disposed to be strongly affected by it.

31 Any recent event or piece of news, by which the fate of states, provinces, or many individuals is affected, is extremely interesting even to those whose welfare is not immediately engaged. Such intelligence is propagated with celerity, heard with avidity, and enquired into with attention and concern. The interest of society appears, on this occasion, to be, in some degree, the interest of each individual. The imagination is sure to be affected; though the passions excited may not always be so strong and steady as to have great influence on the conduct and behaviour.

32 The perusal of a history seems a calm entertainment; but would be no entertainment at all, did not our hearts beat with correspondent movements to those which are described by the historian.

33 THUCYDIDES and GUICCIARDIN support with difficulty our attention; while the former describes the trivial rencounters of the small cities of GREECE, and the latter the harmless wars of PISA. The few persons interested, and the small interest fill not the imagination, and engage not the affections. The deep distress of the numerous ATHENIAN army before SYRACUSE; the danger, which so nearly threatens VENICE; these excite compassion; these move terror and anxiety.

34 The indifferent, uninteresting style of SUETONIUS, equally with the masterly pencil of TACITUS, may convince us of the cruel depravity of NERO or TIBERIUS: But what a difference of sentiment! While the former coldly relates the facts; and the latter sets before our eyes the venerable figures of a SORANUS and a THRASEA, intrepid in their fate, and only moved by the melting sorrows of their friends and kindred. What sympathy then touches

every human heart! What indignation against the tyrant, whose causeless fear or unprovoked malice gave rise to such detestable barbarity! SBN 224

35 If we bring these subjects nearer: If we remove all suspicion of fiction and deceit: What powerful concern is excited, and how much superior, in many instances, to the narrow attachments of self-love and private interest! Popular sedition, party zeal, a devoted obedience to factious leaders; these are some of the most visible, though less laudable effects of this social sympathy in human nature.

36 The frivolousness of the subject too, we may observe, is not able to detach us entirely from what carries an image of human sentiment and affection.

37 When a person stutters, and pronounces with difficulty, we even sympathize with this trivial uneasiness, and suffer for him. And it is a rule in criticism, that every combination of syllables or letters, which gives pain to the organs of speech in the recital, appears also, from a species of sympathy, harsh and disagreeable to the ear. Nay, when we run over a book with our eye, we are sensible of such unharmonious composition; because we still imagine, that a person recites it to us, and suffers from the pronunciation of these jarring sounds. So delicate is our sympathy!

38 Easy and unconstrained postures and motions are always beautiful: An air of health and vigour is agreeable: Cloaths which warm, without burdening the body; which cover, without imprisoning the limbs, are well-fashioned. In every judgment of beauty, the feelings of the person affected enter into consideration, and communicate to the spectator similar touches of pain or pleasure.[21] What wonder, then, if we can pronounce no judgment concerning the character and conduct of men, without considering the tendencies of their actions, and the happiness or misery which thence arises to society? What association of ideas would ever operate, were that principle here totally unactive?[22] SBN 225

[21] "Decentior equus cujus astricta sunt ilia; sed idem velocior. Pulcher aspectu sit athleta, cujus lacertos exercitatio expressit; idem certamini paratior. Nunquam enim *species* ab *utilitate* dividitur. Sed hoc quidem discernere modici judicii est." Quintilian, Inst. lib. 8. cap. 3. SBN 224

[22] In proportion to the station which a man possesses, according to the relations in which he is placed; we always expect from him a greater or less degree of good, and when disappointed, blame his inutility; and much more do we blame him, if any ill or prejudice arise from his conduct and behaviour. When the interests of one country interfere with those of another, we estimate the merits of a statesman by the good or ill, which results to his own country from his measures and councils, without regard to the prejudice which he brings on its enemies and rivals. His fellow-citizens are the objects, which lie nearest the eye, while we determine his character. And as nature has implanted in every one a superior affection to his own country, we never expect any regard to distant nations, where a competition arises. Not to mention, that, while every man consults the good of his own community, we are sensible, that the general interest of mankind is better promoted, than by any loose indeterminate views to the good of a species, whence no beneficial action could ever result, for want of a duly limited object, on which they could exert themselves. SBN 225

39 If any man, from a cold insensibility, or narrow selfishness of temper, is unaffected with the images of human happiness or misery, he must be equally indifferent to the images of vice and virtue: As, on the other hand, it is always found, that a warm concern for the interests of our species is attended with a delicate feeling of all moral distinctions; a strong resentment of injury done to men; a lively approbation of their welfare. In this particular, though great superiority is observable of one man above another; yet none are so entirely indifferent to the interest of their fellow-creatures, as to perceive no distinctions of moral good and evil, in consequence of the different tendencies of actions and principles. How, indeed, can we suppose it possible in any one, who wears a human heart, that, if there be subjected to his censure, one character or system of conduct, which is beneficial, and another, which is pernicious, to his species or community, he will not so much as give a cool *SBN 226* preference to the former, or ascribe to it the smallest merit or regard? Let us suppose such a person ever so selfish; let private interest have ingrossed ever so much his attention; yet in instances, where that is not concerned, he must unavoidably feel *some* propensity to the good of mankind, and make it an object of choice, if every thing else be equal. Would any man, who is walking along, tread as willingly on another's gouty toes, whom he has no quarrel with, as on the hard flint and pavement? There is here surely a difference in the case. We surely take into consideration the happiness and misery of others, in weighing the several motives of action, and incline to the former, where no private regards draw us to seek our own promotion or advantage by the injury of our fellow-creatures. And if the principles of humanity are capable, in many instances, of influencing our actions, they must, at all times, have *some* authority over our sentiments, and give us a general approbation of what is useful to society, and blame of what is dangerous or pernicious. The degrees of these sentiments may be the subject of controversy; but the reality of their existence, one should think, must be admitted, in every theory or system.

40 A creature, absolutely malicious and spiteful, were there any such in nature, must be worse than indifferent to the images of vice and virtue. All his sentiments must be inverted, and directly opposite to those, which prevail in the human species. Whatever contributes to the good of mankind, as it crosses the constant bent of his wishes and desires, must produce uneasiness and disapprobation; and on the contrary, whatever is the source of disorder and misery in society, must, for the same reason, be regarded with pleasure and complacency. Timon, who, probably from his affected spleen, more than any inveterate malice, was denominated the man-hater, embraced Alcibiades, with great fondness. "Go on, my boy!" cried he, "acquire the *SBN 227* confidence of the people: You will one day, I foresee, be the cause of great

calamities to them:"[23] Could we admit the two principles of the MANICHEANS, it is an infallible consequence, that their sentiments of human actions, as well as of every thing else, must be totally opposite, and that every instance of justice and humanity, from its necessary tendency, must please the one deity and displease the other. All mankind so far resemble the good principle, that, where interest or revenge or envy perverts not our disposition, we are always inclined, from our natural philanthropy, to give the preference to the happiness of society, and consequently to virtue, above its opposite. Absolute, unprovoked, disinterested malice has never, perhaps, place in any human breast; or if it had, must there pervert all the sentiments of morals, as well as the feelings of humanity. If the cruelty of NERO be allowed entirely voluntary, and not rather the effect of constant fear and resentment; it is evident, that TIGELLINUS, preferably to SENECA or BURRHUS, must have possessed his steady and uniform approbation.

41 A statesman or patriot, who serves our own country, in our own time, has always a more passionate regard paid to him, than one whose beneficial influence operated on distant ages or remote nations; where the good, resulting from his generous humanity, being less connected with us, seems more obscure, and affects us with a less lively sympathy. We may own the merit to be equally great, though our sentiments are not raised to an equal height, in both cases. The judgment here corrects the inequalities of our internal emotions and perceptions; in like manner, as it preserves us from error, in the several variations of images, presented to our external senses. The same object, at a double distance, really throws on the eye a picture of but half the bulk; yet we imagine that it appears of the same size in both situations; *SBN 228* because we know, that, on our approach to it, its image would expand on the eye, and that the difference consists not in the object itself, but in our position with regard to it. And, indeed, without such a correction of appearances, both in internal and external sentiment, men could never think or talk steadily on any subject; while their fluctuating situations produce a continual variation on objects, and throw them into such different and contrary lights and positions.[24]

[23] PLUTARCH. in vita ALC. *SBN 227*

[24] For a like reason, the tendencies of actions and characters, not their real accidental consequences, are alone regarded in our moral determinations or general judgments; though in our real feeling or sentiment, we cannot help paying greater regard to one whose station, joined to virtue, renders him really useful to society, than to one, who exerts the social virtues only in good intentions and benevolent affections. Separating the character from the fortune, by an easy and necessary effort of thought, we pronounce these persons alike, and give them the same general praise. The judgment corrects or endeavours to correct the appearance: But is not able entirely to prevail over sentiment. *SBN 228*

Why is this peach-tree said to be better than that other; but because it produces more or better fruit? And would not the same praise be given it, though snails or vermin had destroyed the peaches,

42 The more we converse with mankind, and the greater social intercourse we maintain, the more shall we be familiarized to these general preferences and distinctions, without which our conversation and discourse could scarcely be rendered intelligible to each other. Every man's interest is peculiar to himself, and the aversions and desires, which result from it, cannot be supposed to affect others in a like degree. General language, therefore, being formed for general use, must be moulded on some more general views, and must affix the epithets of praise or blame, in conformity to sentiments, which arise from the general interests of the community. And if these sentiments, in most men, be not so strong as those, which have a reference to private good; *SBN 229* yet still they must make some distinction, even in persons the most depraved and selfish; and must attach the notion of good to a beneficent conduct, and of evil to the contrary. Sympathy, we shall allow, is much fainter than our concern for ourselves, and sympathy with persons remote from us, much fainter than that with persons near and contiguous; but for this very reason, it is necessary for us, in our calm judgments and discourse concerning the characters of men, to neglect all these differences, and render our sentiments more public and social. Besides, that we ourselves often change our situation in this particular, we every day meet with persons, who are in a situation different from us, and who could never converse with us, were we to remain constantly in that position and point of view, which is peculiar to ourselves. The intercourse of sentiments, therefore, in society and conversation, makes us form some general unalterable standard, by which we may approve or disapprove of characters and manners. And though the heart takes not part entirely with those general notions, nor regulates all its love and hatred, by the universal, abstract differences of vice and virtue, without regard to self, or the persons with whom we are more intimately connected; yet have these moral differences a considerable influence, and being sufficient, at least, for discourse, serve all our purposes in company, in the pulpit, on the theatre, and in the schools.[25]

43 Thus, in whatever light we take this subject, the merit, ascribed to the *SBN 230* social virtues, appears still uniform, and arises chiefly from that regard, which the natural sentiment of benevolence engages us to pay to the interests

before they came to full maturity? In morals too, is not *the tree known by the fruit*? And cannot we easily distinguish between nature and accident, in the one case as well as in the other?

[25] It is wisely ordained by nature, that private connexions should commonly prevail over universal views and considerations; otherwise our affections and actions would be dissipated and lost, for want of a proper limited object. Thus a small benefit done to ourselves, or our near friends, excites more lively sentiments of love and approbation than a great benefit done to a distant commonwealth: But still we know here, as in all the senses, to correct these inequalities by reflection, and retain a general standard of vice and virtue, founded chiefly on general usefulness. *SBN 229*

of mankind and society. If we consider the principles of the human make, such as they appear to daily experience and observation; we must, *a priori*, conclude it impossible for such a creature as man to be totally indifferent to the well or ill-being of his fellow-creatures, and not readily, of himself, to pronounce, where nothing gives him any particular biass, that what promotes their happiness is good, what tends to their misery is evil, without any farther regard or consideration. Here then are the faint rudiments, at least, or outlines, of a *general* distinction between actions; and in proportion as the humanity of the person is supposed to encrease, his connexion with those who are injured or benefited, and his lively conception of their misery or happiness; his consequent censure or approbation acquires proportionable vigour. There is no necessity, that a generous action, barely mentioned in an old history or remote gazette, should communicate any strong feelings of applause and admiration. Virtue, placed at such a distance, is like a fixed star, which, though to the eye of reason, it may appear as luminous as the sun in his meridian, is so infinitely removed, as to affect the senses, neither with light nor heat. Bring this virtue nearer, by our acquaintance or connexion with the persons, or even by an eloquent recital of the case; our hearts are immediately caught, our sympathy enlivened, and our cool approbation converted into the warmest sentiments of friendship and regard. These seem necessary and infallible consequences of the general principles of human nature, as discovered in common life and practice.

44 Again; reverse these views and reasonings: Consider the matter *a posteriori*; and weighing the consequences, enquire if the merit of social virtue be not, in a great measure, derived from the feelings of humanity, with which it affects the spectators. It appears to be matter of fact, that the circumstance of *utility*, in all subjects, is a source of praise and approbation: That it is constantly appealed to in all moral decisions concerning the merit and demerit of actions: That it is the *sole* source of that high regard paid to justice, fidelity, honour, allegiance, and chastity: That it is inseparable from all the other social virtues, humanity, generosity, charity, affability, lenity, mercy, and moderation: And, in a word, that it is a foundation of the chief part of morals, which has a reference to mankind and our fellow-creatures. *SBN 231*

45 It appears also, that, in our general approbation of characters and manners, the useful tendency of the social virtues moves us not by any regards to self-interest, but has an influence much more universal and extensive. It appears, that a tendency to public good, and to the promoting of peace, harmony, and order in society, does always, by affecting the benevolent principles of our frame, engage us on the side of the social virtues. And it appears, as an additional confirmation, that these principles of humanity and

sympathy enter so deeply into all our sentiments, and have so powerful an influence, as may enable them to excite the strongest censure and applause. The present theory is the simple result of all these inferences, each of which seems founded on uniform experience and observation.

46 Were it doubtful, whether there were any such principle in our nature as humanity or a concern for others, yet when we see, in numberless instances, that whatever has a tendency to promote the interests of society, is so highly approved of, we ought thence to learn the force of the benevolent principle; since it is impossible for any thing to please as means to an end, where the end is totally indifferent. On the other hand, were it doubtful, whether there were, implanted in our nature, any general principle of moral blame and approbation, yet when we see, in numberless instances, the influence of humanity, we ought thence to conclude, that it is impossible, but that every thing, which promotes the interest of society, must communicate pleasure, and what is pernicious give uneasiness. But when these different reflections and observations concur in establishing the same conclusion, must they not bestow an undisputed evidence upon it?

SBN 232

47 It is however hoped, that the progress of this argument will bring a farther confirmation of the present theory, by showing the rise of other sentiments of esteem and regard from the same or like principles.

SECTION 6

SBN 233

Of Qualities Useful to Ourselves

PART 1

1 It seems evident, that where a quality or habit is subjected to our examination, if it appear, in any respect, prejudicial to the person possessed of it, or such as incapacitates him for business and action, it is instantly blamed, and ranked among his faults and imperfections. Indolence, negligence, want of order and method, obstinacy, fickleness, rashness, credulity; these qualities were never esteemed by any one indifferent to a character; much less, extolled as accomplishments or virtues. The prejudice, resulting from them, immediately strikes our eye, and gives us the sentiment of pain and disapprobation.

2 No quality, it is allowed, is absolutely either blameable or praise-worthy. It is all according to its degree. A due medium, say the Peripatetics, is the characteristic of virtue. But this medium is chiefly determined by utility. A proper celerity, for instance, and dispatch in business, is commendable. When defective, no progress is ever made in the execution of any purpose: When excessive, it engages us in precipitate and ill-concerted measures and enterprizes: By such reasonings, we fix the proper and commendable mediocrity in all moral and prudential disquisitions; and never lose view of the advantages, which result from any character or habit.

3 Now as these advantages are enjoyed by the person possessed of the character, it can never be *self-love* which renders the prospect of them agreeable to us, the spectators, and prompts our esteem and approbation. No force of imagination can convert us into another person, and make us fancy, that we, being that person, reap benefit from those valuable qualities, which belong to him. Or if it did, no celerity of imagination could immediately transport us back, into ourselves, and make us love and esteem the person, as different from us. Views and sentiments, so opposite to known truth, and to each other, could never have place, at the same time, in the same person. All suspicion, therefore, of selfish regards, is here totally excluded. It is a quite different principle, which actuates our bosom, and interests us in the felicity of the person whom we contemplate. Where his natural talents and acquired abilities give us the prospect of elevation, advancement, a figure in life,

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prosperous success, a steady command over fortune, and the execution of great or advantageous undertakings; we are struck with such agreeable images, and feel a complacency and regard immediately arise towards him. The ideas of happiness, joy, triumph, prosperity, are connected with every circumstance of his character, and diffuse over our minds a pleasing sentiment of sympathy and humanity.[26]

4 Let us suppose a person originally framed so as to have no manner of *SBN 235*
concern for his fellow-creatures, but to regard the happiness and misery of all sensible beings with greater indifference than even two contiguous shades of the same colour. Let us suppose, if the prosperity of nations were laid on 10
the one hand, and their ruin on the other, and he were desired to choose; that he would stand, like the schoolman's ass, irresolute and undetermined, between equal motives; or rather, like the same ass between two pieces of wood or marble, without any inclination or propensity to either side. The consequence, I believe, must be allowed just, that such a person, being absolutely unconcerned, either for the public good of a community or the private utility of others, would look on every quality, however pernicious, or however beneficial, to society, or to its possessor, with the same indifference as on the most common and uninteresting object.

5 But if, instead of this fancied monster, we suppose a *man* to form a judg- 20
ment or determination in the case, there is to him a plain foundation of preference, where every thing else is equal; and however cool his choice may be, if his heart be selfish, or if the persons interested be remote from him; there must still be a choice or distinction between what is useful, and what is pernicious. Now this distinction is the same in all its parts, with the *moral distinction*, whose foundation has been so often, and so much in vain, enquired after. The same endowments of the mind, in every circumstance, are agreeable to the sentiment of morals and to that of humanity; the same temper is susceptible of high degrees of the one sentiment and of the other; and the same alteration in the objects, by their nearer approach or by connexions, *SBN 236*
enlivens the one and the other. By all the rules of philosophy, therefore, we

[26] One may venture to affirm, that there is no human creature, to whom the appearance of hap- *SBN 234*
piness (where envy or revenge has no place) does not give pleasure, that of misery, uneasiness. This seems inseparable from our make and constitution. But they are only the more generous minds, that are thence prompted to seek zealously the good of others, and to have a real passion for their welfare. With men of narrow and ungenerous spirits, this sympathy goes not beyond a slight feeling of the imagination, which serves only to excite sentiments of complacency or censure, and makes them apply to the object either honourable or dishonourable appellations. A griping miser, for instance, praises extremely *industry* and *frugality* even in others, and sets them, in his estimation, above all the other virtues. He knows the good that results from them, and feels that species of happiness with a *SBN 235*
more lively sympathy, than any other you could represent to him; though perhaps he would not part 10
with a shilling to make the fortune of the industrious man, whom he praises so highly.

must conclude, that these sentiments are originally the same; since, in each particular, even the most minute, they are governed by the same laws, and are moved by the same objects.

6 Why do philosophers infer, with the greatest certainty, that the moon is kept in its orbit by the same force of gravity, that makes bodies fall near the surface of the earth, but because these effects are, upon computation, found similar and equal? And must not this argument bring as strong conviction, in moral as in natural disquisitions?

7 To prove, by any long detail, that all the qualities, useful to the possessor, are approved of, and the contrary censured, would be superfluous. The least reflection on what is every day experienced in life, will be sufficient. We shall only mention a few instances, in order to remove, if possible, all doubt and hesitation.

8 The quality, the most necessary for the execution of any useful enterprize, is DISCRETION; by which we carry on a safe intercourse with others, give due attention to our own and to their character, weigh each circumstance of the business which we undertake, and employ the surest and safest means for the attainment of any end or purpose. To a CROMWELL, perhaps, or a DE RETZ, discretion may appear an alderman-like virtue, as Dr. SWIFT calls it; and being incompatible with those vast designs, to which their courage and ambition prompted them, it might really, in them, be a fault or imperfection. But in the conduct of ordinary life, no virtue is more requisite, not only to obtain success, but to avoid the most fatal miscarriages and disappointments. The greatest parts without it, as observed by an elegant writer, may be fatal to their owner; as POLYPHEMUS, deprived of his eye, was only the more exposed, *SBN 237* on account of his enormous strength and stature.

9 The best character, indeed, were it not rather too perfect for human nature, is that which is not swayed by temper of any kind; but alternately employs enterprize and caution, as each is *useful* to the particular purpose intended. Such is the excellence which ST. EVREMOND ascribes to mareschal TURENNE, who displayed every campaign, as he grew older, more temerity in his military enterprizes; and being now, from long experience, perfectly acquainted with every incident in war, he advanced with greater firmness and security, in a road so well known to him. FABIUS, says MACHIAVEL, was cautious; SCIPIO enterprizing: And both succeeded, because the situation of the ROMAN affairs, during the command of each, was peculiarly adapted to his genius; but both would have failed, had these situations been reversed. He is happy, whose circumstances suit his temper; but he is more excellent, who can suit his temper to any circumstances.

10 What need is there to display the praises of INDUSTRY, and to extol its

advantages, in the acquisition of power and riches, or in raising what we call a *fortune* in the world? The tortoise, according to the fable, by his perseverance, gained the race of the hare, though possessed of much superior swiftness. A man's time, when well husbanded, is like a cultivated field, of which a few acres produce more of what is useful to life, than extensive provinces, even of the richest soil, when over-run with weeds and brambles.

11 But all prospect of success in life, or even of tolerable subsistence, must fail, where a reasonable FRUGALITY is wanting. The heap, instead of encreasing, diminishes daily, and leaves its possessor so much more unhappy, as, not having been able to confine his expences to a large revenue, he will still less be able to live contentedly on a small one. The souls of men, according to PLATO,[27] enflamed with impure appetites, and losing the body, which alone afforded means of satisfaction, hover about the earth, and haunt the places, where their bodies are deposited; possessed with a longing desire to recover the lost organs of sensation. So may we see worthless prodigals, having consumed their fortune in wild debauches, thrusting themselves into every plentiful table, and every party of pleasure, hated even by the vicious, and despised even by fools. *SBN 238*

12 The one extreme of frugality is *avarice*, which, as it both deprives a man of all use of his riches, and checks hospitality and every social enjoyment, is justly censured on a double account. *Prodigality*, the other extreme, is commonly more hurtful to a man himself; and each of these extremes is blamed above the other, according to the temper of the person who censures, and according to his greater or less sensibility to pleasure, either social or sensual.

13 QUALITIES often derive their merit from complicated sources. *Honesty*, *fidelity*, *truth*, are praised for their immediate tendency to promote the interests of society; but after those virtues are once established upon this foundation, they are also considered as advantageous to the person himself, and as the source of that trust and confidence, which can alone give a man any consideration in life. One becomes contemptible, no less than odious, when he forgets the duty, which, in this particular, he owes to himself as well as to society.

14 Perhaps, this consideration is one *chief* source of the high blame, which is thrown on any instance of failure among women in point of *chastity*. The greatest regard, which can be acquired by that sex, is derived from their fidelity; and a woman becomes cheap and vulgar, loses her rank, and is exposed to every insult, who is deficient in this particular. The smallest failure is here sufficient to blast her character. A female has so many oppor- *SBN 239*

[27] Phædo. *SBN 238*

tunities of secretly indulging these appetites, that nothing can give us security but her absolute modesty and reserve; and where a breach is once made, it can scarcely ever be fully repaired. If a man behave with cowardice on one occasion, a contrary conduct reinstates him in his character. But by what action can a woman, whose behaviour has once been dissolute, be able to assure us, that she has formed better resolutions, and has self-command enough to carry them into execution?

15 All men, it is allowed, are equally desirous of happiness; but few are successful in the pursuit: One considerable cause is the want of STRENGTH of MIND, which might enable them to resist the temptation of present ease or 10 pleasure, and carry them forward in the search of more distant profit and enjoyment. Our affections, on a general prospect of their objects, form certain rules of conduct, and certain measures of preference of one above another: And these decisions, though really the result of our calm passions and propensities, (for what else can pronounce any object eligible or the contrary?) are yet said, by a natural abuse of terms, to be the determinations of pure *reason* and reflection. But when some of these objects approach nearer to us, or acquire the advantages of favourable lights and positions, which catch the heart or imagination; our general resolutions are frequently confounded, a small enjoyment preferred, and lasting shame and sorrow entailed 20 upon us. And however poets may employ their wit and eloquence, in celebrating present pleasure, and rejecting all distant views to fame, health, or fortune; it is obvious, that this practice is the source of all dissoluteness and disorder, repentance and misery. A man of a strong and determined temper adheres tenaciously to his general resolutions, and is neither seduced by the allurements of pleasure, nor terrified by the menaces of pain; but keeps still *SBN 240* in view those distant pursuits, by which he, at once, ensures his happiness and his honour.

16 Self-satisfaction, at least in some degree, is an advantage, which equally attends the FOOL and the WISE MAN: But it is the only one; nor is there any 30 other circumstance in the conduct of life, where they are upon an equal footing. Business, books, conversation; for all of these, a fool is totally incapacitated, and except condemned by his station to the coarsest drudgery, remains a *useless* burden upon the earth. Accordingly, it is found, that men are extremely jealous of their character in this particular; and many instances are seen of profligacy and treachery, the most avowed and unreserved; none of bearing patiently the imputation of ignorance and stupidity. DICÆARCHUS, the MACEDONIAN general, who, as POLYBIUS tells us,[28] openly erected one altar

[28] Lib. 17. cap. 35. *SBN 240*

to impiety, another to injustice, in order to bid defiance to mankind; even he, I am well assured, would have started at the epithet of *fool*, and have meditated revenge for so injurious an appellation. Except the affection of parents, the strongest and most indissoluble bond in nature, no connexion has strength sufficient to support the disgust arising from this character. Love itself, which can subsist under treachery, ingratitude, malice, and infidelity, is immediately extinguished by it, when perceived and acknowledged; nor are deformity and old age more fatal to the dominion of that passion. So dreadful are the ideas of an utter incapacity for any purpose or undertaking, and of continued error and misconduct in life!

17 When it is asked, *Whether a quick or a slow apprehension be most valuable? Whether one, that, at first view, penetrates far into a subject, but can perform nothing upon study; or a contrary character, which must work out every thing by dint of application? Whether a clear head or a copious invention? Whether a profound genius or a sure judgment?* In short, what character, or peculiar turn of understanding is more excellent than another? It is evident, that we can answer none of these questions, without considering which of those qualities capacitates a man best for the world, and carries him farthest in any undertaking. *SBN 241*

18 If refined sense and exalted sense be not so *useful* as common sense, their rarity, their novelty, and the nobleness of their objects make some compensation, and render them the admiration of mankind: As gold, though less serviceable than iron, acquires, from its scarcity, a value, which is much superior.

19 The defects of judgment can be supplied by no art or invention; but those of MEMORY frequently may, both in business and in study, by method and industry, and by diligence in committing every thing to writing; and we scarcely ever hear a short memory given as a reason for a man's failure in any undertaking. But in ancient times, when no man could make a figure without the talent of speaking, and when the audience were too delicate to bear such crude, undigested harangues as our extemporary orators offer to public assemblies; the faculty of memory was then of the utmost consequence, and was accordingly much more valued than at present. Scarce any great genius is mentioned in antiquity, who is not celebrated for this talent; and CICERO enumerates it among the other sublime qualities of CÆSAR himself.[29]

20 Particular customs and manners alter the usefulness of qualities: They also alter their merit. Particular situations and accidents have, in some degree, the same influence. He will always be more esteemed, who possesses

[29] "Fuit in illo ingenium, ratio, memoria, literæ, cura, cogitatio, diligentia," *&c.* PHILIP. 2. *SBN 241*

those talents and accomplishments, which suit his station and profession, than he whom fortune has misplaced in the part which she has assigned him. The private or selfish virtues are, in this respect, more arbitrary than the public and social. In other respects, they are, perhaps, less liable to doubt and controversy. SBN 242

21 In this kingdom, such continued ostentation, of late years, has prevailed among men in *active* life with regard to *public spirit*, and among those in *speculative* with regard to *benevolence*; and so many false pretensions to each have been, no doubt, detected, that men of the world are apt, without any bad intention, to discover a sullen incredulity on the head of those moral endowments, and even sometimes absolutely to deny their existence and reality. In like manner, I find, that, of old, the perpetual cant of the Stoics and Cynics concerning *virtue*, their magnificent professions and slender performances, bred a disgust in mankind; and Lucian, who, though licentious with regard to pleasure, is yet, in other respects, a very moral writer, cannot, sometimes, talk of virtue, so much boasted, without betraying symptoms of spleen and irony.[30] But surely this peevish delicacy, whence-ever it arises, can never be carried so far as to make us deny the existence of every species of merit, and all distinction of manners and behaviour. Besides *discretion*, *caution*, *enterprize*, *industry*, *assiduity*, *frugality*, *œconomy*, *good sense*, *prudence*, *discernment*; besides these endowments, I say, whose very names force an avowal of their merit, there are many others, to which the most determined scepticism cannot, for a moment, refuse the tribute of praise and approbation. *Temperance*, *sobriety*, *patience*, *constancy*, *perseverance*, *forethought*, *considerateness*, *secrecy*, *order*, *insinuation*, *address*, *presence of mind*, *quickness of conception*, *facility of expression*; these, and a thousand more of the same kind, no man will ever deny to be excellencies and perfections. As their merit consists in their tendency to serve the person, possessed of them, without any magnificent claim to public and social desert, we are the less jealous of their pretensions, and readily admit them into the catalogue of laudable qualities. We are not sensible, that, by this concession, we have paved the way for all the other moral excellencies, and cannot consistently hesitate any longer, with regard to disinterested benevolence, patriotism, and humanity. SBN 243

22 It seems, indeed, certain, that first appearances are here, as usual, extremely deceitful, and that it is more difficult, in a speculative way, to

[30] Ἀρετήν τινα καὶ ἀσώματα καὶ λήρους μεγάλῃ τῇ φωνῇ ξυνειρόντων. Lucian. Timon. Again, Καὶ συνάγοντες (οἱ φιλόσοφοι) εὐεξαπάτητα μειράκια τήν τε πολυθρύλλητον ἀρετὴν τραγῳδοῦσι. Icuro-Men. In another place, Ἤ ποῦ γάρ ἐστιν ἡ πολυθρύλλητος ἀρετή, καὶ φύσις, καὶ εἱμαρμένη, καὶ τύχη, ἀνυπόστατα καὶ κενὰ πραγμάτων ὀνόματα; Deor. concil. SBN 242

resolve into self-love the merit, which we ascribe to the selfish virtues above-mentioned, than that even of the social virtues, justice and beneficence. For this latter purpose, we need but say, that whatever conduct promotes the good of the community is loved, praised, and esteemed by the community, on account of that utility and interest, of which every one partakes: And though this affection and regard be, in reality, gratitude, not self-love, yet a distinction, even of this obvious nature, may not readily be made by superficial reasoners; and there is room, at least, to support the cavil and dispute for a moment. But as qualities, which tend only to the utility of their possessor, without any reference to us, or to the community, are yet esteemed and valued; by what theory or system can we account for this sentiment from self-love, or deduce it from that favourite origin? There seems here a necessity for confessing that the happiness and misery of others are not spectacles entirely indifferent to us; but that the view of the former, whether in its causes or effects, like sun-shine or the prospect of well-cultivated plains, (to carry our pretensions no higher) communicates a secret joy and satisfaction; the appearance of the latter, like a lowering cloud or barren landscape, throws a melancholy damp over the imagination. And this concession being once made, the difficulty is over; and a natural, unforced interpretation of the phænomena of human life will afterwards, we may hope, prevail among all speculative enquirers.

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PART 2

23 It may not be improper, in this place, to examine the influence of bodily endowments, and of the goods of fortune, over our sentiments of regard and esteem, and to consider whether these phænomena fortify or weaken the present theory. It will naturally be expected, that the beauty of the body, as is supposed by all ancient moralists, will be similar, in some respects, to that of the mind; and that every kind of esteem, which is paid to a man, will have something similar in its origin, whether it arise from his mental endowments, or from the situation of his exterior circumstances.

24 It is evident, that one considerable source of *beauty* in all animals is the advantage, which they reap from the particular structure of their limbs and members, suitably to the particular manner of life, to which they are by nature destined. The just proportions of a horse, described by Xenophon and Virgil, are the same, that are received at this day by our modern jockeys; because the foundation of them is the same, namely, experience of what is detrimental or useful in the animal.

25 Broad shoulders, a lank belly, firm joints, taper legs; all these are beautiful in our species, because signs of force and vigour. Ideas of utility and its contrary, though they do not entirely determine what is handsome or deformed, are evidently the source of a considerable part of approbation or dislike. *SBN 245*

26 In ancient times, bodily strength and dexterity, being of greater *use* and importance in war, was also much more esteemed and valued, than at present. Not to insist on HOMER and the poets, we may observe, that historians scruple not to mention *force of body* among the other accomplishments even of EPAMINONDAS, whom they acknowledge to be the greatest hero, statesman, and general of all the GREEKS.[31] A like praise is given to POMPEY, one of the greatest of the ROMANS.[32] This instance is similar to what we observed above, with regard to memory.

27 What derision and contempt, with both sexes, attend *impotence*; while the unhappy object is regarded as one deprived of so capital a pleasure in life, and at the same time, as disabled from communicating it to others. *Barrenness* in women, being also a species of *inutility*, is a reproach, but not in the same degree: Of which the reason is very obvious, according to the present theory.

28 There is no rule in painting or statuary more indispensible than that of balancing the figures, and placing them with the greatest exactness on their proper center of gravity. A figure, which is not justly balanced, is ugly; because it conveys the disagreeable ideas of fall, harm, and pain.[33]

29 A disposition or turn of mind, which qualifies a man to rise in the world, and advance his fortune, is entitled to esteem and regard, as has already been explained. It may, therefore, naturally be supposed, that the actual possession of riches and authority will have a considerable influence over these sentiments. *SBN 246*

[31] DIODORUS SICULUS, lib. 15. It may not be improper to give the character of EPAMINONDAS, as drawn by the historian, in order to show the ideas of perfect merit, which prevailed in those ages. In other illustrious men, says he, you will observe, that each possessed some one shining quality, which was the foundation of his fame: In EPAMINONDAS all the *virtues* are found united; force of body, eloquence of expression, vigour of mind, contempt of riches, gentleness of disposition, and *what is chiefly to be regarded*, courage and conduct in war. *SBN 245*

[32] "Cum alacribus, saltu; cum velocibus, cursu; cum validis recte certabat." SALLUST. apud VEGET.

[33] All men are equally liable to pain and disease and sickness; and may again recover health and ease. These circumstances, as they make no distinction between one man and another, are no source of pride or humility, regard or contempt. But comparing our own species to superior ones, it is a very mortifying consideration, that we should all be so liable to diseases and infirmities; and divines accordingly employ this topic, in order to depress self-conceit and vanity. They would have more success, if the common bent of our thoughts were not perpetually turned to compare ourselves with others. The infirmities of old age are mortifying; because a comparison with the young may take place. The king's evil is industriously concealed, because it affects others, and is often transmitted to posterity. The case is nearly the same with such diseases as convey any nauseous or frightful images; the epilepsy, for instance, ulcers, sores, scabs, *&c.* *SBN 246*

30 Let us examine any hypothesis, by which we can account for the regard paid to the rich and powerful: We shall find none satisfactory, but that which derives it from the enjoyment communicated to the spectator by the images of prosperity, happiness, ease, plenty, authority, and the gratification of every appetite. Self-love, for instance, which some affect so much to consider as the source of every sentiment, is plainly insufficient for this purpose. Where no good-will or friendship appears, it is difficult to conceive on what we can found our hope of advantage from the riches of others; though we naturally respect the rich, even before they discover any such favourable disposition towards us.

31 We are affected with the same sentiments, when we lie so much out of the sphere of their activity, that they cannot even be supposed to possess the power of serving us. A prisoner of war, in all civilized nations, is treated with a regard suited to his condition; and riches, it is evident, go far towards fixing the condition of any person. If birth and quality enter for a share, this still affords us an argument to our present purpose. For what is it we call a man of *SBN 247* birth, but one who is descended from a long succession of rich and powerful ancestors, and who acquires our esteem by his connexion with persons whom we esteem? His ancestors, therefore, though dead, are respected, in some measure, on account of their riches; and consequently, without any kind of expectation.

32 But not to go so far as prisoners of war or the dead, to find instances of this disinterested regard for riches; we may only observe, with a little attention, those phænomena, which occur in common life and conversation. A man, who is himself, we shall suppose, of a competent fortune, and of no profession, being introduced to a company of strangers, naturally treats them with different degrees of respect, as he is informed of their different fortunes and conditions; though it is impossible that he can so suddenly propose, and perhaps he would not accept of, any pecuniary advantage from them. A traveller is always admitted into company, and meets with civility, in proportion as his train and equipage speak him a man of great or moderate fortune. In short, the different ranks of men are, in a great measure, regulated by riches; and that with regard to superiors as well as inferiors, strangers as well as acquaintance.

33 What remains, therefore, but to conclude, that, as riches are desired for ourselves only as the means of gratifying our appetites, either at present or in some imaginary future period; they beget esteem in others merely from their having that influence? This indeed is their very nature or essence: They have a direct reference to the commodities, conveniencies, and pleasures of life:

The bill of a banker, who is broke, or gold in a desert island, would otherwise be full as valuable. When we approach a man, who is, as we say, at his ease, we are presented with the pleasing ideas of plenty, satisfaction, cleanliness, warmth; a cheerful house, elegant furniture, ready service, and whatever is desirable in meat, drink, or apparel. On the contrary, when a poor man appears, the disagreeable images of want, penury, hard labour, dirty *SBN 248* furniture, coarse or ragged cloaths, nauseous meat and distasteful liquor, immediately strike our fancy. What else do we mean by saying that one is rich, the other poor? And as regard or contempt is the natural consequence of those different situations in life; it is easily seen what additional light and evidence this throws on our preceding theory, with regard to all moral distinctions.[34]

34 A man, who has cured himself of all ridiculous prepossessions, and is fully, sincerely, and steadily convinced, from experience as well as philosophy, that the difference of fortune makes less difference in happiness than is vulgarly imagined; such a one does not measure out degrees of esteem according to the rent-rolls of his acquaintance. He may, indeed, externally pay a superior deference to the great lord above the vassal; because riches are the most convenient, being the most fixed and determinate, source of distinction: But his internal sentiments are more regulated by the personal characters of men, than by the accidental and capricious favours of fortune.

35 In most countries of EUROPE, family, that is, hereditary riches, marked with titles and symbols from the sovereign, is the chief source of distinction. In ENGLAND, more regard is paid to present opulence and plenty. Each prac- *SBN 249* tice has its advantages and disadvantages. Where birth is respected, unactive, spiritless minds remain in haughty indolence, and dream of nothing but pedigrees and genealogies: The generous and ambitious seek honour and authority and reputation and favour. Where riches are the chief idol, corruption, venality, rapine prevail: Arts, manufactures, commerce, agriculture flourish. The former prejudice, being favourable to military virtue, is more

[34] There is something extraordinary, and seemingly unaccountable in the operation of our pas- *SBN 248* sions, when we consider the fortune and situation of others. Very often another's advancement and prosperity produces envy, which has a strong mixture of hatred, and arises chiefly from the comparison of ourselves with the person. At the very same time, or at least, in very short intervals, we may feel the passion of respect, which is a species of affection or good-will, with a mixture of humility. On the other hand, the misfortunes of our fellows often cause pity, which has in it a strong mixture of good-will. This sentiment of pity is nearly allied to contempt, which is a species of dislike, with a mixture of pride. I only point out these phænomena, as a subject of speculation to such as are curious with regard to moral enquiries. It is sufficient for the present purpose to observe in general, that power and riches commonly cause respect, poverty and meanness contempt, though particular views and incidents may sometimes raise the passions of envy and of pity.

suited to monarchies. The latter, being the chief spur to industry, agrees better with a republican government. And we accordingly find, that each of these forms of government, by varying the *utility* of those customs, has commonly a proportionable effect on the sentiments of mankind.

SECTION 7

SBN 250

Of Qualities Immediately Agreeable to Ourselves

1 WHOEVER has passed an evening with serious melancholy people, and has observed how suddenly the conversation was animated, and what sprightliness diffused itself over the countenance, discourse, and behaviour of every one, on the accession of a good-humoured, lively companion; such a one will easily allow, that CHEERFULNESS carries great merit with it, and naturally conciliates the good-will of mankind. No quality, indeed, more readily communicates itself to all around; because no one has a greater propensity to display itself, in jovial talk and pleasant entertainment. The flame spreads through the whole circle; and the most sullen and morose are often caught by it. That the melancholy hate the merry, even though HORACE says it, I have some difficulty to allow; because I have always observed, that, where the jollity is moderate and decent, serious people are so much the more delighted, as it dissipates the gloom, with which they are commonly oppressed; and gives them an unusual enjoyment.

2 From this influence of cheerfulness, both to communicate itself, and to engage approbation, we may perceive, that there is another set of mental qualities, which, without any utility or any tendency to farther good, either of the community or of the possessor, diffuse a satisfaction on the beholders, and procure friendship and regard. Their immediate sensation, to the person possessed of them, is agreeable: Others enter into the same humour, and catch the sentiment, by a contagion or natural sympathy: And as we cannot forbear loving whatever pleases, a kindly emotion arises towards the person, who communicates so much satisfaction. He is a more animating spectacle: His presence diffuses over us more serene complacency and enjoyment: Our imagination, entering into his feelings and disposition, is affected in a more agreeable manner, than if a melancholy, dejected, sullen, anxious temper were presented to us. Hence the affection and approbation, which attend the former: The aversion and disgust, with which we regard the latter.[35]

SBN 251

[35] There is no man, who, on particular occasions, is not affected with all the disagreeable passions, fear, anger, dejection, grief, melancholy, anxiety, *&c*. But these, so far as they are natural, and universal, make no difference between one man and another, and can never be the object of blame. It is only when the disposition gives a *propensity* to any of these disagreeable passions, that they disfigure the character, and by giving uneasiness, convey the sentiment of disapprobation to the spectator.

SBN 251

3 Few men would envy the character, which CÆSAR gives of CASSIUS.

> He loves no play,
> As thou do'st, ANTHONY: He hears no music:
> Seldom he smiles; and smiles in such a sort,
> As if he mock'd himself, and scorn'd his spirit
> That could be mov'd to smile at any thing.

Not only such men, as CÆSAR adds, are commonly *dangerous*, but also, having little enjoyment within themselves, they can never become agreeable to others, or contribute to social entertainment. In all polite nations and ages, a relish for pleasure, if accompanied with temperance and decency, is esteemed a considerable merit, even in the greatest men; and becomes still more requisite in those of inferior rank and character. It is an agreeable representation, which a FRENCH writer gives of the situation of his own mind in this particular, "Virtue I love," says he, "without austerity: Pleasure, without *SBN 252*
effeminacy: And life, without fearing its end."[36]

4 Who is not struck with any signal instance of GREATNESS of MIND or Dignity of Character; with elevation of sentiment, disdain of slavery, and with that noble pride and spirit, which arises from conscious virtue? The sublime, says LONGINUS, is often nothing but the echo or image of magnanimity; and where this quality appears in any one, even though a syllable be not uttered, it excites our applause and admiration; as may be observed of the famous silence of AJAX in the ODYSSEY, which expresses more noble disdain and resolute indignation, than any language can convey.[37]

5 "Were I ALEXANDER," said PARMENIO, "I would accept of these offers made by DARIUS." "So would I too," replied ALEXANDER, "were I PARMENIO." This saying is admirable, says LONGINUS, from a like principle.[38]

6 "Go!" cries the same hero to his soldiers, when they refused to follow him to the INDIES, "go tell your countrymen, that you left ALEXANDER compleating the conquest of the world." "ALEXANDER," said the Prince of CONDE, who always admired this passage, "abandoned by his soldiers, among Barbarians, not yet fully subdued, felt in himself such a dignity and right of empire, that he could not believe it possible, that any one would refuse to obey him. Whether in EUROPE or in ASIA, among GREEKS or PERSIANS, all was indifferent to him: Wherever he found men, he fancied he should find subjects."

7 The confident of MEDEA in the tragedy recommends caution and submis-

[36] "J'aime la vertu, sans rudesse; *SBN 252*
J'aime le plaisir, sans molesse;
J'aime la vie, & n'en crains point la fin." ST. EVREMOND.

[37] Cap. 9. [38] Idem. *SBN 252*

sion; and enumerating all the distresses of that unfortunate heroine, asks her, what she has to support her against her numerous and implacable enemies. "Myself," replies she; "myself, I say, and it is enough." BOILEAU justly rec- *SBN 253*
ommends this passage as an instance of true sublime.[39]

8 When PHOCION, the modest, the gentle PHOCION, was led to execution, he turned to one of his fellow-sufferers, who was lamenting his own hard fate. "Is it not glory enough for you," says he, "that you die with PHOCION?"[40]

9 Place in opposition the picture, which TACITUS draws of VITELLIUS, fallen from empire, prolonging his ignominy from a wretched love of life, delivered over to the merciless rabble; tossed, buffeted, and kicked about; constrained, 10
by their holding a poinard under his chin, to raise his head, and expose himself to every contumely. What abject infamy! What low humiliation! Yet even here, says the historian, he discovered some symptoms of a mind not wholly degenerate. To a tribune, who insulted him, he replied, "I am still your emperor."[41]

10 We never excuse the absolute want of spirit and dignity of character, or a proper sense of what is due to one's self, in society and the common intercourse of life. This vice constitutes what we properly call *meanness*; when a man can submit to the basest slavery, in order to gain his ends; fawn upon those who abuse him; and degrade himself by intimacies and familiarities 20
with undeserving inferiors. A certain degree of generous pride or self-value is so requisite, that the absence of it in the mind displeases, after the same manner as the want of a nose, eye, or any of the most material features of the face or members of the body.[42]

11 The utility of COURAGE, both to the public and to the person possessed of *SBN 254*
it, is an obvious foundation of merit: But to any one who duly considers of the matter, it will appear, that this quality has a peculiar lustre, which it derives wholly from itself, and from that noble elevation inseparable from it. Its figure, drawn by painters and by poets, displays, in each feature, a sublimity

[39] Réflexion 10 sur LONGIN. [40] PLUTARCH. in PHOC. *SBN 253*

[41] TACIT. hist. lib. 3. The author entering upon the narration, says, "*Laniata veste, fœdum spectaculum ducebatur, multis increpantibus, nullo inlacrimante*: deformitas exitus misericordiam abstulerat." To enter thoroughly into this method of thinking, we must make allowance for the ancient maxims, that no one ought to prolong his life after it became dishonourable; but, as he had always a right to dispose of it, it then became a duty to part with it.

[42] The absence of a virtue may often be a vice; and that of the highest kind; as in the instance of ingratitude, as well as meanness. Where we expect a beauty, the disappointment gives an uneasy *SBN 254*
sensation, and produces a real deformity. An abjectness of character, likewise, is disgustful and contemptible in another view. Where a man has no sense of value in himself, we are not likely to have any higher esteem of him. And if the same person, who crouches to his superiors, is insolent to his inferiors (as often happens), this contrariety of behaviour, instead of correcting the former vice, aggravates it extremely by the addition of a vice, still more odious. See Section 8.

and daring confidence; which catches the eye, engages the affections, and diffuses, by sympathy, a like sublimity of sentiment over every spectator.

12 Under what shining colours does DEMOSTHENES[43] represent PHILIP; where the orator apologizes for his own administration, and justifies that pertinacious love of liberty, with which he had inspired the ATHENIANS. "I beheld PHILIP," says he, "he with whom was your contest, resolutely, while in pursuit of empire and dominion, exposing himself to every wound; his eye goared, his neck wrested, his arm, his thigh pierced, whatever part of his body fortune should seize on, that cheerfully relinquishing; provided that, with what remained, he might live in honour and renown. And shall it be said, that he, born in PELLA, a place heretofore mean and ignoble, should be inspired with so high an ambition and thirst of fame: While you, ATHENIANS, *&c.*" These praises excite the most lively admiration; but the views presented by the orator, carry us not, we see, beyond the hero himself, nor ever regard the future advantageous consequences of his valour.

13 The martial temper of the ROMANS, enflamed by continual wars, had raised their esteem of courage so high, that, in their language, it was called *SBN 255*
virtue, by way of excellence and of distinction from all other moral qualities. "The SUEVI," in the opinion of TACITUS,[44] "dressed their hair with a laudable intent: Not for the purpose of loving or being loved: They adorned themselves only for their enemies, and in order to appear more terrible." A sentiment of the historian, which would sound a little oddly in other nations and other ages.

14 The SCYTHIANS, according to HERODOTUS,[45] after scalping their enemies, dressed the skin like leather, and used it as a towel; and whoever had the most of those towels was most esteemed among them. So much had martial bravery, in that nation, as well as in many others, destroyed the sentiments of humanity; a virtue surely much more useful and engaging.

15 It is indeed observable, that, among all uncultivated nations, who have not, as yet, had full experience of the advantages attending beneficence, justice, and the social virtues, courage is the predominant excellence; what is most celebrated by poets, recommended by parents and instructors, and admired by the public in general. The ethics of HOMER are, in this particular, very different from those of FENELON, his elegant imitator; and such as were well suited to an age, when one hero, as remarked by THUCYDIDES,[46] could ask another, without offence, whether he were a robber or not. Such also, very lately, was the system of ethics, which prevailed in many barbarous parts of

[43] Pro corona. [44] De moribus GERM. *SBN 254–5*
[45] Lib. 4. [46] Lib. 1. *SBN 255*

Ireland; if we may credit Spencer, in his judicious account of the state of that kingdom.[47]

16 Of the same class of virtues with courage is that undisturbed philosophical tranquillity, superior to pain, sorrow, anxiety, and each assault of adverse fortune. Conscious of his own virtue, say the philosophers, the sage elevates himself above every accident of life; and securely placed in the temple of wisdom, looks down on inferior mortals, engaged in pursuit of honours, riches, reputation, and every frivolous enjoyment. These pretensions, no doubt, when stretched to the utmost, are, by far, too magnificent for human nature. They carry, however, a grandeur with them, which seizes the spectator, and strikes him with admiration. And the nearer we can approach in practice, to this sublime tranquillity and indifference (for we must distinguish it from a stupid insensibility) the more secure enjoyment shall we attain within ourselves, and the more greatness of mind shall we discover to the world. The philosophical tranquillity may, indeed, be considered only as a branch of magnanimity. *SBN 256*

17 Who admires not Socrates; his perpetual serenity and contentment, amidst the greatest poverty and domestic vexations; his resolute contempt of riches, and his magnanimous care of preserving liberty, while he refused all assistance from his friends and disciples, and avoided even the dependence of an obligation? Epictetus had not so much as a door to his little house or hovel; and therefore, soon lost his iron lamp, the only furniture which he had worth taking. But resolving to disappoint all robbers for the future, he supplied its place with an earthen lamp, of which he very peaceably kept possession ever after.

18 Among the ancients, the heroes in philosophy, as well as those in war and patriotism, have a grandeur and force of sentiment, which astonishes our narrow souls, and is rashly rejected as extravagant and supernatural. They, in their turn, I allow, would have had equal reason to consider as romantic and incredible, the degree of humanity, clemency, order, tranquillity, and other social virtues, to which, in the administration of government, we have attained in modern times, had any one been then able to have made a fair representation of them. Such is the compensation, which nature, or rather education, has made in the distribution of excellencies and virtues, in these different ages. *SBN 257*

[47] "It is a common use," says he, "amongst their gentlemen's sons, that, as soon as they are able to use their weapons, they straight gather to themselves three or four stragglers or kern, with whom wandering a while up and down idly the country, taking only meat, he at last falleth into some bad occasion, that shall be offered; which being once made known, he is thenceforth counted a man of worth, in whom there is courage." *SBN 255*

19 The merit of BENEVOLENCE, arising from its utility, and its tendency to promote the good of mankind, has been already explained, and is, no doubt, the source of a *considerable* part of that esteem, which is so universally paid to it. But it will also be allowed, that the very softness and tenderness of the sentiment, its engaging endearments, its fond expressions, its delicate attentions, and all that flow of mutual confidence and regard, which enters into a warm attachment of love and friendship: It will be allowed, I say, that these feelings, being delightful in themselves, are necessarily communicated to the spectators, and melt them into the same fondness and delicacy. The tear naturally starts in our eye on the apprehension of a warm sentiment of this nature: Our breast heaves, our heart is agitated, and every humane tender principle of our frame is set in motion, and gives us the purest and most satisfactory enjoyment.

20 When poets form descriptions of ELYSIAN fields, where the blessed inhabitants stand in no need of each other's assistance, they yet represent them as maintaining a constant intercourse of love and friendship, and sooth our fancy with the pleasing image of these soft and gentle passions. The idea of tender tranquillity in a pastoral ARCADIA is agreeable from a like principle, as has been observed above.[48]

21 Who would live amidst perpetual wrangling, and scolding, and mutual reproaches? The roughness and harshness of these emotions disturb and displease us: We suffer by contagion and sympathy; nor can we remain indifferent spectators, even though certain, that no pernicious consequences would ever follow from such angry passions. *SBN 258*

22 As a certain proof, that the whole merit of benevolence is not derived from its usefulness, we may observe, that, in a kind way of blame, we say, a person is *too good*; when he exceeds his part in society, and carries his attention for others beyond the proper bounds. In like manner, we say a man is *too high-spirited*, *too intrepid*, *too indifferent about fortune*: Reproaches, which really, at bottom, imply more esteem than many panegyrics. Being accustomed to rate the merit and demerit of characters chiefly by their useful or pernicious tendencies, we cannot forbear applying the epithet of blame, when we discover a sentiment, which rises to a degree that is hurtful: But it may happen, at the same time, that its noble elevation, or its engaging tenderness so seizes the heart, as rather to encrease our friendship and concern for the person.[49]

23 The amours and attachments of HARRY the IVth of FRANCE, during the

[48] Section 5. Part 2. *SBN 257*

[49] Cheerfulness could scarce admit of blame from its excess, were it not that dissolute mirth, without a proper cause or subject, is a sure symptom and characteristic of folly, and on that account disgustful. *SBN 258*

civil wars of the league, frequently hurt his interest and his cause; but all the young, at least, and amorous, who can sympathize with the tender passions, will allow, that this very weakness (for they will readily call it such) chiefly endears that hero, and interests them in his fortunes.

24 The excessive bravery and resolute inflexibility of CHARLES the XIIth ruined his own country, and infested all his neighbours; but have such splendour and greatness in their appearance, as strikes us with admiration; and they might, in some degree, be even approved of, if they betrayed not sometimes too evident symptoms of madness and disorder.

25 The ATHENIANS pretended to the first invention of agriculture and of laws; *SBN 259* and always valued themselves extremely on the benefit thereby procured to the whole race of mankind. They also boasted, and with reason, of their warlike enterprizes; particularly against those innumerable fleets and armies of PERSIANS, which invaded GREECE during the reigns of DARIUS and XERXES. But though there be no comparison, in point of utility, between these peaceful and military honours; yet we find, that the orators, who have writ such elaborate panegyrics on that famous city, have chiefly triumphed in displaying the warlike atchievements. LYSIAS, THUCYDIDES, PLATO, and ISOCRATES discover, all of them, the same partiality; which, though condemned by calm reason and reflection, appears so natural in the mind of man.

26 It is observable, that the great charm of poetry consists in lively pictures of the sublime passions, magnanimity, courage, disdain of fortune; or those of the tender affections, love and friendship; which warm the heart, and diffuse over it similar sentiments and emotions. And though all kinds of passion, even the most disagreeable, such as grief and anger, are observed, when excited by poetry, to convey a satisfaction, from a mechanism of nature, not easy to be explained: Yet those more elevated or softer affections have a peculiar influence, and please from more than one cause or principle. Not to mention, that they alone interest us in the fortune of the persons represented, or communicate any esteem and affection for their character.

27 And can it possibly be doubted, that this talent itself of poets, to move the passions, this PATHETIC and SUBLIME of sentiment, is a very considerable merit; and being enhanced by its extreme rarity, may exalt the person possessed of it, above every character of the age in which he lives? The prudence, address, steadiness, and benign government of AUGUSTUS, adorned with all the splendour of his noble birth and imperial crown, render him but an unequal competitor for fame with VIRGIL, who lays nothing into the opposite *SBN 260* scale but the divine beauties of his poetical genius.

28 The very sensibility to these beauties, or a DELICACY of taste, is itself a

beauty in any character; as conveying the purest, the most durable, and most innocent of all enjoyments.

29 These are some instances of the several species of merit, that are valued for the immediate pleasure, which they communicate to the person possessed of them. No views of utility or of future beneficial consequences enter into this sentiment of approbation; yet is it of a kind similar to that other sentiment, which arises from views of a public or private utility. The same social sympathy, we may observe, or fellow-feeling with human happiness or misery, gives rise to both; and this analogy, in all the parts of the present theory, may justly be regarded as a confirmation of it. 10

SECTION 8

SBN 261

Of Qualities Immediately Agreeable to Others[50]

1 As the mutual shocks, in *society*, and the oppositions of interest and self-love have constrained mankind to establish the laws of *justice*; in order to preserve the advantages of mutual assistance and protection: In like manner, the eternal contrarieties, in *company*, of men's pride and self-conceit, have introduced the rules of GOOD MANNERS or POLITENESS; in order to facilitate the intercourse of minds, and an undisturbed commerce and conversation. Among well-bred people, a mutual deference is affected: Contempt of others disguised: Authority concealed: Attention given to each in his turn: And an easy stream of conversation maintained, without vehemence, without interruption, without eagerness for victory, and without any airs of superiority. These attentions and regards are immediately *agreeable* to others, abstracted from any consideration of utility or beneficial tendencies: They conciliate affection, promote esteem, and extremely enhance the merit of the person, who regulates his behaviour by them.

2 Many of the forms of breeding are arbitrary and casual: But the thing expressed by them is still the same. A SPANIARD goes out of his own house before his guest, to signify that he leaves him master of all. In other countries, the landlord walks out last, as a common mark of deference and regard. *SBN 262*

3 But, in order to render a man perfect *good company*, he must have WIT and INGENUITY as well as good manners. What wit is, it may not be easy to define; but it is easy surely to determine, that it is a quality immediately *agreeable* to others, and communicating, on its first appearance, a lively joy and satisfaction to every one who has any comprehension of it. The most profound metaphysics, indeed, might be employed, in explaining the various kinds and species of wit; and many classes of it, which are now received on the sole testimony of taste and sentiment, might, perhaps, be resolved into more general principles. But this is sufficient for our present purpose, that it does affect taste and sentiment, and bestowing an immediate enjoyment, is a sure source of approbation and affection.

[50] It is the nature, and, indeed, the definition of virtue, that it is *a quality of the mind agreeable to or approved of by every one, who considers or contemplates it*. But some qualities produce pleasure, because they are useful to society, or useful or agreeable to the person himself; others produce it more immediately: Which is the case with the class of virtues here considered. *SBN 261*

4 In countries, where men pass most of their time in conversation, and visits, and assemblies, these *companionable* qualities, so to speak, are of high estimation, and form a chief part of personal merit. In countries, where men live a more domestic life, and either are employed in business, or amuse themselves in a narrower circle of acquaintance, the more solid qualities are chiefly regarded. Thus, I have often observed, that, among the FRENCH, the first questions, with regard to a stranger, are, *Is he polite*? *Has he wit*? In our own country, the chief praise bestowed, is always that of a *good-natured, sensible fellow*.

5 In conversation, the lively spirit of dialogue is *agreeable*, even to those who desire not to have any share in the discourse: Hence the teller of long stories, or the pompous declaimer, is very little approved of. But most men desire likewise their turn in the conversation, and regard, with a very evil eye, that *loquacity*, which deprives them of a right they are naturally so jealous of. *SBN 263*

6 There is a sort of harmless *liars*, frequently to be met with in company, who deal much in the marvellous. Their usual intention is to please and entertain; but as men are most delighted with what they conceive to be truth, these people mistake extremely the means of pleasing, and incur universal blame. Some indulgence, however, to lying or fiction is given in *humorous* stories; because it is there really agreeable and entertaining; and truth is not of any importance.

7 Eloquence, genius of all kinds, even good sense, and sound reasoning, when it rises to an eminent degree, and is employed upon subjects of any considerable dignity and nice discernment; all these endowments seem immediately agreeable, and have a merit distinct from their usefulness. Rarity, likewise, which so much enhances the price of every thing, must set an additional value on these noble talents of the human mind.

8 Modesty may be understood in different senses, even abstracted from chastity, which has been already treated of. It sometimes means that tenderness and nicety of honour, that apprehension of blame, that dread of intrusion or injury towards others, that PUDOR, which is the proper guardian of every kind of virtue, and a sure preservative against vice and corruption. But its most usual meaning is when it is opposed to *impudence* and *arrogance*, and expresses a diffidence of our own judgment, and a due attention and regard for others. In young men chiefly, this quality is a sure sign of good sense; and is also the certain means of augmenting that endowment, by preserving their ears open to instruction, and making them still grasp after new attainments. But it has a farther charm to every spectator; by flattering every man's vanity, and presenting the appearance of a docile pupil, who receives, with proper attention and respect, every word they utter. *SBN 264*

9 Men have, in general, a much greater propensity to over-value than under-value themselves; notwithstanding the opinion of ARISTOTLE.[51] This makes us more jealous of the excess on the former side, and causes us to regard, with a peculiar indulgence, all tendency to modesty and self-diffidence; as esteeming the danger less of falling into any vicious extreme of that nature. It is thus, in countries, where men's bodies are apt to exceed in corpulency, personal beauty is placed in a much greater degree of slenderness, than in countries, where that is the most usual defect. Being so often struck with instances of one species of deformity, men think they can never keep at too great a distance from it, and wish always to have a leaning to the opposite side. In like 10 manner, were the door opened to self-praise, and were MONTAIGNE's maxim observed, that one should say as frankly, *I have sense, I have learning, I have courage, beauty, or wit*; as it is sure we often think so; were this the case, I say, every one is sensible, that such a flood of impertinence would break in upon us, as would render society wholly intolerable. For this reason custom has established it as a rule, in common societies, that men should not indulge themselves in self-praise, or even speak much of themselves; and it is only among intimate friends or people of very manly behaviour, that one is allowed to do himself justice. No body finds fault with MAURICE, Prince of ORANGE, for his reply to one, who asked him, whom he esteemed the first 20 general of the age, "The marquis of SPINOLA," said he, "is the second." Though it is observable, that the self-praise implied is here better implied, than if it had been directly expressed, without any cover or disguise.

10 He must be a very superficial thinker, who imagines, that all instances of *SBN 265* mutual deference are to be understood in earnest, and that a man would be more esteemable for being ignorant of his own merits and accomplishments. A small biass towards modesty, even in the internal sentiment, is favourably regarded, especially in young people; and a strong biass is required in the outward behaviour: But this excludes not a noble pride and spirit, which may openly display itself in its full extent, when one lies under calumny or 30 oppression of any kind. The generous contumacy of SOCRATES, as CICERO calls it, has been highly celebrated in all ages; and when joined to the usual modesty of his behaviour, forms a shining character. IPHICRATES, the ATHENIAN, being accused of betraying the interests of his country, asked his accuser, "Would you," says he, "have, on a like occasion, been guilty of that crime?" "By no means," replied the other. "And can you then imagine," cried the hero, "that IPHICRATES would be guilty?"[52] In short, a generous spirit and self-value, well founded, decently disguised, and courageously supported

[51] Ethic. ad Nicomachum. [52] QUINTIL. lib. 5. cap. 12. *SBN 264–5*

under distress and calumny, is a great excellency, and seems to derive its merit from the noble elevation of its sentiment, or its immediate agreeableness to its possessor. In ordinary characters, we approve of a biass towards modesty, which is a quality immediately agreeable to others: The vicious excess of the former virtue, namely, insolence or haughtiness, is immediately disagreeable to others: The excess of the latter is so to the possessor. Thus are the boundaries of these duties adjusted.

11 A desire of fame, reputation, or a character with others, is so far from being blameable, that it seems inseparable from virtue, genius, capacity, and a generous or noble disposition. An attention even to trivial matters, in order to please, is also expected and demanded by society; and no one is surprized, if he find a man in company, to observe a greater elegance of dress and more pleasant flow of conversation, than when he passes his time at home, and with his own family. Wherein, then, consists VANITY, which is so justly regarded as a fault or imperfection? It seems to consist chiefly in such an intemperate display of our advantages, honours, and accomplishments; in such an importunate and open demand of praise and admiration, as is offensive to others, and encroaches too far on *their* secret vanity and ambition. It is besides a sure symptom of the want of true dignity and elevation of mind, which is so great an ornament in any character. For why that impatient desire of applause; as if you were not justly entitled to it, and might not reasonably expect, that it would for ever attend you? Why so anxious to inform us of the great company which you have kept; the obliging things which were said to you; the honours, the distinctions which you met with; as if these were not things of course, and what we could readily, of ourselves, have imagined, without being told of them? *SBN 266*

12 DECENCY, or a proper regard to age, sex, character, and station in the world, may be ranked among the qualities, which are immediately agreeable to others, and which, by that means, acquire praise and approbation. An effeminate behaviour in a man, a rough manner in a woman; these are ugly, because unsuitable to each character, and different from the qualities which we expect in the sexes. It is as if a tragedy abounded in comic beauties, or a comedy in tragic. The disproportions hurt the eye, and convey a disagreeable sentiment to the spectators, the source of blame and disapprobation. This is that *indecorum*, which is explained so much at large by CICERO in his Offices.

13 Among the other virtues, we may also give CLEANLINESS a place; since it naturally renders us agreeable to others, and is no inconsiderable source of love and affection. No one will deny, that a negligence in this particular is a fault; and as faults are nothing but smaller vices, and this fault can have no other origin than the uneasy sensation, which it excites in others; we may, in *SBN 267*

this instance, seemingly so trivial, clearly discover the origin of moral distinctions, about which the learned have involved themselves in such mazes of perplexity and error.

14 But besides all the *agreeable* qualities, the origin of whose beauty, we can, in some degree, explain and account for, there still remains something mysterious and inexplicable, which conveys an immediate satisfaction to the spectator, but how, or why, or for what reason, he cannot pretend to determine. There is a MANNER, a grace, an ease, a genteelness, an I-know-not-what, which some men possess above others, which is very different from external beauty and comeliness, and which, however, catches our affection almost as suddenly and powerfully. And though this *manner* be chiefly talked of in the passion between the sexes, where the concealed magic is easily explained, yet surely much of it prevails in all our estimation of characters, and forms no inconsiderable part of personal merit. This class of accomplishments, therefore, must be trusted entirely to the blind, but sure testimony of taste and sentiment; and must be considered as a part of ethics, left by nature to baffle all the pride of philosophy, and make her sensible of her narrow boundaries and slender acquisitions.

15 We approve of another, because of his wit, politeness, modesty, decency, or any agreeable quality which he possesses; although he be not of our acquaintance, nor has ever given us any entertainment, by means of these accomplishments. The idea, which we form of their effect on his acquaintance, has an agreeable influence on our imagination, and gives us the sentiment of approbation. This principle enters into all the judgments, which we form concerning manners and characters.

SECTION 9

SBN 268

Conclusion

PART 1

1 It may justly appear surprizing, that any man, in so late an age, should find it requisite to prove, by elaborate reasoning, that PERSONAL MERIT consists altogether in the possession of mental qualities, *useful* or *agreeable* to the *person himself* or to *others*. It might be expected, that this principle would have occurred even to the first rude, unpracticed enquirers concerning morals, and been received from its own evidence, without any argument or disputation. Whatever is valuable in any kind, so naturally classes itself under the division of *useful* or *agreeable*, the *utile* or the *dulce*, that it is not easy to imagine, why we should ever seek farther, or consider the question as a matter of nice research or enquiry. And as every thing useful or agreeable must possess these qualities with regard either to the *person himself* or to *others*, the compleat delineation or description of merit seems to be performed as naturally as a shadow is cast by the sun, or an image is reflected upon water. If the ground, on which the shadow is cast, be not broken and uneven; nor the surface, from which the image is reflected, disturbed and confused; a just figure is immediately presented, without any art or attention. And it seems a reasonable presumption, that systems and hypotheses have perverted our natural understanding; when a theory, so simple and obvious, could so long have escaped the most elaborate examination.

SBN 269

2 But however the case may have fared with philosophy; in common life, these principles are still implicitly maintained, nor is any other topic of praise or blame ever recurred to, when we employ any panegyric or satire, any applause or censure of human action and behaviour. If we observe men, in every intercourse of business or pleasure, in every discourse and conversation; we shall find them no where, except in the schools, at any loss upon this subject. What so natural, for instance, as the following dialogue? You are very happy, we shall suppose one to say, addressing himself to another, that you have given your daughter to CLEANTHES. He is a man of honour and humanity. Every one, who has any intercourse with him, is sure of *fair* and *kind* treatment.[53] I congratulate you too, says another, on the promising expecta-

[53] Qualities useful to others.

SBN 269

tions of this son-in-law; whose assiduous application to the study of the laws, whose quick penetration and early knowledge both of men and business, prognosticate the greatest honours and advancement.[54] You surprize me, replies a third, when you talk of CLEANTHES as a man of business and application. I met him lately in a circle of the gayest company, and he was the very life and soul of our conversation: So much wit with good manners; so much gallantry without affectation; so much ingenious knowledge so genteelly delivered, I have never before observed in any one.[55] You would admire him still more, says a fourth, if you knew him more familiarly. That cheerfulness, which you might remark in him, is not a sudden flash struck out by company: It runs through the whole tenor of his life, and preserves a perpetual serenity on his countenance, and tranquillity in his soul. He has met with severe trials, misfortunes as well as dangers; and by his greatness of mind, was still superior to all of them.[56] The image, gentlemen, which you have here delineated of CLEANTHES, cried I, is that of accomplished merit. Each of you has given a stroke of the pencil to his figure; and you have unawares exceeded all the pictures drawn by GRATIAN or CASTIGLIONE. A philosopher might select this character as a model of perfect virtue. *SBN 270*

3 And as every quality, which is useful or agreeable to ourselves or others, is, in common life, allowed to be a part of personal merit; so no other will ever be received, where men judge of things by their natural, unprejudiced reason, without the delusive glosses of superstition and false religion. Celibacy, fasting, penance, mortification, self-denial, humility, silence, solitude, and the whole train of monkish virtues; for what reason are they every where rejected by men of sense, but because they serve to no manner of purpose; neither advance a man's fortune in the world, nor render him a more valuable member of society; neither qualify him for the entertainment of company, nor encrease his power of self-enjoyment? We observe, on the contrary, that they cross all these desirable ends; stupify the understanding and harden the heart, obscure the fancy and sour the temper. We justly, therefore, transfer them to the opposite column, and place them in the catalogue of vices; nor has any superstition force sufficient, among men of the world, to pervert entirely these natural sentiments. A gloomy, hair-brained enthusiast, after his death, may have a place in the calendar; but will scarcely ever be admitted, when alive, into intimacy and society, except by those who are as delirious and dismal as himself.

4 It seems a happiness in the present theory, that it enters not into that vulgar

[54] Qualities useful to the person himself. [55] Qualities immediately agreeable to others. *SBN 269*
[56] Qualities immediately agreeable to the person himself. *SBN 270*

dispute concerning the *degrees* of benevolence or self-love, which prevail in human nature; a dispute which is never likely to have any issue, both because *SBN 271*
men, who have taken part, are not easily convinced, and because the phænomena, which can be produced on either side, are so dispersed, so uncertain, and subject to so many interpretations, that it is scarcely possible accurately to compare them, or draw from them any determinate inference or conclusion. It is sufficient for our present purpose, if it be allowed, what surely, without the greatest absurdity, cannot be disputed, that there is some benevolence, however small, infused into our bosom; some spark of friendship for human kind; some particle of the dove, kneaded into our frame, 10
along with the elements of the wolf and serpent. Let these generous sentiments be supposed ever so weak; let them be insufficient to move even a hand or finger of our body; they must still direct the determinations of our mind, and where every thing else is equal, produce a cool preference of what is useful and serviceable to mankind, above what is pernicious and dangerous. A *moral distinction*, therefore, immediately arises; a general sentiment of blame and approbation; a tendency, however faint, to the objects of the one, and a proportionable aversion to those of the other. Nor will those reasoners, who so earnestly maintain the predominant selfishness of human kind, be any wise scandalized at hearing of the weak sentiments of virtue, implanted 20
in our nature. On the contrary, they are found as ready to maintain the one tenet as the other; and their spirit of satire (for such it appears, rather than of corruption) naturally gives rise to both opinions; which have, indeed, a great and almost an indissoluble connexion together.

5 Avarice, ambition, vanity, and all passions vulgarly, though improperly, comprized under the denomination of *self-love*, are here excluded from our theory concerning the origin of morals, not because they are too weak, but because they have not a proper direction, for that purpose. The notion of *SBN 272*
morals implies some sentiment common to all mankind, which recommends the same object to general approbation, and makes every man, or most men, 30
agree in the same opinion or decision concerning it. It also implies some sentiment, so universal and comprehensive as to extend to all mankind, and render the actions and conduct, even of the persons the most remote, an object of applause or censure, according as they agree or disagree with that rule of right which is established. These two requisite circumstances belong alone to the sentiment of humanity here insisted on. The other passions produce, in every breast, many strong sentiments of desire and aversion, affection and hatred; but these neither are felt so much in common, nor are so comprehensive, as to be the foundation of any general system and established theory of blame or approbation. 40

6 When a man denominates another his *enemy*, his *rival*, his *antagonist*, his *adversary*, he is understood to speak the language of self-love, and to express sentiments, peculiar to himself, and arising from his particular circumstances and situation. But when he bestows on any man the epithets of *vicious* or *odious* or *depraved*, he then speaks another language, and expresses sentiments, in which, he expects, all his audience are to concur with him. He must here, therefore, depart from his private and particular situation, and must choose a point of view, common to him with others: He must move some universal principle of the human frame, and touch a string, to which all mankind have an accord and symphony. If he mean, therefore, to express, that this man possesses qualities, whose tendency is pernicious to society, he has chosen this common point of view, and has touched the principle of humanity, in which every man, in some degree, concurs. While the human heart is compounded of the same elements as at present, it will never be wholly indifferent to public good, nor entirely unaffected with the tendency of characters and manners. And though this affection of humanity may not generally be esteemed so strong as vanity or ambition, yet, being common to all men, it can alone be the foundation of morals, or of any general system of blame or praise. One man's ambition is not another's ambition; nor will the same event or object satisfy both: But the humanity of one man is the humanity of every one; and the same object touches this passion in all human creatures. *SBN 273*

7 But the sentiments, which arise from humanity, are not only the same in all human creatures, and produce the same approbation or censure; but they also comprehend all human creatures; nor is there any one whose conduct or character is not, by their means, an object, to every one, of censure or approbation. On the contrary, those other passions, commonly denominated selfish, both produce different sentiments in each individual, according to his particular situation; and also contemplate the greater part of mankind with the utmost indifference and unconcern. Whoever has a high regard and esteem for me flatters my vanity; whoever expresses contempt mortifies and displeases me: But as my name is known but to a small part of mankind, there are few, who come within the sphere of this passion, or excite, on its account, either my affection or disgust. But if you represent a tyrannical, insolent, or barbarous behaviour, in any country or in any age of the world; I soon carry my eye to the pernicious tendency of such a conduct, and feel the sentiments of repugnance and displeasure towards it. No character can be so remote as to be, in this light, wholly indifferent to me. What is beneficial to society or to the person himself must still be preferred. And every quality or action, of every human being, must, by this means, be ranked under some class or denomination, expressive of general censure or applause.

8 What more, therefore, can we ask to distinguish the sentiments, dependent *SBN 274*
on humanity, from those connected with any other passion, or to satisfy us, why the former are the origin of morals, not the latter? Whatever conduct gains my approbation, by touching my humanity, procures also the applause of all mankind, by affecting the same principle in them: But what serves my avarice or ambition pleases these passions in me alone, and affects not the avarice and ambition of the rest of mankind. There is no circumstance of conduct in any man, provided it have a beneficial tendency, that is not agreeable to my humanity, however remote the person: But every man, so far removed as neither to cross nor serve my avarice and ambition, is regarded as wholly indifferent by those passions. The distinction, therefore, between these species of sentiment being so great and evident, language must soon be moulded upon it, and must invent a peculiar set of terms, in order to express those universal sentiments of censure or approbation, which arise from humanity, or from views of general usefulness and its contrary. VIRTUE and VICE become then known: Morals are recognized: Certain general ideas are framed of human conduct and behaviour: Such measures are expected from men, in such situations: This action is determined to be conformable to our abstract rule; that other, contrary. And by such universal principles are the particular sentiments of self-love frequently controuled and limited.[57]

9 From instances of popular tumults, seditions, factions, panics, and of all *SBN 275*
passions, which are shared with a multitude; we may learn the influence of society, in exciting and supporting any emotion; while the most ungovernable disorders are raised, we find, by that means, from the slightest and most frivolous occasions. SOLON was no very cruel, though, perhaps, an unjust legislator, who punished neuters in civil wars; and few, I believe, would, in such cases, incur the penalty, were their affection and discourse allowed sufficient to absolve them. No selfishness, and scarce any philosophy, have there force

[57] It seems certain, both from reason and experience, that a rude, untaught savage regulates *SBN 274*
chiefly his love and hatred by the ideas of private utility and injury, and has but faint conceptions of a general rule or system of behaviour. The man who stands opposite to him in battle, he hates heartily, not only for the present moment, which is almost unavoidable, but for ever after; nor is he satisfied without the most extreme punishment and vengeance. But we, accustomed to society, and to more enlarged reflections, consider, that this man is serving his own country and community; that any man, in the same situation, would do the same; that we ourselves, in like circumstances, observe a like conduct; that, in general, human society is best supported on such maxims: And by these sup- *SBN 275*
positions and views, we correct, in some measure, our ruder and narrower passions. And though much of our friendship and enmity be still regulated by private considerations of benefit and harm, we pay, at least, this homage to general rules, which we are accustomed to respect, that we commonly pervert our adversary's conduct, by imputing malice or injustice to him, in order to give vent to those passions, which arise from self-love and private interest. When the heart is full of rage, it never wants pretences of this nature; though sometimes as frivolous, as those from which HORACE, being almost crushed by the fall of a tree, affects to accuse of parricide the first planter of it.

sufficient to support a total coolness and indifference; and he must be more or less than man, who kindles not in the common blaze. What wonder then, that moral sentiments are found of such influence in life; though springing from principles, which may appear, at first sight, somewhat small and delicate? But these principles, we must remark, are social and universal: They form, in a manner, the *party* of human kind against vice or disorder, its common enemy: And as the benevolent concern for others is diffused, in a greater or less degree, over all men, and is the same in all, it occurs more frequently in discourse, is cherished by society and conversation, and the blame and approbation, consequent on it, are thereby rouzed from that lethargy, into which they are probably lulled, in solitary and uncultivated nature. Other passions, though perhaps originally stronger, yet being selfish and private, are often overpowered by its force, and yield the dominion of our breast to those social and public principles. SBN 276

10 Another spring of our constitution, that brings a great addition of force to moral sentiment, is, the love of fame; which rules, with such uncontrouled authority, in all generous minds, and is often the grand object of all their designs and undertakings. By our continual and earnest pursuit of a character, a name, a reputation in the world, we bring our own deportment and conduct frequently in review, and consider how they appear in the eyes of those, who approach and regard us. This constant habit of surveying ourselves, as it were, in reflection, keeps alive all the sentiments of right and wrong, and begets, in noble natures, a certain reverence for themselves as well as others; which is the surest guardian of every virtue. The animal conveniencies and pleasures sink gradually in their value; while every inward beauty and moral grace is studiously acquired, and the mind is accomplished in every perfection, which can adorn or embellish a rational creature.

11 Here is the most perfect morality with which we are acquainted: Here is displayed the force of many sympathies. Our moral sentiment is itself a feeling chiefly of that nature: And our regard to a character with others seems to arise only from a care of preserving a character with ourselves; and in order to attain this end, we find it necessary to prop our tottering judgment on the correspondent approbation of mankind.

12 But, that we may accommodate matters, and remove, if possible, every difficulty, let us allow all these reasonings to be false. Let us allow, that, when we resolve the pleasure, which arises from views of utility, into the sentiments of humanity and sympathy, we have embraced a wrong hypothesis. Let us confess it necessary to find some other explication of that applause, which is paid to objects, whether inanimate, animate, or rational, if they have a tendency to promote the welfare and advantage of mankind. However SBN 277

difficult it be to conceive, that an object is approved of on account of its tendency to a certain end, while the end itself is totally indifferent; let us swallow this absurdity, and consider what are the consequences. The preceding delineation or definition of PERSONAL MERIT must still retain its evidence and authority: It must still be allowed, that every quality of the mind, which is *useful* or *agreeable* to the *person himself* or to *others*, communicates a pleasure to the spectator, engages his esteem, and is admitted under the honourable denomination of virtue or merit. Are not justice, fidelity, honour, veracity, allegiance, chastity, esteemed solely on account of their tendency to promote the good of society? Is not that tendency inseparable from humanity, benevolence, lenity, generosity, gratitude, moderation, tenderness, friendship, and all the other social virtues? Can it possibly be doubted, that industry, discretion, frugality, secrecy, order, perseverance, forethought, judgment, and this whole class of virtues and accomplishments, of which many pages would not contain the catalogue; can it be doubted, I say, that the tendency of these qualities to promote the interest and happiness of their possessor, is the sole foundation of their merit? Who can dispute that a mind, which supports a perpetual serenity and cheerfulness, a noble dignity and undaunted spirit, a tender affection and good-will to all around; as it has more enjoyment within itself, is also a more animating and rejoicing spectacle, than if dejected with melancholy, tormented with anxiety, irritated with rage, or sunk into the most abject baseness and degeneracy? And as to the qualities, immediately *agreeable to others*, they speak sufficiently for themselves; and he must be unhappy, indeed, either in his own temper, or in his situation and company, who has never perceived the charms of a facetious wit or flowing affability, of a delicate modesty or decent genteelness of address and manner. *SBN 278*

13 I am sensible, that nothing can be more unphilosophical than to be positive or dogmatical on any subject; and that, even if *excessive* scepticism could be maintained, it would not be more destructive to all just reasoning and enquiry. I am convinced, that, where men are the most sure and arrogant, they are commonly the most mistaken, and have there given reins to passion, without that proper deliberation and suspence, which can alone secure them from the grossest absurdities. Yet, I must confess, that this enumeration puts the matter in so strong a light, that I cannot, *at present*, be more assured of any truth, which I learn from reasoning and argument, than that personal merit consists entirely in the usefulness or agreeableness of qualities to the person himself possessed of them, or to others, who have any intercourse with him. But when I reflect, that, though the bulk and figure of the earth have been measured and delineated, though the motions of the tides have been accounted for, the order and œconomy of the heavenly bodies subjected to

their proper laws, and INFINITE itself reduced to calculation; yet men still dispute concerning the foundation of their moral duties: When I reflect on this, I say, I fall back into diffidence and scepticism, and suspect, that an hypothesis, so obvious, had it been a true one, would, long ere now, have been received by the unanimous suffrage and consent of mankind.

PART 2

14 Having explained the moral *approbation* attending merit or virtue, there remains nothing, but briefly to consider our interested *obligation* to it, and to enquire, whether every man, who has any regard to his own happiness and welfare, will not best find his account in the practice of every moral duty. If this can be clearly ascertained from the foregoing theory, we shall have the *SBN 279* satisfaction to reflect, that we have advanced principles, which not only, it is hoped, will stand the test of reasoning and enquiry, but may contribute to the amendment of men's lives, and their improvement in morality and social virtue. And though the philosophical truth of any proposition by no means depends on its tendency to promote the interests of society; yet a man has but a bad grace, who delivers a theory, however true, which, he must confess, leads to a practice dangerous and pernicious. Why rake into those corners of nature, which spread a nuisance all around? Why dig up the pestilence from the pit, in which it is buried? The ingenuity of your researches may be admired; but your systems will be detested: And mankind will agree, if they 20 cannot refute them, to sink them, at least, in eternal silence and oblivion. Truths, which are *pernicious* to society, if any such there be, will yield to errors, which are salutary and *advantageous*.

15 But what philosophical truths can be more advantageous to society, than those here delivered, which represent virtue in all her genuine and most engaging charms, and make us approach her with ease, familiarity, and affection? The dismal dress falls off, with which many divines, and some philosophers have covered her; and nothing appears but gentleness, humanity, beneficence, affability; nay even, at proper intervals, play, frolic, and gaiety. She talks not of useless austerities and rigours, suffering and self-denial. She 30 declares, that her sole purpose is, to make her votaries and all mankind, during every instant of their existence, if possible, cheerful and happy; nor does she ever willingly part with any pleasure but in hopes of ample compensation in some other period of their lives. The sole trouble, which she demands, is that of just calculation, and a steady preference of the greater happiness. And if any austere pretenders approach her, enemies to joy and

pleasure, she either rejects them as hypocrites and deceivers; or if she admit them in her train, they are ranked, however, among the least favoured of her votaries. *SBN 280*

16 And, indeed, to drop all figurative expression, what hopes can we ever have of engaging mankind to a practice, which we confess full of austerity and rigour? Or what theory of morals can ever serve any useful purpose, unless it can show, by a particular detail, that all the duties, which it recommends, are also the true interest of each individual? The peculiar advantage of the foregoing system seems to be, that it furnishes proper mediums for that purpose.

17 That the virtues which are immediately *useful* or *agreeable* to the person possessed of them, are desirable in a view to self-interest, it would surely be superfluous to prove. Moralists, indeed, may spare themselves all the pains, which they often take in recommending these duties. To what purpose collect arguments to evince, that temperance is advantageous, and the excesses of pleasure hurtful? When it appears, that these excesses are only denominated such, because they are hurtful; and that, if the unlimited use of strong liquors, for instance, no more impaired health or the faculties of mind and body than the use of air or water, it would not be a whit more vicious or blameable.

18 It seems equally superfluous to prove, that the *companionable* virtues of good manners and wit, decency and genteelness, are more desirable than the contrary qualities. Vanity alone, without any other consideration, is a sufficient motive to make us wish for the possession of these accomplishments. No man was ever willingly deficient in this particular. All our failures here proceed from bad education, want of capacity, or a perverse and unpliable disposition. Would you have your company coveted, admired, followed; rather than hated, despised, avoided? Can any one seriously deliberate in the case? As no enjoyment is sincere, without some reference to company and society; so no society can be agreeable, or even tolerable, where a man feels his presence unwelcome, and discovers all around him symptoms of disgust and aversion. *SBN 281*

19 But why, in the greater society or confederacy of mankind, should not the case be the same as in particular clubs and companies? Why is it more doubtful, that the enlarged virtues of humanity, generosity, beneficence, are desirable with a view to happiness and self-interest, than the limited endowments of ingenuity and politeness? Are we apprehensive, lest those social affections interfere, in a greater and more immediate degree than any other pursuits, with private utility, and cannot be gratified, without some important sacrifice of honour and advantage? If so, we are but ill instructed in the nature of the

human passions, and are more influenced by verbal distinctions than by real differences.

20 Whatever contradiction may vulgarly be supposed between the *selfish* and *social* sentiments or dispositions, they are really no more opposite than selfish and ambitious, selfish and revengeful, selfish and vain. It is requisite, that there be an original propensity of some kind, in order to be a basis to self-love, by giving a relish to the objects of its pursuit; and none more fit for this purpose than benevolence or humanity. The goods of fortune are spent in one gratification or another: The miser, who accumulates his annual income, and lends it out at interest, has really spent it in the gratification of his avarice. 10 And it would be difficult to show, why a man is more a loser by a generous action, than by any other method of expence; since the utmost which he can attain, by the most elaborate selfishness, is the indulgence of some affection.

21 Now if life, without passion, must be altogether insipid and tiresome; let a man suppose that he has full power of modelling his own disposition, and let him deliberate what appetite or desire he would choose for the foundation of his happiness and enjoyment. Every affection, he would observe, when *SBN 282* gratified by success, gives a satisfaction proportioned to its force and violence; but besides this advantage, common to all, the immediate feeling of benevolence and friendship, humanity and kindness, is sweet, smooth, 20 tender, and agreeable, independent of all fortune and accidents. These virtues are besides attended with a pleasing consciousness or remembrance, and keep us in humour with ourselves as well as others; while we retain the agreeable reflection of having done our part towards mankind and society. And though all men show a jealousy of our success in the pursuits of avarice and ambition; yet are we almost sure of their good-will and good-wishes, so long as we persevere in the paths of virtue, and employ ourselves in the execution of generous plans and purposes. What other passion is there where we shall find so many advantages united; an agreeable sentiment, a pleasing consciousness, a good reputation? But of these truths, we may observe, men 30 are, of themselves, pretty much convinced; nor are they deficient in their duty to society, because they would not wish to be generous, friendly, and humane; but because they do not feel themselves such.

22 Treating vice with the greatest candour, and making it all possible concessions, we must acknowledge, that there is not, in any instance, the smallest pretext for giving it the preference above virtue, with a view to self-interest; except, perhaps, in the case of justice, where a man, taking things in a certain light, may often seem to be a loser by his integrity. And though it is allowed, that, without a regard to property, no society could subsist; yet, according to the imperfect way in which human affairs are conducted, a sensible knave, in 40

particular incidents, may think, that an act of iniquity or infidelity will make a considerable addition to his fortune, without causing any considerable breach in the social union and confederacy. That *honesty is the best policy*, may be a good general rule; but is liable to many exceptions: And he, it may, *SBN 283* perhaps, be thought, conducts himself with most wisdom, who observes the general rule, and takes advantage of all the exceptions.

23 I must confess, that, if a man think, that this reasoning much requires an answer, it will be a little difficult to find any, which will to him appear satisfactory and convincing. If his heart rebel not against such pernicious maxims, if he feel no reluctance to the thoughts of villany or baseness, he has indeed lost a considerable motive to virtue; and we may expect, that his practice will be answerable to his speculation. But in all ingenuous natures, the antipathy to treachery and roguery is too strong to be counterbalanced by any views of profit or pecuniary advantage. Inward peace of mind, consciousness of integrity, a satisfactory review of our own conduct; these are circumstances very requisite to happiness, and will be cherished and cultivated by every honest man, who feels the importance of them.

24 Such a one has, besides, the frequent satisfaction of seeing knaves, with all their pretended cunning and abilities, betrayed by their own maxims; and while they purpose to cheat with moderation and secrecy, a tempting incident occurs, nature is frail, and they give into the snare; whence they can never extricate themselves, without a total loss of reputation, and the forfeiture of all future trust and confidence with mankind.

25 But were they ever so secret and successful, the honest man, if he has any tincture of philosophy, or even common observation and reflection, will discover that they themselves are, in the end, the greatest dupes, and have sacrificed the invaluable enjoyment of a character, with themselves at least, for the acquisition of worthless toys and gewgaws. How little is requisite to supply the *necessities* of nature? And in a view to *pleasure*, what comparison between the unbought satisfaction of conversation, society, study, even health and the common beauties of nature, but above all the peaceful *SBN 284* reflection on one's own conduct: What comparison, I say, between these, and the feverish, empty amusements of luxury and expence? These natural pleasures, indeed, are really without price; both because they are below all price in their attainment, and above it in their enjoyment.

APPENDIX 1

SBN 285

Concerning Moral Sentiment

1 If the foregoing hypothesis be received, it will now be easy for us to determine the question first started,[58] concerning the general principles of morals; and though we postponed the decision of that question, lest it should then involve us in intricate speculations, which are unfit for moral discourses, we may resume it at present, and examine how far either *reason* or *sentiment* enters into all decisions of praise or censure.

2 One principal foundation of moral praise being supposed to lie in the usefulness of any quality or action; it is evident, that *reason* must enter for a considerable share in all decisions of this kind; since nothing but that faculty can instruct us in the tendency of qualities and actions, and point out their beneficial consequences to society and to their possessor. In many cases, this is an affair liable to great controversy: Doubts may arise; opposite interests may occur; and a preference must be given to one side, from very nice views, and a small overbalance of utility. This is particularly remarkable in questions with regard to justice; as is, indeed, natural to suppose, from that species of utility, which attends this virtue.[59] Were every single instance of justice, like that of benevolence, useful to society; this would be a more simple state of the case, and seldom liable to great controversy. But as single *SBN 286* instances of justice are often pernicious in their first and immediate tendency, and as the advantage to society results only from the observance of the general rule, and from the concurrence and combination of several persons in the same equitable conduct; the case here becomes more intricate and involved. The various circumstances of society; the various consequences of any practice; the various interests, which may be proposed: These, on many occasions, are doubtful, and subject to great discussion and enquiry. The object of municipal laws is to fix all the questions with regard to justice: The debates of civilians; the reflections of politicians; the precedents of history and public records, are all directed to the same purpose. And a very accurate *reason* or *judgment* is often requisite, to give the true determination, amidst such intricate doubts arising from obscure or opposite utilities.

3 But though reason, when fully assisted and improved, be sufficient to

[58] Section 1. [59] See Appendix 3.

instruct us in the pernicious or useful tendency of qualities and actions; it is not alone sufficient to produce any moral blame or approbation. Utility is only a tendency to a certain end; and were the end totally indifferent to us, we should feel the same indifference towards the means. It is requisite a *sentiment* should here display itself, in order to give a preference to the useful above the pernicious tendencies. This sentiment can be no other than a feeling for the happiness of mankind, and a resentment of their misery; since these are the different ends, which virtue and vice have a tendency to promote. Here, therefore, *reason* instructs us in the several tendencies of actions, and *humanity* makes a distinction in favour of those, which are useful and beneficial.

4 This partition between the faculties of understanding and sentiment, in all moral decisions, seems clear from the preceding hypothesis. But I shall suppose that hypothesis false: It will then be requisite to look out for some *SBN 287* other theory, that may be satisfactory; and I dare venture to affirm, that none such will ever be found, so long as we suppose reason to be the sole source of morals. To prove this, it will be proper to weigh the five following considerations.

5 1. It is easy for a false hypothesis to maintain some appearance of truth, while it keeps wholly in generals, makes use of undefined terms, and employs comparisons, instead of instances. This is particularly remarkable in that philosophy, which ascribes the discernment of all moral distinctions to reason alone, without the concurrence of sentiment. It is impossible that, in any particular instance, this hypothesis can so much as be rendered intelligible; whatever specious figure it may make in general declamations and discourses. Examine the crime of *ingratitude*, for instance; which has place, wherever we observe good-will, expressed and known, together with good offices performed, on the one side, and a return of ill-will or indifference, with ill-offices or neglect on the other: Anatomize all these circumstances, and examine, by your reason alone, in what consists the demerit or blame: You never will come to any issue or conclusion.

6 Reason judges either of *matter of fact* or of *relations*. Enquire then, *first*, where is that matter of fact, which we here call *crime*; point it out; determine the time of its existence; describe its essence or nature; explain the sense or faculty, to which it discovers itself. It resides in the mind of the person, who is ungrateful. He must, therefore, feel it, and be conscious of it. But nothing is there, except the passion of ill-will or absolute indifference. You cannot say, that these, of themselves, always, and in all circumstances, are crimes. No: They are only crimes, when directed towards persons, who have before expressed and displayed good-will towards us. Consequently, we may infer,

that the crime of ingratitude is not any particular individual *fact*; but arises from a complication of circumstances, which, being presented to the spectator, excites the *sentiment* of blame, by the particular structure and fabric of his mind. *SBN 288*

7 This representation, you say, is false. Crime, indeed, consists not in a particular *fact*, of whose reality we are assured by *reason*: But it consists in certain *moral relations*, discovered by reason, in the same manner as we discover, by reason, the truths of geometry or algebra. But what are the relations, I ask, of which you here talk? In the case stated above, I see first good-will and good offices in one person; then ill-will and ill-offices in the other. Between these, there is the relation of *contrariety*. Does the crime consist in that relation? But suppose a person bore me ill-will or did me ill-offices; and I, in return, were indifferent towards him, or did him good offices: Here is the same relation of *contrariety*; and yet my conduct is often highly laudable. Twist and turn this matter as much as you will, you can never rest the morality on relation; but must have recourse to the decisions of sentiment.

8 When it is affirmed, that two and three are equal to the half of ten; this relation of equality, I understand perfectly. I conceive, that if ten be divided into two parts, of which one has as many units as the other; and if any of these parts be compared to two added to three, it will contain as many units as that compound number. But when you draw thence a comparison to moral relations, I own that I am altogether at a loss to understand you. A moral action, a crime, such as ingratitude, is a complicated object. Does the morality consist in the relation of its parts to each other. How? After what manner? Specify the relation: Be more particular and explicit in your propositions; and you will easily see their falsehood.

9 No, say you, the morality consists in the relation of actions to the rule of right; and they are denominated good or ill, according as they agree or disagree with it. What then is this rule of right? In what does it consist? How is it determined? By reason, you say, which examines the moral relations of actions. So that moral relations are determined by the comparison of actions to a rule. And that rule is determined by considering the moral relations of objects. Is not this fine reasoning? *SBN 289*

10 All this is metaphysics, you cry: That is enough: There needs nothing more to give a strong presumption of falsehood. Yes, reply I: Here are metaphysics surely: But they are all on your side, who advance an abstruse hypothesis, which can never be made intelligible, nor quadrate with any particular instance or illustration. The hypothesis which we embrace is plain. It maintains, that morality is determined by sentiment. It defines virtue to be *whatever mental action or quality gives to a spectator the pleasing sentiment of*

approbation; and vice the contrary. We then proceed to examine a plain matter of fact, to wit, what actions have this influence: We consider all the circumstances, in which these actions agree: And thence endeavour to extract some general observations with regard to these sentiments. If you call this metaphysics, and find any thing abstruse here, you need only conclude, that your turn of mind is not suited to the moral sciences.

11 2. When a man, at any time, deliberates concerning his own conduct, (as, whether he had better, in a particular emergence, assist a brother or a benefactor) he must consider these separate relations, with all the circumstances and situations of the persons, in order to determine the superior duty and obligation: And in order to determine the proportion of lines in any triangle, it is necessary to examine the nature of that figure, and the relations which its several parts bear to each other. But notwithstanding this appearing similarity in the two cases, there is, at bottom, an extreme difference between them. A speculative reasoner concerning triangles or circles considers the several known and given relations of the parts of these figures; and thence infers some unknown relation, which is dependent on the former. But in moral *SBN 290* deliberations, we must be acquainted, before-hand, with all the objects, and all their relations to each other; and from a comparison of the whole, fix our choice or approbation. No new fact to be ascertained: No new relation to be discovered. All the circumstances of the case are supposed to be laid before us, ere we can fix any sentence of blame or approbation. If any material circumstance be yet unknown or doubtful, we must first employ our enquiry or intellectual faculties to assure us of it; and must suspend for a time all moral decision or sentiment. While we are ignorant, whether a man were aggressor or not, how can we determine whether the person, who killed him, be criminal or innocent? But after every circumstance, every relation is known, the understanding has no farther room to operate, nor any object, on which it could employ itself. The approbation or blame, which then ensues, cannot be the work of the judgment, but of the heart; and is not a speculative proposition or affirmation, but an active feeling or sentiment. In the disquisitions of the understanding, from known circumstances and relations, we infer some new and unknown. In moral decisions, all the circumstances and relations must be previously known; and the mind, from the contemplation of the whole, feels some new impression of affection or disgust, esteem or contempt, approbation or blame.

12 Hence the great difference between a mistake of *fact* and one of *right*; and hence the reason, why the one is commonly criminal and not the other. When Œdipus killed Laius, he was ignorant of the relation, and from circumstances, innocent and involuntary, formed erroneous opinions concerning

the action which he committed. But when NERO killed AGRIPPINA, all the relations between himself and the person, and all the circumstances of the fact were previously known to him: But the motive of revenge, or fear, or *SBN 291* interest, prevailed in his savage heart over the sentiments of duty and humanity. And when we express that detestation against him, to which he, himself, in a little time, became insensible; it is not, that we see any relations, of which he was ignorant; but that, from the rectitude of our disposition, we feel sentiments, against which he was hardened, from flattery and a long perseverance in the most enormous crimes. In these sentiments, then, not in a discovery of relations of any kind, do all moral determinations consist. Before we can pretend to form any decision of this kind, every thing must be known and ascertained on the side of the object or action. Nothing remains but to feel, on our part, some sentiment of blame or approbation; whence we pronounce the action criminal or virtuous.

13 3. This doctrine will become still more evident, if we compare moral beauty with natural, to which, in many particulars, it bears so near a resemblance. It is on the proportion, relation, and position of parts, that all natural beauty depends; but it would be absurd thence to infer, that the perception of beauty, like that of truth in geometrical problems, consists wholly in the perception of relations, and was performed entirely by the understanding or intellectual faculties. In all the sciences, our mind, from the known relations, investigates the unknown: But in all decisions of taste or external beauty, all the relations are before-hand obvious to the eye; and we thence proceed to feel a sentiment of complacency or disgust, according to the nature of the object, and disposition of our organs.

14 EUCLID has fully explained all the qualities of the circle; but has not, in any proposition, said a word of its beauty. The reason is evident. The beauty is not a quality of the circle. It lies not in any part of the line, whose parts are equally distant from a common center. It is only the effect, which that figure produces upon the mind, whose peculiar fabric or structure renders it sus- *SBN 292* ceptible of such sentiments. In vain would you look for it in the circle, or seek it, either by your senses or by mathematical reasonings, in all the properties of that figure.

15 Attend to PALLADIO and PERRAULT, while they explain all the parts and proportions of a pillar: They talk of the cornice and frieze and base and entablature and shaft and architrave; and give the description and position of each of these members. But should you ask the description and position of its beauty, they would readily reply, that the beauty is not in any of the parts or members of a pillar, but results from the whole, when that complicated figure is presented to an intelligent mind, susceptible of those finer sensations. Till

such a spectator appear, there is nothing but a figure of such particular dimensions and proportions: From his sentiments alone arise its elegance and beauty.

16 Again; attend to CICERO, while he paints the crimes of a VERRES or a CATILINE; you must acknowledge that the moral turpitude results, in the same manner, from the contemplation of the whole, when presented to a being, whose organs have such a particular structure and formation. The orator may paint rage, insolence, barbarity on the one side: Meekness, suffering, sorrow, innocence on the other: But if you feel no indignation or compassion arise in you from this complication of circumstances, you would in vain ask him, in what consists the crime or villany, which he so vehemently exclaims against: At what time, or on what subject it first began to exist: And what has a few months afterwards become of it, when every disposition and thought of all the actors is totally altered, or annihilated. No satisfactory answer can be given to any of these questions, upon the abstract hypothesis of morals; and we must at last acknowledge, that the crime or immorality is no particular fact or relation, which can be the object of the understanding: *SBN 293* But arises entirely from the sentiment of disapprobation, which, by the structure of human nature, we unavoidably feel on the apprehension of barbarity or treachery.

17 4. Inanimate objects may bear to each other all the same relations, which we observe in moral agents; though the former can never be the object of love or hatred, nor are consequently susceptible of merit or iniquity. A young tree, which over-tops and destroys its parent, stands in all the same relations with NERO, when he murdered AGRIPPINA; and if morality consisted merely in relations, would, no doubt, be equally criminal.

18 5. It appears evident, that the ultimate ends of human actions can never, in any case, be accounted for by *reason*, but recommend themselves entirely to the sentiments and affections of mankind, without any dependence on the intellectual faculties. Ask a man, *why he uses exercise*; he will answer, *because he desires to keep his health*. If you then enquire, *why he desires health*, he will readily reply, *because sickness is painful*. If you push your enquiries farther, and desire a reason, *why he hates pain*, it is impossible he can ever give any. This is an ultimate end, and is never referred to any other object.

19 Perhaps, to your second question, *why he desires health*, he may also reply, that *it is necessary for the exercise of his calling*. If you ask, *why he is anxious on that head*, he will answer, *because he desires to get money*. If you demand *Why? It is the instrument of pleasure*, says he. And beyond this it is an absurdity to ask for a reason. It is impossible there can be a progress *in infinitum*; and that one thing can always be a reason, why another is desired. Something must be

desirable on its own account, and because of its immediate accord or agreement with human sentiment and affection.

20 Now as virtue is an end, and is desirable on its own account, without fee or *SBN 294*
reward, merely for the immediate satisfaction which it conveys; it is requisite that there should be some sentiment, which it touches; some internal taste or feeling, or whatever you please to call it, which distinguishes moral good and evil, and which embraces the one and rejects the other.

21 Thus the distinct boundaries and offices of *reason* and of *taste* are easily ascertained. The former conveys the knowledge of truth and falsehood: The latter gives the sentiment of beauty and deformity, vice and virtue. The one 10
discovers objects, as they really stand in nature, without addition or diminution: The other has a productive faculty, and gilding or staining all natural objects with the colours, borrowed from internal sentiment, raises, in a manner, a new creation. Reason, being cool and disengaged, is no motive to action, and directs only the impulse received from appetite or inclination, by showing us the means of attaining happiness or avoiding misery: Taste, as it gives pleasure or pain, and thereby constitutes happiness or misery, becomes a motive to action, and is the first spring or impulse to desire and volition. From circumstances and relations, known or supposed, the former leads us to the discovery of the concealed and unknown: After all circumstances and 20
relations are laid before us, the latter makes us feel from the whole a new sentiment of blame or approbation. The standard of the one, being founded on the nature of things, is eternal and inflexible, even by the will of the Supreme Being: The standard of the other, arising from the internal frame and constitution of animals, is ultimately derived from that Supreme Will, which bestowed on each being its peculiar nature, and arranged the several classes and orders of existence.

APPENDIX 2

SBN 295

Of Self-Love

1 THERE is a principle, supposed to prevail among many, which is utterly incompatible with all virtue or moral sentiment; and as it can proceed from nothing but the most depraved disposition, so in its turn it tends still further to encourage that depravity. This principle is, that all *benevolence* is mere hypocrisy, friendship a cheat, public spirit a farce, fidelity a snare to procure trust and confidence; and that, while all of us, at bottom, pursue only our private interest, we wear these fair disguises, in order to put others off their guard, and expose them the more to our wiles and machinations. What heart one must be possessed of who professes such principles, and who feels no internal sentiment that belies so pernicious a theory, it is easy to imagine: And also, what degree of affection and benevolence he can bear to a species, whom he represents under such odious colours, and supposes so little susceptible of gratitude or any return of affection. Or if we should not ascribe these principles wholly to a corrupted heart, we must, at least, account for them from the most careless and precipitate examination. Superficial reasoners, indeed, observing many false pretences among mankind, and feeling, perhaps, no very strong restraint in their own disposition, might draw a general and a hasty conclusion, that all is equally corrupted, and that men, different from all other animals, and indeed from all other species of existence, admit of no degrees of good or bad, but are, in every instance, the same creatures under different disguises and appearances.

SBN 296

2 There is another principle, somewhat resembling the former; which has been much insisted on by philosophers, and has been the foundation of many a system; that, whatever affection one may feel, or imagine he feels for others, no passion is, or can be disinterested; that the most generous friendship, however sincere, is a modification of self-love; and that, even unknown to ourselves, we seek only our own gratification, while we appear the most deeply engaged in schemes for the liberty and happiness of mankind. By a turn of imagination, by a refinement of reflection, by an enthusiasm of passion, we seem to take part in the interests of others, and imagine ourselves divested of all selfish considerations: But, at bottom, the most generous patriot and most niggardly miser, the bravest hero and most abject coward, have, in every action, an equal regard to their own happiness and welfare.

3 Whoever concludes, from the seeming tendency of this opinion, that those, who make profession of it, cannot possibly feel the true sentiments of benevolence, or have any regard for genuine virtue, will often find himself, in practice, very much mistaken. Probity and honour were no strangers to EPICURUS and his sect. ATTICUS and HORACE seem to have enjoyed from nature, and cultivated by reflection, as generous and friendly dispositions as any disciple of the austerer schools. And among the moderns, HOBBES and LOCKE, who maintained the selfish system of morals, lived irreproachable lives; though the former lay not under any restraint of religion, which might supply the defects of his philosophy.

4 An EPICUREAN or a HOBBIST readily allows, that there is such a thing as friendship in the world, without hypocrisy or disguise; though he may attempt, by a philosophical chymistry, to resolve the elements of this passion, if I may so speak, into those of another, and explain every affection to be self-love, twisted and moulded, by a particular turn of imagination, into a variety of appearances. But as the same turn of imagination prevails not in every man, nor gives the same direction to the original passion; this is sufficient, even according to the selfish system, to make the widest difference in human characters, and denominate one man virtuous and humane, another vicious and meanly interested. I esteem the man, whose self-love, by whatever means, is so directed as to give him a concern for others, and render him serviceable to society: As I hate or despise him, who has no regard to any thing beyond his own gratifications and enjoyments. In vain would you suggest, that these characters, though seemingly opposite, are, at bottom, the same, and that a very inconsiderable turn of thought forms the whole difference between them. Each character, notwithstanding these inconsiderable differences, appears to me, in practice, pretty durable and untransmutable. And I find not in this, more than in other subjects, that the natural sentiments, arising from the general appearances of things, are easily destroyed by subtile reflections concerning the minute origin of these appearances. Does not the lively, cheerful colour of a countenance inspire me with complacency and pleasure; even though I learn from philosophy, that all difference of complexion arises from the most minute differences of thickness, in the most minute parts of the skin; by means of which a superficies is qualified to reflect one of the original colours of light, and absorb the others? *SBN 297*

5 But though the question, concerning the universal or partial selfishness of man be not so material, as is usually imagined, to morality and practice, it is certainly of consequence in the speculative science of human nature, and is a

proper object of curiosity and enquiry. It may not, therefore, be unsuitable, in this place, to bestow a few reflections upon it.[60] *SBN 298*

6 The most obvious objection to the selfish hypothesis, is, that, as it is contrary to common feeling and our most unprejudiced notions, there is required the highest stretch of philosophy to establish so extraordinary a paradox. To the most careless observer, there appear to be such dispositions as benevolence and generosity; such affections as love, friendship, compassion, gratitude. These sentiments have their causes, effects, objects, and operations, marked by common language and observation, and plainly distinguished from those of the selfish passions. And as this is the obvious appearance of things, it must be admitted; till some hypothesis be discovered, which, by penetrating deeper into human nature, may prove the former affections to be nothing but modifications of the latter. All attempts of this kind have hitherto proved fruitless, and seem to have proceeded entirely, from that love of *simplicity*, which has been the source of much false reasoning in philosophy. I shall not here enter into any detail on the present subject. Many able philosophers have shown the insufficiency of these systems. And I shall take for granted what, I believe, the smallest reflection will make evident to every impartial enquirer.

7 But the nature of the subject furnishes the strongest presumption, that no better system will ever, for the future, be invented, in order to account for the origin of the benevolent from the selfish affections, and reduce all the various emotions of the human mind to a perfect simplicity. The case is not the same in this species of philosophy as in physics. Many an hypothesis in nature, contrary to first appearances, has been found, on more accurate scrutiny, solid and satisfactory. Instances of this kind are so frequent, that a judicious, as well as witty philosopher,[61] has ventured to affirm, if there be more than one way, in which any phænomenon may be produced, that there is a general presumption for its arising from the causes, which are the least obvious and familiar. But the presumption always lies on the other side, in all enquiries concerning the origin of our passions, and of the internal operations of the human mind. The simplest and most obvious cause, which can there be *SBN 299*

[60] Benevolence naturally divides into two kinds, the *general* and the *particular*. The first is, where we have no friendship or connexion or esteem for the person, but feel only a general sympathy with him or a compassion for his pains, and a congratulation with his pleasures. The other species of benevolence is founded on an opinion of virtue, on services done us, or on some particular connexions. Both these sentiments must be allowed real in human nature; but whether they will resolve into some nice considerations of self-love, is a question more curious than important. The former sentiment, to wit, that of general benevolence, or humanity, or sympathy, we shall have occasion frequently to treat of in the course of this enquiry; and I assume it as real, from general experience, without any other proof. *SBN 298*

[61] Mons. Fontenelle. *SBN 299*

assigned for any phænomenon, is probably the true one. When a philosopher, in the explication of his system, is obliged to have recourse to some very intricate and refined reflections, and to suppose them essential to the production of any passion or emotion, we have reason to be extremely on our guard against so fallacious an hypothesis. The affections are not susceptible of any impression from the refinements of reason or imagination; and it is always found, that a vigorous exertion of the latter faculties, necessarily, from the narrow capacity of the human mind, destroys all activity in the former. Our predominant motive or intention is, indeed, frequently concealed from ourselves, when it is mingled and confounded with other motives, which the mind, from vanity or self-conceit, is desirous of supposing more prevalent: But there is no instance, that a concealment of this nature has ever arisen from the abstruseness and intricacy of the motive. A man, who has lost a friend and patron, may flatter himself, that all his grief arises from generous sentiments, without any mixture of narrow or interested considerations: But a man, that grieves for a valuable friend, who needed his patronage and protection; how can we suppose, that his passionate tenderness arises from some metaphysical regards to a self-interest, which has no foundation or reality? We may as well imagine, that minute wheels and springs, like those of a watch, give motion to a loaded waggon, as account for the origin of passion from such abstruse reflections. *SBN 300*

8 Animals are found susceptible of kindness, both to their own species and to ours; nor is there, in this case, the least suspicion of disguise or artifice. Shall we account for all *their* sentiments too, from refined deductions of self-interest? Or if we admit a disinterested benevolence in the inferior species, by what rule of analogy can we refuse it in the superior?

9 Love between the sexes begets a complacency and good-will, very distinct from the gratification of an appetite. Tenderness to their offspring, in all sensible beings, is commonly able alone to counterbalance the strongest motives of self-love, and has no manner of dependence on that affection. What interest can a fond mother have in view, who loses her health by assiduous attendance on her sick child, and afterwards languishes and dies of grief, when freed, by its death, from the slavery of that attendance?

10 Is gratitude no affection of the human breast, or is that a word merely, without any meaning or reality? Have we no satisfaction in one man's company above another's, and no desire of the welfare of our friend, even though absence or death should prevent us from all participation in it? Or what is it commonly, that gives us any participation in it, even while alive and present, but our affection and regard to him?

11 These and a thousand other instances are marks of a general benevolence

in human nature, where no *real* interest binds us to the object. And how an *imaginary* interest, known and avowed for such, can be the origin of any passion or emotion, seems difficult to explain. No satisfactory hypothesis of *SBN 301* this kind has yet been discovered; nor is there the smallest probability, that the future industry of men will ever be attended with more favourable success.

12 But farther, if we consider rightly of the matter, we shall find, that the hypothesis, which allows of a disinterested benevolence, distinct from self-love, has really more *simplicity* in it, and is more conformable to the analogy of nature, than that which pretends to resolve all friendship and humanity 10 into this latter principle. There are bodily wants or appetites, acknowledged by every one, which necessarily precede all sensual enjoyment, and carry us directly to seek possession of the object. Thus, hunger and thirst have eating and drinking for their end; and from the gratification of these primary appetites arises a pleasure, which may become the object of another species of desire or inclination, that is secondary and interested. In the same manner, there are mental passions, by which we are impelled immediately to seek particular objects, such as fame, or power, or vengeance, without any regard to interest; and when these objects are attained, a pleasing enjoyment ensues, as the consequence of our indulged affections. Nature must, by the internal 20 frame and constitution of the mind, give an original propensity to fame, ere we can reap any pleasure from that acquisition, or pursue it from motives of self-love, and a desire of happiness. If I have no vanity, I take no delight in praise: If I be void of ambition, power gives me no enjoyment: If I be not angry, the punishment of an adversary is totally indifferent to me. In all these cases, there is a passion, which points immediately to the object, and constitutes it our good or happiness; as there are other secondary passions, which afterwards arise, and pursue it as a part of our happiness, when once it is constituted such by our original affections. Were there no appetite of any kind antecedent to self-love, that propensity could scarcely ever exert itself; 30 because we should, in that case, have felt few and slender pains or pleasures, *SBN 302* and have little misery or happiness to avoid or to pursue.

13 Now where is the difficulty in conceiving, that this may likewise be the case with benevolence and friendship, and that, from the original frame of our temper, we may feel a desire of another's happiness or good, which, by means of that affection, becomes our own good, and is afterwards pursued, from the combined motives of benevolence and self-enjoyment? Who sees not that vengeance, from the force alone of passion, may be so eagerly pursued, as to make us knowingly neglect every consideration of ease, interest, or safety; and, like some vindictive animals, infuse our very souls into the wounds we 40

give an enemy?[62] And what a malignant philosophy must it be, that will not allow, to humanity and friendship, the same privileges, which are undisputably granted to the darker passions of enmity and resentment? Such a philosophy is more like a satire than a true delineation or description of human nature; and may be a good foundation for paradoxical wit and raillery, but is a very bad one for any serious argument or reasoning.

[62] "Animasque in vulnere ponunt." VIRG. "Dum alteri noceat, sui negligens," says SENECA of Anger. De ira, lib. 1. *SBN 302*

APPENDIX 3

SBN 303

Some Farther Considerations with Regard to Justice

1 THE intention of this Appendix is to give some more particular explication of the origin and nature of justice, and to mark some differences between it and the other virtues.

2 The social virtues of humanity and benevolence exert their influence immediately, by a direct tendency or instinct, which chiefly keeps in view the simple object, moving the affections, and comprehends not any scheme or system, nor the consequences resulting from the concurrence, imitation, or example of others. A parent flies to the relief of his child; transported by that natural sympathy, which actuates him, and which affords no leisure to reflect on the sentiments or conduct of the rest of mankind in like circumstances. A generous man cheerfully embraces an opportunity of serving his friend; because he then feels himself under the dominion of the beneficent affections, nor is he concerned whether any other person in the universe were ever before actuated by such noble motives, or will ever afterwards prove their influence. In all these cases, the social passions have in view a single individual object, and pursue the safety or happiness alone of the person loved and esteemed. With this they are satisfied: In this, they acquiesce. And as the SBN 304 good, resulting from their benign influence, is in itself compleat and entire, it also excites the moral sentiment of approbation, without any reflection on farther consequences, and without any more enlarged views of the concurrence or imitation of the other members of society. On the contrary, were the generous friend or disinterested patriot to stand alone in the practice of beneficence; this would rather enhance his value in our eyes, and join the praise of rarity and novelty to his other more exalted merits.

3 The case is not the same with the social virtues of justice and fidelity. They are highly useful, or indeed absolutely necessary to the well-being of mankind: But the benefit, resulting from them, is not the consequence of every individual single act; but arises from the whole scheme or system, concurred in by the whole, or the greater part of the society. General peace and order are the attendants of justice or a general abstinence from the possessions of others: But a particular regard to the particular right of one individual citizen may frequently, considered in itself, be productive of pernicious consequences. The result of the individual acts is here, in many instances,

directly opposite to that of the whole system of actions; and the former may be extremely hurtful, while the latter is, to the highest degree, advantageous. Riches, inherited from a parent, are, in a bad man's hand, the instruments of mischief. The right of succession may, in one instance, be hurtful. Its benefit arises only from the observance of the general rule; and it is sufficient, if compensation be thereby made for all the ills and inconveniencies, which flow from particular characters and situations.

4 CYRUS, young and unexperienced, considered only the individual case before him, and reflected on a limited fitness and convenience, when he assigned the long coat to the tall boy, and the short coat to the other of smaller size. His governor instructed him better; while he pointed out more enlarged views and consequences, and informed his pupil of the general, inflexible rules, necessary to support general peace and order in society. *SBN 305*

5 The happiness and prosperity of mankind, arising from the social virtue of benevolence and its subdivisions, may be compared to a wall, built by many hands; which still rises by each stone, that is heaped upon it, and receives encrease proportional to the diligence and care of each workman. The same happiness, raised by the social virtue of justice and its subdivisions, may be compared to the building of a vault, where each individual stone would, of itself, fall to the ground; nor is the whole fabric supported but by the mutual assistance and combination of its corresponding parts.

6 All the laws of nature, which regulate property, as well as all civil laws, are general, and regard alone some essential circumstances of the case, without taking into consideration the characters, situations, and connexions of the person concerned, or any particular consequences which may result from the determination of these laws, in any particular case which offers. They deprive, without scruple, a beneficent man of all his possessions, if acquired by mistake, without a good title; in order to bestow them on a selfish miser, who has already heaped up immense stores of superfluous riches. Public utility requires, that property should be regulated by general inflexible rules; and though such rules are adopted as best serve the same end of public utility, it is impossible for them to prevent all particular hardships, or make beneficial consequences result from every individual case. It is sufficient, if the whole plan or scheme be necessary to the support of civil society, and if the balance of good, in the main, does thereby preponderate much above that of evil. Even the general laws of the universe, though planned by infinite wisdom, cannot exclude all evil or inconvenience, in every particular operation. *SBN 306*

7 It has been asserted by some, that justice arises from HUMAN CONVENTIONS, and proceeds from the voluntary choice, consent, or combination of

mankind. If by convention be here meant a *promise* (which is the most usual sense of the word) nothing can be more absurd than this position. The observance of promises is itself one of the most considerable parts of justice; and we are not surely bound to keep our word, because we have given our word to keep it. But if by convention be meant *a sense of common interest*; which sense each man feels in his own breast, which he remarks in his fellows, and which carries him, in concurrence with others, into a general plan or system of actions, which tends to public utility; it must be owned, that, in this sense, justice arises from human conventions. For if it be allowed (what is, indeed, evident) that the particular consequences of a particular act of justice may be hurtful to the public as well as to individuals; it follows, that every man, in embracing that virtue, must have an eye to the whole plan or system, and must expect the concurrence of his fellows in the same conduct and behaviour. Did all his views terminate in the consequences of each act of his own, his benevolence and humanity, as well as his self-love, might often prescribe to him measures of conduct very different from those, which are agreeable to the strict rules of right and justice.

8 Thus two men pull the oars of a boat by common convention, for common interest, without any promise or contract: Thus gold and silver are made the measures of exchange; thus speech and words and language are fixed, by human convention and agreement. Whatever is advantageous to two or more persons, if all perform their part; but what loses all advantage, if only one perform, can arise from no other principle. There would otherwise be no motive for any one of them to enter into that scheme of conduct.[63] *SBN 307*

9 The word, *natural*, is commonly taken in so many senses, and is of so loose a signification, that it seems vain to dispute, whether justice be natural or not. If self-love, if benevolence be natural to man; if reason and forethought be also natural; then may the same epithet be applied to justice, order, fidelity, property, society. Men's inclination, their necessities lead them to combine;

[63] This theory concerning the origin of property, and consequently of justice, is, in the main, the same with that hinted at and adopted by Grotius. "Hinc discimus, quæ fuerit causa, ob quam a primæva communione rerum primo mobilium, deinde & immobilium discessum est: nimirum quod cum non contenti homines vesci sponte natis, antra habitare, corpore aut nudo agere, aut corticibus arborum ferarumve pellibus vestito, vitæ genus exquisitius delegissent, industria opus fuit, quam singuli rebus singulis adhiberent: Quo minus autem fructus in commune conferrentur, primum obstitit locorum, in quæ homines discesserunt, distantia, deinde justitiæ & amoris defectus, per quem fiebat, ut nec in labore, nec in consumtione fructuum, quæ debebat, æqualitas servaretur. Simul discimus, quomodo res in proprietatem iverint; non animi actu solo, neque enim scire alii poterant, quid alii suum esse vellent, ut eo abstinerent, & idem velle plures poterant; sed pacto quodam aut expresso, ut per divisionem, aut tacito, ut per occupationem." De jure belli & pacis, lib. 2. cap. 2. § 2. art. 4 & 5. *SBN 307*

their understanding and experience tell them, that this combination is impossible, where each governs himself by no rule, and pays no regard to the possessions of others: And from these passions and reflections conjoined, as soon as we observe like passions and reflections in others, the sentiment of justice, throughout all ages, has infallibly and certainly had place, to some degree or other, in every individual of the human species. In so sagacious an animal, what necessarily arises from the exertion of his intellectual faculties, may justly be esteemed natural.[64]

Among all civilized nations, it has been the constant endeavour to remove every thing arbitrary and partial from the decision of property, and to fix the sentence of judges by such general views and considerations, as may be equal to every member of the society. For besides, that nothing could be more dangerous than to accustom the bench, even in the smallest instance, to regard private friendship or enmity; it is certain, that men, where they imagine, that there was no other reason for the preference of their adversary but personal favour, are apt to entertain the strongest ill-will against the magistrates and judges. When natural reason, therefore, points out no fixed view of public utility, by which a controversy of property can be decided, positive laws are often framed to supply its place, and direct the procedure of all courts of judicature. Where these too fail, as often happens, precedents are called for; and a former decision, though given itself without any sufficient reason, justly becomes a sufficient reason for a new decision. If direct laws and precedents be wanting, imperfect and indirect ones are brought in aid; and the controverted case is ranged under them, by analogical reasonings and comparisons, and similitudes, and correspondencies, which are often more fanciful than real. In general, it may safely be affirmed, that jurisprudence is, in this respect, different from all the sciences; and that in many of its nicer questions, there cannot properly be said to be truth or falsehood on either side. If one pleader bring the case under any former law or precedent, by a refined analogy or comparison; the opposite pleader is not at a loss to find an opposite analogy or comparison: And the preference given by the judge is often founded more on taste and imagination than on any solid argument. Public utility is the general object of all courts of judicature; and this utility too requires a stable rule in all controversies: But where several rules, nearly

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[64] Natural may be opposed, either to what is *unusual*, *miraculous*, or *artificial*. In the two former senses, justice and property are undoubtedly natural. But as they suppose reason, forethought, design, and a social union and confederacy among men, perhaps that epithet cannot strictly, in the last sense, be applied to them. Had men lived without society, property had never been known, and neither justice nor injustice had ever existed. But society among human creatures, had been impossible, without reason and forethought. Inferior animals, that unite, are guided by instinct, which supplies the place of reason. But all these disputes are merely verbal.

SBN 307 *SBN 308*

equal and indifferent, present themselves, it is a very slight turn of thought, which fixes the decision in favour of either party.[65]

11 We may just observe, before we conclude this subject, that, after the laws *SBN 310*
of justice are fixed by views of general utility, the injury, the hardship, the harm, which result to any individual from a violation of them, enter very much into consideration, and are a great source of that universal blame,

[65] That there be a separation or distinction of possessions, and that this separation be steady and *SBN 309*
constant; this is absolutely required by the interests of society, and hence the origin of justice and property. What possessions are assigned to particular persons; this is, generally speaking, pretty indifferent; and is often determined by very frivolous views and considerations. We shall mention a few particulars.

Were a society formed among several independent members, the most obvious rule, which could be agreed on, would be to annex property to *present* possession, and leave every one a right to what he at present enjoys. The relation of possession, which takes place between the person and the object, naturally draws on the relation of property.

For a like reason, occupation or first possession becomes the foundation of property. 10

Where a man bestows labour and industry upon any object, which before belonged to no body; as in cutting down and shaping a tree, in cultivating a field, &c. the alteration, which he produces, causes a relation between him and the object, and naturally engages us to annex it to him by the new relation of property. This cause here concurs with the public utility, which consists in the encouragement given to industry and labour.

Perhaps too, private humanity towards the possessor, concurs, in this instance, with the other motives, and engages us to leave with him what he has acquired by his sweat and labour; and what he has flattered himself in the constant enjoyment of. For though private humanity can, by no means, be the origin of justice; since the latter virtue so often contradicts the former; yet when the rule of separate and constant possession is once formed by the indispensible necessities of society, 20
private humanity, and an aversion to the doing a hardship to another, may, in a particular instance, give rise to a particular rule of property.

I am much inclined to think, that the right of succession or inheritance much depends on those connexions of the imagination, and that the relation to a former proprietor begetting a relation to the object, is the cause why the property is transferred to a man after the death of his kinsman. It is true; industry is more encouraged by the transference of possession to children or near relations: But this consideration will only have place in a cultivated society; whereas the right of succession is *SBN 310*
regarded even among the greatest Barbarians.

Acquisition of property by *accession* can be explained no way but by having recourse to the relations and connexions of the imagination. 30

The property of rivers, by the laws of most nations, and by the natural turn of our thought, is attributed to the proprietors of their banks, excepting such vast rivers as the Rhine or the Danube, which seem too large to follow as an accession to the property of the neighbouring fields. Yet even these rivers are considered as the property of that nation, through whose dominions they run; the idea of a nation being of a suitable bulk to correspond with them, and bear them such a relation in the fancy.

The accessions, which are made to land, bordering upon rivers, follow the land, say the civilians, provided it be made by what they call *alluvion*, that is, insensibly and imperceptibly; which are circumstances, that assist the imagination in the conjunction.

Where there is any considerable portion torn at once from one bank and added to another, it 40
becomes not *his* property, whose land it falls on, till it unite with the land, and till the trees and plants have spread their roots into both. Before that, the thought does not sufficiently join them.

In short, we must ever distinguish between the necessity of a separation and constancy in men's possession, and the rules, which assign particular objects to particular persons. The first necessity is obvious, strong, and invincible: The latter may depend on a public utility more light and frivolous, on the sentiment of private humanity and aversion to private hardship, on positive laws, on precedents, analogies, and very fine connexions and turns of the imagination.

which attends every wrong or iniquity. By the laws of society, this coat, this horse is mine, and *ought* to remain perpetually in my possession: I reckon on the secure enjoyment of it: By depriving me of it, you disappoint my expectations, and doubly displease me, and offend every bystander. It is a public wrong, so far as the rules of equity are violated: It is a private harm, so far as an individual is injured. And though the second consideration could have no *SBN 311*
place, were not the former previously established: For otherwise the distinction of *mine* and *thine* would be unknown in society: Yet there is no question, but the regard to general good is much enforced by the respect to particular. What injures the community, without hurting any individual, is often more 10
lightly thought of. But where the greatest public wrong is also conjoined with a considerable private one, no wonder the highest disapprobation attends so iniquitous a behaviour.

APPENDIX 4

SBN 312

Of Some Verbal Disputes

1 NOTHING is more usual than for philosophers to encroach upon the province of grammarians; and to engage in disputes of words, while they imagine, that they are handling controversies of the deepest importance and concern. It was in order to avoid altercations, so frivolous and endless, that I endeavoured to state with the utmost caution the object of our present enquiry; and proposed simply to collect on the one hand, a list of those mental qualities which are the object of love or esteem, and form a part of personal merit, and on the other hand, a catalogue of those qualities, which are the object of censure or reproach, and which detract from the character of the person, possessed of them; subjoining some reflections concerning the origin of these sentiments of praise or blame. On all occasions, where there might arise the least hesitation, I avoided the terms *virtue* and *vice*; because some of those qualities, which I classed among the objects of praise, receive, in the ENGLISH language, the appellation of *talents*, rather than of virtues; as some of the blameable or censurable qualities are often called *defects*, rather than vices. It may now, perhaps, be expected, that, before we conclude this moral enquiry, we should exactly separate the one from the other; should mark the precise boundaries of virtues and talents, vices and defects; and should explain the reason and origin of that distinction. But in order to SBN 313 excuse myself from this undertaking, which would, at last, prove only a grammatical enquiry, I shall subjoin the four following reflections, which shall contain all that I intend to say on the present subject.

2 *First*, I do not find, that in the ENGLISH, or any other modern tongue, the boundaries are exactly fixed between virtues and talents, vices and defects, or that a precise definition can be given of the one as contradistinguished from the other. Were we to say, for instance, that the esteemable qualities alone, which are voluntary, are entitled to the appellation of virtues; we should soon recollect the qualities of courage, equanimity, patience, self-command; with many others, which almost every language classes under this appellation, though they depend little or not at all on our choice. Should we affirm, that the qualities alone, which prompt us to act our part in society, are entitled to that honourable distinction; it must immediately occur, that these are indeed the most valuable qualities, and are commonly denominated the *social*

virtues; but that this very epithet supposes, that there are also virtues of another species. Should we lay hold of the distinction between *intellectual* and *moral* endowments, and affirm the last alone to be the real and genuine virtues, because they alone lead to action; we should find, that many of those qualities, usually called intellectual virtues, such as prudence, penetration, discernment, discretion, had also a considerable influence on conduct. The distinction between the *heart* and the *head* may also be adopted: The qualities of the first may be defined such as in their immediate exertion are accompanied with a feeling or sentiment; and these alone may be called the genuine virtues: But industry, frugality, temperance, secrecy, perseverance, and many other laudable powers or habits, generally styled virtues, are exerted without any immediate sentiment in the person possessed of them; and are only known to him by their effects. It is fortunate, amidst all this seeming perplexity, that the question, being merely verbal, cannot possibly be of any importance. A moral, philosophical discourse needs not enter into all these caprices of language, which are so variable in different dialects, and in different ages of the same dialect. But on the whole, it seems to me, that, though it is always allowed, that there are virtues of many different kinds, yet, when a man is called *virtuous*, or is denominated a man of virtue, we chiefly regard his social qualities, which are, indeed, the most valuable. It is, at the same time, certain, that any remarkable defect in courage, temperance, œconomy, industry, understanding, dignity of mind, would bereave even a very good-natured, honest man of this honourable appellation. Who did ever say, except by way of irony, that such a one was a man of great virtue, but an egregious blockhead? *SBN 314*

3 But, *secondly*, it is no wonder, that languages should not be very precise in marking the boundaries between virtues and talents, vices and defects; since there is so little distinction made in our internal estimation of them. It seems indeed certain, that the *sentiment* of conscious worth, the self-satisfaction proceeding from a review of a man's own conduct and character; it seems certain, I say, that this sentiment, which, though the most common of all others, has no proper name in our language,[66] arises from the endowments of courage and capacity, industry and ingenuity, as well as from any other mental excellencies. Who, on the other hand, is not deeply mortified with reflecting on his own folly and dissoluteness, and feels not a secret sting or *SBN 315*

[66] The term, *pride*, is commonly taken in a bad sense; but this sentiment seems indifferent, and may be either good or bad, according as it is well or ill founded, and according to the other circumstances which accompany it. The FRENCH express this sentiment by the term, *amour propre*, but as they also express self-love as well as vanity, by the same term, there arises thence a great confusion in ROCHEFOUCAULT, and many of their moral writers. *SBN 314*

compunction, whenever his memory presents any past occurrence, where he behaved with stupidity or ill-manners? No time can efface the cruel ideas of a man's own foolish conduct, or of affronts, which cowardice or impudence has brought upon him. They still haunt his solitary hours, damp his most aspiring thoughts, and show him, even to himself, in the most contemptible and most odious colours imaginable.

4 What is there too we are more anxious to conceal from others than such blunders, infirmities, and meannesses, or more dread to have exposed by raillery and satire? And is not the chief object of vanity, our bravery or learning, our wit or breeding, our eloquence or address, our taste or abilities? These we display with care, if not with ostentation; and we commonly show more ambition of excelling in them, than even in the social virtues themselves, which are, in reality, of such superior excellence. Good-nature and honesty, especially the latter, are so indispensibly required, that, though the greatest censure attends any violation of these duties, no eminent praise follows such common instances of them, as seem essential to the support of human society. And hence the reason, in my opinion, why, though men often extol so liberally the qualities of their heart, they are shy in commending the endowments of their head: Because the latter virtues, being supposed more rare and extraordinary, are observed to be the more usual objects of pride and self-conceit; and when boasted of, beget a strong suspicion of these sentiments.

5 It is hard to tell, whether you hurt a man's character most by calling him a knave or a coward, and whether a beastly glutton or drunkard be not as odious and contemptible, as a selfish, ungenerous miser. Give me my choice, and I would rather, for my own happiness and self-enjoyment, have a friendly, humane heart, than possess all the other virtues of Demosthenes and Philip united: But I would rather pass with the world for one endowed with extensive genius and intrepid courage, and should thence expect stronger instances of general applause and admiration. The figure which a man makes in life, the reception which he meets with in company, the esteem paid him by his acquaintance; all these advantages depend as much upon his good sense and judgment, as upon any other part of his character. Had a man the best intentions in the world, and were the farthest removed from all injustice and violence, he would never be able to make himself be much regarded, without a moderate share, at least, of parts and understanding. *SBN 316*

6 What is it then we can here dispute about? If sense and courage, temperance and industry, wisdom and knowledge confessedly form a considerable part of *personal merit*: If a man, possessed of these qualities, is both better satisfied with himself, and better entitled to the good-will, esteem, and ser-

vices of others, than one entirely destitute of them; if, in short, the *sentiments* are similar, which arise from these endowments and from the social virtues; is there any reason for being so extremely scrupulous about a *word*, or disputing whether they be entitled to the denomination of virtues? It may, indeed, be pretended, that the sentiment of approbation, which those accomplishments produce, besides its being *inferior*, is also somewhat *different* from that, which attends the virtues of justice and humanity. But this seems not a sufficient reason for ranking them entirely under different classes and appellations. The character of CÆSAR and that of CATO, as drawn by SALLUST, are both of them virtuous, in the strictest and most limited sense of the word; but in a different way: Nor are the sentiments entirely the same, which arise from them. The one produces love; the other, esteem: The one is amiable; the other awful: We should wish to meet the one character in a friend; the other we should be ambitious of in ourselves. In like manner the approbation, *SBN 317* which attends temperance or industry or frugality, may be somewhat different from that which is paid to the social virtues, without making them entirely of a different species. And, indeed, we may observe, that these endowments, no more than the other virtues, produce not, all of them, the same kind of approbation. Good sense and genius beget esteem and regard: Wit and humour excite love and affection.[67]

7 Most people, I believe, will naturally, without premeditation, assent to the definition of the elegant and judicious poet.

> Virtue (for mere good-nature is a fool)
> Is sense and spirit with humanity.[68]

8 What pretensions has a man to our generous assistance or good offices, who has dissipated his wealth in profuse expences, idle vanities, chimerical

[67] Love and esteem are nearly the same passion, and arise from similar causes. The qualities, *SBN 317* which produce both, are such as communicate pleasure. But where this pleasure is severe and serious; or where its object is great, and makes a strong impression; or where it produces any degree of humility and awe: In all these cases, the passion, which arises from the pleasure, is more properly denominated esteem than love. Benevolence attends both: But is connected with love in a more eminent degree. There seems to be still a stronger mixture of pride in contempt than of humility in esteem; and the reason would not be difficult to one, who studied accurately the passions. All these various mixtures and compositions and appearances of sentiment form a very curious subject of speculation, but are wide of our present purpose. Throughout this enquiry, we always consider in general, what qualities are a subject of praise or of censure, without entering into all the minute differences of sentiment, which they excite. It is evident, that whatever is contemned, is also disliked, as well as what is hated; and we here endeavour to take objects, according to their most simple views and appearances. These sciences are but too apt to appear abstract to common readers, even with all the precautions which we can take to clear them from superfluous speculations, and bring them down to every capacity.

[68] *The Art of preserving Health*, Book 4. *SBN 317*

projects, dissolute pleasures, or extravagant gaming? These vices (for we scruple not to call them such) bring misery unpitied, and contempt on every one addicted to them. *SBN 318*

9 ACHÆUS, a wise and prudent prince, fell into a fatal snare, which cost him his crown and life, after having used every reasonable precaution to guard himself against it. On that account, says the historian, he is a just object of regard and compassion: His betrayers alone of hatred and contempt.[69]

10 The precipitate flight and improvident negligence of POMPEY, at the beginning of the civil wars, appeared such notorious blunders to CICERO, as quite palled his friendship towards that great man. "In the same manner," says he, "as want of cleanliness, decency, or discretion in a mistress are found to alienate our affections." For so he expresses himself, where he talks, not in the character of a philosopher, but in that of a statesman and man of the world, to his friend ATTICUS.[70]

11 But the same CICERO, in imitation of all the ancient moralists, when he reasons as a philosopher, enlarges very much his ideas of virtue, and comprehends every laudable quality or endowment of the mind, under that honourable appellation. This leads to the *third* reflection, which we proposed to make, to wit, that the ancient moralists, the best models, made no material distinction among the different species of mental endowments and defects, but treated all alike under the appellation of virtues and vices, and made them indiscriminately the object of their moral reasonings. The *prudence* explained in CICERO's *Offices*,[71] is that sagacity, which leads to the discovery of truth, and preserves us from error and mistake. *Magnanimity*, *temperance*, *decency*, are there also at large discoursed of. And as that eloquent moralist followed the common received division of the four cardinal virtues, our social duties form but one head, in the general distribution of his subject.[72] *SBN 319*

[69] POLYBIUS, lib. 8. cap. 2. [70] Lib. 9. epist. 10. [71] Lib. 1. cap. 6. *SBN 318*

[72] The following passage of CICERO is worth quoting, as being the most clear and express to our purpose, that any thing can be imagined, and, in a dispute, which is chiefly verbal, must, on account of the author, carry an authority, from which there can be no appeal. *SBN 319*

"Virtus autem, quæ est per se ipsa laudabilis, et sine qua nihil laudari potest, tamen habet plures partes, quarum alia est alia ad laudationem aptior. Sunt enim aliæ virtutes, quæ videntur in moribus hominum, et quadam comitate ac beneficentia positæ: aliæ quæ in ingenii aliqua facultate, aut animi magnitudine ac robore. Nam clementia, justitia, benignitas, fides, fortitudo in periculis communibus, jucunda est auditu in laudationibus. Omnes enim hæ virtutes non tam ipsis, qui eas in se habent, quam generi hominum fructuosæ putantur. Sapientia et magnitudo animi, qua omnes res humanæ, tenues et pro nihilo putantur; et in cogitando vis quædam ingenii, et ipsa eloquentia admirationis habet non minus, jucunditatis minus. Ipsos enim magis videtur, quos laudamus, quam illos, apud quos laudamus, ornare ac tueri: sed tamen in laudanda jungenda sunt etiam hæc genera virtutum. Ferunt enim aures hominum, cum illa quæ jucunda et grata, tum etiam illa, quæ mirabilia sunt in virtute, laudari." De orat. lib. 2. cap. 84.

I suppose, if CICERO were now alive, it would be found difficult to fetter his moral sentiments by

12 We need only peruse the titles of chapters in ARISTOTLE's Ethics to be convinced, that he ranks courage, temperance, magnificence, magnanimity, modesty, prudence, and a manly openness, among the virtues, as well as justice and friendship.

13 To *sustain* and to *abstain*, that is, to be patient and continent, appeared to some of the ancients a summary comprehension of all morals.

14 EPICTETUS has scarcely ever mentioned the sentiment of humanity and compassion, but in order to put his disciples on their guard against it. The virtue of the STOICS seems to consist chiefly in a firm temper and a sound understanding. With them, as with SOLOMON and the eastern moralists, folly *SBN 320* and wisdom are equivalent to vice and virtue.

15 Men will praise thee, says DAVID,[73] when thou dost well unto thyself. I hate a wise man, says the GREEK poet, who is not wise to himself.[74]

16 PLUTARCH is no more cramped by systems in his philosophy than in his history. Where he compares the great men of GREECE and ROME, he fairly sets in opposition all their blemishes and accomplishments of whatever kind, and omits nothing considerable, which can either depress or exalt their characters. His moral discourses contain the same free and natural censure of men and manners.

17 The character of HANNIBAL, as drawn by LIVY,[75] is esteemed partial, but 20 allows him many eminent virtues. Never was there a genius, says the historian, more equally fitted for those opposite offices of commanding and obeying; and it were, therefore, difficult to determine whether he rendered himself *dearer* to the general or to the army. To none would HASDRUBAL entrust more willingly the conduct of any dangerous enterprize; under none, did the soldiers discover more courage and confidence. Great boldness in facing danger; great prudence in the midst of it. No labour could fatigue his body or subdue his mind. Cold and heat were indifferent to him: Meat and drink he sought as supplies to the necessities of nature, not as gratifications of his voluptuous appetites: Waking or rest he used indiscriminately, by night 30 or by day.——These great VIRTUES were balanced by great VICES: Inhuman cruelty; perfidy more than *punic*; no truth, no faith, no regard to oaths, promises, or religion.

18 The character of ALEXANDER the Sixth, to be found in GUICCIARDIN,[76] is *SBN 321* pretty similar, but juster; and is a proof, that even the moderns, where they speak naturally, hold the same language with the ancients. In this pope, says

narrow systems; or persuade him, that no qualities were to be admitted as *virtues*, or acknowledged to be a part of *personal merit*, but what were recommended by *The Whole Duty of Man*.

[73] Psalm 49th.
[74] Μισῶ σοφιστὴν ὅστις οὐχ αὑτῷ σοφός. EURIPIDES. *SBN 320*
[75] Lib. 21. cap. 4.
[76] Lib. 1. *SBN 320–1*

he, there was a singular capacity and judgment: Admirable prudence; a wonderful talent of persuasion; and in all momentous enterprizes, a diligence and dexterity incredible. But these *virtues* were infinitely overbalanced by his *vices*; no faith, no religion, insatiable avarice, exorbitant ambition, and a more than barbarous cruelty.

19 POLYBIUS,[77] reprehending TIMÆUS for his partiality against AGATHOCLES, whom he himself allows to be the most cruel and impious of all tyrants, says: If he took refuge in SYRACUSE, as asserted by that historian, flying the dirt and smoke and toil of his former profession of a potter; and if proceeding from such slender beginnings, he became master, in a little time, of all SICILY; brought the CARTHAGINIAN state into the utmost danger; and at last died in old age, and in possession of sovereign dignity: Must he not be allowed something prodigious and extraordinary, and to have possessed great talents and capacity for business and action? His historian, therefore, ought not to have alone related what tended to his reproach and infamy; but also what might redound to his PRAISE and HONOUR.

20 In general, we may observe, that the distinction of voluntary or involuntary was little regarded by the ancients in their moral reasonings; where they frequently treated the question as very doubtful, *whether virtue could be taught or not*?[78] They justly considered, that cowardice, meanness, levity, anxiety, impatience, folly, and many other qualities of the mind, might appear ridiculous and deformed, contemptible and odious, though independent of the will. Nor could it be supposed, at all times, in every man's power to attain every kind of mental, more than of exterior beauty. *SBN 322*

21 And here there occurs the *fourth* reflection which I purposed to make, in suggesting the reason, why modern philosophers have often followed a course, in their moral enquiries, so different from that of the ancients. In later times, philosophy of all kinds, especially ethics, have been more closely united with theology than ever they were observed to be among the Heathens; and as this latter science admits of no terms of composition, but bends every branch of knowledge to its own purpose, without much regard to the phænomena of nature, or to the unbiassed sentiments of the mind, hence reasoning, and even language, have been warped from their natural course, and distinctions have been endeavoured to be established, where the difference of the objects was, in a manner, imperceptible. Philosophers, or rather divines under that disguise, treating all morals, as on a like footing with civil laws, guarded by the sanctions of reward and punishment, were necessarily

[77] Lib. 12. *SBN 321*

[78] Vid. PLATO, in MENONE, SENECA, de otio sap. cap. 31. So also HORACE, *Virtutem doctrina paret, naturane donet*. Epist. lib. 1. ep. 18. ÆSCHINES SOCRATICUS, Dial. 1. *SBN 321*

led to render this circumstance, of *voluntary* or *involuntary*, the foundation of their whole theory. Every one may employ *terms* in what sense he pleases: But this, in the mean time, must be allowed, that *sentiments* are every day experienced of blame and praise, which have objects beyond the dominion of the will or choice, and of which it behoves us, if not as moralists, as speculative philosophers at least, to give some satisfactory theory and explication.

22 A blemish, a fault, a vice, a crime; these expressions seem to denote different degrees of censure and disapprobation; which are, however, all of them, at the bottom, pretty nearly of the same kind or species. The explication of one will easily lead us into a just conception of the others; and it is of greater 10
consequence to attend to things than to verbal appellations. That we owe a duty to ourselves is confessed even in the most vulgar system of morals; and it must be of consequence to examine that duty, in order to see, whether it *SBN 323*
bears any affinity to that which we owe to society. It is probable, that the approbation, attending the observance of both, is of a similar nature, and arises from similar principles; whatever appellation we may give to either of these excellencies.

A DIALOGUE

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1 My friend, Palamedes, who is as great a rambler in his principles as in his person, and who has run over, by study and travel, almost every region of the intellectual and material world, surprized me lately with an account of a nation, with whom, he told me, he had passed a considerable part of his life, and whom, he found, in the main, a people extremely civilized and intelligent.

2 There is a country, said he, in the world, called Fourli, no matter for its longitude or latitude, whose inhabitants have ways of thinking, in many things, particularly in morals, diametrically opposite to ours. When I came among them, I found that I must submit to double pains; first to learn the meaning of the terms in their language, and then to know the import of those terms, and the praise or blame attached to them. After a word had been explained to me, and the character, which it expressed, had been described, I concluded, that such an epithet must necessarily be the greatest reproach in the world; and was extremely surprized to find one in a public company, apply it to a person, with whom he lived in the strictest intimacy and friendship. "You fancy," said I, one day, to an acquaintance, "that Changuis is your mortal enemy: I love to extinguish quarrels; and I must, therefore, tell you, that I heard him talk of you in the most obliging manner." But to my great astonishment, when I repeated Changuis's words, though I had both remembered and understood them perfectly, I found, that they were taken *SBN 325* for the most mortal affront, and that I had very innocently rendered the breach between these persons altogether irreparable.

3 As it was my fortune to come among this people on a very advantageous footing, I was immediately introduced to the best company; and being desired by Alcheic to live with him, I readily accepted of his invitation; as I found him universally esteemed for his personal merit, and indeed regarded by every one in Fourli, as a perfect character.

4 One evening he invited me, as an amusement, to bear him company in a serenade, which he intended to give to Gulki, with whom, he told me, he was extremely enamoured; and I soon found that his taste was not singular: For we met many of his rivals, who had come on the same errand. I very naturally concluded, that this mistress of his must be one of the finest women in town;

and I already felt a secret inclination to see her, and be acquainted with her. But as the moon began to rise, I was much surprized to find, that we were in the midst of the university, where GULKI studied: And I was somewhat ashamed for having attended my friend, on such an errand.

5 I was afterwards told, that ALCHEIC's choice of GULKI was very much approved of by all the good company in town; and that it was expected, while he gratified his own passion, he would perform to that young man the same good office, which he had himself owed to ELCOUF. It seems ALCHEIC had been very handsome in his youth, had been courted by many lovers; but had bestowed his favours chiefly on the sage ELCOUF; to whom he was supposed 10 to owe, in a great measure, the astonishing progress which he had made in philosophy and virtue.

6 It gave me some surprize, that ALCHEIC's wife (who by-the-bye happened also to be his sister) was nowise scandalized at this species of infidelity.

7 Much about the same time I discovered (for it was not attempted to be kept *SBN 326* a secret from me or any body) that ALCHEIC was a murderer and a parricide, and had put to death an innocent person, the most nearly connected with him, and whom he was bound to protect and defend by all the ties of nature and humanity. When I asked, with all the caution and deference imaginable, what was his motive for this action; he replied coolly, that he was not then so 20 much at ease in his circumstances as he is at present, and that he had acted, in that particular, by the advice of all his friends.

8 Having heard ALCHEIC's virtue so extremely celebrated, I pretended to join in the general voice of acclamation, and only asked, by way of curiosity, as a stranger, which of all his noble actions was most highly applauded; and I soon found, that all sentiments were united in giving the preference to the assassination of USBEK. This USBEK had been to the last moment ALCHEIC's intimate friend, had laid many high obligations upon him, had even saved his life on a certain occasion, and had, by his will, which was found after the murder, made him heir to a considerable part of his fortune. ALCHEIC, it 30 seems, conspired with about twenty or thirty more, most of them also USBEK's friends; and falling all together on that unhappy man, when he was not aware, they had torn him with a hundred wounds; and given him that reward for all his past favours and obligations. USBEK, said the general voice of the people, had many great and good qualities: His very vices were shining, magnificent, and generous: But this action of ALCHEIC's sets him far above USBEK in the eyes of all judges of merit; and is one of the noblest that ever perhaps the sun shone upon.

9 Another part of ALCHEIC's conduct, which I also found highly applauded, was his behaviour towards CALISH, with whom he was joined in a project or 40

undertaking of some importance. CALISH, being a passionate man, gave ALCHEIC, one day, a sound drubbing; which he took very patiently, waited the return of CALISH's good-humour, kept still a fair correspondence with him; *SBN 327* and by that means brought the affair, in which they were joined, to a happy issue, and gained to himself immortal honour by his remarkable temper and moderation.

10 I have lately received a letter from a correspondent in FOURLI, by which I learn, that, since my departure, ALCHEIC, falling into a bad state of health, has fairly hanged himself; and has died universally regretted and applauded in that country. So virtuous and noble a life, says each FOURLIAN, could not be 10 better crowned than by so noble an end; and ALCHEIC has proved by this, as well as by all his other actions, what was his constant principle during his life, and what he boasted of near his last moments, that a wise man is scarcely inferior to the great god, VITZLI. This is the name of the supreme deity among the FOURLIANS.

11 The notions of this people, continued PALAMEDES, are as extraordinary with regard to good manners and sociableness, as with regard to morals. My friend ALCHEIC formed once a party for my entertainment, composed of all the prime wits and philosophers of FOURLI; and each of us brought his mess along with him to the place where we assembled. I observed one of them to be 20 worse provided than the rest, and offered him a share of my mess, which happened to be a roasted pullet: And I could not but remark, that he and all the rest of the company smiled at my simplicity. I was told, that ALCHEIC had once so much interest with his club as to prevail with them to eat in common, and that he had made use of an artifice for that purpose. He persuaded those, whom he observed to be *worst* provided, to offer their mess to the company; after which, the others, who had brought more delicate fare, were ashamed not to make the same offer. This is regarded as so extraordinary an event, that it has since, as I learn, been recorded in the history of ALCHEIC's life, composed by one of the greatest geniuses of FOURLI. 30

12 Pray, said I, PALAMEDES, when you were at FOURLI, did you also learn the *SBN 328* art of turning your friends into ridicule, by telling them strange stories, and then laughing at them, if they believed you. I assure you, replied he, had I been disposed to learn such a lesson, there was no place in the world more proper. My friend, so often mentioned, did nothing, from morning to night, but sneer, and banter, and rally; and you could scarcely ever distinguish, whether he were in jest or earnest. But you think then, that my story is improbable; and that I have used, or rather abused the privilege of a traveller. To be sure, said I, you were but in jest. Such barbarous and savage manners are not only incompatible with a civilized, intelligent people, such as you said 40

these were; but are scarcely compatible with human nature. They exceed all we ever read of, among the MINGRELIANS, and TOPINAMBOUES.

13 Have a care, cried he, have a care! You are not aware that you are speaking blasphemy, and are abusing your favourites, the GREEKS, especially the ATHENIANS, whom I have couched, all along, under these bizarre names I employed. If you consider aright, there is not one stroke of the foregoing character, which might not be found in the man of highest merit at ATHENS, without diminishing in the least from the brightness of his character. The amours of the GREEKS, their marriages,[79] and the exposing of their children cannot but strike you immediately. The death of USBEK is an exact counterpart to that of CÆSAR.

14 All to a trifle, said I, interrupting him: You did not mention that USBEK was an usurper.

15 I did not, replied he; lest you should discover the parallel I aimed at. But even adding this circumstance, we should make no scruple, according to our sentiments of morals, to denominate BRUTUS, and CASSIUS, ungrateful traitors and assassins: Though you know, that they are, perhaps, the highest characters of all antiquity; and the ATHENIANS erected statues to them; which they placed near those of HARMODIUS and ARISTOGITON, their own deliverers. And if you think this circumstance, which you mention, so material to absolve these patriots, I shall compensate it by another, not mentioned, which will equally aggravate their crime. A few days before the execution of their fatal purpose, they all swore fealty to CÆSAR; and protesting to hold his person ever sacred, they touched the altar with those hands, which they had already armed for his destruction.[80]

16 I need not remind you of the famous and applauded story of THEMISTOCLES, and of his patience towards EURYBIADES, the SPARTAN, his commanding officer, who, heated by debate, lifted his cane to him in a council of war, (the same thing as if he had cudgelled him) "Strike!" cries the ATHENIAN, "strike! but hear me."

17 You are too good a scholar not to discover the ironical SOCRATES and his ATHENIAN club in my last story; and you will certainly observe, that it is exactly copied from XENOPHON, with a variation only of the names.[81] And I think I have fairly made it appear, that an ATHENIAN man of merit might be such a one as with us would pass for incestuous, a parricide, an assassin, an ungrateful, perjured traitor, and something else too abominable to be named; not to mention his rusticity and ill-manners. And having lived in this manner,

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[79] The laws of ATHENS allowed a man to marry his sister by the father. SOLON's law forbid pæderasty to slaves, as being an act of too great dignity for such mean persons. *SBN 328*

[80] APPIAN. de bell. civ. lib. 2. SUETONIUS, in vita CÆSARIS.

[81] Mem. SOC. lib. 3. sub fine. *SBN 329*

his death might be entirely suitable: He might conclude the scene by a desperate act of self-murder, and die with the most absurd blasphemies in his mouth. And notwithstanding all this, he shall have statues, if not altars, erected to his memory; poems and orations shall be composed in his praise; great sects shall be proud of calling themselves by his name; and the most distant posterity shall blindly continue their admiration: Though were such *SBN 330*
a one to arise among themselves, they would justly regard him with horror and execration.

18 I might have been aware, replied I, of your artifice. You seem to take pleasure in this topic; and are indeed the only man I ever knew, who was well 10
acquainted with the ancients, and did not extremely admire them. But instead of attacking their philosophy, their eloquence, or poetry, the usual subjects of controversy between us, you now seem to impeach their morals, and accuse them of ignorance in a science, which is the only one, in my opinion, in which they are not surpassed by the moderns. Geometry, physics, astronomy, anatomy, botany, geography, navigation; in these we justly claim the superiority: But what have we to oppose to their moralists? Your representation of things is fallacious. You have no indulgence for the manners and customs of different ages. Would you try a GREEK or ROMAN by the common law of ENGLAND? Hear him defend himself by his own maxims; and then 20
pronounce.

19 There are no manners so innocent or reasonable, but may be rendered odious or ridiculous, if measured by a standard, unknown to the persons; especially, if you employ a little art or eloquence, in aggravating some circumstances, and extenuating others, as best suits the purpose of your discourse. All these artifices may easily be retorted on you. Could I inform the ATHENIANS, for instance, that there was a nation, in which adultery, both active and passive, so to speak, was in the highest vogue and esteem: In which every man of education chose for his mistress a married woman, the wife, perhaps, of his friend and companion; and valued himself upon these infa- 30
mous conquests, as much as if he had been several times a conqueror in boxing or wrestling at the *Olympic* games: In which every man also took a pride in his tameness and facility with regard to his own wife, and was glad to make friends or gain interest by allowing her to prostitute her charms; and *SBN 331*
even, without any such motive, gave her full liberty and indulgence: I ask, what sentiments the ATHENIANS would entertain of such a people; they who never mentioned the crime of adultery but in conjunction with robbery and poisoning? Which would they admire most, the villany or the meanness of such a conduct?

20 Should I add, that the same people were as proud of their slavery and 40

dependence as the ATHENIANS of their liberty; and though a man among them were oppressed, disgraced, impoverished, insulted, or imprisoned by the tyrant, he would still regard it as the highest merit to love, serve, and obey him; and even to die for his smallest glory or satisfaction: These noble GREEKS would probably ask me, whether I spoke of a human society, or of some inferior, servile species.

21 It was then I might inform my ATHENIAN audience, that these people, however, wanted not spirit and bravery. If a man, say I, though their intimate friend, should throw out, in a private company, a raillery against them, nearly approaching any of those, with which your generals and demagogues every day regale each other, in the face of the whole city, they never can forgive him; but in order to revenge themselves, they oblige him immediately to run them through the body, or be himself murdered. And if a man, who is an absolute stranger to them, should desire them, at the peril of their own life, to cut the throat of their bosom-companion, they immediately obey, and think themselves highly obliged and honoured by the commission. These are their maxims of honour: This is their favourite morality.

22 But though so ready to draw their sword against their friends and countrymen; no disgrace, no infamy, no pain, no poverty will ever engage these people to turn the point of it against their own breast. A man of rank would row in the gallies, would beg his bread, would languish in prison, would suffer any tortures; and still preserve his wretched life. Rather than escape his *SBN 332* enemies by a generous contempt of death, he would infamously receive the same death from his enemies, aggravated by their triumphant insults, and by the most exquisite sufferings.

23 It is very usual too, continue I, among this people to erect jails, where every art of plaguing and tormenting the unhappy prisoners is carefully studied and practiced: And in these jails it is usual for a parent voluntarily to shut up several of his children; in order, that another child, whom he owns to have no greater or rather less merit than the rest, may enjoy his whole fortune, and wallow in every kind of voluptuousness and pleasure. Nothing so virtuous in their opinion as this barbarous partiality.

24 But what is more singular in this whimsical nation, say I to the ATHENIANS, is, that a frolic of yours during the SATURNALIA,[82] when the slaves are served by their masters, is seriously continued by them throughout the whole year, and throughout the whole course of their lives; accompanied too with some circumstances, which still farther augment the absurdity and ridicule. Your

[82] The GREEKS kept the feast of SATURN or CHRONUS, as well as the ROMANS. See LUCIAN. epist. SATURN. *SBN 332*

sport only elevates for a few days those whom fortune has thrown down, and whom she too, in sport, may really elevate for ever above you: But this nation gravely exalts those, whom nature has subjected to them, and whose inferiority and infirmities are absolutely incurable. The women, though without virtue, are their masters and sovereigns: These they reverence, praise, and magnify: To these, they pay the highest deference and respect: And in all places and all times, the superiority of the females is readily acknowledged and submitted to by every one, who has the least pretensions to education and politeness. Scarce any crime would be so universally detested as an infraction of this rule.

25 You need go no further, replied PALAMEDES; I can easily conjecture the *SBN 333* people whom you aim at. The strokes, with which you have painted them, are pretty just; and yet you must acknowledge, that scarce any people are to be found, either in ancient or modern times, whose national character is, upon the whole, less liable to exception. But I give you thanks for helping me out with my argument. I had no intention of exalting the moderns at the expence of the ancients. I only meant to represent the uncertainty of all these judgments concerning characters; and to convince you, that fashion, vogue, custom, and law, were the chief foundation of all moral determinations. The ATHENIANS surely, were a civilized, intelligent people, if ever there were one; and yet their man of merit might, in this age, be held in horror and execration. The FRENCH are also, without doubt, a very civilized, intelligent people; and yet their man of merit might, with the ATHENIANS, be an object of the highest contempt and ridicule, and even hatred. And what renders the matter more extraordinary: These two people are supposed to be the most similar in their national character of any in ancient and modern times; and while the ENGLISH flatter themselves that they resemble the ROMANS, their neighbours on the continent draw the parallel between themselves and those polite GREEKS. What wide difference, therefore, in the sentiments of morals, must be found between civilized nations and Barbarians, or between nations whose characters have little in common? How shall we pretend to fix a standard for judgments of this nature?

26 By tracing matters, replied I, a little higher, and examining the first principles, which each nation establishes, of blame or censure. The RHINE flows north, the RHONE south; yet both spring from the *same* mountain, and are also actuated, in their opposite directions, by the *same* principle of gravity. The different inclinations of the ground, on which they run, cause all the difference of their courses.

27 In how many circumstances would an ATHENIAN and a FRENCH man of *SBN 334* merit certainly resemble each other? Good sense, knowledge, wit, eloquence,

humanity, fidelity, truth, justice, courage, temperance, constancy, dignity of mind: These you have all omitted; in order to insist only on the points, in which they may, by accident, differ. Very well: I am willing to comply with you; and shall endeavour to account for these differences from the most universal, established principles of morals.

28 The GREEK loves, I care not to examine more particularly. I shall only observe, that, however blameable, they arose from a very innocent cause, the frequency of the gymnastic exercises among that people; and were recommended, though absurdly, as the source of friendship, sympathy, mutual attachment, and fidelity;[83] qualities esteemed in all nations and all ages.

29 The marriage of half-brothers and sisters seems no great difficulty. Love between the nearer relations is contrary to reason and public utility; but the precise point, where we are to stop, can scarcely be determined by natural reason; and is therefore a very proper subject for municipal law or custom. If the ATHENIANS went a little too far on the one side, the canon law has surely pushed matters a great way into the other extreme.[84]

30 Had you asked a parent at ATHENS, why he bereaved his child of that life, which he had so lately given it. It is because I love it, he would reply; and regard the poverty which it must inherit from me, as a greater evil than death, which it is not capable of dreading, feeling, or resenting.[85]

31 How is public liberty, the most valuable of all blessings, to be recovered from the hands of an usurper or tyrant, if his power shields him from public rebellion, and our scruples from private vengeance? That his crime is capital by law, you acknowledge: And must the highest aggravation of his crime, the *SBN 335* putting of himself above law, form his full security? You can reply nothing, but by showing the great inconveniencies of assassination; which could any one have proved clearly to the ancients, he had reformed their sentiments in this particular.

32 Again, to cast your eye on the picture which I have drawn of modern manners; there is almost as great difficulty, I acknowledge, to justify FRENCH as GREEK gallantry; except only, that the former is much more natural and agreeable than the latter. But our neighbours, it seems, have resolved to sacrifice some of the domestic to the sociable pleasures; and to prefer ease, freedom, and an open commerce to a strict fidelity and constancy. These ends are both good, and are somewhat difficult to reconcile; nor need we be surprized, if the customs of nations incline too much, sometimes to the one side, sometimes to the other.

[83] PLAT. symp. p. 182. ex edit. SERR.
[84] See *Enquiry*, Section 4. *SBN 334*
[85] PLUTARCH. de amore prolis, sub fine.

33 The most inviolable attachment to the laws of our country is every where acknowledged a capital virtue; and where the people are not so happy, as to have any legislature but a single person, the strictest loyalty is, in that case, the truest patriotism.

34 Nothing surely can be more absurd and barbarous than the practice of duelling; but those, who justify it, say, that it begets civility and good manners. And a duellist, you may observe, always values himself upon his courage, his sense of honour, his fidelity and friendship; qualities, which are here indeed very oddly directed, but which have been esteemed universally, since the foundation of the world.

35 Have the gods forbid self-murder? An ATHENIAN allows, that it ought to be forborn. Has the Deity permitted it? A FRENCHMAN allows, that death is preferable to pain and infamy.

36 You see then, continued I, that the principles upon which men reason in morals are always the same; though the conclusions which they draw are *SBN 336* often very different. That they all reason aright with regard to this subject, more than with regard to any other, it is not incumbent on any moralist to show. It is sufficient, that the original principles of censure or blame are uniform, and that erroneous conclusions can be corrected by sounder reasoning and larger experience. Though many ages have elapsed since the fall of GREECE and ROME; though many changes have arrived in religion, language, laws, and customs; none of these revolutions has ever produced any considerable innovation in the primary sentiments of morals, more than in those of external beauty. Some minute differences, perhaps, may be observed in both. HORACE[86] celebrates a low forehead, and ANACREON joined eyebrows:[87] But the APOLLO and the VENUS of antiquity are still our models for male and female beauty; in like manner as the character of SCIPIO continues our standard for the glory of heroes, and that of CORNELIA for the honour of matrons.

37 It appears, that there never was any quality recommended by any one, as a virtue or moral excellence, but on account of its being *useful*, or *agreeable* to a man *himself*, or to *others*. For what other reason can ever be assigned for praise or approbation? Or where would be the sense of extolling a *good* character or action, which, at the same time, is allowed to be *good for nothing*? All the differences, therefore, in morals, may be reduced to this one general foundation, and may be accounted for by the different views, which people take of these circumstances.

[86] Epist. lib. 1. epist. 7. Also lib. 1. ode 33. *SBN 336*

[87] Ode 28. PETRONIUS (cap. 126.) joins both these circumstances as beauties.

38 Sometimes men differ in their judgment about the usefulness of any habit or action: Sometimes also the peculiar circumstances of things render one moral quality more useful than others, and give it a peculiar preference.

39 It is not surprizing, that, during a period of war and disorder, the military *SBN 337* virtues should be more celebrated than the pacific, and attract more the admiration and attention of mankind. "How usual is it," says TULLY,[88] "to find CIMBRIANS, CELTIBERIANS, and other Barbarians, who bear, with inflexible constancy, all the fatigues and dangers of the field; but are immediately dispirited under the pain and hazard of a languishing distemper: While, on the other hand, the GREEKS patiently endure the slow approaches of death, when armed with sickness and disease; but timorously fly his presence, when he attacks them violently with swords and falchions!" So different is even the same virtue of courage among warlike or peaceful nations! And indeed, we may observe, that, as the difference between war and peace is the greatest that arises among nations and public societies, it produces also the greatest variations in moral sentiment, and diversifies the most our ideas of virtue and personal merit.

40 Sometimes too, magnanimity, greatness of mind, disdain of slavery, inflexible rigour and integrity, may better suit the circumstances of one age than those of another, and have a more kindly influence, both on public affairs, and on a man's own safety and advancement. Our idea of merit, therefore, will also vary a little with these variations; and LABEO, perhaps, be censured for the same qualities, which procured CATO the highest approbation.

41 A degree of luxury may be ruinous and pernicious in a native of SWITZERLAND, which only fosters the arts, and encourages industry in a FRENCHMAN or ENGLISHMAN. We are not, therefore, to expect, either the same sentiments, or the same laws in BERNE, which prevail in LONDON or PARIS.

42 Different customs have also some influence as well as different utilities; and by giving an early biass to the mind, may produce a superior propensity, either to the useful or the agreeable qualities; to those which regard self, or *SBN 338* those which extend to society. These four sources of moral sentiment still subsist; but particular accidents may, at one time, make any one of them flow with greater abundance than at another.

43 The customs of some nations shut up the women from all social commerce: Those of others make them so essential a part of society and conversation, that, except where business is transacted, the male sex alone are supposed almost wholly incapable of mutual discourse and entertainment.

[88] Tusc. quæst. lib. 2. *SBN 337*

As this difference is the most material that can happen in private life, it must also produce the greatest variation in our moral sentiments.

44 Of all nations in the world, where polygamy was not allowed, the GREEKS seem to have been the most reserved in their commerce with the fair sex, and to have imposed on them the strictest laws of modesty and decency. We have a strong instance of this in an oration of LYSIAS.[89] A widow injured, ruined, undone, calls a meeting of a few of her nearest friends and relations; and though never before accustomed, says the orator, to speak in the presence of men, the distress of her circumstances constrained her to lay the case before them. The very opening of her mouth in such company required, it seems, an apology.

45 When DEMOSTHENES prosecuted his tutors, to make them refund his patrimony, it became necessary for him, in the course of the law-suit, to prove that the marriage of APHOBUS's sister with ONETER was entirely fraudulent, and that, notwithstanding her sham marriage, she had lived with her brother at ATHENS for two years past, ever since her divorce from her former husband. And it is remarkable, that though these were people of the first fortune and distinction in the city, the orator could prove this fact no way, but by calling for her female slaves to be put to the question, and by the evidence of one physician, who had seen her in her brother's house during her illness.[90] So reserved were GREEK manners. *SBN 339*

46 We may be assured, that an extreme purity of manners was the consequence of this reserve. Accordingly we find, that, except the fabulous stories of an HELEN and a CLYTEMNESTRA, there scarcely is an instance of any event in the GREEK history, which proceeded from the intrigues of women. On the other hand, in modern times, particularly in a neighbouring nation, the females enter into all transactions and all management of church and state: And no man can expect success, who takes not care to obtain their good graces. HARRY the third, by incurring the displeasure of the fair, endangered his crown, and lost his life, as much as by his indulgence to heresy.

47 It is needless to dissemble: The consequence of a very free commerce between the sexes, and of their living much together, will often terminate in intrigues and gallantry. We must sacrifice somewhat of the *useful*, if we be very anxious to obtain all the *agreeable* qualities; and cannot pretend to reach alike every kind of advantage. Instances of licence, daily multiplying, will weaken the scandal with the one sex, and teach the other, by degrees, to adopt the famous maxim of LA FONTAINE, with regard to female infidelity, "that if one knows it, it is but a small matter; if one knows it not, it is nothing."[91]

[89] Orat. 33. [90] In ONETEREM. *SBN 338–9*

[91] "Quand on le sçait c'est peu de chose:
Quand on l'ignore, ce n'est rien." *SBN 339*

48 Some people are inclined to think, that the best way of adjusting all differences, and of keeping the proper medium between the *agreeable* and the *useful* qualities of the sex, is to live with them after the manner of the ROMANS and the ENGLISH (for the customs of these two nations seem similar in this respect[92]); that is, without gallantry,[93] and without jealousy. By a parity of reason, the customs of the SPANIARDS and of the ITALIANS of an age ago (for the present are very different) must be the worst of any; because they favour both gallantry and jealousy. *SBN 340*

49 Nor will these different customs of nations affect the one sex only: Their idea of personal merit in the males must also be somewhat different with regard, at least, to conversation, address, and humour. The one nation, where the men live much apart, will naturally more approve of prudence; the other of gaiety. With the one simplicity of manners will be in the highest esteem; with the other, politeness. The one will distinguish themselves by good sense and judgment; the other, by taste and delicacy. The eloquence of the former will shine most in the senate; that of the other, on the theatre.

50 These, I say, are the *natural* effects of such customs. For it must be confessed, that chance has a great influence on national manners; and many events happen in society, which are not to be accounted for by general rules. Who could imagine, for instance, that the ROMANS, who lived freely with their women, should be very indifferent about music, and esteem dancing infamous: While the GREEKS, who never almost saw a woman but in their own houses, were continually piping, singing, and dancing?

51 The differences of moral sentiment, which naturally arise from a republican or monarchical government, are also very obvious; as well as those, which proceed from general riches or poverty, union or faction, ignorance or learning. I shall conclude this long discourse with observing, that different customs and situations vary not the original ideas of merit (however they may, some consequences) in any very essential point, and prevail chiefly with regard to young men, who can aspire to the agreeable qualities, and may attempt to please. The MANNER, the ORNAMENTS, the GRACES, which succeed in this shape, are more arbitrary and casual: But the merit of riper years is almost every where the same; and consists chiefly in integrity, humanity, ability, knowledge, and the other more solid and useful qualities of the human mind. *SBN 341*

[92] During the time of the emperors, the ROMANS seem to have been more given to intrigues and gallantry than the ENGLISH are at present: And the women of condition, in order to retain their lovers, endeavoured to fix a name of reproach on those who were addicted to wenching and low amours. They were called *Ancillarioli*. See SENECA, de beneficiis, lib. 1. cap. 9. See also MARTIAL, lib. 12. epig. 58. *SBN 340*

[93] The gallantry here meant is that of amours and attachments, not that of complaisance, which is as much paid to the fair sex in ENGLAND as in any other country.

52 What you insist on, replied PALAMEDES, may have some foundation, when you adhere to the maxims of common life and ordinary conduct. Experience and the practice of the world readily correct any great extravagance on either side. But what say you to *artificial* lives and manners? How do you reconcile the maxims, on which, in different ages and nations, these are founded?

53 What do you understand by *artificial* lives and manners? said I. I explain myself, replied he. You know, that religion had, in ancient times, very little influence on common life, and that, after men had performed their duty in sacrifices and prayers at the temple, they thought, that the gods left the rest of their conduct to themselves, and were little pleased or offended with those virtues or vices, which only affected the peace and happiness of human society. In those ages, it was the business of philosophy alone to regulate men's ordinary behaviour and deportment; and accordingly, we may observe, that this being the sole principle, by which a man could elevate himself above his fellows, it acquired a mighty ascendant over many, and produced great singularities of maxims and of conduct. At present, when philosophy has lost the allurement of novelty, it has no such extensive influence; but seems to confine itself mostly to speculations in the closet; in the same manner, as the ancient religion was limited to sacrifices in the temple. Its place is now sup- *SBN 342*
plied by the modern religion, which inspects our whole conduct, and pre-
scribes an universal rule to our actions, to our words, to our very thoughts and inclinations; a rule so much the more austere, as it is guarded by infinite, though distant, rewards and punishments; and no infraction of it can ever be concealed or disguised.

54 DIOGENES is the most celebrated model of extravagant philosophy. Let us seek a parallel to him in modern times. We shall not disgrace any philosophic name by a comparison with the DOMINICS or LOYOLAS, or any canonized monk or friar. Let us compare him to PASCAL, a man of parts and genius as well as DIOGENES himself; and perhaps too, a man of virtue, had he allowed his virtuous inclinations to have exerted and displayed themselves.

55 The foundation of DIOGENES's conduct was an endeavour to render himself an independent being as much as possible, and to confine all his wants and desires and pleasures within himself and his own mind: The aim of PASCAL was to keep a perpetual sense of his dependence before his eyes, and never to forget his numberless wants and infirmities. The ancient supported himself by magnanimity, ostentation, pride, and the idea of his own superiority above his fellow-creatures. The modern made constant profession of humility and abasement, of the contempt and hatred of himself; and endeavoured to attain these supposed virtues, as far as they are attainable. The austerities of the GREEK were in order to inure himself to hardships, and

prevent his ever suffering: Those of the FRENCHMAN were embraced merely for their own sake, and in order to suffer as much as possible. The philosopher indulged himself in the most beastly pleasures, even in public: The saint refused himself the most innocent, even in private. The former thought it his duty to love his friends, and to rail at them, and reprove them, and scold them: The latter endeavoured to be absolutely indifferent towards his nearest *SBN 343* relations, and to love and speak well of his enemies. The great object of DIOGENES's wit was every kind of superstition, that is every kind of religion known in his time. The mortality of the soul was his standard principle; and even his sentiments of a divine providence seem to have been licentious. The most ridiculous superstitions directed PASCAL's faith and practice; and an extreme contempt of this life, in comparison of the future, was the chief foundation of his conduct.

56 In such a remarkable contrast do these two men stand: Yet both of them have met with general admiration in their different ages, and have been proposed as models of imitation. Where then is the universal standard of morals, which you talk of? And what rule shall we establish for the many different, nay contrary sentiments of mankind?

57 An experiment, said I, which succeeds in the air, will not always succeed in a vacuum. When men depart from the maxims of common reason, and affect these *artificial* lives, as you call them, no one can answer for what will please or displease them. They are in a different element from the rest of mankind; and the natural principles of their mind play not with the same regularity, as if left to themselves, free from the illusions of religious superstition or philosophical enthusiasm.

EDITOR'S ANNOTATIONS

Plan of the Annotations

The objective of the annotations is to provide information about the text, not to interpret it. Each annotation serves at least one of the following seven purposes.

1. Definition. A few terms and phrases are defined or otherwise explained. However, most archaic, obsolete, or puzzling terms are treated in the Glossary.

2. Translation. French, Latin, and Greek quotations supplied by Hume are always translated.

3. Interpretation. Interpretations of the text are avoided. Interpretation of the works of many authors cited by Hume is, however, unavoidable. See 5 below.

4. Completion of a self-reference. A few annotations identify a passage to which Hume is referring in his own text (a cross-reference), although he does not provide an explicit chapter or section reference.

5. Information on passages in named authors. Hume's footnote references are expressed in full and occasionally summarized. A few annotations explain, summarize, or paraphrase the context or content of a work that Hume identifies or to which he alludes. These annotations are provided when Hume's surrounding sentences assume more than readers could be expected to know.

6. Identification of passages in unnamed authors. Several annotations identify or suggest unnamed authors to whom Hume alludes. Names and titles of works are supplied, but full names and titles are usually found only in the biographical appendix or the reference list.

7. Identification of the intellectual background. A few annotations make suggestions about Hume's possible sources and assumptions, especially if a passage suggests an author known to have been read by Hume. In some cases the intellectual background of a passage is discussed. These identifications should be considered probable rather than certain or definitive. When a broad social and intellectual context is mentioned, the discussion is selective and intended only to point the reader in a helpful direction. (To provide context, works are occasionally mentioned that were published after *EPM*.)

Reference numbers on the left margin (of the form 3.12) are to page and line in the text, as are cross-references in the annotations. By contrast, references to the text itself are to section (or appendix or 'A Dialogue') and paragraph numbers and generally are preceded by the designations *EPM*, Appx., or Dial. (e.g. *EPM* 3.29 and Appx. 3.8–9).

Citations and Forms of Reference

For a list of general abbreviations and conventions, see p. ix above.

Short titles are often used. Full bibliographical information for a cited work is found in the Reference List—or, in rare instances, in the Catalogue (Cat.). The Reference List is the default list. Cat. is typically cited only if a scholar of Hume's text might need to examine the eighteenth-century (or earlier) material it lists. Citations with page numbers to entries in these lists are given only when needed for clarity or specificity; otherwise, divisions in the work are provided by reference to books, parts, chapters, sections, and the like. Classical works are cited by standard forms in the field of Classics. Works are cited by titles in general scholarly use, whether English or Latin: for example, Horace, *Odes* (not *Carmina*), but Cicero, *De natura deorum* (not *On the Nature of the Gods*). Where both English and Latin titles are in use, the English title is cited. In the case of modern publications, there are exceptions to some standard conventions, including the following: part numbers are not used for Hobbes's *Leviathan*, because his chapters are numbered sequentially throughout; however, chapter and paragraph numbers are used—for example, *Leviathan* 13.8–9. In citing Hutcheson's writings, a part of the work designated 'Treatise' is handled separately from the sequence of numbers—for example, *An Inquiry into the Original of our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue*, Treatise 1, 1.14. References to Hutcheson are to divisions and pages in his first editions, unless otherwise noted.

Translations

All Greek and Latin words or passages presented by Hume are translated by M. A. Stewart. All French words or passages presented by Hume are translated by Tom L. Beauchamp. Translations of non-English texts quoted by the editor (and not by Hume) are generally from the published translations listed in the Reference List.

SECTION 1

3.12 **reality of moral distinctions]** See ann. 3.28. A moral distinction is a moral standard or moral difference. To make a moral distinction is either to use moral precepts properly or to distinguish between good and evil, obligatory and unlawful, just and unjust, and the like. 'Those who have denied the reality of moral distinctions' sceptically denied that there are meaningful moral standards of duty and virtue, that proper uses of moral terms occur, or that there are conditions (in human nature, for example) that support distinctions between the morally proper and the morally improper. In the late 17th and 18th c. Thomas Hobbes[B] was taken as the paradigmatic sceptic who denied the reality of moral distinctions. By contrast, many philosophers and theologians believed that moral distinctions are fixed by the will of God, whereas rationalists (see Clarke[B] and Cudworth[B] below) believed that distinctions of good and evil (and the like) are objective realities analogous to mathematical truths and are knowable by reason. In the moral sense tradition, moral distinctions are real, but known through mental affections.

3.28 **a controversy . . . foundation of** MORALS] The proper account of moral discernment and judgement is the fundamental problem. Hume outlines this controversy and names the primary parties during a discussion of 'the Foundations of Morality' in *A Letter from a Gentleman to his Friend in Edinburgh* (1745). Speaking of himself in the third person, he writes:

> He hath indeed denied the eternal Difference of Right and Wrong in the Sense in which *Clark* and *Woolaston* maintained them, *viz.* That the Propositions of Morality were of the same Nature with the Truths of Mathematicks and the abstract Sciences, the Objects *merely* of Reason, not the *Feelings* of our internal *Tastes* and *Sentiments*. In this Opinion he concurs with all the antient Moralists, as well as with Mr. *Hutchison* Professor of Moral Philosophy in the University of *Glasgow*, who, with others, has revived the antient Philosophy in this Particular. (*Letter*, 30.)

Samuel Clarke[B] and the English moral philosopher and theologian William Wollaston (1659–1724) are primary figures on the side of reason. Ralph Cudworth[B] is named in a similar capacity in *EPM* (see 3.34–5 and n. 12). Another candidate is English philosopher and theologian John Balguy (1686–1748), who supported Clarke and criticized Scottish philosopher Francis Hutcheson (1694–1746) in 1728 for relying too much on instinct and failing to see the importance of 'truth and right reason' in morals (*Foundation*, 1: 10–11, 28–9, 46–7).

Lord Shaftesbury[B] and Hutcheson are influential figures on the side of sentiment (see e.g. Hutcheson, *Essay*, Treatise 2, 2–3, on Clarke and Wollaston). Other figures included George Turnbull (1698–1749), a Regent at Marischal College, Aberdeen (see *Principles* 1.4) and, later, Lord Kames (see Intro. to the present volume). Hutcheson responded to Balguy in (later editions of) his *Illustrations On the Moral Sense*, and Balguy responded (in part 2 of his *Foundation*) to 40 queries that he stated in a Hutchesonian manner. This exchange reflected the controversy over sentiment and reason to which Hume alludes. For other contributions to this controversy written in the quarter-century preceding *EPM*, see: Gilbert Burnet, *Letters*; Archibald Campbell, *Enquiry*; John Clarke, *The Foundation of Morality*; Thomas Mole, *Foundation . . . Consider'd* and *Foundation . . . Re-considered*.

Hume is not specific regarding how early the 'controversy started of late' began, but it is reasonable to begin with Hugo Grotius,[B] *On the Law of War and Peace* (1625). For Hume's arguments in *THN* that morality is not founded on reason, but on sentiment or feeling, see esp. 3.1.1–2 and 3.3.1.

3.30 SENTIMENT] an inner sensing, feeling, or emotion of which a person is aware—for example, anger, approval, disgust, sympathy, and compassion. The term was a key concept in moral and aesthetic treatises of Hume's period. Chambers (*Cyclopædia*, 'Thought') defines it as follows: 'a general Name for all the ideas consequent on the Operations of the Mind, and even for the Operations themselves'. Whereas Hume used 'moral sense' in *THN*, he primarily uses 'moral sentiment' in *EPM* (see 3.37 and Appx. 2.1 and Intro., pp. 19–21). 'Sentiment' is often used, like 'taste',

to refer to judgement and opinion. Hume does not sharply distinguish sensing, judging, believing, responding, preferring, and the like.

3.32 **finer internal sense]** a general reference to moral sense theory, including the elements of taste (see ann. 4.5) and sentiment that are central to Hume's theory; see *EPM* 1.3–4; 1.10; 7.28. Hutcheson used the term 'internal sense' similarly (*Inquiry into the Original*, Treatise 1, 1.10–13, *et passim*). The distinction between external sense and internal sense had roots in Shaftesbury[B] and in Locke,[B] who used similar and sometimes identical terms. (Locke's basic term is 'reflection', but he says the perception of our own mental operations 'might properly be call'd internal sense'. *Essay* 2.1.4.) Perhaps the most elaborate account of internal sense during Hume's lifetime is in Alexander Gerard's *Essay on Taste*, first published in 1759. Hume may have seen a draft submitted to the Edinburgh Society before publishing his essay 'Of the Standard of Taste' (1757), but not before publishing *EPM*.

4.1 **beauty and deformity]** English essayist and politician Joseph Addison (1672–1719) offered similar appraisals of beauty and deformity, as well as taste and disgust, in a well-known series of essays in *Spectator* 412–18. See also Hutcheson, *Inquiry into the Original*, Treatise 1, 1–6 (citing p. 78 of Addison, *Spectator* 412, as an authority). *THN* 2.1.8 is entitled, 'Of beauty and deformity' (though the objective is rather different there); Hume also provides relevant reflections on beauty and deformity in his *Essays*. See anns. 4.6; 60.14; and 65.40.

4.3 **ancient philosophers . . . modern enquirers]** Hume could be referring to several ancient philosophers. He often cites Cicero[B] approvingly, but Aristotle[B] and various Aristotelians, Sophists, Cynics, and Epicureans are candidates for ancients who derive morals from taste and sentiment. The 'modern enquirers' are the rationalists just noted. Hume is also referring to rationalists when he says that some philosophers deduce their conclusions 'from the most abstract principles of the understanding' (*EPM* 1.4).

4.3 **virtue is nothing but conformity to reason]** This language closely corresponds to *THN* 3.1.1.4, where Hume attributes the view to philosophers who believe that 'there are eternal fitnesses and unfitness of things, which are the same to every rational being'. His reference is to Clarke,[B] Cudworth,[B] and perhaps other post-medieval rationalists (see Intro., pp. 19–20) who defend reason in the controversy mentioned at 1.3. See anns. 22.21 and n. 12.

4.5 **taste]** Addison, citing Baltasar Gracián [y Morales][B] (see ann. 73.17) and other authors mentioned by Hume, defines 'taste in writing' as 'that Faculty . . . which discerns the Beauties of an Author with Pleasure, and the Imperfections with Dislike' (*Spectator* 409; cf. 293, 412–18). Irish statesman and philosopher Edmund Burke (1729–97), writing in a manner reminiscent of Hume, but five years after Hume published *EPM*, defined taste as follows: 'I mean by the word Taste no more than that faculty, or those faculties of the mind which are affected with, or which form a judgement of the works of imagination and the elegant arts' (*Philosophical Enquiry*, introduction, 13). According to Chambers (*Cyclopædia*, 'Taste'), 'In Effect, a good

Taste seems to be little else but right Reason, which we otherwise express by the Word Judgment. . . . [O]ne may say, Taste is the Judgment of Nature, and Judgment the Taste of Reason.'

Much was written in the 18th c. about the nature and standards of taste. Hutcheson provided the first polished philosophical account in the English-speaking world. See two wide-ranging essays in the *Encyclopédie* of Diderot and d'Alembert: 'Goût', by François Marie Arouet de Voltaire (1694–1778), and a fragment from an incomplete article, 'Essai sur le goût', by Montesquieu[B] (7: 761–7).

See also *EPM* 1.9; 7.28; Appx. 3.10; Hume's essay 'Of the Standard of Taste'; and Hugh Blair (1718–1800), *Lectures on Rhetoric* 2.

4.6 **beauty of virtue, and deformity of vice]** See 1.3; 1.7; and *THN* 2.1.8, 'Of beauty and deformity'. Theses that virtue is beautiful and vice a deformity are found in Hutcheson (*Inquiry*, preface; Treatise 1, 1.14–15; 1.8.5). For Addison's related views on beauty, see ann. 4.1; 4.5.

4.12 **Lord Shaftesbury[B]]** Shaftesbury was among the first to use the term 'moral sense'. He based his account of the recognition of virtue on this notion (*Characteristics*, 'Inquiry concerning Virtue' 1.2.3; 1.3.1 [251–5, 258–60]), though he used the term far less than his successors Hutcheson and Turnbull. The degree to which the distinction Hume mentions is present in Shaftesbury, and whether some 'confusion' is present, requires a close reading of the latter's eloquent, but loosely arranged writings.

5.29 **internal sense . . . universal]** Cf. Hutcheson's views on 'the universality of this moral sense' in *Inquiry*, Treatise 1, 6.4–5; Treatise 2, 4.1–3; 4.7. Hutcheson also maintains that an internal sense of beauty is universal.

6.11 **mental qualities]** Hume defines virtue or personal merit in terms of 'a quality of the mind' in n. 50. Analysis of virtue (and vice) in terms of qualities of the mind had a long history in moral philosophy, especially in the Aristotelian tradition.

6.12 **personal merit]** Similar accounts are found in Hutcheson: *Inquiry*, introduction and Treatise 2, 4; *Essay*, Treatise 2, introduction (untitled) and 1, 4, 5; *Short Introduction* 1.1.10, 12–13, 17. Balguy's *Foundation* was an attempt to rebut this thesis. Citing Cicero[B] (*De officiis* 1), Balguy insisted that the terms '*Merit* or *Praiseworthyness*' properly '*denote the Quality in Actions which* not only *gains the Approbation of the Observer*, but which also *deserves* or is *worthy* of it. *Approbation* does not constitute *Merit*, but is produced by it' (Part 1 [22]). On this view, a person could be meritorious though others had withheld their approbation.

6.15 **praise or blame . . . panegyric or satire]** These distinctions have classical roots. Aristotle[B] distinguishes between praise and panegyric in the *Nicomachean Ethics*, esp. $1101^{b}32$–4, and *Rhetoric* $1366^{a}23$–$1367^{b}35$; the having of a virtue merits praise, the result of having it is the point of panegyric. Panegyric is a form of public appraisal, praise of private appraisal. Hume's distinction between satire and blame may have been modelled on this tradition. (See, further, 9.2 below and Hume's 'Of

Love and Marriage' 2.) The tradition of panegyric in the Latin imperial panegyrics such as those of Cicero[B] (*Pro Marcello*), Pliny the Younger (*Panegyricus*), and Claudian may also be part of the background of Hume's distinctions. See also the distinctions between panegyric and satire in Matthew Prior, 'Heads for a Treatise of Learning' (1: 582, 585). Scottish literature of Hume's period also often included panegyric or satire, for example, in the works of Mary MacLeod, Alexander MacDonald, Duncan Bàn Macintyre, and Robert Mackay.

6.19 **framing the catalogue]** listing the qualities that make up personal merit. The catalogue is primarily of the moral virtues and vices, as Hume discusses at 6.21; 9.3; 9.12; and in *THN* 3.3.4.2. For virtues and vices that help fill out Hume's catalogue, see *THN* 3.3 and 3.2, *passim*. Cataloguing the virtues and vices had a long history in moral philosophy, possibly dating from the sections in Aristotle's[B] *Nicomachean Ethics* that are cited by Hume at Appx. 4.12. Hume's frequent presentation of strings of virtues, with class designations such as 'social virtues' and 'companionable virtues', may constitute his catalogue. See esp. *EPM* 9.12.

6.31 **foundation of ethics]** See *EHU* 8.7, and Hutcheson's *Short Introduction* 1.1.10 (esp. 20) on the foundation of ethics in the unchanging constitution of human nature, which ensures that virtue is unchanging.

6.34 **experimental method]** 'Experimental philosophy' (see *THN*, introduction 7) relies on observation and experiment to find correct causal generalizations (the laws of science). Hume uses 'experimental' to include the observational and the experiential. The proposal that an experimental method be cultivated for philosophy plays a major role in *THN*, which bears the subtitle *An Attempt to introduce the experimental Method of Reasoning into Moral Subjects*. The method is also discussed in *EHU* 1.

Francis Bacon[B] and Newton[B] influenced Hume's thinking about the experimental method, as did experimental scientists Robert Boyle (1627–91) and Robert Hooke (1635–1703); see Hume's *History of England*, ch. 71 and ann. 37.27. The idea of applying an experimental method to the human mind was not original with Hume; cf. George Turnbull, *Principles*, introduction (1: 9–11, 21–3), which offers a more extensive and ambitious programme than Hume's.

6.35 **other scientifical method]** This method has been associated, at least since Aristotle,[B] with the theory that science begins with rationally self-evident axioms. Aristotle holds that the first principles of a science are not themselves demonstrable. Rather, they are the foundational principles from which all scientific knowledge is derived (*Posterior Analytics* $71^{b}18$–23). On this view, unprovable axioms are essential for understanding ($72^{a}15$–23), and a demonstration proceeds from necessary premisses ($73^{a}23$–6). By contrast, the experimental method permits only postulates that can be put to the test of experience.

7.4 **reformation in all moral disquisitions]** Several writers in Hume's time had noticed that philosophers need to account for the moral phenomena of the mind, just as Newton[B] had done for natural phenomena. See e.g. George Turnbull, *Principles*, title-page, epistle dedicatory, preface, and introduction to pt. I; Alexander Pope,

Essay on Man, epistle 1. Newton himself made the suggestion that his method could be applied to moral philosophy in *Opticks*, bk. 3, pt. 1 (405).

7.7 **social virtues]** This term, denoting virtues that benefit other people in society, occurs 29 times in *EPM*, but only twice in *THN* (3.3.1.11 and 3.3.6.6, where it is defined in terms of moral qualities that tend to the good of society). Hume offers a list of the social virtues at *EPM* 5.44 below: 'humanity, generosity, charity, affability, lenity, mercy, and moderation'.

SECTION 2

8.15 and n. 2 **Pericles[B]]** Footnote reference: Plutarch, *Lives*, 'Pericles' 38.4, 173 C. According to Plutarch[B] (see also *Lives* 39.1), Pericles, as Athens' victorious general, set up nine trophies (war monuments) to honour the city. Pericles expressed amazement at the citizens' praise and commemoration of achievements that were due as much to good fortune as character. He considered among his most crowning achievements that he never caused an Athenian to 'go into mourning' because of his political and military decisions, and he thought his most admirable qualities were modesty and control of the temptation to abuse power. Plutarch also reports that Pericles never indulged his envy or related passions in exercising his vast powers, and never treated a present foe as forever a foe.

8.28 and n. 3 **Cicero[B]]** Footnote reference: Cicero, *De officiis* 1.19.62–3; 1.44.157. Cicero maintains that a motive of justice is required to possess the virtue of courage. 'Courage' accompanied by treachery and cunning lacks justice and is an effrontery rather than true courage. Cicero presents a framework dividing social obligation into types of virtue, including *benevolence* and *justice*—a division that cuts across the treatment of these topics in *EPM*.

9.1 and n. 4 **Juvenal[B]]** Footnote reference: Juvenal, *Satires* 15, lines 139–47. Juvenal maintains that our ability to cry and feel pity exhibits tenderness and elevates humans above other animals.

9.14 **speculative . . . practical]** Contrast *THN* 3.1.1.5, where Hume draws this distinction in a different manner.

9.17 **humanity]** At *EPM* 5.46 Hume speaks of 'any such principle *in our nature* as humanity or a concern for others' (italics added). He also refers to humanity as a virtue of concern and attention to others. 'Humanity' was a pivotal concept in moral treatises at the time Hume wrote. It was often associated with a capacity for sympathy (see *EPM* 5.20) and with fellow-feeling (see 5.17). Balguy suggested that a 'Principle of Humanity' comes to nothing more in moral sense theories (esp. Hutcheson's) than an 'internal Sentiment' (*Foundation*, Second Part, 18).

10.4 **higher station]** apparently a reference to a higher position in the 'rank of men', as Hume puts it in 'Of the Middle Station of Life' 2.

10.26 **romance]** English lexicographer Samuel Johnson (1709–84) lists several meanings of this term, including 'a tale of wild adventures in war and love' (*Dictionary*, 'Romance'). In the 18th c. it generally referred to a fictional narrative of heroic deeds, adventures, or intrigues. Hume's friend Hugh Blair, Regius chair of rhetoric and *belles-lettres* at Edinburgh, noted that the term 'romance' 'now appl[ies] to all fictitious composition'. Blair claimed that the influence of romance on morals and taste is 'likely to be considerable' (*Lectures on Rhetoric* 37 [506–8]). In a letter of 29 Jan. 1748 to James Oswald (*Letters*, 1: 110), Hume wittily discusses the following French romances, which are distantly related to the discussions of gallantry and love found later in *EPM*: Gauthier de Costes de la Calprenède, *Pharamond* and *Cassandre*; Madeleine de Scudéry, *Le grand Cyrus*. In 'Of the Balance of Power' 1, Hume refers to Xenophon's *Cyropaedia* as 'altogether a romance'; and in 'Of Polygamy and Divorces' 5, he calls Denis Vairasse's *The History of the Sevarites or Sevarambi* an 'agreeable romance'.

10.30 and n. 5 **gods, says Cicero[B]]** Footnote reference: Cicero, *De natura deorum* 1.36.100–1. Cicero notes that religions began when people worshipped objects, such as the sun, for their usefulness. The Egyptians deified animals for their utility by worshipping the ibis, which destroyed snakes. By contrast, the Epicureans' gods performed no service, as if idleness were a virtue.

10.35 and n. 6 **sceptics assert]** Footnote reference: Sextus Empiricus, *Against the Physicists 1.18 (Adversus mathematicos* 9.18; *Adversus Dogmaticos* 3.18). Sextus Empiricus,[B] a basic authority on the sceptic school, quotes Prodicus of Ceos (Sophist, 5th and early 4th c. BC) as asserting that: 'The ancients accounted as gods the sun and moon and rivers and springs and in general all the things that are of benefit for our life, because of the benefit derived from them, even as the Egyptians deify the Nile'.

Nicolas Malebranche[B] had cited both Cicero[B] (as in *EPM* 2.14 immediately above) and Sextus in making substantially the same point made by Hume, whose references to these two authors are identical to Malebranche's (*Search after Truth*, 684). By traditional standards, these citations of Sextus use incorrect numbers, probably because Hume and Malebranche rely on the edition of Sextus edited by P. and J. Chouët, which uses numbering consistent with their citations (as Julia Annas has shown in the case of Hume).

11.1 and n. 7 **historians]** Footnote reference: Diodorus Siculus, *Historical Library* 4.1.4–7; 4.2.1 ff. Diodorus Siculus[B] claims that heroes, demigods, and the like have been honoured 'because of the benefits they conferred which have been shared by all men' (2: 340–3).

11.4 **religion of Zoroaster[B]]** A sentence almost identical in wording to this sentence in Hume is found in the *Persian Letters* of Baron de Montesquieu:[B] 'que les actes les plus agréables à Dieu que les hommes puissent faire, c'était de faire un enfant, labourer un champ, et planter un arbre' (Starobinski edn., Lettre 119). In Zoroastrianism, agriculture is a special good and whoever plants a tree and sows a

field of harvestable crops will benefit from a yield of food. There is also a Zoroastrian belief that procreation of children is meritorious. In *The Natural History of Religion*, Hume lists as a source of information on Zoroastrianism a work by English orientalist Thomas Hyde (1636–1703), *Historia religionis veterum Persarum*, which contains some versions of the information mentioned here by Hume.

11.17 ***Tyrannicide* . . . Timoleon[B] and a Brutus[B]]** Timoleon helped assassinate his brother, the tyrant Timophanes, after attempting in vain to reform him. Plutarch[B] reports that Timophanes had a ruinous passion for absolute power. Influential Corinthians applauded Timoleon for setting country before family, and honesty and justice before expediency; but others regarded his deed as abominable, and he was driven by them and by his family into isolation (*Lives*, 'Timoleon' 3.3). Pierre Bayle,[B] another of Hume's possible sources of information, praised Timoleon, calling him 'the scourge of tyrants' and the great punisher of 'usurpers of sovereign power' (*Dictionary*, 'Timoleon', 5: 363–6).

Plutarch reports that 'Antony . . . declared that in his opinion Brutus was the only conspirator against Caesar[B] who was impelled by the splendour and by what seemed to him the nobility of the enterprise' (*Lives*, 'Brutus' 29.5–6). Hume treats Brutus favourably in *THN* 3.3.1.16 and in a letter to Hutcheson of 17 Sept. 1739 (*Letters*, 1: 35). He also discusses Brutus' 'virtue and good intentions' in 'That Politics may be reduced to a Science' 19. Cicero[B] repeatedly attempted to justify the assassination of Caesar as tyrannicide (*De officiis* 2.7.23–2.8.28; 3.4.19; 3.21.82–5), and in Hume's time many writers endorsed tyrannicide. See e.g. the detailed defence of Brutus' actions in *Cato's Letters* 55–6 (1: 165–92). Hobbes,[B] by contrast, opposed the action in *Elements of Law* 8.10 and *De cive* 12.3. Hume comments further on tyrannicide in his essay, 'Of Passive Obedience' 3 and on Timoleon and tyrants in his essay 'Of the Populousness of Ancient Nations' 52.

11.25 **Liberality in princes]** Hume may be reflecting on either Machiavelli,[B] *Prince* 16, 'Of Liberality and Miserliness' or Cicero,[B] *De officiis* 1.14.42–1.18.59; 2.15.52–2.24.85; and 2.52–85. Both dwell on these themes. Hume's language and point are closer to Cicero's discussion. (Aristotle's[B] *Nicomachean Ethics* $1119^{b}20$–$1122^{a}17$ does not discuss princes, but it contains an influential body of thought on liberality as a virtue and mean between the extremes of prodigality and meanness.) Hume discusses the morality of princes in *THN* 3.2.11.3–5 and liberality in princes at several points in his *History of England*.

11.31 **Luxury]** This reference is one of three direct (and several indirect) references in *EPM* to a thriving 18th-c. dispute over the effects on society of luxury goods. Prior to the 18th c. the pursuit of luxury had been widely condemned as sinful and harmful to society. The term 'luxury' was used to refer to exorbitant expenditure and forms of self-gratification. However, as prosperity and commerce expanded, many people resisted the notion that the pursuit of luxury entails moral degeneracy.

Philosopher, physician, and economic theorist Bernard Mandeville (*c.*1670–1733) attempted to sever the connection of luxury to immorality in his *Fable of the Bees*

and became the central figure in the luxury debate. The theory summarized in Hume's paragraph is similar to Mandeville's. See ann. 90.1–91.8. After the appearance of Mandeville's book, the term 'luxury' was often used not for moral condemnation, but to refer to the level of wealth and prosperity needed to live an affluent lifestyle. For example, in Saint-Lambert's 'Luxe' (Luxury) in Diderot's *Encyclopédie*, the term was defined simply as 'the use people make of wealth and industry to procure for themselves a pleasant existence' (9: 763).

At roughly the time he was writing *EPM*, Hume wrote 'Of Luxury' (1752), changed in title in 1760 to 'Of Refinement in the Arts' (see par. 21, citing Mandeville). He held that 'luxury' is 'a word of uncertain signification'. He distinguished 'a good as well as . . . a bad sense' of the term 'luxury', and also distinguished between innocent and vicious luxuries. See *EPM* 4.13. Hume discusses 'the *pleasures* of luxury and the *profits* of commerce' in his essay 'Of Commerce' (where he cites J. F. Melon, a follower of Mandeville) and occasionally comments on luxury in his *History*, vols. 1–5.

11.35 **all satirists . . . moralists]** Many figures contributed to these controversies about luxury. The central figures are discussed in Sekora, *Luxury;* Hont and Ignatieff, *Wealth and Virtue*; Horne, *The Social Thought of Bernard Mandeville*; Whitney, *Primitivism*; and Johnson, *Predecessors of Adam Smith*. These writers list numerous figures prior to Mandeville who anticipated his views, many known to have been read by Hume (Saint-Évremond,[B] Arnauld, Bayle,[B] Fénelon,[B] etc.). Among those who wrote after Mandeville's 1st edn. and whose views Hume might have encountered, see Montesquieu,[B] *Spirit of the Laws* 7.1–15; Hutcheson, *Short Introduction* (67, 280 f., 296, 321–2), and *Hibernicus's Letters* 46 (12 Feb. 1726), in *Opera Minora*, 382–403; John Dennis, *Vice and Luxury*; Addison, *Spectator* 55 (3 May 1711; after publication of Mandeville's *Grumbling Hive*); Archibald Campbell, *Enquiry* 3.1–3; George Berkeley, *Alciphron* 2; William Law, *Remarks upon a Late Book*; William Warburton, *Divine Legation* 1.6; Daniel DeFoe, *Complete English Tradesman* 10; and George Turnbull, *Principles* 2.2 (1: 341–3).

SECTION 3

13.ttl **Of Justice]** Hume's discussion of justice in Sect. 3 envisions a strong connection between justice and public utility. This thesis had precedents in writers such as Hutcheson (*Short Introduction* 1.3.3; 1.7.2; 2.1.1–3; 2.2.1–4). Cf. Hume's more extended treatment in *THN* 3.2.1–2 and 3.2.6, and his reference to Grotius[B] in n. 63.

13.20 **never once have been dreamed of]** Cf. *THN* 3.2.1.9 and 3.2.2.8, 11, 25, where Hume uses the language 'unintelligible'.

13.30 **Water and air]** Cf. the similar passage in *THN* 3.2.2.17.

14.3 **liberty of the seas]** Cf. Grotius,[B] *On the Law of War and Peace* 2.2.3; 2.3.

n. 10 **Genesis]** Footnote reference: Gen. 13: 7–12; 21: 25–30. These passages refer to wells near Beersheba in Israel, to which access was essential for nomadic life. Hume has taken both his point and the two references in Genesis from Hugo Grotius,[B] *On the Law of War and Peace* 2.2.2, article 3—the article immediately before the passage he quotes below in n. 63.

14.23 **friendship . . . second self]** Hume may be assuming the theory of friendship of Aristotle,[B] which covers many types of co-operative relationships. Aristotle says that friendship among virtuous people entails a mutual concern for the other's good; it involves acting so that the other becomes like a 'second self', as Hume here puts it. See Aristotle, *Magna moralia* 2.12, 15 (esp. 1213[a]10–26); *Eudemian Ethics* 7.12 (esp. 1245[a]29–39); *Nicomachean Ethics* 9.4 (esp. 1166[a]30–[b]1).

15.4 **enthusiasms . . . fanatics]** Hume here and elsewhere (see *EPM* 3.23–4) links enthusiasm in religion to fanaticism on the part of, for example, zealous Puritans and fervent Protestant and Roman Catholic believers. Publications and sermons that cautioned about the follies and dangers of enthusiasm and fanaticism were common before and during Hume's lifetime. Many philosophers had commented critically on the subject, including English philosopher and theologian Henry More (1614–87) and John Locke.[B] More wrote an influential attack, *Enthusiasmus Triumphatus*, which called for reliance on reason and the development of a criterion to distinguish genuine from false inspiration in religion. Locke, influenced by More, added a chapter 'Of Enthusiasm' in the 4th edn. of his *Essay* (4.19); he portrayed enthusiasm as destructive of the truths of both reason and revelation. Also sharply critical of religious enthusiasts and fanatics were Classics scholar Méric Casaubon (1599–1671), in *A Treatise Concerning Enthusiasme*; Robert South (1634–1716), Prebendary of Westminster and Canon of Christ Church, Oxford, *Sermons* 55–6; Addison, *Spectator* 201 (and cf. also 11, 185, 207, 213); and Jonathan Swift,[B] *Discourse* and *Tale of a Tub*. Diderot's *Encyclopédie* contains an extremely disapproving definition in a controversial entry 'Fanatisme' ('Fanaticism') by Deleyre (6: 393–401). Some writers, including Shaftesbury,[B] viewed enthusiasm more favourably, but even Shaftesbury distinguished good and bad enthusiasms and warned against degeneration into fanaticism, superstition, and loss of reason. See *Characteristics*, 'Letter concerning Enthusiasm', 5–39, and 'Miscellaneous Reflections' 2.1 (173–80). Hume's 'Of Superstition and Enthusiasm' seems indebted to these earlier writers. See also *Dialogues* 12, *NHR* 12.22, and his depictions in *History of England*, chs. 34, 40, 47, 55, 57–62. See also ann. 123.24.

15.11 **foregoing suppositions]** namely, the hypothetical situation (entertained since near the beginning of Sect. 3) in which a superabundance of human benevolence or basic goods eliminates the need for rules of justice.

15.28 **opens granaries]** Each of these extreme emergencies had been discussed by Samuel Pufendorf (1632–94), *On the Law of Nature and Nations* 2.6.5; 8.5.7; and James Dalrymple, 1st Viscount Stair (1619–95), *Institutions* 2.1.6. See also Grotius,[B] *On the Law of War and Peace* 2.2.6 (citing Seneca and Cicero[B]) and 2.2.19; and

Hutcheson, *System* 1.17.5 (124–5). The subject of these writers is the right of eminent domain. Stair (following Grotius, at least in part) suggested that rather than a suspension or cancellation of justice (as Hume proposes), there are obligations to give needed goods to people in emergency circumstances; subsequently an obligation of recompense is owed to the owners of the appropriated property. In a related comment, Hume elsewhere mentions the siege of Athens (*EHU* 3.14).

16.9 **rules . . . suspended]** Cf. the similar passage in *THN* 3.2.2.22.

16.14 **laws of war]** See ann. 17.14 and n. 11; 21.21; 28.17.

16.38 **golden age . . . reign of Saturn]** The reference is to the legend that, during the reign of Cronus, an idyllic period existed in which rules of justice and property did not exist. According to the early poet Hesiod (8th–7th c. BC), who wrote about a golden race, only males enjoyed this period, and they lived like gods (*Works and Days* 109–20). Later Roman poets such as Horace,[B] Virgil,[B] and Ovid[B] developed the notion of the golden age.

The festival of Saturnalia, a time for merriment and the exchange of gifts, was celebrated in Saturn's honour. In the Roman account Zeus drove out Cronus, who fled to Italy where he established the golden age. For Hume's connection of this passage to the 'philosophical fiction [invention] of the state of nature', see n. 11. At n. 82 Hume notes 'the feast of Saturn or Chronus' as discussed in Lucian,[B] *Saturnalia*. Hobbes[B] mentions both the golden age and the reign of Saturn in *De cive*, preface; Locke[B] invokes the notion of the golden age in *Second Treatise* 111.

17.14 and n. 11 ***state of nature***] Footnote references: Thomas Hobbes, *Leviathan* 13–14, 17, 21; Plato, *Republic* 2, 358 E ff.; Cicero, *Pro Sestio* 42.91–2. Depictions of the state of nature ranged from the portrayal in Hobbes[B] (*Leviathan* 13.8–9) of a fierce war of all against all (mentioned by Hume at *EPM* 3.15 and 4.3) to French author Jean Jacques Rousseau (1712–78), who envisioned 'noble savages' living in moral innocence (written after *EPM*). Hume is construing the notion broadly enough (in n. 11) to link it to the writings of Plato[B] and Cicero.[B] Plato reflects on the theses that no strong individual would enter into a social contract and that only the weak wish to form a social arrangement in order to protect themselves (*Republic* 358 E ff.). Cicero considers how human society emerged from a state of savagery through justice and humanity. The passage from Cicero may be translated:

> Which judge among you is not aware of the natural course of events? There was once a time when neither natural nor civil law had yet been defined. Mankind led a wandering existence, scattered and dispersed across the land, and possessed no more than they could seize or retain by their own hand and strength, inflicting wounds and slaughter. Those therefore who first distinguished themselves by their merit and wisdom, having observed the distinctive learning skill and natural talent of human beings, brought together the scattered population into a single place, and transformed their savagery into justice and gentleness. They established what we call the public domain, serving the common good, and created

> communities of people which were afterwards called states. They then linked dwellings together and surrounded them with defensive walls, having introduced both divine and human law: these are what we call cities. Between this civilized life and the previous savagery there is no clearer demarcation than that between law and violence. Whichever of these we reject, we must employ the other. Do we wish to eliminate violence? Then law must prevail, that is, the legal institutions within which all law is sustained. Are legal institutions not to our taste, or do they not exist? Then violence will inevitably reign. Everyone knows these things.

In *THN* 3.2.2.10 ff., Hume dismisses theories of the origins of society by social contract and the state of nature as idle philosophical fictions. This discussion is linked to the golden age and resembles that in *EPM*.

17.21 **No distinction of property]** Cf. the similar claim in *THN* 3.2.2.11.

n. 11 **following passage]** In all editions of *EPM* from 1751 to 1760, Hume appended the following statement after the words 'following passage' in n. 11 (*EPM* 1753 [43–4]):

> Not imitating in this the example of *Puffendorff*, nor even that of *Grotius*,[B] who think a verse from *Ovid*[B] or *Plautus* or *Petronius*[B] a necessary warrant for every moral truth; or the example of Mr. *Woolaston*, who has constant recourse to *Hebrew* and *Arabic* authors for the same purpose.

See: Pufendorf, *On the Law of Nature and Nations* 2.2–3 (2: 154–63, 208–13); Grotius, *On the Law of War and Peace*, Prolegomena and 1.9–14 (2: 9–30, 38–44); Wollaston, *Religion* 6–7 (esp. 127–54). Hume criticized Wollaston's book in *THN* 3.1.1.15 (note).

18.24 **possess reason]** Hume discusses the nature and extent of reason and related capacities in animals in *EHU* 9 and *THN* 1.3.16; 2.1.12; 2.2.12; and in his essays 'Of the Dignity or Meanness of Human Nature' and 'Of the Immortality of the Soul'.

18.25 **barbarous Indians]** Hume is probably referring to the natives of the Americas. Michel de Montaigne[B] and other writers had debated the condition and merits of the American Indian. If Hume is following Montaigne's examples in 'On Coaches' and 'On the Cannibals', the Indians are American—e.g. the natives of Mexico and Brazil, as encountered by the Spaniards. In a famous public dispute between Juan Ginés Sepúlveda and Bartolomé de Las Casas in 1550–1, the question of the lawfulness of Spanish conquest and war against the American Indian was debated. Hume might have viewed this debate as about whether Europeans could 'throw off all restraints of justice, and even of humanity, in our treatment of them'. Sepúlveda argued that the Indians were idolatrous, sinful, less than human in nature, and without appropriate religious faith. Las Casas maintained that love and kindness were the only legitimate forces to be used in converting the natives, whom he regarded as fully human. (Hanke, *American Indians*, 30–43; Wagner, *Las Casas*, 170–82.)

18.28 **reduced to like slavery**] Hume later gives an example of the problem of the enslavement of women in one of these 'many nations'. See his discussion of the status of women in ancient Athens, Dial. 43–4 and n. 89.

19.17 **boundaries of justice still grow**] a reference to the creation of treaties, international law, and the like. See ann. 28.17 on laws of nations, and *THN* 3.2.11.

20.4 ***founded on grace***] See Rom. 5: 17, 6: 14.

20.4 ***saints alone inherit the earth***] See Matt. 5: 5; Ps. 37: 9–11; 37: 29; Isa. 57: 13; 1 Cor. 6: 2; Dan. 7: 27.

20.5 **sublime theorists**] religious fanatics. See ann. 20.9.

20.9 **fanatics . . . enthusiasts**] diverse religious groups whose influence peaked during the reign of Oliver Cromwell.[B] These comments are linked to the discussion of enthusiasm and fanaticism at 3.7. Religious fanaticism often supported political fanaticism, and the converse. Cromwell's own troopers could be considered religious fanatics. Hume mentions Cromwell and numerous fanatic religious groups in his *History of England*, chs. 40, 57, 59, 60, 61, and 62. According to Chambers (*Cyclopædia*, 'Enthusiast'), 'Enthusiast is of the like Import with Fanatic; and is applied to the Quakers, the antient Anabaptists, and modern Prophets, from their Pretences to any extraordinary Lights, Revelation, Visions, Impulses, &c. from Heaven.'

20.13 ***levellers***] the Levellers, a name applied to them (*c.*1647) because of their commitments to (1) social equality through a levelling of social ranks and (2) government shared equally between the nobility and the commonality. An English Puritan sect, the Levellers demanded constitutional reform and appealed to natural rights in support of what then seemed to be radical political objectives: a written constitution, biennial parliaments, universal manhood suffrage, full religious liberty, equal and proportional representation, equal distribution of property, and the abolition of monarchy and all privileges for the nobility. Cromwell[B] resolutely opposed them; see Hume's discussion of their suppression in *History of England*, ch. 60. Hume mentions 'the *levellers* and other fanatics in England' in 'Of Superstition and Enthusiasm' 7, where he discusses 'the *anabaptists* in Germany, the *camisars* in France, the *levellers* and other fanatics in England, and the *covenanters* in Scotland'.

20.24 **frivolous vanity**] For the context, see ann. 11.31, on luxury.

20.28 **particularly that of Sparta**] 'The rule of equality' was, as Hume puts it, achieved 'in an imperfect degree'. In Sparta (after 600 BC) the ruling class, or Spartiates, shared in the allotment of serfs (helots), who were bound to the land. Hume briefly discusses the helots and Spartans in 'Of Commerce' 7 and 'Of the Populousness of Ancient Nations' 26, 121. (In the latter essay, Hume cites Strabo and Thucydides[B] as his sources.) Most Spartan citizens lived in the city of Sparta and owned land outside the city. Plutarch,[B] a Spartan, reported on equality in land distribution (*Lives*, 'Lycurgus', 8.2–3 [1: 226–9]):

> A . . . bold political measure of Lycurgus [came] in his redistribution of the land. For there was a dreadful inequality in this regard, the city was heavily burdened with indigent and helpless people, and wealth was wholly concentrated in the hands of a few. . . . He persuaded his fellow-citizens to make one parcel of all their territory and divide it up anew. . . .
>
> He distributed the rest of the Laconian land among the 'perioeci', or free provincials, in thirty thousand lots, and that which belonged to the city of Sparta, in nine thousand lots, to as many genuine Spartans.

The lot that each Spartan obtained could not be sold; it belonged irrevocably to the citizen and descendants. Cultivating the land was largely left to the helots, who constituted a majority of the population in every region except the city.

20.29 **Agrarian laws]** The 'Agrarian laws' in Rome dealt with the allotment of land using landholdings from conquered territories. During the 4th c. BC, Roman conquests produced large tracts of public land. Thousands of small parcels were eventually distributed to peasants. In the 3rd c. BC public lands confiscated from the Gauls were divided into small farms and distributed. In the 2nd c. BC an Agrarian Commission was formed to distribute available public land to a free class of landowning peasants and veterans. Montesquieu[B] comments on the 'equal division of lands' made by Lycurgus, Romulus, and Solon[B] (citing Plutarch[B] as his authority for Solon) in the work Hume cites in n. 12 (*Spirit of the Laws* 5.4–5).

20.33 ***perfect* equality]** A distrust of schemes of perfect equality, especially for property, was common in the Enlightenment, when justice and liberty were typically more important principles. However, some writers, including Rousseau and Voltaire, championed the eradication of inequality in ways similar to those here under discussion, incorporating the themes about property, the golden age, savage nature, and the state of nature discussed by Hume at 3.15–16.

20.36 **check these virtues]** See the discussion of 'luxury' in ann. 11.31.

21.16 **alienated by consent]** the transfer of property by the voluntary consent of the owner. See *THN* 3.2.4, 'Of the transference of property by consent', which treats the forms taken by rules permitting property transfer.

21.21 **writers on the laws of nature]** On writers in the natural law tradition, see Intro., pp. 19–20 and *THN* 3.2.3–8. The principal figures when Hume wrote were Grotius[B] and Pufendorf, who were regularly taught in Scottish universities. However, the innovative article on 'Droit de la nature, ou Droit naturel' in Diderot's *Encyclopédie* (5: 131–4) pointed to other figures as significant on the Continent. Influential writings and commentary in Scotland were those of Richard Cumberland (1631–1718), *Laws of Nature*; Jean Barbeyrac (1674–1744), 'Historical and Critical Account'; and Stair, *Institutions*. Hobbes,[B] who proposed several rules that he called 'laws of nature' (*Leviathan* 14–15), and Leibniz, Locke,[B] Hutcheson, and Rousseau, could all be included in the natural law tradition; but their link to mainstream natural law theories and their influence as natural law thinkers is disputable. Hume also

might be referring to classical Aristotelian or Stoic writers or to a range of modern figures in the natural law tradition including Anglican bishop and philosopher Joseph Butler (1692–1752), who argued that duty is erected on the law of nature: 'Your obligation to obey this law, is its being the law of your nature' (*Fifteen Sermons* 3 [2: 71]).

Below, Hume refers to 'the rules of natural justice' and cites Montesquieu[B] (*EPM* 3.34). On related subjects, Hume often cites Cicero.[B] In a letter to Hutcheson of 17 Sept. 1739 (*Letters*, 1: 33), Hume writes that 'I have never call'd Justice unnatural, but only artificial. *Atque ipsa utilitas justi prope mater & aequi*. [And so the common good itself is, so to speak, the mother of the just and the equitable. Horace,[B] *Satires* 1.3. line 98.] Says one of the best Moralists of Antiquity. Grotius & Puffendorf, to be consistent, must assert the same.' See also at Appx. 3.6 below, where Hume writes about 'the laws of nature, which regulate property'—the only other reference to 'laws of nature' in *EPM*. See, further, *THN* 3.2.4–12.

22.3 **supreme law]** This maxim appears to be an English rendering of a Roman legal saying found in Cicero,[B] *De legibus* 3.3.8: 'ollis salus populi suprema lex esto' (the safety of the people shall be their supreme law). In 'Of Passive Obedience' 2, Hume cites the Latin 'Salus populi suprema Lex', which he there translates 'the safety of the people is the supreme law'.

22.8 **prescription]** On the complex dimensions of the laws of prescription, see Stair, *Institutions* 2.12 (546 ff.).

22.11–18 **natural *code* . . . natural justice]** the code of natural law that includes authoritative and universal rules of justice. 'Natural justice' sometimes meant no more than the rules of justice; but, more typically, the term referred in the 18th c. to fundamental rules of justice antecedent to particular rules established by governments. In *THN* Hume wrote as follows: '[W]hen I deny justice to be a natural virtue, I make use of the word, *natural*, only as oppos'd to *artificial*. . . . Tho' the rules of justice be *artificial*, they are not *arbitrary*. Nor is the expression improper to call them *Laws of Nature*; if by *natural* we understand what is common to any species, or even if we confine it to mean what is inseparable from the species' (3.2.1.19; the artificial virtues are the subject of *THN* 3.2, the natural virtues of *THN* 3.3). See *EPM* 4.1 and n. 64 for the terms 'natural justice' and 'natural'. On the relevant meanings of 'nature' and 'natural', see Chambers, *Cyclopædia*, 'Nature' and 'Natural'.

22.21 and n. 12 **late author]** Footnote reference: Charles Louis de Secondat Montesquieu, *De l'esprit des loix* (*Spirit of the Laws*). For pertinent passages, see *Spirit of the Laws* 1, 5, 14, 19–20, 24–6. Montesquieu,[B] Malebranche,[B] Cudworth,[B] and Clarke,[B] each represent rationalism. For the general background, see ann. 3.28–4.12 and *THN* 3.1.1. Although Malebranche provided an account of the role of reason in morals, his views do not directly correspond to the description given here by Hume. Paradigmatic of Hume's concerns is Clarke's statement that 'Thus have I endeavoured to deduce the *original Obligations of Morality*, from the *necessary* and *eternal Reason* and *Proportions of Things*' (*Discourse*, in *Works*, 2: 630 and preceding mater-

ial). Hutcheson and John Clarke of Hull (*Foundation of Morality*, 13–23) had complained before Hume of obscurity in these theories. In the case of Cudworth, Hume is perhaps referring to *The True Intellectual System*, although *A Treatise Concerning Eternal and Immutable Morality* is more relevant. Cudworth's name was added in this passage only in the 5th edn. (1764). Publication dates make it possible to claim, as Hume does, that Malebranche first started this type of account, but Cudworth (whose *Treatise* was published from manuscripts in 1731, well after his death in 1688) had developed his views in advance of Malebranche. The 'others' in Hume's statements would presumably include William Wollaston; see ann. 3.28 and 17.14 and n. 11. For arguments that morality cannot be founded on relations or rapports, see *THN* 3.1.1 and 1.1.5; however, Montesquieu's *Spirit of the Laws* appeared eight years after the publication of *THN*.

n. 12.20 ***in foro humano . . . conscientiæ***] The Latin may be translated: 'In a human court . . . before the bar (court) of conscience'.

23.14 **Syrian . . . Egyptian**] According to Lucian,[B] Syrians 'consider fish something sacred and they never touch one. They eat all other birds, apart from the [pigeon] dove. For them this is sacred' (*De dea Syria* 14). According to Herodotus[B] (2.47), 'Swine are held by the Egyptians to be unclean beasts. Firstly, if an Egyptian touch a hog in passing by, he goes to the river and dips himself in it, clothed as he is; . . . Nor do the Egyptians think [it] right to sacrifice swine to any god save the Moon and Dionysius; . . . then they eat of the flesh. . . . [B]ut they will not taste it on any other day.'

24.16 and n. 13 **articulating certain sounds**] These distinctions and theses about speech, intention, and action are mentioned by some of the writers on laws of nature. Grotius,[B] for example, offered related comments in *On the Law of War and Peace* 2.11.1–4 regarding property, justice, assertion, promising, and intending. Cf. also Pufendorf, *On the Law of Nature and Nations* 3.5.5–8 (regarding promises); Cocceijus (von Cocceji), 'Introductio' (102); Stair, *Institutions* 1.10.1–7 (on contracts and promises); and Hutcheson, *Short Introduction* 2.9.3 (179–80), apparently following Pufendorf. Hume discusses related matters regarding promising, human conventions, and unintelligibility in *THN* 3.2.5.1, 6, 12–15, where a passage occurs that is effectively identical to the first paragraph in *EPM* n. 13.

n. 13.1 **never transfers property**] See Hume's discussion in *THN* 3.2.4–5, entitled 'Of the transference of property by consent' and 'Of the obligation of promises'.

n. 13.21 **Bayle[B] . . . Loyola[B]**] Footnote reference: Pierre Bayle, *Dictionnaire historique et critique*, 'Loyola' (T). Bayle chastises the Jesuits for their scholastic and casuistic approach to moral questions. In Bayle's judgement, the Jesuits' methods of reasoning promoted endless dogmatic wrangling; their scholastic methods were to blame more than any 'corruption of the heart'. Bayle agrees with a 'saying' (citing as his source the *Journal des Savans*, 30 Mar. 1665 [m.249]) that 'the books of the Casuists are nothing but the art of cavilling with God' (3: 894). See also Hume's comment on theologians and holy orders in *THN* 3.2.4.14.

By 'a metaphysical schoolman' and 'scholastic', Hume typically means a theologian or philosopher associated with the Aristotelianism of the late Middle Ages and Renaissance. A 'relaxed casuist' is one who is lax in the use of rules. Less scrupulous uses of casuistry led to charges of 'laxism' by critics.

n. 13.32 **invalidate any sacrament]** Several debates about priestly intention occurred during and after the 12th c. The Council of Ferrara–Florence (1438–45) and the Council of Trent (1545–63) declared that the minister of a sacrament must intend to do what the Church intends. This general rule was subsequently analysed with exceptional subtlety as to the precise intention that must occur: the internal, secret intention of the priest was distinct from the sacrament as an external visible sign, and a clear and distinct intention by the priest not to do what the Church intends (in embracing the rite) invalidates a sacrament.

25.4 **stronger foundation]** See *THN* 3.2.8.4–5, where Hume discusses whether natural laws can supply the foundation.

25.9–16 **justice . . . original instinct]** In *THN* 3.1.2.9–10 and 3.2.3.3, Hume draws a distinction between natural and artificial virtues. In 'Of the Original Contract', he draws a similar distinction between moral duties from 'natural instinct or immediate propensity' and moral duties from the 'necessities of human society', the latter of which include duties of justice.

25.26 **prescription]** See ann. 22.8.

26.35 **necessity, which leads to justice]** See 'The Origin of Government' 2 and *THN* 3.2.8.3.

27.15 and n. 14 **rules of philosophy]** Footnote reference: Isaac Newton, *Philosophiae naturalis principia mathematica* 3. Newton[B] formulated four 'rules of reasoning in philosophy' (*Mathematical Principles*, 398–400). In early editions of *EPM*, Hume referred explicitly to Newton's second rule, though Hume's formulation deviates from Newton's. In the introduction to *THN*, Hume offers reflections on method, reasoning, and science that suggest connections between his 'rules of philosophy' and Newton's.

SECTION 4

28.ttl **Of Political Society]** The discussion in this section reflects a more ample discussion in *THN* 3.2. Hume's most influential statements on various aspects of political society are found in his political essays and his *History*.

28.7 **positive law, where natural justice]** See ann. 22.11–18. Here the contrast is between laws enacted by governments (positive law) and natural laws (of justice). In *THN* Hume maintains that '*natural* as well as *civil* justice, derives its origins from human conventions'; but he also notes that 'the state of society without government is one of the most natural states' (*THN* 3.2.8.2–4).

28.12 **duty of** ALLEGIANCE] See *THN* 3.2.8–10, with sections entitled 'Of the source of allegiance'; 'Of the measures of allegiance'; and 'Of the objects of allegiance'. Hume may have there and here been influenced by Locke,[B] *Two Treatises* (esp. 2.8.95–112), as well as Grotius.[B]

28.17 LAWS **of** NATIONS] These rules are international laws that govern the conduct of nations in both peace and war. Hugo Grotius[B] (see n. 63), was an influential early modern writer on the subject. In n. 63 Hume says that his own 'theory concerning the origin of property, and consequently of justice, is, in the main, the same with that hinted at and adopted by Grotius'. The writings of Samuel Pufendorf, who was cited by Hume in one edition of *EPM* (see ann. n. 11), contained an account of international law that was particularly influential in the 18th c. and directly relevant to Hume's discussion here. For other early modern writers, see Tuck, *Philosophy and Government*. *THN* 3.2.11 is entitled 'Of the laws of nations'. Hume there discusses the relationship of laws of nations and laws of nature, as well as the obligations of individuals and the obligations owed by one nation to another. See, further, *THN* 3.2.4–12.

28.18 **ambassadors . . . quarter in war]** Pufendorf discussed the special privileges of ambassadors and the treatment of captives in war in *On the Law of Nature and Nations* 2.3. Ambassadors are presented as 'inviolable' and 'free from the jurisdiction and control of him to whom they are dispatched', so long as they are not spies (2: 228–9). By 'quarter in war' Hume means exemption from immediate death and other fair treatments offered to a vanquished opponent in war (typically in return for surrender)—as in the expression 'We gave no quarter'. Pufendorf also discusses the guidelines that would be followed by a 'generous victor' in war (8.7 [2: 1316–23]). In *Duty of Man* 2.16, he discusses how civilized nations 'condemn certain ways of inflicting harm on an enemy: for instance, the use of poison' (171). Several of these themes are present in a less explicit discussion in Cicero,[B] *De officiis* 1.11.35–1.12.40. Hutcheson considered similar questions in *Short Introduction* 2.15.5–6 and 3.9–10. See also *THN* 3.2.11, 'Of the laws of nations'. These lines in *EPM* are effectively identical in wording and substance to those in *THN*, but the discussion in *THN* is more detailed.

28.27 **Human nature]** Connections can again be made between Hume's emphases on human nature and those 'writers on the laws of nature' who had argued that natural justice is grounded in human nature rather than in social contracts or laws. See Grotius,[B] *On the Law of War and Peace*, 'Prolegomena' 9–16; Pufendorf, *Duty of Man* 1.3.3–11; 2.1.4–11; 2.3.2–4; and the passages in Hobbes[B] cited in ann. 28.29 below.

28.29 **war of all against all]** See ann. 17.14 and n. 11 on 'a perpetual war'. The comments there and here suggest that Hume had Hobbes[B] (see *Leviathan* 13–14; *Elements of Law* 1.14.10–12; 1.19.1–3; *De cive*, preface; 1.12–14; 1.5.2; 1.8.10) uppermost in mind, and secondarily Plato[B] and Cicero.[B] Both Grotius[B] and Pufendorf refer to conditions in the state of nature in the passages cited in ann. 28.18; see also Locke,[B] *Two Treatises* 2.2–3. For Hobbes, a 'war' need not involve

combat, force, battle, and the like. That the parties have a disposition and incentive to use force is sufficient. See *Leviathan* 13.8.

29.8 **Achæan republic . . . Swiss Cantons and United Provinces]** The Achaean League was a confederation of cities on the Gulf of Corinth, with two distinct periods and leagues. The second Achaean League, to which Hume seems to refer, existed in the 3rd and 2nd c. BC to protect against military conquest by the Macedonians. Its constitution stipulated that the confederacy was a single political state, that all cities had equal rights, and that obedience to the federal government was required. In 'Of the Populousness of Ancient Nations' 129, Hume discusses the number of soldiers marching for the Achaean League, citing Polybius[B] and Pausanias as his sources. In 'Of the Original Contract' 17, Hume discusses the nature of democracy and coercion in the League, again citing Polybius.

Switzerland is divided into cantons and is also called the Swiss Confederation. A defensive league gradually emerged in this territory between 1273 and 1291. It grew to eight members in the mid-14th c. and in the 15th c. emerged as a military power. Eventually 13 Cantons or states of the Swiss Confederation were united. These Cantons formed a 'perpetual alliance' with France in 1516 and were only loosely held together. By the early 17th c. the league had become divided by laws, religion, language, and diverse economic interests.

'United Provinces' is a name for the Netherlands that was widely used after independence had been gained during the Thirty Years War (1618–48). As early as 1579–81, the seven northern provinces had declared independence from Spain and referred to themselves collectively as the United Provinces of the Netherlands.

In all three federations, states joined into a league for common defence, retaining sovereignty in other matters.

29.15 **chastity]** See *THN* 3.2.12, entitled 'Of chastity and modesty'. See also below, *EPM* 4.9; 6.14; Dial. 44 and n. 89. In n. 72 Hume cites the list of virtues in the *Whole Duty of Man*, which prominently lists chastity (defending it for different reasons from those given by Hume). See also Hume's letter to Hutcheson, 10 Jan. 1743 (*Letters*, 1: 48).

n. 15.1 **Plato]** Footnote reference: Plato, *Republic* 5, 457 B, in *Opera*, trans. Ioanne Serranus (1578 edn.), 457. The passage from Plato[B] may be translated, 'For it is an admirable saying, and will remain so, that what is beneficial is beautiful and what is harmful is ugly.' Plato is discussing the importance of evaluating policies for 'the women of the guardians' in light of their useful objectives.

n. 15.7 **Phædrus]** Footnote reference: Phaedrus, *Aesopic Fables* 3, fable 17, line 12. The passage from Phaedrus[B] may be translated, 'Unless what we do is useful, the glory is vain.' Phaedrus' fable, 'Trees under the Patronage of the Gods', has Minerva express a preference for the olive tree because it bears fruit. The father of the gods congratulates her for selecting what is useful.

n. 15.8 **Plutarch]** Footnote reference: Plutarch, *Moralia*, 'On False Shame' 3, 529 E. The passage from Plutarch[B] may be translated, 'Beauty excludes anything harmful'.

Plutarch is discussing harmful disorders, such as a tendency to have undue respect for others.

n. 15.10 **Sext. Emp.**] Footnote reference: Sextus Empiricus, *Outlines of Pyrrhonism* 3.22.169 (ch. 20 in older editions). The passage from Sextus Empiricus[B] may be translated, 'The Stoics, therefore, assert that 'good' is the same as 'benefit', or not distinct from benefit, by 'benefit' meaning virtue and right action.

29.20 **These rules**] These lines are effectively identical to *THN* 3.2.12.7.

29.24 **rage of the Mississippi**] The rage (wild financial speculation) of the Mississippi resulted from a scheme of the Mississippi Company founded in France by financier, gambler, and speculator John Law (1671–1729) of Edinburgh. His stated intention was to meet the financial needs of the Prince Regent of France by commercially exploiting the Mississippi Valley and other French colonies. Banknotes backed by the king were issued in anticipation of revenue from the Mississippi territory. Law helped found the first state bank in France and launched the Mississippi Company in Sept. 1717. It assumed legal control of French colonial trade as well as France's entire government debt. Haste and the lack of real assets caused an abrupt failure. The 'Mississippi Bubble' burst on 20 Oct. 1720 when the public rushed to redeem the company's shares. A governmental crisis ensued, and Law fled. These events are an object of satire in Montesquieu,[B] *Persian Letters* 132 intermittently until 146.

29.25 **Rue de Quincempoix**] This street (also sp. Rue Quincampoix and Quinquempoix), is the street in Paris where John Law set up his operation and the state bank. Crowds gathered on the street to trade stock in the Mississippi Company. Bankers, brokers, and stock speculators established their headquarters on this street.

30.9 **Incest, . . . superior turpitude**] Cf. *THN* 3.1.1.25 on incest and 'moral turpitude'.

30.17 **criminal correspondence . . . intercourse**] 'Criminal correspondence' is wrongful or illicit interaction. Athenian laws and customs ('manners') discouraged or restricted various forms of homosexuality, adultery, and incest. Female adultery and male homosexual prostitution were viewed as morally disgraceful and were grounds for social isolation and exclusion, but were not punished directly by law. Adultery by males was viewed as a deep threat to family and honour and was punished as a criminal activity. As the Oedipus story (at Appx. 1.12) indicates, incest between mother and son was viewed as a particularly serious moral and religious offence, but the incest taboo also extended to other relationships.

30.36 **lesser morality**] Rules of good manners, politeness, or etiquette were commonly treated as social customs of a somewhat lower order of importance than law and morals. Hobbes[B] referred to politeness as 'small morals' (see *Leviathan* 11.1), and Addison said, 'By Manners I do not mean Morals, but Behaviour and Good Breeding' (*Spectator* 119). Related terms in this literature and in Hume's writings are 'civility', 'complacence', 'breeding', 'refinement', 'cultivated', 'politeness', etc.

These terms played a role in writings Hume would have read by authors such as Saint-Évremond,[B] La Bruyère, Shaftesbury,[B] Addison, and Mandeville. Below Hume depicts good manners, genteelness, and the like as '*companionable* virtues' (*EPM* 9.18).

31.9 **Robbers and pirates]** These issues about thieves and distributive justice (and the like) had a long history in philosophical, political, and theological writings. In an influential passage, Caesar[B] (who was captured by pirates at a young age) said acts of brigandage committed beyond state borders were not considered disgraceful and often were considered favourably (*Gallic War* 6.23), and Cicero[B] discussed justice in the impartial administration of a 'code of laws' among robbers (*De officiis* 2.11.40). Many philosophers subsequently pursued these themes. See, e.g. St Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologica* II-I.94.4 (quoting Caesar); Pufendorf, *On the Law of Nature and Nations* 3.4.2 (quoting Cicero) and 8.4.5 (quoting Diodorus Siculus[B]); Heineccius, *Universal Law* 1.14.388 (301–2, quoting Cicero); Locke,[B] *Essay* 1.3.2; Berkeley, *Alciphron*, Third Dialogue 2.10 (115); Hutcheson, *Inquiry*, Treatise 2, 4.4. In his essay, 'Of the Populousness of Ancient Nations' 174 (see nn. 248–51), Hume mentions that 'robbery and plunder were esteemed honourable among the Spaniards', citing Caesar, Strabo, and Justin.

31.13 ***drinking companion*]** The saying 'I hate a drinking companion with a memory' derives from Martial,[B] *Epigrams* 1.27.

31.16 **immoral gallantry]** Contrast the meaning of 'gallantry' at *EPM* 9.2.

31.19 **court or parliament of love]** During the Middle Ages 'amour courtois' or 'courtly love' referred to the codes of proper behaviour for upper-class love affairs. Little agreement exists regarding the nature and origins of such codes. According to standard accounts, a man must fall deeply in love with a married woman of equal or higher social rank, must suffer a lengthy period of silence before the love is declared, and must prove an underlying devotion by dedicated, ennobling service and daring adventures. The lovers must pledge secrecy and faithfulness through all obstacles. Some writers attempted to codify the rules. Among them was Andreas Capellanus (André le Chapelain), a primary source on courtly love. He mentions 'courts of love' and reviews the role of what Hume mentions as a 'thin veil of mystery' (*Art of Courtly Love*). Also relevant is Marie-Madeleine Pioche de la Vergne, Comtesse de Lafayette. In her *The Princess of Cleves*, a 1704 edn. of which is listed in the Hume Library under La Fayette (Norton and Norton, 83), various relationships of gallantry at court that Madame de Lafayette had herself allegedly observed are described. See also the distinctions between gallantry and coquetry in La Bruyère's 'Of Women' (in *Characters*). Some of Hume's discussions of love and gallantry in his *Essays* dwell on related themes, esp. 'Essay Writing' 7–8.

'Courts of love' in France and Flanders supposedly cultivated the code of courtly love. Problems in interpreting and applying the code of love were argued before noble women who delivered 'judgements of love'. It has been reported that Eleanor of Aquitaine (12th c.), Queen of Louis VII of France and of Henry II of England,

held courts of love at Poitiers (W. central France), from which doctrines about the code of love were developed. Historical documentation is controversial, though various records have survived. (See Owen, *Noble Lovers*.)

SECTION 5

34.1 **effects of usefulness]** a reference to the opening comment in *EPM* 5.1: we 'would expect to meet with this principle every where in moral writers'.

34.11 **sceptics . . . education]** Sceptics deny the reality of moral notions (or moral 'distinctions', as Hume puts it here and at *EPM* 1.2) or deny that there is either an appropriate use of moral terms and ideas or an appropriate manner of discriminating or perceiving moral qualities or differences, on the grounds that such human acts arise exclusively from enculturation or training. A prominent modern moral sceptic is Mandeville, who emphasized the role of politicians and social education. Cf. this paragraph to the similar content of *THN* 3.3.1.11. In his essay 'Of Refinement in the Arts' 21 and n. 2, Hume cites Mandeville for the view that 'moral distinctions are inventions of politicians for public interest'. Hume's set of passages suggest that Mandeville and related figures such as Hobbes[B] are the modern sceptics. Ancient sceptics are less obvious, but Polybius[B] is perhaps cited as an example at *EPM* 5.6.

34.23 **place in any language]** The argument that egoism cannot adequately account for the meaningfulness of moral language had been used by Hutcheson, *Inquiry*, Treatise 2, 7.3 (1st edn.), 7.5 (4th edn.) and Turnbull, *Principles*, introduction and 1.4 (1: 16, 118–19). See also Hume's comment about 'general language' at *EPM* 5.42.

34.26 **paradox of the sceptics]** This comment may be directed primarily at Mandeville's scepticism in the *Fable of the Bees* about the reality and praiseworthiness of virtue.

34.27 **abstruser studies of logic and metaphysics]** See *EPM* 1.4 and Appx. 1.10. See also Hume's discussion of 'metaphysical reasoning' in *THN* (intro. 3) and *EHU* 1.11–12; 2.9, where he also uses 'abstruse'.

34.29 **sciences of politics and morals]** Hume thought that functions of government could be studied scientifically; see 'That Politics May be Reduced to a Science'.

35.7 **fruits of mutual protection]** Hume discusses social offers of 'mutual protection and assistance' in *THN* 3.2.3.3; see also 3.2.2.1.

35.9 **morals from self-love]** Hobbes[B] was the most notorious philosopher (at least in the modern period) to attempt to ground morality in self-love. (See Appx. 2.3.) There followed the 'Hobbists' (see Appx. 2.2–4) and the currents surrounding Mandeville's arguments.

35.11 and n. 18 **Polybius[B]**] Footnote reference: Polybius, *Histories* 6.6.2–7. The passage on 'undutifulness to parents' may be translated, 'Seeing what is to come, and reckoning that something similar will befall each of them'. The passage on ingratitude may be translated, 'Joining in their neighbour's resentment and attributing a similar feeling to them, from which each individual derives a sense of the function and principles of fit conduct'. These passages appear during a discussion of natural human duty and justice. Polybius gives examples of a child's failure to show gratitude to parents and of a man who fails to show gratitude to someone who rescued him from danger (3: 278–81).

35.18 **virtuous actions**] Regarding the extension of virtue from character to action, see *THN* 3.2.1.4 and Hume's tracing of his views on virtuous action to Cicero's *De finibus* 4.17 in a letter to Hutcheson (17 Sept. 1739, *Letters*, 1: 35).

35.19 **remote countries**] In his *Inquiry*, Treatise 2, 5.7–8, Hutcheson discusses these themes. See the specific references below, ann. 36.21 ('distant ages').

36.15 **Æschines[B] and Demosthenes[B]**] Demosthenes attacked Philip II[B] in a famous series of orations (*Philippics*) and led a patriotic party in opposition to Philip. See ann. 62.3 and n. 43 and 104.27. In 346 BC Demosthenes was made an ambassador, joining his colleagues Philocrates and Aeschines, with the objective of establishing peace with Philip. (In 'Of the Populousness of Ancient Nations' 48, Hume mentions this mission and the salary each ambassador was paid; Demosthenes and Thucydides[B] are cited as sources.) Philocrates and Aeschines were eventually bribed by Philip with Macedonian gold. Demosthenes formally accused them of accepting the bribes. There ensued bitter disputes and orations over this accusation and over a gold crown proposed as an award to Demosthenes. Aeschines lost, was fined, and retired to Rhodes, where, according to Plutarch,[B] he lived as a Sophist. Subsequently, the Macedonian party accused Demosthenes of taking bribes from a departed finance minister. After imprisonment, Demosthenes escaped and fled.

In his *Moralia* (845 E–F [10: 420–1]), Plutarch tells the following brief story about Aeschines in flight:

> When Aeschines fled after his condemnation, [Demosthenes] followed him on horseback, and Aeschines, thinking he was arresting him, fell at his feet and covered his head, but Demosthenes raised him up, encouraged him, and gave him a talent of silver.

However, in his 'Demosthenes' (*Lives* 26.2–3 [7: 64–5]), Plutarch recounts the following quite different story about Demosthenes in flight, which is evidently the story foremost in Hume's presentation:

> When [Demosthenes] was in flight at a short distance from the city, he learned that some of the citizens who were his enemies were in pursuit of him, and therefore wished to hide himself; and when they called upon him loudly by name, and came up near to him, and begged him to accept from them provision for his journey, declaring that they were bringing money from home for this very purpose, and

> were pursuing him only in order to get it to him; and when at the same time they exhorted him to be of good courage and not to be pained at what had happened, Demosthenes broke out all the more into cries of grief, saying: 'Surely I must be distressed to leave a city where my enemies are as generous as I can hardly find friends to be in another.'

Aeschines does not figure in the second story. Hume apparently conflated the two stories into one account.

36.21 **distant ages]** The argument involving a use of imagination to make a connection between self-interest and the acts of people in distant times had been used by Archibald Campbell (*Enquiry*, Treatise 2, 7 [365]). Arguments and examples similar to Hume's reply had been used earlier by Hutcheson (see *Essay*, Treatise 2, introduction [1st edn.: 209–10; 3rd edn.: 211–12], 4 [1st edn.: 276–7; 3rd edn.: 281–2]); *Inquiry* (here 4th edn. only), Treatise 2, 1.3, 6; and 2.4–5. On *imaginary* interest, see Hume's similar thesis at Appx. 2.11.

36.28 **brink of a precipice]** Hume uses effectively the same example in *THN* 1.3.13.10; 2.3.9.23; and *DIS* 1.16. Pascal[B] presented this example and linked the person's feelings directly to the role of the imagination (*Pensées*, 'Imagination', Sellier no. 78 [Levi, 17]), but the example had been used earlier—in a version similar to that in *THN*—by Montaigne[B] in 'Apology for Raimond Sebond' (*Essays*, 671).

37.1 **associations of ideas]** See *EPM* 4.7; 5.38; and also *THN* 1.1.4; 2.1.4; and *EHU* 3 on *laws of association*. See the final paragraphs of Hume's *Abstract* of *THN* for the importance of these topics. On 18th-c. understandings, see Chambers, *Cyclopædia*, 'Association'.

37.11 **Self-love is a principle]** Butler analysed 'the cool principle of self-love' as a part of human nature and a principle of action (*Fifteen Sermons* 1–3, 11).

37.21 **found it simpler]** The reference is to egoists; Hobbes[B] and Locke[B] have already been named by Hume. Archibald Campbell stated that he found it simpler to deny disinterest (using appeals to benevolence and the like) and to explain everything in terms of self-interest (*Enquiry*, Treatise 2, 7 [366–7]).

37.27 ***experimentum crucis*]** A 'crucial experiment' indicates that one theory is better supported, or even decisive in competition with other theories. The concept seems to have its origins in Francis Bacon's[B] *Novum organum*, where he referred not to an *experimentum crucis*, but to *instantias crucis*, or decisive instances. In *Novum organum* 2.36 he used the Latin 'de natura judicare per Instantias *Crucis* et *experimenta* lucifera' (to judge of nature by instances of the *fingerpost* and *experiments* of light).

Bacon's successors, beginning with Robert Hooke, used the term *experimentum crucis* in an altered sense, perhaps Hume's reason for saying 'what natural philosophers, after Lord Bacon, have affected to call the *experimentum crucis*'. Hooke, it appears, coined the term while exploring the generation of colours. His

experimental conditions served 'as a Guide or Land-mark', an 'Experimentum Crucis' with which to 'search after the true cause of Colours' (*Micrographia*, 54).

Newton[B] adopted the term and discussed Hooke's problem in a publication of 1672. He had undertaken to determine why the coloured spectrum produced by the passage of light through a prism was of oblong rather than circular shape. 'The gradual removal of [my] suspitions', he says, 'at length led me to the *Experimentum Crucis*' (*Papers & Letters*, 50, 88, 101–9). Newton and Hooke subsequently disputed whether the other had produced an *experimentum crucis* (*Papers & Letters*, 111).

38.2 **contradiction in terms]** See the restatement of this point at *EPM* 5.46 in terms of impossibility and again at *EPM* 9.12 in terms of absurdity.

n. 19.3 **general principles]** Cf. *THN* 3.3.1.27 on 'original principles' that cannot be accounted for.

38.10 **humanity and benevolence]** These passages deserve close study by comparison to *THN* 3.3.1–5, which emphasizes sympathy no less than benevolence as a principle of human nature. In *EPM* Hume reduces mention of both sympathy and other psychological theories in *THN*. On the connection between sympathy and fellow-feeling in *EPM*, see 7.29.

38.13 and n. 20 **Horace[B]]** Footnote reference: Horace, *Art of Poetry*, lines 101–2. The passage cited from Horace may be translated, 'As human faces laugh with those who laugh, so do they weep with those who weep.' Horace notes that the words of the poet should be suited to convey the proper emotion. See *THN* 2.1.11 on sympathy, which might explain the phenomenon Horace notes. (Note: Hume's 'Uti' is a metrical error for 'Ut'.)

39.1 **pleasing sympathy]** Sympathy is a pivotal moral category throughout *EPM* 2.5 and in *THN*. Hume's comments at *THN* 3.3.1.8–9 and 3.3.2.5 (and, further, 2.1.11.2–8; 2.2.2.17; 2.2.5.14) resemble the statement here. In *EPM* and other 17th-c. and 18th-c. writings such as those of Adam Smith (*Moral Sentiments* 1.1.1–5 and 1.3.1–5) and Edmund Burke (*Philosophical Enquiry* 12–15 [44–8]), 'sympathy' has a similar use and shows a close family connection to Hume's use of 'fellow-feeling' (see *EPM* n. 19 and 7.29), 'pity' (see n. 34), and 'compassion'. When Hume uses the word 'sympathy', he often seems to designate not a particular sentiment, but a psychological capacity to feel or arrive at sentiments; see esp. *THN* 2.1.11.

39.8 **field and scaffold]** battlefield and gallows.

39.14–17 **sympathetic movement . . . theatre]** See *EPM* 5.18; 5.42 (and *THN* 3.3.3.5) on similar or related themes. The analysis by Cicero[B] in *De oratore* is similar, and these views about 'sympathetic movement' had currency in other writings of the 18th c., e.g. see Thomas Gordon's 'Of Eloquence, considered philosophically' (*Cato's Letters*, 322–30). See also John Henley, *Art of Speaking*, and Hume's elaborations of these themes in his essays 'Of Eloquence', which discusses sympathetic responses in the audience, and 'Of Tragedy', which discusses Cicero, eloquence, and sympathetic feeling in the audience.

40.2 **Sannazarius**[B]] Sannazarius is Italian poet Jacopo Sannazaro, author of *Arcadia* and *Piscatorial Eclogues*. *Arcadia* enjoyed an enduring popularity, passing through several editions during Sannazaro's lifetime. It moves from opening scenes of shepherds pasturing sheep in the spring, to descriptions of moonlit paths, pleasing landscapes, and decorated houses (see *EPM* 7.20). The *Piscatorial Eclogues* transfers the scene to the sea-shore, as Hume puts it. Sannazaro describes 'Lycon, a weary fisherman' with a 'sorrowful heart' and 'sick mind' who laments his fate (Eclogue 2, 'Galatea').

Bernard le Bovier de Fontenelle[B] was critical of Sannazaro for his use, as Hume puts it, 'of toil, labour, and danger, suffered by the fishermen'. Fontenelle thought it essential that pastoral poetry depict tranquil scenes and portray a quiet life. It therefore should be confined to shepherds who are free from pressing want; a fisherman's hard and toilsome way of living is too shocking ('Discours sur la nature de l'églogue'). In 'Of Simplicity and Refinement in Writing' 7, Hume says that 'There is not a finer piece of criticism than *the dissertation on pastorals* by Fontenelle', though Hume does also judge it defective in its appraisal of *Arcadia*. Samuel Johnson found Sannazaro's sea eclogues unsatisfactory because the sea presents terrors and offers less descriptive variety than the land (*Rambler*, 210–11). Richard Steele criticized Sannazaro for his unpardonable, arbitrary change from the pleasing aspects of the pastoral countryside to the sea-shore and boundless ocean (*Guardian* 28 [123]). Relevant aspects of the 18th-c. discussion of pastoral poetry, including observations on Sannazarius, are found in Blair's *Lectures on Rhetoric* 39.

40.8 **French poet]** The French poet is Jean Antoine Du Cerceau,[B] S.J. The lines appear in his *Recueil de poésies diverses* (77). The exact lines are the following:

> J'etois pour Ovide à quinze ans,
> Mais je suis pour Horace à trente.
>
> (I was for Ovid at fifteen years,
> But I am for Horace at thirty.)

Ovid[B] was influenced by Horace,[B] but the two near-contemporaries are often contrasted. Ovid dwelled on the arts of love and beauty (including erotic poems, some about his mistress, Corinna) and wrote poems thought to be of interest to the age range cited by Hume. By contrast, Horace wrote satires, lampoons, interpretations of Roman culture, and literary criticism of greater appeal to a more mature audience. He actively opposed rather than supported material about the passions of the young in the style of Ovid.

40.28 **Thucydides**[B] **and Guicciardin**[B]] Thucydides (7.51–87) discusses 'the numerous Athenian army before Syracuse' and the Athenian disaster. Guicciardini wrote about the 'wars of Pisa' in bks. 2, 4, 6, and 8 and about the threat to Venice (from the Turks) in bk. 4. The 'wars of Pisa' are those between Florence and Pisa, dating from the 13th c., but Guicciardini's history covers these wars only for the

period 1490–1534. Hume mentions Guicciardini in *THN* 2.2.8.17; *DIS* 4.9; and in many passages and notes in his *History of England*, esp. vol. 3.

40.35 **Suetonius**[B] . . . **Tacitus**[B]] Four so-called Julio-Claudian emperors followed Augustus,[B] beginning with the ascendancy of Tiberius[B] in AD 14 and ending with the death of Nero[B] in AD 69. Continuous accounts of these reigns are found only in Dio Cassius 57–63 and Suetonius, who provides portraits in *Lives* 3, 'Tiberius' and 6, 'Nero' (1: 290–401; 2: 86–187).

Cornelius Tacitus wrote his *Histories* as an account of the reigns of emperors, but in *Annals*, to which Hume here refers, he reports that 'Nero in the end conceived the ambition to extirpate virtue herself by killing Thrasea Paetus[B] [a Stoic] and Barea Soranus[B] [a consul and governor]'. Both men were condemned to death in the Senate on the basis of fabricated accusations (14.33). Tacitus describes both Nero and Tiberius in highly unfavourable terms (16.21–35 [366–75]). (Other passages in Tacitus are relevant: on Soranus, see 12.53; on Thrasea, see 13.49; 14.48–9; 15.20–8; and throughout 16.)

n. 21.3 **Quintilian**[B]] Footnote reference: Quintilian, *Institutes* 8.3.10–11. The passage quoted may be translated, 'The horse whose flanks are spare is more becoming but also faster. The athlete whose arm muscles have been developed by exercise may please the eye but is also more equipped for contest. For outward appearance is never separate from usefulness. Any person of ordinary judgement can recognize this at least.' This quotation appeared in identical form in *THN* 3.3.1.8 (note). In using the term 'enim' here Hume is misquoting. When he cited the same passage in *THN* he read 'vero'. Quintilian makes the remark while examining the relationship between beauty and utility, especially in oratory. He maintains that beauty and utility can be simultaneous and complementary in oratory and illustrates his point with the example of the horse and the athlete (3: 216–17).

42.24 **principles of humanity**] On the humane principles of human nature, see *EPM* 2.5; 5.17–18; 5.43; 5.46.

42.38 **Timon**[B]] Timon is the notorious Athenian misanthrope. Lucian[B] provides a detailed description, much of it probably apocryphal (*Timon*, 326–93).

42.40 and n. 23 **Alcibiades**[B]] Footnote reference: Plutarch, *Lives*, 'Alcibiades' 16.6, 199 C–D. Alcibiades, renowned for beauty and conceit, several times lost the confidence of Athenians and Spartans, both of whom he served as a military leader. Plutarch,[B] as cited in n. 23, contains the following passage (4: 42–3):

> Timon[B] the misanthrope once saw Alcibiades, after a successful day, being publicly escorted home from the assembly. He did not pass him by nor avoid him, as his custom was with others, but met him and greeted him, saying: 'It's well you're growing so, my child; you'll grow big enough to ruin all this rabble.' At this some laughed, and some railed, and some gave much heed to the saying. So undecided was public opinion about Alcibiades, by reason of the unevenness of his nature.

43.1 **principles of the MANICHEANS]** Once an influential religion, Manichaeism was founded by the prophet Mani (3rd c. AD), born of Persian descent in Babylonia. Influenced by Zoroastrian belief in a fundamental antagonism between good and evil deities, his primary doctrine was a dualism that strictly separated good and evil and rejected the possibility that both come from the same source. The conflict of light and darkness correspond, respectively, to the opposition of God and Satan, truth and error, good and evil, and soul and body. Hume briefly discusses 'the Manichaean system' and its 'mixture of good and ill' in *Dialogues* 11.14. Some of his arguments consider the type of material found in Bayle,[B] articles on 'Manichees' and 'Paulicians' (Manichees in Armenia), *Dictionary*, 4: 90–7, 512–28.

43.11 **NERO[B] . . . TIGELLINUS[B] . . . SENECA[B] or BURRHUS[B]]** Nero is depicted by Tacitus[B] and Suetonius[B] as blinded by a desire for popularity, driven by fears and insecurities, and often controlled by his intimates (*Annals* 16.20–4; *Lives* 6, 'Nero'). Seneca the Younger, tutor and political adviser to Nero, urged on Nero a policy of clemency toward his subjects to win their love and support. In the year 65, Nero turned on Seneca, accusing him of complicity in a conspiracy. By order of Nero, Seneca took his own life. Burrhus was associated with Seneca as adviser and tutor to Nero, and helped secure Nero's succession to the throne. Burrhus and Seneca were of respectable social status and both urged on Nero a policy of fostering favourable public opinion. The two advisers became accessories in the murder of the ambitious and ruthless Agrippina[B] in 59, but Burrhus refused to approve some assassinations ordered by the emperor and died suddenly, possibly from poison.

After the death of Burrhus, Ofonius Tigellinus became Nero's favourite counsellor. A Sicilian of low birth, he rose to wealth, power, and favour under Nero. Both Tacitus (*Histories* 1.72 [120–3]; *Annals*, *passim* [see 188–205, 268–93, 312–15, 362–7]) and Dio Cassius (59.23 [7: 334–5]; 62.13, 27–8 [8: 104–7, 134–7]) describe Tigellinus as an adviser who incited the tyrant to murder, treachery, and debauchery, and who assembled a ring of informers and spies, instigating a period of terror. Plutarch[B] describes Tigellinus as the most publicly hated of Nero's counsellors (*Lives*, 'Galba' 17.2–5 and 'Otho' 2).

44.13 **Sympathy]** The passage beginning here and running to the end of this paragraph is effectively identical to one in *THN* 3.3.3.2.

45.14 **Virtue, placed at such a distance]** Cf. *THN* 3.3.1.15 on the role of 'distance or contiguity'.

45.14 **fixed star]** a star so distant from earth that its position, relative to other stars, appears to the naked eye not to change. The term 'fixed star' derives from the astronomers of antiquity, who could detect no motions in these stars. Motions were first detected by English astronomer Edmund Halley (1656–1742) in 1718.

46.9 **impossible . . . end is totally indifferent]** Cf. similar themes at *EPM* 5.17 ('contradiction') and 9.12 ('absurdity').

SECTION 6

47.3 **incapacitates him for business and action]** Hume presents a different list of qualities that incapacitate for business and action in *THN* 3.3.4.

47.11 **Peripatetics]** Peripatetics are 'those from the Peripatos', supposedly the covered walk where Aristotle[B] lectured. Although the philosophers of this school eventually followed the teachings of Theophrastus more closely than those of Aristotle, 'Peripatetic' was used in the 18th c. chiefly to refer to the philosophy of Aristotle, and derivatively to refer to his successors and interpreters. Aristotle analyses virtue as a disposition to choose in accordance with a mean determined by a rule that a practically wise person would recognize (*Nicomachean Ethics* 1106^{a}14–1107^{a}2; see also 1104^{a}1 ff., 1107^{a}1 ff., 1138^{b}16–34). In saying that 'a due medium . . . is the characteristic of virtue', Hume seems to be referring to Aristotle's theory. See also Hume's 'Of the Rise and Progress of the Arts and Sciences' 20.

48.12 **schoolman's ass]** The schoolman's ass is an indecisive jackass that dies of starvation when placed equidistant between two equally inviting stacks of hay, because it is unable to choose one rather than the other. 'Schoolman' refers to a scholastic theologian or philosopher in the medieval period (see 9.2), during which the parable perhaps originated. 'Buridan's Ass', as the jackass is often called, was named after French 'schoolman' and physicist Jean Buridan (13th–14th c. AD), to whom the story had been incorrectly attributed. This problem seems to have been first discussed by Aristotle[B] as the problem of 'indifference' in a man who 'stands at an equal distance from food and drink, and who therefore must remain where he is' (*On the Heavens* 295^{b}10 ff., esp. 295^{b}31–4).

48.31 **rules of philosophy . . . same laws]** The 'rules of philosophy' may be the rules of experimental method; and this passage may be an allusion to Newton[B] (see ann. 6.34 and 27.15 and n. 14).

49.8 **in moral as in natural disquisitions]** *Moral* philosophy studies *human* nature (including the inner life of the mind and human behaviour), whereas *natural* philosophy studies *physical* nature. In *EHU* 1.1 Hume presents moral philosophy as the science of man, i.e. the systematic study of human nature. This distinction between moral philosophy and natural philosophy was common during the period. See e.g. George Turnbull, *Principles*, introduction (1: 1–24).

49.18 **Cromwell[B]]** Oliver Cromwell combined strict discipline with religious enthusiasm, was a consummate opportunist, engaged in regicide, often changed his mind about his goals, waged a vicious campaign in Ireland, and expelled the Rump of the Long Parliament. Although clever and capable, he was not notable for discretion. On Cromwell and contemporary religious movements, see ann. 15.4 and 20.9.

49.18 **de Retz[B]]** Cardinal de Retz was given to intrigues in love and politics and was indiscreet in disclosing his love affairs with women. He was also known for quickly shifting his political and religious affiliations, thus acting disloyally. In 'Idea of a

Perfect Commonwealth' 53, Hume cites de Retz on how assemblies are easily 'swayed in their debates by the least motive'. In *THN* 1.3.13.18, Hume discusses de Retz on deception and decorum.

49.19 **Swift**[B]] Jonathan Swift was an influential Church of Ireland priest, satirist, and pamphleteer. He uses the expression 'Aldermanly Discretion' in a general discussion of discretion as 'a Species of lower Prudence' (*Intelligencer*, in *Irish Tracts: 1728–1733,* 38–9). The essay carried the title 'A Description of What the World Calls Discretion' in the table of contents.

49.24 **elegant writer . . . Polyphemus]** The 'elegant writer' is Joseph Addison (Box, 'An Allusion', *Notes & Queries*, 60–1), who makes a similar statement and uses the example of Polyphemus in *Spectator* 225, which is an 'essay on discretion'. 'Elegant' here means eloquent and refined (cf. *EPM* 1.4). Polyphemus is the principal figure among the race of lawless giants who loses his one eye when Odysseus blinds him (*Odyssey* 1.69 ff. and 9.380 [1: 6 ff., 328–31]).

49.30 **St. Evremond**[B] **. . . Turenne**[B]] A leading French general in the wars of Louis XIV, Turenne was a renowned and extraordinary figure. Saint-Évremond depicts Turenne as loyal to the prince, morally virtuous and practically wise, filled with almost superhuman valour and courage, and a genius exhibiting great presence of mind as well as a vast understanding of military history and strategy. This praise is found in two contiguous essays: 'Éloge de Monsieur de Turenne' (Eulogy of Monsieur de Turenne) and 'Paralléle de Monsieur le Prince et de Monsieur de Turenne' (Comparison of the prince [of Condé] and Monsieur de Turenne) (*Œuvres meslées*, 1: 175–84; *Works*, 2: 320–34). These essays were standard parts of the corpus of Saint-Évremond's works through several editions. Two similar essays with content close to Hume's depiction were subsequently discovered, but they never appeared in the standard body of Saint-Évremond's works. It is unlikely that Hume would have known of them. The essays are entitled 'Éloge de Monsieur le Prince' and 'Comparaison de lui et de M. de Turenne' (*Œuvres en prose*, 1: 106–12). See also Hume's descriptions of Turenne in *History of England*, chs. 61, 65–6.

49.34 **Fabius,**[B] **says Machiavel**[B]] Fabius Maximus withstood the might of Hannibal[B] by conducting small harassing operations and avoiding major battles; Scipio Africanus[B] crushed Hannibal in the battle of Zama (19 Oct. 202). In 206 BC Scipio planned an African campaign to bring the long war between Rome and Carthage to an end. He was opposed by the oldest members of the Senate, Fabius Maximus among them. The Senate refused to supply Scipio with an army, but he collected a volunteer force that defeated Hannibal. See ann. Appx. 107.20 and n. 75.

Hume's reference is to Machiavelli's *Discourses* 3.9.2–3. Machiavelli says that 'Fabius Maximus . . . proceeded circumspectly and with a caution far removed from the impetuosity and boldness characteristic of the Roman.' In his plans to go to Africa and end the war, Scipio was bold, daring, and innovative beyond Fabius' recommendation: 'So that, if Fabius had been king of Rome, he might easily have lost this war, since he was incapable of altering his methods as circumstances

changed. . . . Fabius . . . was the best man to keep the war going when circumstances required this, [but] later it had a Scipio at a time suited to its victorious consummation' (496–7). See, further, Machiavelli, *Prince* 17; *Discourses* 3.21.

50.3 **gained the race]** from 'The Tortoise and the Hare', Phaedrus,[B] *Aesopic Fables*, appx. 226 (465).

50.12 and n. 27 **Plato[B] . . . impure appetites]** Footnote reference: Plato, *Phaedo*, 80 C–81 E. Plato explores the possibility that those who enjoy a lifestyle of bodily pleasures will not be freed from the desires of the body after death, for then their souls will long for the physical delights they refused to renounce. Subsequently, these souls assume the forms of animals sharing their indulgences. For example, those who have pursued the pleasures of drunkenness and gluttony become asses.

50.19 ***avarice***] See ann. 74.25 and Hume's essay 'Of Avarice'.

50.21 ***Prodigality***] Cf. Aristotle's[B] definition and discussion of prodigality in *Nicomachean Ethics* $1119^{b}23$–$1120^{a}8$; $1121^{a}8$–$^{b}17$. He too treats prodigality as an extreme (with liberality as the mean).

50.34 ***chastity***] See 4.5–6 and also *THN* 3.2.12, entitled 'Of chastity and modesty'.

51.14 **calm passions]** The distinction between calm and other forms of passions played a role in *THN* 2.1.1.3; 2.3.3.8–10; 2.3.4 and *DIS* 5.4; 6.1. At *THN* 2.3.3.8 Hume argues that the calm passions are frequently mistaken for reason. The distinction had a history before Hume, including Hutcheson's *Essay*, Treatise 1, 2.2–3; *Short Introduction* 1.1.5–7; and many reflections on 'calm desires and passions' in Hutcheson's posthumous *System*. Sometimes 'calm passions' referred to a type of passion that is always calm, such as fondness or the desire for another's happiness; but in some cases it refers to a particular quality of a passion on an occasion—e.g. fear might be calm at one time, violent at another.

51.37 and n. 28 **Dicæarchus[B]]** Footnote reference: Polybius, *Histories*, bk. 18 (17 in older editions), ch. 54 (35 in older editions), sects. 6–10. Polybius[B] writes that wherever Dicaearchus 'anchored his ships he constructed two altars, one of Impiety and the other of Lawlessness, and on these he sacrificed and worshipped these powers as if they were divine'.

52.4 **bond in nature]** In his discussion of this topic in *THN* 2.2.12, Hume treats the parent–offspring bond as an instinct in animals and humans.

52.11 **When it is asked . . .]** This paragraph is effectively identical to *THN* 3.3.4.6.

52.26 and n. 29 **memory . . . Cæsar[B]]** Footnote reference: Cicero,[B] *Philippics* 2.45.116. The ancient Greeks invented techniques to enhance memory, which were passed on to the Romans and were of practical import prior to the invention of printing (see Yates, *Art of Memory*). The translation of the passage from *Philippics* is, 'In him was talent, intelligence, memory, writing skill, attentiveness, reflective judgement, diligence.'

53.7 ***public spirit . . . benevolence***] Hume discusses 'public spirit' in his essays, but he names only figures in the ancient world. Many 'speculative' thinkers—philosophers, essayists, and the like—relied on benevolence as a category in their accounts, Butler and Hutcheson being the most prominent when Hume wrote. The theme about false pretensions and denying the reality of benevolence and public spirit is expanded at *EPM* 2.1 and in Hume's withdrawn essay, 'Of Moral Prejudices'.

53.12 **perpetual cant**] Both the Stoics and the Cynics exalted the cultivation of virtue. For example, the Stoic Zeno of Citium (4th–3rd c. BC), a student of the Cynic Crates, pronounced virtue the only goal meriting pursuit. Hume is referring to the asceticism promoted by both groups. The Cynics allowed only the subsistence level of amenities and dismissed the importance of social conventions; the Stoics were less severe, and only the most austere Stoics were similar to the Cynics. Hume's comments on Stoic philosophy and practice were generally antagonistic. See his essay 'The Stoic' and the early paragraphs in 'Of Moral Prejudices'. In a letter to Hutcheson of 17 Sept. 1739 (*Letters*, 1: 35), Hume recommends Cicero,[B] *De finibus* 4, itself an attack on Stoic accounts of virtue. In *THN* 1.4.7.13, Hume observes that 'The Cynics are an extraordinary instance of philosophers, [with] as great extravagancies of conduct as any *Monk* or *Dervise* that ever was in the world'. In his essays Montaigne[B] examines the Stoics on virtue and expresses reservations similar to those here expressed by Hume, saying that our soul could not reach as high as the Stoics expect. See especially 'On Drunkenness' (390).

53.14 & n. 30 **Lucian**[B]] Footnote references: Lucian, *Timon; or, The Misanthrope* 9; *Icaromenippus; or, The Sky Man* 30; *The Parliament of the Gods* 13. Lucian, who had criticized magnificent professions and slender performances, writes about virtue with 'spleen and irony' in the course of writing a comedy, a satire, and a comic dialogue. The passages from Lucian may be translated as follows: *Timon*: people 'declaiming loudly on "virtue", "incorporeals", and [other] trumpery'. *Icaromenippus*: 'and collecting round them youths, they (the philosophers) perform their "vaunted virtue"'. *Parliament*: 'where then are their vaunted "virtue", "nature", "fate", and "fortune"—names without substance, empty of reality'.

54.1 **resolve into self-love . . . selfish virtues**] The mentioned selfish virtues are listed and explained at *EPM* 6.20–1. Hutcheson also wrote on these problems. See ann. 36.21.

54.33 **proportions of a horse**] Hume is referring to *On the Art of Horsemanship* by Xenophon[B] (*Scripta Minora* 1–3) and to Virgil,[B] *Georgics* 3, lines 72–102. Xenophon discusses criteria for selecting a horse. He writes about how to assess the feet, the knees, bone structure, chest, neck, and the like, primarily with regard to the utility of these body parts for war (esp. 296–307, 310–11). Virgil describes the type of horse that should be bred for racing and discusses the fundamental importance of temperament and form (1: 158–61). The term 'jockey' here means horse-dealer.

55.1 **Broad shoulders . . .]** Parts of this paragraph are effectively identical to *THN* 3.3.5.3. The notion of bodily endowments presented in *EPM* 6.23 is discussed at *THN* 3.3.4.1.

55.9 and n. 31 **Epaminondas[B]]** Footnote reference: Diodorus Siculus, *Historical Library* 15.88.3–4. Epaminondas was among the commanders who defeated the Spartan army at Leuctra, for which he was uncommonly celebrated. He is portrayed by Diodorus Siculus[B] as having a noble character, including the ideal or perfectionist qualities of supreme virtue that Hume refers to in n. 31 as 'perfect merit'. Among these virtues is strength of body. In his essay 'Of the Balance of Power' 2, Hume further discusses Epaminondas, as portrayed by Xenophon.[B]

55.10 **Pompey[B]]** Pompey the Great crushed insurrections, cleared the seas of pirates, and organized (with Julius Caesar[B] and Crassus) the First Triumvirate. His Eastern campaigns are generally considered his greatest achievement: he annexed Syria, settled Judaea, and shaped the Roman organization of the East. According to Plutarch,[B] he was kingly in appearance, possessed a trustworthy character and dignity, and enjoyed above all Romans the respect and goodwill of the citizens (*Lives*, 'Pompey' 1–2, 21–4, 79–80).

n. 32.7 **Sallust. apud Veget.]** Footnote reference: Vegetius, *De re militari* 1.9, lines 14–15 (quoting Sallust). The passage from Vegetius[B] may be translated: 'He [Pompey[B] the Great] would contend appropriately with the fit, with the agile at jumping, with the swift at running.' (Note: this passage is not in the extant writings of Sallust.[B])

55.17 **present theory]** A note occurred at this point in the 1751 edn. only (see critical apparatus and Intro., p. lx). This note was largely identical to a passage in *THN* 3.3.5.3.

55.18 **painting or statuary]** In *THN* 2.2.5.19, Hume presents a near identical discussion of this rule.

n. 33.8 **king's evil]** This variety of tuberculosis (tuberculous adenitis) was the subject of medical treatises in the 18th c. It was thought by some to be curable by the king's or sovereign's touch. Hume also refers to this disease in *THN* 2.1.8.9 and *DIS* 2.45.

56.1 **Let us examine . . .]** The next three paragraphs are largely identical to three paragraphs in *THN* 2.2.5.9–11.

56.31 **train and equipage]** retinue of personal attendants and equipment needed for a journey (e.g. a carriage with changes of attire, drivers, and attendants).

57.1 **bill of a banker]** banker's draft or note.

n. 34.10 **power and riches]** Cf. *THN* 2.2.5, 'Of our esteem for the rich and powerful'.

n. 34.11 **envy and of pity]** Hume discusses envy, hatred, respect, malice, and pity in similar passages at *THN* 3.3.2 and 2.2.7–9. The section 'Of malice and envy',

THN 2.2.8, is introduced by saying that 'We must now proceed to account for the passion of *malice*, which imitates the effects of hatred, as pity does those of love.' Hume treats pity as 'an arbitrary and original instinct implanted in our nature' and as 'a concern for . . . the misery of others, without any friendship or enmity to occasion this concern' (2.2.8.1). In 'Of Tragedy', he discusses how the passion of pity combines with other feelings, such as beauty. A related discussion appears in *THN* 2.2.8.9.

Many writers prior to Hume regarded pity, compassion, fellow-feeling, sympathy, and related emotions as natural reactions. Some linked pity to imagination, and some construed pity as similar or even identical to compassion (also to tenderness or sympathy)—as discussed at 7.29 below. For explanations of pity (and compassion) in terms of self-interest, see Hobbes,[B] *Leviathan* 6.46; *Elements of Law* 1.9.10; and Mandeville, *Fable of the Bees*, 1: 134–41, 254–61. Butler rejected Hobbes's egoistic views regarding compassion, pity, love, and the like, arguing that they are other-regarding passions that restrain envy; he regarded envy as a principle from which people do evil to one another (*Fifteen Sermons* 1, 5–6, 8). Hutcheson responded to Hobbes, using arguments not unlike those found in Hume. See *Inquiry*, Treatise 2, 1.3; 2.8; 2.11; and 5.8; *Essay*, Treatise 1, 3.3–5.

57.30 **military virtue]** See ann. 119.4.

58.1 **monarchies . . . republican government]** The practice of placing a premium on birth in monarchies and wealth ('riches') in republics is discussed in Hume's *Essays* and *History of England*. See esp. 'Of Civil Liberty' 10 and *History*, chs. 60–2.

SECTION 7

59.10 **melancholy . . . Horace[B]]** The reference is to Horace, *Epistles* 1.18, lines 89–90: 'The grave dislike the gay, the merry the grave, the quick the staid, the lazy the stirring man of action.'

60.1 **Cæsar[B] gives of Cassius[B]]** The quotation is from William Shakespeare,[B] *Julius Caesar*, Act 1, Scene 2, lines 204–8. 'Caesar adds' refers to the lines immediately before and after; Caesar had just confessed to Antony[B] his fear of Cassius (lines 195–6).

60.10 and n. 36 **St. Evremond[B]]** Footnote reference: Seigneur de Saint-Évremond, 'Lettre à M. le Comte Magalotti'. Saint-Évremond's verse occurs at the end of a letter he sent to 'Count Magalotti, Counsellor of State to his Royal Highness the Great Duke of Tuscany'. He prefaces the verse with this sentence: 'I shall end by giving an account of the state in which I have found myself for a long time' (*Letters*, 2: 417–18). Apparently, Saint-Évremond found a measure of peace and serenity in Tuscany, and used verse to describe his state of mind. A translation of the passage in n. 36 is as follows:

Virtue, if not sour, I choose;
Pleasure, if not wild and loose;
Life I love, but do not fly
At Death's approach, nor fear to die.

(From the Des Maizeaux translation (*Works*, 2: 451) with English modernized.)

60.11 **GREATNESS OF MIND**] This topic is the subject of an entire section in *THN* 3.3.2, where Hume appears to treat it more as a division of the heroic virtues than a single character trait (*THN* 3.3.2.13). See, further, *EPM* 7.16.

60.14 and n. 37 **LONGINUS**[B]] Footnote reference: *On the Sublime* 9.2–3. *On the Sublime* was long erroneously attributed to Longinus. This work was the leading source for reflection on the sublime, an important topic in aesthetics during Hume's period. Its peak of influence occurred between 1730 and 1755. It was popularized in part by the translation and commentary by Boileau[B] that Hume cites in n. 39.

'Longinus' held that the sublime (the stirring and grand, high or elevated) is the feature in a work of fine or literary art that gives it a peculiar puissance or distinctive power; sublimity is the 'echo of magnanimity' in the metaphorical sense of the resonance of a noble mind (*On the Sublime* 9.2–4). Others who wrote substantial discourses on the sublime shortly before and after *EPM* include Shaftesbury,[B] *Characteristics*, 'Soliloquy' 1.3, 2.2 (136, 157–69); Addison, *Spectator* 412–18; Burke, *Philosophical Enquiry* 1.7; 3.27; 4.1, 5; John Baillie, *Essay on the Sublime*; and Alexander Gerard, *Essay on Taste*. The latter contains footnote references to 'Longinus' that identify the major texts of influence in the 18th c. Many other authors wrote on the subject of the sublime, including Hume's friends Lord Kames, Hugh Blair, and John Armstrong.[B]

In *THN* 2.3.8.2 ff. Hume provides some reflections on 'greatness' and the sublime that suggest an early interest in his later reflections on the sublime.

60.17 **silence of AJAX**] *On the Sublime* discusses a summoning of the spirits of the dead that takes place in the *Odyssey* (11: 543–67). Ajax is full of wrath for a defeat and refuses to be consoled or reassured. This silence expresses his anger and indignation, which 'Longinus'[B] thought grander than any use of language.

60.20 **DARIUS**[B] **. . . PARMENIO**[B]] Parmenio served under Philip[B] and Alexander the Great[B] and rose to be second-in-command to Alexander in Asia. When Darius III offered terms of peace, Alexander solicited the advice of Parmenio and responded as Hume reports.

60.21 and n. 38 **like principle**] Footnote reference: *On the Sublime* 9.4. Alexander's[B] saying is from a 'like principle' because it is similar to the principle(s) noted above regarding (1) the resonance of a noble mind and (2) Ajax's silence. The story about Parmenio[B] conveyed by Hume is fragmentary in all extant sources of *On the Sublime*; however, the complete story is found in Arrian, *Anabasis* 2.25.2 (1: 214–15).

60.22 **refused to follow]** 'The same hero' is Alexander,[B] who did not invade further into the East Indies, because his soldiers were exhausted and refused to continue.

60.24 **Prince of Conde[B]]** Conde is the name of a family of French nobility, the chief of whom bears the title 'Prince de Condé'. The particular Condé is Louis II, 'the Great Condé'. In *THN* 3.3.2.12 Hume quotes this same passage about Alexander[B] and the Prince of Condé and adds the following reference: 'This passage was always particularly admir'd by the prince of *Conde*, as we learn from *St. Évremond.*' In an essay on Alexander entitled 'Jugement sur Alexandre, et sur César', Saint-Évremond[B] (not Longinus[B]) provides the context and precise statements quoted by Hume (*Œuvres meslées*, 3: 146–7; *Œuvres en prose*, 1: 218–19). The Des Maizeaux translation renders Saint-Évremond's comment as follows (*Works*, 1: 67–8):

> *Go*, says he, *go you ungrateful Cowards, and tell your Country-men, that you have left* Alexander *with his Friends, labouring for the Glory of* Greece, *amongst Nations that will obey him better than you*.
>
> Of all the Passages of his Life, the Prince of *Condé* used to admire nothing more than this Haughtiness he shew'd to the *Macedonians*, and this Confidence in himself. *Alexander*, says he, *left by his own Men, amongst barbarous Nations, who were not throughly subdued, was so sensible of his own Worth and Capacity to Command, that he thought it not in the Power of Men to refuse to pay him Obedience. To reside in* Europe *or in* Asia, *amongst Greeks, or Persians, was indifferent to him; he thought he could not want Subjects, wherever he met with Men*.

60.30 and n. 39 **Medea . . . true sublime]** Footnote reference: Nicolas Boileau-Despréaux, *Réflexions critiques sur quelques passages de Longin*, Réflexion 10. 'Of true sublime' here refers to true greatness or grandeur in literature (and art), placing it in the highest or most exalted regions of thought and passion. Hume is referring to Pierre Corneille's[B] tragedy, *Médée*, which contains scenes based on Seneca[B] the Younger's original *Medea*. Corneille's tragedy is discussed in the source cited in n. 39 by Boileau-Despréaux.[B] In *Médée*, the confidante Nérine suggests caution and possibly submission in the face of Medea's reverse of fortune and tragic circumstance, asking what other recourse is left. Medea responds, 'Moy, Moy, dis-je, & c'est assez.' *Translation*: 'Me, me, say I, and that is enough' (*Médée* 1.5, in *Le théâtre*, 2: 297). Medea's response is both passionate and courageous, meeting the standards of the true sublime.

Boileau translated and popularized 'Longinus'[B] (see ann. 60.14 and n. 37). Hume had a high opinion of both Corneille and Boileau. In 'Of the Middle Station of Life' 9, he declares them, together with Racine and Voltaire, the only great French poets.

61.5 and n. 40 **Phocion]** Footnote reference: Plutarch, *Lives*, 'Phocion' 36.2–3, 758D. The Athenian politician and military leader Phocion[B] was renowned for his virtuous conduct, simple habits, and desire for peace. When democracy was restored to Athens (318 BC), Phocion was falsely accused of treason and executed at age 85. Plutarch,[B] the source in n. 40, recounts several stories about Phocion's calmness,

dignity, nobility, and bravery in the final moments of life, and reports the comment (made to Thudippus) that Hume mentions. In context, Phocion is chastising people sent to die with him for their complaints about their fate.

61.8 and n. 41 **Tacitus[B] draws of Vitellius[B]**] Footnote reference: Tacitus, *Histories* 3.84–5. Aulus Vitellius was proclaimed Roman emperor by his army. He was opposed by Vespasian and his army under Antonius Primus. The Eastern legions at first swore allegiance to Vitellius, but later switched loyalty to Vespasian, who assembled a large army, marched on Rome, and defeated Vitellius. Found in hiding, Vitellius was led through the forum and murdered. The passage cited in n. 41 from Tacitus may be translated as follows: 'He was led away, clothing in shreds, a pitiful sight. Many shouted at him; none wept. The ugliness of his exit had driven out compassion.'

n. 41.4 **ancient maxims**] Many ancients, including Plato[B] and Aristotle,[B] held that various dishonouring and debilitating conditions explained (and perhaps justified) suicide. Many fewer writers argued that suicide is a duty, but the Greek and Roman Stoics did recommend suicide as a responsible, wise, and prudent act under various conditions. In 'Of Suicide' Hume does not discuss such a maxim, but he cites four ancient authors: Cicero,[B] Seneca,[B] Tacitus, and Pliny. Of these authors, Seneca, along with Cato the Younger (1st c. BC) and others, is well known for defending such maxims. See further Dial. 10; Dial. 22; Dial. 35.

61.21 **generous pride**] In *DIS* 2.1 Hume defines 'pride' as self-value in the form of 'a certain satisfaction in ourselves, on account of some accomplishment or possession, which we enjoy'. In *THN* 2.1 Hume presents an influential analysis of pride, which includes the following definition and comment (2.1.7.8):

> [B]y *pride* I understand that agreeable impression, which arises in the mind, when the view either of our virtue, beauty, riches or power makes us satisfy'd with ourselves: And that by *humility* I mean the opposite impression. 'Tis evident the former impression is not always vicious, nor the latter virtuous. The most rigid morality allows us to receive a pleasure from reflecting on a generous action.

See his comments on pride below, at *EPM* 8.10 and 9.3, and his observation about our 'propensity to over-value' ourselves, at 8.9. Hume recognized that some forms of pride were vicious, typically when people lack the qualities they attribute to themselves (*THN* 3.3.2.6–10).

62.3 and n. 43 **Demosthenes[B] represent Philip[B]**] Footnote reference: Demosthenes, *On the Crown* 67–8. Demosthenes discusses the duty of Athenians to resist once they had discovered Philip's ambition to establish a despotic empire over the Hellenic states. Demosthenes praises Philip for his sacrifices and lofty ambitions. He 'apologizes for his own administration' in the sense of *justifying the advice* he gave Athenians in the face of some serious charges brought against him by his enemy Aeschines.[B] He does not apologize in the sense of asking pardon. Hume uses quotation marks because he is loosely translating or closely paraphrasing the passage in

Demosthenes. Demosthenes, Philip, and Aeschines are discussed in ann. 36.15 and 104.27.

62.11 **Pella]** the ancient capital of Macedonia and the birthplace of Alexander the Great.[B] Ruins of the ancient city are some 25 miles west-north-west of Salonika, Greece.

62.19 and n. 44 **Suevi]** Footnote reference: Tacitus, *Germania* 38. The reference is to several ancient, warlike tribes of Germanic nomads occupying territory east of the Elbe river. The 'virtue' of courage had utility for the continual wars the Suevi faced. Tacitus[B] reports on the Suevi in the work mentioned in n. 44. (Hume's compressed title for Tacitus' work—'De moribus Germ.'—serves as an abbreviation for two titles given to *Germania*: *De moribus Germanorum* and *De situ, moribus et populis Germaniae*.)

62.24 and n. 45 **Scythians . . . Herodotus]** Footnote reference: Herodotus, *History* 4.46. The Scythians were the inhabitants of ancient Scythia (present-day southern Russia). Herodotus[B] describes them as savage and nomadic. In 'Of Love and Marriage' 3–5, Hume recounts an elaborate story of Scythian women.

62.31 **courage]** In *THN* 3.3.2.13 courage is categorized as one of the heroic virtues and is closely linked to pride and self-esteem. The comments immediately below about Homer,[B] Fénelon,[B] Thucydides,[B] and ancient and modern ages further treat the theme that many ancient and primitive societies exalted virtues such as courage and the martial temper because of their utility and the sublimity of sentiment they occasion.

62.33 **ethics of Homer[B] . . . Fenelon[B]]** The reference to 'the ethics of Homer' is to the code of honour and conception of heroic excellence in pre-Socratic, Hellenic culture. The code emphasized courage and personal glory. Some scholars have argued that the code contained none of the virtues recognized as central to ethics in modern Europe—and hence is 'very different' from later Western ethics—but others have argued that at least a modern sense of *justice* was recognized in the Homeric period (Lloyd-Jones, *Justice of Zeus*, 158–63).

In 'Of the Standard of Taste' 3, Hume comments that, 'Even poets and other authors, whose compositions are chiefly calculated to please the imagination, are yet found, from Homer down to Fénelon, to inculcate the same moral precepts.' See the discussion of taste, in ann. 4.5 and 65.40, and the cardinal virtues in ann. 106.26.

François Fénelon's *Aventures de Télémaque* has often been said to imitate the style and use of characters in the *Odyssey*. Occasionally, passages appear that are near duplications of the wording in Homer and that show a resemblance to Homeric figures, narratives, speeches, prayers, epithets, and episodes. *Télémaque* seems designed as a treatise on ethics, politics, and peace for a prince, but whether there is any deep-seated imitation of Homer is controversial.

62.35 and n. 46 **Thucydides[B]]** Footnote reference: Thucydides, *History* 1.5.2–3. In a discussion of piracy among the Hellenes and the Barbarians, Thucydides remarks

that, prior to the Peloponnesian War, piracy 'did not as yet involve disgrace, but rather conferred something even of glory'. He notes that the early poets, including Homer,[B] would 'invariably ask the question of all who put in to shore, whether they are pirates' (1.5).

63.1 and n. 47 **Spencer[B]]** Footnote reference: Edmund Spenser, *A View of the [Present] State of Ireland*. Spenser was once lord deputy of Ireland. Some doubt has been thrown on his authorship of the work mentioned, though Hume would have had no reason to question it. Whether it was Spenser or not, the author advocated the use of stern measures, consistently administered, in order to suppress resistance to English landowners and officials in Ireland (*View*, 145). In speaking of the 'barbarous' parts of Ireland, Hume may be expressing the then common British view that many people are barbarous because they do not accept the same conventions of property as the British. In n. 47 'kern' means Irish foot-soldier(s); 'straight' means directly or not in a roundabout fashion.

63.3 **philosophical tranquillity . . . sage]** In some ancient philosophical writings, the sage or wise man was a model of virtue, self-sufficiency, happiness, and the like. Similar views were found among the Stoics and Epicureans. In 'On Tranquillity of Mind', the Stoic Seneca[B] analyses how to introduce forms of tranquillity that 'elevate' one, in Hume's sense (*Moral Essays* 9.2.4). Epicurus[B] recommended an untroubled, quiet life free from disturbance (*Epicurus Reader*, texts 3.85–7; 4.128–31; 9; 16.53). According to Sextus Empiricus,[B] sceptics held that happiness and peace of mind are found in detachment and tranquillity—such an inner state being the goal of scepticism. On tranquillity and the sage, see Epictetus[B] (Arrian, *Discourses* 2.2, 'On Tranquillity'). See Hume's essay 'The Stoic' 12–13, 18.

63.14 **greatness of mind . . . magnanimity]** 'Magnanimity' here seems to refer broadly to greatness of spirit, courage, and nobleness. See also *EPM* 7.4; Dial. 40; *THN* 3.3.2. In his *History of England*, Hume presents several figures in English history as exhibiting magnanimity—William Wallace being a favourite example (*History*, ch. 13). For the historical roots of philosophical discussion of these virtues, see Aristotle's[B] *Nicomachean Ethics* 1122^{a}19–1123^{a}31.

63.21 **Epictetus[B]]** Epictetus, born a slave in Rome, was later banished to Nicopolis in Epirus, north-western Greece. There he lived in a small house provided with simple items such as a mat, a pallet, and an earthenware lamp that replaced a stolen iron lamp. This theft led Epictetus to reflect on the relative unimportance of possessions and the importance of moral purpose (Arrian, *Discourses* 1.18.15–20).

64.8 **delightful in themselves]** See *EPM* 7.29: 'valued for the immediate pleasure', and not for 'utility or future beneficial consequences'.

64.14 **Elysian fields]** In Homeric mythology heroes exempted from death and mortal relatives of the king of the gods are taken by the gods to Elysium or the Isles of the Blessed, where they enjoy the purest pleasures. Hesiod, Pindar, and Virgil[B]

gave different locations and descriptions, but all emphasized perfect felicity. Hume comments on poetic descriptions of the Elysian fields in *THN* 1.3.9.5.

64.18 **pastoral Arcadia**] Pastoral Arcadia was in the central Peloponnesus, the home of Hellenic people who never realized a strong political unity but achieved a stable culture that included a passionate love of music. The region came to symbolize simplicity, tranquillity, and rustic enchantment. See ann. 40.2 on the *Arcadia* of Sannazarius.[B]

64.24 **angry passions**] Cf. the treatment of the topics in these paragraphs with five paragraphs in *THN* 3.3.3.4–8.

64.36 **Harry the IVth**[B] **. . . the league**] Henry IV was first Henry of Navarre. The Catholic League, founded in 1576 to defend Catholicism against Protestantism, refused to recognize a Protestant as king of France and persuaded King Henry III[B] (see Dial. 46), who had instigated the massacre of the Huguenots, to bar Henry of Navarre from succession and to revoke the concessions that Henry III had previously made to the Protestants. In a resulting war, Henry of Navarre defeated Henry III and succeeded to the throne of France in 1589. As Henry IV, he renounced Protestantism, ending the Catholic League in 1593.

Henry's marriage with Margaret of Valois was annulled in 1599 and he married Marie de' Medici. He had numerous mistresses. For example, a serious confrontation with Henry III developed over whether Henry of Navarre should take back his wife (which he did, in 1584). In part because of his passions, Henry IV was popular and gained a reputation as gallant, affable, witty, and concerned about the common people of France. In his essay 'Of the Middle Station of Life' 5, Hume describes Henry IV as one of five monarchs in France since Charles VII to have been 'esteem'd Princes of Capacity'.

65.5 **Charles the XIIth**[B]] Dubbed 'the Invincible', Charles XII was involved in a series of successful invasions and attacks on Denmark and Russia. Fascinated by Alexander[B] and Caesar,[B] he aspired to imitate them. He defeated Peter the Great but afterwards met with several disasters that ultimately cost Sweden its rank as a major power and left the nation in a deplorable state.

Voltaire's influential biography, *History of Charles XII*, was widely read during Hume's period. Voltaire depicts the king as heroic but as bringing disaster to his country. He notes that Charles underwent astounding changes of character at about age 18 and depicts him as an extremely aggressive and brave warrior who abstained from both wine and women as an example of discipline and virtue (*Lion of the North*, 42–3). Hume was once accused of imitating Voltaire's historical writing in the writing of his own *History*—an accusation Hume politely denied; see his letter of 5 Nov. 1755, to Abbé le Blanc (*Letters*, 1: 226–7).

65.14 **Darius**[B] **and Xerxes**[B]] The Persian Wars, 500–449 BC, were waged between the Persian Empire and Hellenic city-states. The empire of Darius I stretched from west Asia to Egypt. In the beginning a few Ionian city-states revolted against Darius' oppressive rule. Athens had helped these cities, and in 490 the Persians marched on

Athens in an attempt to punish the Athenians. They were attacked and defeated decisively by an Athenian army of 10,000 heavily outnumbered soldiers. Darius then prepared to overwhelm the Hellenic city-states, but died in 486. Xerxes I succeeded Darius and continued to lay plans for conquest. Although Athens was taken in 480, the Persian fleet was thereafter crushed, and Xerxes returned to Persia, leaving his army behind. The defeat of his army at Plataea in 479, together with another Hellenic naval victory and careful planning, prevented a further Persian advance. The Athenians took their victories to demonstrate the superiority of their culture over barbarian cultures.

65.18 **Lysias,[B] Thucydides,[B] Plato,[B] and Isocrates[B]**] Lysias fled from Athens after it fell under control of the Thirty Tyrants, but returned to impeach one tyrant in a classic oration (*Against Eratosthenes*, *Orations* 12). His funeral oration in honour of those Athenians who perished in battle under Iphicrates[B] is generally considered his masterpiece on the topics mentioned by Hume (*Funeral Oration*, *Orations* 2).

Isocrates, Lysias' near contemporary, offered speeches in praise of Athens in which he contrasted the behaviour of Athenians and Spartans. He depicts Athens as mindful of agriculture and the educator of Greece, and Sparta as intent on military conquest (*Panathenaicus* 90, 94; *Panegyricus* 51–140). A Panhellenic patriot, Isocrates late in life appealed to Philip II[B] of Macedon to unite the chief Hellenic city-states and to lead an expedition to conquer the East. Both Lysias and Isocrates addressed the alleged desertion of military duty by Alcibiades[B] (son of the more famous Alcibiades, discussed at *EPM* 5.40 and in ann. n. 23).

Himself a military commander, Thucydides wrote about war and exhibited pride in Athenian military achievements. Plato's writings show a reasonably balanced approach to Athenian achievements, but the vital role of soldiers is apparent.

65.33 **pathetic and sublime of sentiment**] 'Pathetic' here means stirring and exaltation of feeling through artistic works or extraordinary, elevated form of passion; on 'sublime' see ann. 60.14 and n. 37 and 60.30 and n. 39. Hume appears to anticipate Burke's well-known treatment of the subject in his *Philosophical Enquiry*. The topic of kinds of sensibility is also treated in Hume's essay 'Of Eloquence'.

65.36 **Augustus[B] . . . Virgil[B]**] Augustus, or Octavian, descended from a wealthy family to become the first Roman emperor. Although celebrated for valour, steadiness, and justice, his fame and stature as a cultural symbol never approached that of his contemporary Virgil, whose *Aeneid* is a national epic emphasizing the divine origins of the Romans. During Hume's period, Virgil's *Georgics* and *Aeneid* were widely praised. See Addison, *Spectator* 417 and his controversial 'Essay on Virgil's *Georgics*', which treats of the 'beauties in the Georgics' and 'how far Virgil has excelled all who have written in the same way' (379, 387).

65.40 **delicacy of taste**] See ann. 4.5 and 5.29. Hume wrote about this subject in his essays 'Of the Delicacy of Taste and Passion' and 'Of the Standard of Taste'. In the latter, he addresses delicacy of taste as follows: 'Though it be certain, that beauty and deformity, more than sweet and bitter, are not qualities in objects, but belong

entirely to the sentiment, internal or external; it must be allowed, that there are certain qualities in objects, which are fitted by nature to produce those particular feelings. Now as these qualities may be found in a small degree, or may be mixed and confounded with each other, it often happens, that the taste is not affected with such minute qualities, or is not able to distinguish all the particular flavours, amidst the disorder, in which they are presented. Where the organs are so fine, as to allow nothing to escape them; and at the same time so exact as to perceive every ingredient in the composition: This we call delicacy of taste. . . . [A] quick and acute perception of beauty and deformity must be the perfection of our mental taste. . . . [A] delicate taste of wit or beauty must always be a desirable quality; because it is the source of all the finest and most innocent enjoyments, of which human nature is susceptible. In this decision the sentiments of all mankind are agreed. Wherever you can ascertain a delicacy of taste, it is sure to meet with approbation; and the best way of ascertaining it is to appeal to those models and principles, which have been established by the uniform consent and experience of nations and ages' (pars. 16–17). Hume's work on these topics appears to have been influenced by Jean Baptiste Dubos, *Refléxions critiques sur la poësie et sur la peinture*; see vol. 2, sects. 23, 29. Hume cites Dubos's work in his essays.

66.8 **fellow-feeling]** The close connection of sympathy and fellow-feeling suggested by Hume had been anticipated by Hutcheson (*Short Introduction* 1.1.9) and Archibald Campbell, *Enquiry*, introduction 2. Hobbes[B] had closely identified pity, compassion, and fellow-feeling (*Leviathan* 6), but Hutcheson and Hume appear to view pity more as a *form* of sympathy or fellow-feeling. See ann. n. 34. Cf. *THN* 2.2.7.2; 2.2.9.11; 2.2.9.18–19.

SECTION 8

n. 50.1 **definition of virtue]** See also Appx. 1.10. The 'definition of Personal Merit' given at *EPM* 9.12 was called a 'definition of Virtue' in the 1st edn. of *EPM*.

67.5 GOOD MANNERS **or** POLITENESS] See 4.13 on 'laws of good manners'. 'Good manners' and 'politeness' had a history of discussion in writings on moral, social, and literary subjects, often in a context of the human advance from primitive behaviour to cultivated morals, civility, and a refined writing style. For example, Hobbes[B] devoted a chapter to 'manners', which he began by describing 'decency of behaviour' as 'the small morals' (*Leviathan* 11.1); and Berkeley discussed both politeness and good manners in his *Alciphron*. See also Montesquieu[B] on distinctions between laws of nature, morals, religious precepts, politeness of behaviour, manners, customs, and taste (distinctions he thought often 'confounded') in *Spirit of the Laws*, and the influential writings by Addison and Steele on themes of politeness, civility, manners, appearance, and graceful living in *The Spectator*. Hume mentions politeness only once in *THN*, but the term frequently appears in his *Essays* and correspondence.

67.15 **breeding]** Steele and Addison (*Spectator* 83, 104, 119, 218, 236) as well as Thomas Gordon in *Cato's Letters* 121 (126–33) associate good breeding with decorum—see ann. 70.35—and with a wide range of virtues. Hume offers many comments on 'good-breeding' and 'ill-breeding' in *THN* and the *Essays*.

67.19 WIT . . . **not be easy to define]** The nature of wit was the subject of a series of articles by Addison (*Spectator* 58–63) attempting to distinguish true wit from false wit. Addison began by saying that 'Nothing is so much admired and so little understood as Wit.' He maintained that no prior author had written directly on the subject, but then cited several writers who obliquely or indirectly had done so. He approvingly cites Locke,[B] *Essay* 2.11.2, and disapprovingly discusses a terse definition by Dryden. Locke, who devoted a full section to wit and judgement (*Essay* 2.11.2), and Dryden were more concerned than Addison to express 'what wit is', in Hume's wording. Chambers (*Cyclopædia*, 'Wit') used Locke as a basis for his discussion, but mentioned other sources as well. Alexander Pope's *An Essay on Criticism* (1711) also contains influential observations about wit, presented in verse, but no definition. Hobbes[B] commented on wit in several works, especially *Leviathan* 8. See ann. 65.40. In *THN* 2.1.8.2 Hume said that wit 'cannot be defin'd, but is discern'd only by a taste or sensation'.

68.13 **evil eye]** major disapproval; disaffected view.

68.22 **Eloquence]** The art of oratory was widely discussed in the 18th c., as various of Hume's allusions to Demosthenes[B] indicate (see *EPM* 5.11; 7.12 and n. 43; Appx. 4.5). Eloquence was typically viewed as a constructive way of guiding a community through forms of speech that move the passions. 'Longinus'[B] (see 7.4 and n. 37) was considered by many the premiere figure in rhetoric, the field of inquiry that analytically studies (but does not practice) eloquence; and Demosthenes was the most widely examined orator. See Hume's 'Of Eloquence', which expresses some distrust of orators who violate standards of politeness, and Blair's *Lectures on Rhetoric* 25–34, citing classical sources that formed the corner-stone of discussions in the 18th c.

68.28 **Modesty . . . chastity]** See Hume's discussion in *THN* 3.2.12, entitled 'Of chastity and modesty', and the partial definition of modesty at *THN* 3.3.2.1. See also his essays 'Of Impudence and Modesty' and 'Of Love and Marriage'. On chastity, see also *EPM* 4.5; 4.7; 6.14. Hutcheson briefly discussed modesty and chastity (*Short Introduction* 1.3.3), observing that these two virtues had been treated by 'the Ancients' as 'branches' of the cardinal virtue of temperance (see ann. 106.26 on the cardinal virtues). See also Mandeville, *Fable of the Bees*, 1: 65.

68.30 **nicety of honour]** The term 'honour' had a background of discussion in the Enlightenment. Montesquieu,[B] for example, connected it to high repute, esteem, and honourableness (as did Spinoza) and linked it to what Hume elsewhere discusses in *EPM* as rank and what is required of people of rank, e.g. politeness and gallantry. See the analysis of this term by de Jaucourt in Diderot's *Encyclopédie*, 'Honneur'-*Morale* (8: 288–90), citing Hume on the connection to utility. This article took

account of the various meanings, but interpreted the modern meaning as closer to self-esteem and elevation of character.

68.31 **PUDOR**] This complicated Latin term was used by several classical authors, including Cicero,[B] Pliny, Horace,[B] and Ovid,[B] but often with very different meanings. Like many terms in use in the 18th c., the word has senses of both virtue and vice, as Hume's sentence suggests. For Cicero, *pudor* means something like a sense of honour and is associated with a sense of reputation, decency, and modesty. However, in many other writers it is most closely associated with shame. Though rarely used in modern philosophy, Spinoza used it to refer to the shame or sadness felt when appropriately blamed by others (*Ethics* 3–4 [510, 516 f., 538, 579]). See also Locke[B] on 'shame', *Essay* 2.20.17.

69.2 and n. 51 **ARISTOTLE**[B]] Footnote reference: Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics* 4.3, esp. 1125[a]19–34. Aristotle observes (1123[a]33–1125[a]34) that magnanimous people of moderate pride and self-esteem can escape both vanity (an excessive evaluation) and humility (or pusillanimity, an undervaluation). The defect in both cases is inadequate knowledge, rather than evil or malicious motives. Aristotle maintains that the unduly humble person is commoner than the vain person. A similar passage occurs in *THN* 3.3.2.10, without reference to Aristotle.

69.11 **MONTAIGNE's maxim**] Montaigne's *Essays* are efforts, in part, at self-exploration. He cites many 'maxims'. In 'On Practice' Montaigne[B] says:

> I hold that we must show wisdom in judging ourselves. . . . If I seemed to myself to be good or wise—or nearly so—I would sing it out at the top of my voice. To say you are worse than you are is not modest but foolish. According to Aristotle, to prize yourself at less than you are worth is weak and faint-hearted. . . . (*Essays* 2.6 [426]).

In 'On Presumption' Montaigne discusses how we flatter ourselves and represent ourselves as other than we are; he thinks we tend to set too great a value on ourselves and too little on others (*Essays* 2.17 [720]). In 'Apology for Raimond Sebond' he frames a personal 'motto' (or emblem) in interrogative rather than declarative form: 'What do I know?' (2.12 [590–1]) and discusses maxims about self-knowledge.

69.19 **MAURICE**[B] **. . . SPINOLA**[B]] Maurice led the Netherlands in the fight for independence against the Spaniards, led by Ambrosio di Spinola (the Marquis de Spinola), a formidable adversary from 1602 until 1607.

69.25 **mutual deference**] A similar passage occurs in *THN* 3.3.2.10.

69.29 **noble pride and spirit**] See *EPM* 7.10 and 8.9 and n. 51.

69.31 **contumacy of SOCRATES**[B]] The reference is to Cicero,[B] *Tusculan Disputations* 1.29.71. Cicero praises Socrates' integrity and noble resistance.

69.33 and n. 52 **IPHICRATES**[B]] Footnote reference: Quintilian, *Institutes* 5.12.9–11. Quintilian[B] says that Iphicrates 'asked Aristophon who was accusing him on a . . . charge of treason whether he would consent to betray his country for a bribe: when

Aristophon replied in the negative, he continued, "Have I then done what you would have refused to do?"' (*Institutes* 5.12.10). Quintilian attributes the example to Aristotle,[B] *Rhetoric* 1398[a]3–9.

70.8 **fame, reputation, or a character]** Cf. the directly related comments in *THN* 2.1.11.1.

70.35 ***indecorum* . . . CICERO[B]]** The reference is to Cicero's *De officiis* 1.27.93–1.28.100. Drawing on Stoic sources, Cicero discusses the Latin term *decorum* (propriety, seemliness) and its Greek equivalent and their connection to moral goodness, virtue, and success in political affairs. Hume's aesthetic associations in this paragraph may draw upon Cicero's explanations of the differences between moral and aesthetic fittingness. Hume discusses the influence of *De officiis* in his correspondence with Hutcheson of 17 Sept. 1739 (*Letters*, 1: 34); see ann. 106.23 and nn. 71–2. See Hume's use of 'decorum' at *THN* 1.3.13.18 and 'indecorum' at *THN* 3.3.4.12.

70.36 CLEANLINESS] These passages parallel, almost verbatim, *THN* 3.3.4.10, where additional information on cleanliness is provided. English poet Thomas Tickell (1686–1740) described cleanliness as 'one of the *Half-Virtues*' (*Spectator* 631).

70.39 **smaller vices]** In the passage at *THN* 3.3.4.10, lack of cleanliness and other 'faults' are all treated as 'smaller vices'. See the quotation from Hobbes,[B] in ann. 67.5, on 'small morals'.

SECTION 9

72.8 ***utile* or the *dulce*]** *Utile* refers to the useful (the expedient, beneficial, profitable, or advantageous), *dulce* to the agreeable (the amiable or soothing). *Utile* and *dulce* are thus the functional counterparts, in Latin, of the English terms 'useful' and 'agreeable'—the two terms that Hume uses to classify the virtues and qualities of mind. For an influential passage on blending the two, see Horace,[B] *Art of Poetry* 343. In *De officiis* 2, Cicero[B] discusses *utile* at length, noting at 2.3.9–10 that what is recognized as virtuous parallels and derives from what is useful (*utile*). In the 3rd book Cicero argues that nothing in conflict with the *honestum* (the honourable, the virtuous) can be *utile*.

72.25 **schools]** These Aristotelian and Scholastic centres were under attack by Locke[B] (*Essay* 3.4.8–10 and 3.10.6–8) and by many other writers who might have influenced Hume; see e.g. the caustic observations in Hobbes,[B] *Leviathan* 1.5; 2.9; 3.12; 5.15; 8.27; 12.31; 46.13–30. Hobbes suggests that what in the schools was accepted as knowledge was often only language empty of thought or sense.

72.28 CLEANTHES] Cleanthes is a name from the history of Stoicism that Hume used for a leading figure in his *Dialogues*. There appears to be no connection between the figure in that work and the 'model of perfect virtue' here, other than to make both represent a particular philosophical type. Although Hume gives no reason for the

choice of the name, a link to Stoicism is suggested by his description of apparent Stoic views about 'a perpetual serenity on his countenance, and tranquillity in his soul' (*EPM* 9.2). Cleanthes was the second head of the Stoic school and was renowned for his politeness, diligence, extraordinary patience, and personal merit. In *Spectator* 404 (authorship unknown), 'Cleanthes' is presented as a person of great talent, but also of 'talents misapplied'.

73.7 **gallantry]** Contrast the use of this term at *EPM* 4.17.

73.17 **Gratian[B]]** Any one of three Gratians might be meant. The most plausible candidate is Baltasar Gracián y Morales,[B] who was widely read in 18th-c. Britain and was cited by Addison as 'the Famous *Gratian*' (*Spectator* 293; see also 409). He wrote five widely disseminated works, including *El héroe*, which describes the qualities that are essential to a hero and leader: virtue, self-perfection, self-knowledge, resolve, discretion, wit, courtesy, charm, and persistence against fools. Fidelity to near-perfect virtue is considered essential to greatness. In another work, *El discreto*, Gracián presents the ideal courtier, and in his *El oráculo* he describes traits that mark the successful and self-sufficient man.

A second candidate is Lucas Gracián Dantisco (Spanish writer, 16th c.), who authored the work *El galateo Español*, which had appeared in English translation. It drew in part on Castiglione's[B] work. This Gratian provided proverbs and concrete rules of etiquette and good manners.

The least plausible candidate is Franciscus Gratianus, who compiled the *Concordia discordantium canonum* or *Decretum Gratiani* (*c.*1140), a collection of decrees and principles. In its first part, this work supplies the initial formulation and foundations of Roman Catholic canon law.

73.17 **Castiglione[B]]** Conte Baldassare Castiglione was well known for his *Il Cortegiano*. The book presents a picture of 15th- and 16th-c. court life and delineates the characteristics of the ideal courtier or excellent man, a noble, witty, graceful, pleasant warrior and horseman, skilled in several languages, and informed about literature and the arts. Though gracious and genteel, he is a soldier, and therefore must be strict, daring, and shrewd. When confronted with difficult moral choices, the courtier is allowed wide discretion.

73.22 **superstition and false religion]** Cf. the first few paragraphs of Hume's essay 'Of Superstition and Enthusiasm' and the opening paragraph of his essay 'Of Suicide'. See also Hobbes's[B] accounts of religion, superstition, and enthusiasm: *Leviathan* 2.8; 6.36; 11.26; 12.19; 32.9.

73.24 **monkish virtues]** Hume also uses the term 'monkish virtues' in *NHR* 10.2, where his list is modified. These 'virtues' had been defended by Blaise Pascal[B] and perhaps also by Diogenes[B] the Cynic; Hume comments on both at Dial. 54 in a similar context, mentioning also Saint Dominic[B] and Saint Ignatius of Loyola.[B]

In *Dialogues* 12, Hume discusses how religious superstition and enthusiasm produce 'a new and frivolous species of merit' (presumed to be a virtue) that has 'the most pernicious consequences' on morality. See also the last line of 'A Dialogue'

below, Hume's comment on 'monkish historians' in his *History of England*, ch. 20, p. 25, and Adam Smith's treatment of monkish virtues in *Moral Sentiments* 3.2 (229–31).

73.33 **hair-brained enthusiast]** Locke[B] explained 'hare-brained' (having the sense of a hare) enthusiasm as 'rising from the conceits of a warmed or over-weening brain'. In Chambers's account (*Cyclopædia*, 'Enthusiasm'), 'There is a Degree of Assent, says Mr. Lock, which . . . is Enthusiasm; which laying by Reason, would set up Revelation without it; . . . Enthusiasm, which, tho' rising from the Conceit of a warm, or over-weaning Brain, works, where it once gets Footing, more powerfully on the Perswasions and Actions of Men, than either Reason, or Revelation.' See also ann. 15.4 and Hume's 'Of Superstition and Enthusiasm'.

73.34 **calendar]** calendar (list) of canonized saints. See Hume's *History of England* 2 and 31 for explicit references.

74.25 **Avarice . . . vulgarly . . . comprized]** See Hume's essay 'Of Avarice'. Various philosophers had argued that both avarice and ambition are founded on self-love and are vices. See, e.g. Hutcheson, *Short Introduction* 1.1.6, 17; 1.6.3 (pp. 9–10, 34, 94); *Inquiry*, Treatise 2, 5.3–4; *Essay*, Treatise 1, 2.2, 7; 3.3.

74.30 **general approbation]** This theme in Hume's moral philosophy had predecessors in Hutcheson, and also in Locke,[B] who wrote that 'the measure of what is every where called and esteemed *Vertue* and *Vice* is this approbation or dislike, praise or blame, which by a secret and tacit consent establishes it self in the several Societies, Tribes, and Clubs of Men in the World' (*Essay* 2.28.10).

75.8 **point of view]** The subject of choosing a common point of view is treated in *THN* 3.3.1.30.

n. 57.14 **Horace[B] . . . tree]** Footnote reference: Horace, *Odes* 2, ode 13, lines 1–12. Horace depicts a malevolent person who once planted a tree on land that Horace now owns. The malevolent person intended to harm his descendants and neighbours, but the tree subsequently fell on the undeserving Horace's head. Horace expresses his feelings of outrage by damning the planter and, on this slender basis, judges him capable of violently killing his own father. To understand the reason for Hume's mention of Horace, see his comments in n. 57, especially about our harbouring 'ruder and narrower passions', our 'imputing malice or injustice', and our distorting the behaviour and motives of others.

76.25 **Solon[B]]** According to Plutarch,[B] Solon supported a law that disenfranchised all who remained neutral in a faction-generated sedition. He held that private good should not be advanced while disregarding the public good (*Lives*, 'Solon' 20.1). Solon had broad powers (*c*.594 BC) to initiate reforms. He repealed Draco's laws and initiated a new humane code of law. He also reorganized the senate, the assembly, and the council of the Areopagus. Although civil strife persisted, Solon gained a reputation for honest and vigilant protection of the rights of all citizens. In 'Of the Populousness of Ancient Nations' 40, Hume mentions Solon's grant of permis-

sion to parents to kill their children, citing Sextus Empiricus[B] as the source of this information.

77.2 **common blaze]** public feeling.

77.24 **animal conveniencies]** material comforts and advantages.

78.2 **totally indifferent]** See the earlier formulations of this point at *EPM* 5.17 ('contradiction'), and at 5.46 ('impossible').

78.4 **definition of PERSONAL MERIT]** See ann. n. 50 above, and also Appx. 1.10 below. The definition here was called a 'definition of virtue' in Hume's 1st edn. of *EPM*. Hume's use of both 'virtue' and 'personal merit' resembles that of Machiavelli,[B] *Prince* (using 'virtú'), even though their lists of virtues differ. However, in Appx. 4.11, Hume suggests that Cicero[B] and other 'ancient moralists' might be the source of his opinion on these matters.

78.28 ***excessive* scepticism]** For Hume's views on this subject, see *EHU* 12.

78.33 **grossest absurdities]** Hume often expresses this view about enthusiasm, superstition, and fanaticism. See ann. 15.4 and 20.9.

79.7 **interested *obligation*]** An interested obligation to virtue is a reason from self-interest to act virtuously. Even if egoistic theories are false, acting according to the duties and virtues of morality may still be in a person's interest. See *EPM* 9.16: 'duties . . . [in] the true interest of each individual'; and the language of 'natural obligation' in *THN* 3.2.2.23; 3.2.5.6; 3.2.8.4; 3.2.9.3–4; 3.2.11.4. Cicero[B] (*De officiis* 3) and the Stoics repeatedly emphasized that virtue is more beneficial to a person than anything else. Butler (and, less clearly, Shaftesbury, who is cited by Butler as holding this view) defended an account that uses language and premisses similar to those that Hume here invokes. See Butler, *Fifteen Sermons*, preface, sects. 13–20, 31–3; 1.4–6; 3.11–13; 11.3–11; and also 'Every Man's true Interest found in the general Interest', *Cato's Letters* 89 (11 Aug. 1722 [192–9]).

79.10 **foregoing theory]** namely, Hume's account of the approbation attending merit or virtue.

79.27 **many divines]** 'Many divines' refers to theologians and ministers who recommend austerity, and perhaps also those who interpret virtuous behaviour as appropriately motivated by a desire for a divine reward (see Appx. 4.21). The 'many divines' might include, for example, the author of *The Whole Duty of Man* (generally thought to be English clergyman Richard Allestree, 1619–81), as cited below at n. 72. 'Austere pretenders' (near the end of *EPM* 9.15) is a general reference to people devoted to ascetic practices who mistake austerity for virtue.

80.9 **foregoing system]** namely, the account of morals, virtue, and personal merit found in *EPM*.

81.3 ***selfish* and *social* sentiments]** again an appeal to a celebrated aspect of Butler's ethics.

81.14 **life, without passion]** Hume's philosophy of passion is more fully developed in *THN* 2–3. The idea that passion makes the kind of positive contribution

indicated by Hume is not without precedent. Descartes, for example, held that the passions are 'all by nature good' (though their misuse or excess must be avoided) and that, 'It is on the passions alone that all the good and evil of this life depends' (*Passions* 211–12). Butler pointed to the vital importance of many passions, including other-regarding passions, all of which he considered real parts of human nature. Hutcheson and Malebranche[B] too should be consulted for the expanded roles they give the passions. Many philosophers in the period from Descartes to Hume reconceived various passions as forms of mental activity, not merely passive responses.

81.23 **in humour]** pleased, satisfied, or agreeable.

81.40 **sensible knave]** The 'sensible knave' may have been what Mandeville had in mind when he wrote his original poem (London, 1705) entitled *The Grumbling Hive: or, Knaves Turn'd Honest*, a work that later evolved into his *Fable of the Bees*. (See Mandeville's comment on his use of the term 'knave' in Remark B, 61–3.) Hume also uses the term 'knave' similarly in his essay 'Of the Independency of Parliament' 1–2. This term and a literature of related problems existed before Mandeville. For example, Hobbes's[B] 'fool' who believes there is no justice and that covenants need not be kept is similar to this knave (*Leviathan* 15.4). Spinoza mentioned the problem of why we should be moral, using the 'knave' as an example (*Collected Works*, 1: Letter 23, to Willem van Blijenbergh, 13 Mar. 1665; but Hume would probably not have known of this letter).

82.33 **luxury]** The connotation of 'luxury' here may differ from Hume's previous uses; see ann. 11.31.

APPENDIX 1

83.2 **question first started]** The goal first stated in Sect. 1 was the discovery of the general principles of morals and the proper roles of reason and sentiment. Resolution of some remaining problems was postponed from Sect. 1 to this Appendix.

83.21 **general rule]** These cryptic passages may, in part, compress some arguments in *THN* 3.2.2–3, 6. See also Hume's discussion below of public utility and individual cases at Appx. 3.6.

83.26 **object of municipal laws]** See also *EPM* 3.45 and Dial. 29. A similar function is assigned to municipal law in an elaborate footnote at *THN* 3.2.3.10.

84.9 ***reason* instructs . . . *humanity* makes a distinction]** See also *THN* 3.1 and 2.3.3. This account of the role of reason had precedents, esp. in Hutcheson's *Inquiry*, Treatise 2, 3.15; 4.3; *Essay*, 105 f., 181, 213–33; 'Letters to Burnet', 28–31; *Short Introduction* 1.1.4–5 (6–7). John Balguy criticized Hutcheson's doctrine in his *Foundation* 1 (23 f., 28 f.).

84.20 **in generals]** to general terms.

84.26 **crime of *ingratitude*]** See further *THN* 3.1.1.24 and *EPM*, nn. 18 and 42. Hume's treatment of ingratitude as a moral transgression had predecessors in the work of Cicero,[B] *De officiis* 2.18.63; Hobbes,[B] *Leviathan* 15.16; *Elements of Law* 1.16.7; 1.17.14; and *De cive* 3.8; Pufendorf, *Duty of Man* 1.8.7–8 and *On the Law of Nature and Nations* 3.3.17; Descartes, *Passions* 194; Spinoza, *Ethics* 4.P71 and *Short Treatise* 2.13; Butler, *Fifteen Sermons* 8; Hutcheson, *Essay*, Treatise 1, 3.6 and Treatise 2, 3; *Inquiry*, Treatise 2, 3.2–3; 5.2; *Short Introduction* 2.4.6 (and see also *System* 1.4.3; 2.5.6).

84.29 **Anatomize all these circumstances]** In *Abstract* 2, Hume said that his objective was to 'anatomize human nature in a regular manner'. In a letter to Hutcheson of 17 Sept. 1739 (*Letters*, 1: 32), Hume identified himself as like an 'anatomist' who examines the 'most secret Springs & Principles' of human nature without attempting to pass value judgements on the subjects treated. See also *THN* 1.4.6.23.

84.32 ***matter of fact* or of *relations*]** This distinction between two types of proposition and two capacities of reason had many predecessors. For a source that influenced Hume (as he notes at *EHU*, n. 10), see Locke,[B] *Essay* 4.2.1–9. Some of Hume's formulations resemble those of Malebranche;[B] both philosophers cite arithmetic, algebra, and geometry as exemplars of relations of ideas (*EHU* 4.1; Malebranche, *Search after Truth* 1.2.1 [7–8]; 6.1.4–5 [427–34]). See also Hume's presentation of the two roles of reason in *THN* 3.1.1 and *EHU* 4; and see ann. 85.7.

85.3 **structure and fabric]** See 1.3 and Intro., pp. 18–22. Use of terms such as 'fabric' and 'anatomy' were common in philosophy for purposes similar to Hume's. See e.g. George Turnbull, *Principles* 1.5 (1: 146–50), quoting Shaftesbury.[B]

85.7 ***moral relations* . . . the truths of geometry or algebra]** An apparent reference is here made to rationalist theories, such as those of Clarke[B] and Balguy. See Chambers (*Cyclopædia*, 'Morality') and Hume's reference at *EPM* 3.35 and n. 12. See also *THN* 3.1.1, 'Moral distinctions not deriv'd from reason', which includes a series of arguments against the rationalists.

85.39 **defines virtue]** See n. 50 above for a definition of virtue, and see the 'definition of Personal Merit' given at *EPM* 9.12.

86.5 **metaphysics . . . any thing abstruse]** On metaphysics and the abstruse, see ann. 34.27.

86.31 **disquisitions of the understanding]** See also Appx. 1.6. These observations about the functions and limits of the understanding may be responses to those who dismiss appeals to sentiment. For example, Balguy saw no need for appeals to either 'sentiment or internal sense' because understanding is sufficient for the task (*Foundation* 2 (17)).

86.37 **mistake of *fact* and . . . *right*]** Cf. the directly parallel discussion of this distinction in *THN* 3.1.1.14.

87.1 **Nero[B] killed Agrippina[B]]** After a long feud, Agrippina threatened to depose her son Nero, which motivated him to have her killed. On the surrounding events, see ann. 40.35 and 43.11.

87.15 **compare moral beauty with natural]** This subject and distinction are discussed further in *THN* 2.1.8.3 (see also 3.1.1.21); *EHU* 12.33; and 'The Sceptic' 15–18.

87.26 **Euclid[B]]** This entire paragraph is copied from Hume's essay 'The Sceptic' 16, first published in 1742. Euclid's *Elements* remained a standard manual of geometry during Hume's lifetime; Euclid's importance is mentioned in *EHU* and *Dialogues*. In *THN* 1.2.4 Hume frequently used Euclidean notions, but without naming Euclid.

87.34 **Palladio[B] and Perrault[B]]** Andrea Palladio refined and adapted ancient Roman architecture to his period and was responsible for the popularity of 'Palladian motif'. His treatise on architecture led to the importation of his style into England as Palladianism. Claude Perrault was one of the designers of the east façade of the Louvre, but was not, as sometimes had been reported in the 18th c., its sole designer. Hume is apparently referring to *A Treatise of the Five Orders of Columns*, in which Perrault discusses the cornice, frieze, base, entablature, and shaft and architrave. See Hume's comment on 'rules of architecture' in *THN* 2.1.8.2.

88.4 **Cicero[B] . . . Verres[B] or a Catiline[B]]** Hume is referring to two works by Cicero: *Against Verres* and *Against Catiline*. Both are similarly mentioned by Hume in his essay 'Of Eloquence' 16. Gaius Verres was convicted of tax theft, extortion, embezzlement, pillage of art, and disregard of civil rights. Cicero recorded his prosecution of Verres, who was then executed. Hume briefly discusses Verres' 'cruelties' and 'criminal' behaviour in his essay 'That Politics may be reduced to a Science' 9. L. Sergius Catiline entered into a conspiracy to plunder Rome and assassinate the consuls. Cicero, a consul, helped foil the plan, assailing Catiline in the Senate and Forum (see Hume's appraisal in *NHR* 14.7).

88.9 **indignation or compassion]** These feelings are discussed in Hume's essay 'Of Tragedy' 1, 9, 19, 22, which presents them in connection with Cicero[B] and Verres.[B] See also *THN* 2.2.7, 'Of compassion'.

88.25 **Nero[B] . . . murdered Agrippina[B]]** See ann. 87.1.

88.28 **by *reason*]** Hume's view that the ultimate goals of human action cannot be explained by appeal to reason had several predecessors. See the discussion of Hutcheson in ann. 84.9. Balguy struggles with this problem in responding to Hutcheson (*Foundation* 2 [23, 80 f.]).

89.14 **Reason . . . no motive to action]** See *THN* 2.3.3, 'Of the influencing motives of the will'; *DIS* 5.1–2; and ann. 84.9. The *DIS* passage gives a particularly clear and terse definition of reason and explanation of why it cannot be a motive to action.

89.23 **Supreme Being]** Hume may be referring to two types of theism: (1) rationalist theories such as Clarke's[B] that emphasize the 'eternal and inflexible' nature of truth and of God, and (2) sentiment theories such as Hutcheson's that emphasize divine freedom, providence, and design, including the design of human nature.

APPENDIX 2

90 **Appendix 2]** This Appendix may have been influenced by the writings of Butler; see *Fifteen Sermons* (esp. Preface and Sermons 1–3, 11–12). He argued that benevolence and self-love, though distinct, are both parts of human nature and that both can influence a person's actions in the same circumstance. Like Hume, Butler insisted that many actions cannot be explained entirely by the principle of self-love.

90.1 **principle, supposed to prevail]** The principle 'that all *benevolence* is mere hypocrisy' is often associated with Mandeville's *Fable of the Bees*. Hume's phrasing of this principle resembles Lord Shaftesbury,[B] in *Characteristics*, 'Sensus Communis' 3.3 (79). However, Shaftesbury's statement of the principle is broad enough to include Hume's second principle, mentioned immediately below at Appx. 2.2.

90.22 **another principle]** The first principle ('all *benevolence* is mere hypocrisy') is mentioned at Appx. 2.1. Immediately below Hume presents Epicurus,[B] Atticus,[B] Horace,[B] Hobbes,[B] Locke,[B] Epicureans, and Hobbists as exponents of this second and 'resembling' principle that 'no passion is, or can be disinterested'.

91.5 **Epicurus[B] . . . Atticus[B] and Horace[B]]** Epicurus taught that living in accordance with the traditional virtues is a means to the end of greater happiness and personal development. Even enemies were said to have admired the Epicureans' practices of friendship. Atticus, an Epicurean, was esteemed by Athenians for his amiability, good character, benevolence, and cultured refinement. In his essay 'Of the Rise and Progress of the Arts and Sciences' 33, Hume describes Atticus as 'That learned and virtuous Roman, whose dignity, though he was only a private gentleman, was inferior to that of no one in Rome'. Horace, to whom Epicurean beliefs have commonly been attributed, was prized by Augustus[B] and the patricians of Rome, and was close to the poets Virgil,[B] Tibullus, and Varius.

91.7 **austerer schools]** schools of classical philosophy with the most austere or ascetic demands of virtuous conduct, such as the Stoics and Cynics. See ann. 53.12.

91.8 **selfish system]** 'The selfish system of morals' is psychological egoism. Many philosophers before Hume had interpreted Hobbes[B] as an egoist in *Leviathan* (see 14.8, 29; 15.4, 16, 31; 27.8). For example, Richard Cumberland had struggled with the proper interpretation of Hobbes in *Laws of Nature* 3; and Shaftesbury[B] had

depicted Hobbes as explaining 'all the social passions and natural affections as to denominate them of the selfish kind . . . only a more deliberate selfishness', *Characteristics*, 'Sensus Communis' 3.3 (79). He offered a similar appraisal of Locke.[B] However, Hobbes (*Leviathan* 13–14) and Locke (*Essay* 1.3.13; 2.21.41–56; 2.28.5; *Second Treatise* 9.123–4) do not use the same terms to express their views; and hedonism is often more apparent than egoism.

In mentioning the 'irreproachable lives' of Hobbes and Locke, Hume is referring to their reputations for character and integrity. Hobbes was controversial and considered prideful, but enjoyed a reputation for wit, good spirits, and a good moral disposition. Locke received esteem and affection from many friends and was regarded as a modest, polite, honest person of sound practical judgement.

91.12 **Hobbist]** 'Hobbist', often a term of abuse, could refer to many figures. In '*Brief Lives', . . . by John Aubrey,* a somewhat gossipy resource, numerous figures of the 17th c. were reported to have admired Hobbes[B] for his work and character. The designation 'Hobbist' extended into Hume's time, when many people who would have repudiated the label were assigned it anyway. Samuel Johnson, according to Boswell, once referred to Hume as a Hobbist (see Russell, 'A Hobbist Tory'). In Hume's lifetime, the egoism indicated here was endorsed most prominently by the 'Hobbist' Bernard Mandeville.

91.40 **science of human nature]** Cf. *THN*, introduction 9; 1.1.1.12; 1.2.5.19; *Abstract* 3, 35; *EHU* 1.1 ff.

92.10 **selfish passions]** Cf. Hume's essay, 'The Stoic' 15, where he contrasts the selfish passions and the social passions.

92.15 **love of *simplicity*]** On this 'love of *simplicity*'—i.e. a desire to admit as few principles or causes as are needed for purposes of explanation—see the passages at *EPM* 5.16 ('simpler to consider') and at Appx. 2.12. Hutcheson maintained a view similar to Hume's in his *Essay* (preface, x–xi): 'Some strange Love of *Simplicity* in the Structure of human Nature, [a] favourite *Hypothesis*, . . . has engag'd many *Writers* to pass over a great many *simple Perceptions*, which we may find in our selves. . . . Had they . . . consider'd our *Affections* without a previous Notion, that they were all from *Self-Love*, they might have felt an *ultimate Desire* of the Happiness of others as easily conceivable, and as certainly implanted in the human Breast, tho perhaps not so strong as *Self-Love*.' Although Hume criticizes egoists for carrying simplicity too far (losing sight of other principles), he commends simplicity in scientific explanation and accepts the rule of Newton[B] that we should admit only as many causes as are true and sufficient for purposes of explanation (*EHU* 4.12).

92.17 **Many able philosophers]** the opponents of egoism, such as Shaftesbury,[B] Hutcheson, and Butler.

92.27 and n. 61 **witty philosopher]** Footnote reference: Bernard le Bovier de Fontenelle, *Entretiens sur la pluralité des mondes* (*Conversations on the Plurality of Worlds*). The 'witty philosopher', Fontenelle,[B] wrote prose works that contain para-

doxes and themes expressing various postulates similar to the principle mentioned by Hume. Fontenelle explored the implications of scientific claims for the human mind. He argued that humans often welcome obscure speculative causes in order to explain phenomena and that philosophers are vulnerable to prejudice and false reasoning when they ask more of reason than it can deliver in the attempt to discover nature's secrets. Illustrations of this thesis are scattered throughout *A Plurality of Worlds* and *History of Oracles* (two works that Hume cites elsewhere). For example, Fontenelle cites once firmly held beliefs in order to show their obsolescence in light of modern knowledge, such as the belief that an eclipse was the result of an angry conflict between the sun and moon (*Plurality*, 46–7); and he proposes that incorrect causal explanations become accepted because of human prejudice and superstition (*Oracles*, 2). See Hume's essay 'Of Tragedy' 6, which cites Fontenelle's discussion of a remotely related problem in the causation of pleasure and pain.

94.2 ***imaginary* interest]** On the role of imaginary interest, see ann. 36.21.

94.17 **passions . . . regard to interest]** This account of the passions and moral psychology resembles Butler's. Similar themes are found in Shaftesbury[B] and Hutcheson; see ann. n. 34.

n. 62.1 **Virg.[B] . . . Seneca[B]]** Footnote references: Virgil, *Georgics* 4, line 238. Seneca, *Moral Essays* 3, 'De ira' 1.1. The passage from Virgil may be translated as follows: 'And they leave their lives in the wound.' Virgil is speaking of a 'rage beyond measure' of the sort possessed by bees who deposit their stingers and die as a result. The passage from Seneca may be translated: 'Having no thought for itself provided that it may injure another.' Seneca is writing to Novatus about how anger might be allayed. He maintains that anger, unlike many emotions, is violent, involving a rage that absorbs the person in the desire to harm another.

APPENDIX 3

96.2 **origin and nature of Justice]** Hume's discussion of justice in Sect. 3 treats the connection between justice and public utility. This appendix emphasizes the origin and nature of justice, as did *THN* 3.2.2. Before Hume, many had undertaken to discuss the nature of justice, but many fewer its origins. In *De cive*, Hobbes[B] placed on the title-pages (under the first title, *Philosophicall Rudiments concerning Government and Society*) his ambition to demonstrate 'the Origine of Justice', and in *Leviathan* 15 he analysed both the 'original of justice' and 'the nature of justice' in terms of the keeping of valid covenants. Plato,[B] Cicero,[B] and Grotius[B] may also have influenced Hume's discussion; see ann. n. 63.2.

96.6 **scheme or system]** See the treatment in *THN* 3.3.1.12–13.

97.10 **long coat . . . short coat]** Hume's story is about Cyrus I;[B] it is found in Xenophon,[B] *Cyropaedia* 1.3.17:

> A big boy with a little tunic, finding a little boy with a big tunic on, took it off him and put his own tunic on him, while he himself put on the other's. So, when I tried their case, I decided that it was better for them both that each should keep the tunic that fitted him. And thereupon the master flogged me, saying that when I was a judge of a good fit, I should do as I had done; but when it was my duty to decide whose tunic it was, I had this question, he said, to consider—whose title was the rightful one; whether it was right that he who took it away by force should keep it, or that he who had had it made for himself or had bought it should own it. And since, he said, what is lawful is right and what is unlawful is wrong, he bade the judge always render his verdict on the side of the law. It is in this way, mother, you see, that I already have a thorough understanding of justice in all its bearings.

97.22 **laws of nature]** See *EPM* 3.29 and Appx. 3.8–9. Laws of nature are more extensively discussed in *THN*, beginning at 3.2.1.19 and ending at 3.3.2.10. See esp. *THN* 3.2.4–12.

97.39 HUMAN CONVENTIONS] At *THN* 3.2.2.10, Hume refers to a convention as 'a general sense of common interest; which sense all the members of the society express to one another, and which induces them to regulate their conduct by certain rules'. His quotation from Grotius[B] (at n. 63) on 'how private property arose' from 'a kind of agreement' suggests that he regards Grotius as an important conventionalist. Hume's passage here shows the influence of Grotius' historical account of the gradual emergence of rules of private property through tacit agreements. The social contract theories of Hobbes[B] and Locke[B] are also candidates (as are many figures in ancient philosophy). In his essay 'Of the Original Contract' 34, 46, Hume discusses how '*justice* or a regard to the property of others, . . . become[s] obligatory'; Locke is cited as 'the most noted of [the] partizans' of an 'original contract' theory, and Locke's *Two Treatises* 11.138–40 is mentioned for its analysis of property.

98.18 **pull the oars]** See the use of this example in the near-identical passage in *THN* 3.2.2.10.

n. 63.2 GROTIUS[B]] Footnote reference: Hugo Grotius, *De jure belli ac pacis* (*On the Law of War and Peace*) 2.2.2, arts. 4–5. The subject of *THN* 3.2.2 is justice and property, and Hume discusses property and 'every writer, that has treated of the laws of nature' in *THN* 3.2.3.7 (note). The passage from Grotius cited in n. 63 may be translated as follows:

> From them [several sources, some biblical] we learn why it was that the initial sharing, first of movable and later of immovable possessions, was abandoned: it was undoubtedly because people, not content to live on what grew naturally to hand, to live in caves, to go naked or clothed in the bark of trees or the hides of wild animals, opted for a choicer mode of life. That called for a life of application, each to his individual tasks. But too little produce was collected this way into the common store. The remoteness of the places people went to was the first obstacle, and then their deficiencies in justice and affection, which had the result that

> neither in the labour exerted nor in the produce consumed was fairness preserved. At the same time we learn how private property arose. It was not just by a mental act; because one party could not know what things another wished to have in order to abstain from them, and there could be more who wanted the same thing. It was rather by a kind of agreement, either explicit, as when one divides between the parties, or tacit, as when one takes possession of something.

Grotius argued that the concept of property implies a social agreement only later formalized by contracts. Grotius' theories in *On the Law of War and Peace* were influential on Scottish moral philosophers prior to and during Hume's lifetime, as were Pufendorf's views in *On the Law of Nature and Nations* 4.4.4–6,14–15; also 4.1.5.

Contrast these views with Locke[B] on a natural right to property in accordance with one's investment of labour. In Second Treatise 5.25, Locke denied the importance of the 'kind of agreement' mentioned by Grotius and tried to explain property 'without any express Compact of all the Commoners' (*Two Treatises*, 286). Other relevant natural law accounts of property include Heineccius, *Methodical System*, 1.9.233–6 (172–3) and Cumberland, *Laws of Nature* 1.22 and 7.1–9. See also ann. n. 65.

98.26 and n. 64 **word, *natural*]** Hume had long made a point of the multiple meanings of this term and its significance. See his early correspondence with Hutcheson, 17 Sept. 1739 (*Letters*, 1: 32) and *THN* 3.2.1.19. On Hume's use of 'natural' in 'natural justice' and 'natural law' in *EPM*, see ann. 21.21–22.21 and n. 12; 28.7.

n. 64.7 **disputes are merely verbal]** For more on disputes as merely verbal, see at Appx. 4.1 and Appx. 4.2; *EHU* 8.22–3; *NHR* 7.1; *THN* 1.4.6.21; *Dialogues* 12.8. Hume is perhaps influenced by Locke:[B] 'The greatest part of the Disputes in the World', he says, may be 'merely verbal' (*Essay* 3.11.7).

99.26 **jurisprudence . . . courts of judicature]** Jurisprudence, sometimes called the *science of law* and also *philosophy of law*, was defined by Adam Smith (in 1762) as 'the theory of the rules by which civil governments ought to be directed' (*Lectures* 1.1 (5)). However, the term is ambiguous, and Hume seems to be using the more general meaning of 'jurisprudence', as *knowledge of or competence in law*. 'Pleaders' are those who plead in a court of law (advocates); and 'courts of judicature' are courts that interpret the law and oversee the administration of justice. The term 'jurisprudence' appears only this one time in Hume's published philosophical writings (and once in Hume's index, referring to this passage), but there was a long tradition of scholarly work on the subject, particularly in the natural jurisprudence tradition. See also Hume's reference above in n. 63 to Grotius,[B] who along with Pufendorf deeply influenced 18th-c. thought about jurisprudence. Other influential sources included Locke,[B] Hutcheson, and Cocceius (von Cocceji). For possible points of connection to this tradition in *EPM*, see ann. 17.14 and n. 11 and 21.21.

n. 65.3 **property]** See Hume's discussion of property and possession at *THN* 3.2.2–4, where he seems at various points to be reflecting on and criticizing Locke,[B] *Two Treatises* 5.27–36, 44–6, 51.

n. 65.37 **accessions . . . civilians . . . *alluvion*]** A jurisprudential account of these legal concepts is found in Grotius,[B] the source on property cited by Hume in n. 63. See *On the Law of War and Peace* 2.8–17, which notes that many ancient and modern jurists have dealt with these problems. For influential treatments besides those cited by Grotius, see Pufendorf, *On the Law of Nature and Nations* 4.7, 9, and *Duty of Man* 1.12.7; Hutcheson, *Short Introduction* 2.6; Heineccius, *Universal Law* 1.250–62; Cocceijus (von Cocceji), 'Introductio', 311–21; Stair, *Institutions* 2.1.34–5. See also *THN* 3.2.3.9–10 (notes).

APPENDIX 4

102.12 **terms *virtue* and *vice*]** Locke[B] commented on the breadth of the 'names' *virtue* and *vice* in *Essay* 1.3.17 and 2.28.10.

102.18 **boundaries of virtues and talents]** Cf. the parallel discussion of the boundaries of virtues and natural abilities in *THN* 3.3.4.

102.21 **grammatical enquiry]** On controversies as grammatical or 'merely verbal', see ann. 103.14 for references. The thesis that it belongs to the province of grammarians to distinguish virtues from other qualities appears in *THN* 3.3.4.4.

103.2 ***intellectual* and *moral* endowments]** Aristotle,[B] *Nicomachean Ethics* $1138^{b}18$–$1139^{b}13$ and $1143^{b}17$–$1145^{a}12$, supplies a classic distinction between intellectual and moral virtues. Aristotle writes as follows about the source of action: 'The source of action . . . is choice, and the source of choice is desire combined with reason, looking to a goal. . . . However, intellect by itself moves nothing . . .' ($1139^{a}32$–5). Aristotle also maintains that 'we deliberate, then select, and then fix our desire in terms of the outcome of the deliberation' ($1113^{a}13$–14).

At Appx. 4.12 Hume explicitly mentions Aristotle. In the first three editions (1751–8) of this Appendix, Hume referred in the first paragraph to 'all antient Moralists, (the best Models) . . .'. This reference to the ancients was dropped (or perhaps modified and relocated a few pages later) in the 1760 and all later editions.

103.14 **merely verbal]** See ann. n. 64 and 102.21. See also *THN* 3.3.4.1.

n. 66 ***amour propre* . . . ROCHEFOUCAULT]** Footnote reference: François de la Rochefoucauld, *Maximes*. Although 'amour propre' is conventionally translated 'self-love' and 'self-regard', other apt translations in La Rochefoucauld,[B] depending on the context, include 'pride', 'conceit', 'egotism', 'vanity', and 'boastfulness'. The expression generally was used with a connotation of selfishness, but it also meant simply 'self-regard'. In no context in Rochefoucauld is 'amour propre' commended (although he was often interpreted in the 18th c. as siding with Hobbes[B]). See e.g. maxims 2, 3, 4, 13, 46, 83, 88, 228, 235, 247, 261, 274, 324, 339, 494, 504, 509, 510, 518. Twenty-seven entries of 'amour propre' appear in Rochefoucauld's *Maximes* (Bazin, *Index*).

104.27 **Demosthenes[B] and Philip[B]]** Both men exhibited a broad range of intellectual and moral virtues. Perhaps Philip's chief virtues were decisiveness, organization, and diplomacy (as Cicero[B] suggests in *Philippics*, a source cited by Hume, at *EPM* 6.19 and n. 29). Perhaps Demosthenes' chief virtues were eloquence and discernment. So successful were Demosthenes' orations against Philip that, according to Plutarch,[B] 'Philip said to those who reported to him the public speeches of Demosthenes against him, "I myself, if I had heard Demosthenes speak, would have elected the man general to carry on the war against me" ' (Plutarch, *Moralia*, 'Demosthenes' 845 D [10: 420–1]). For the historical and political background, see ann. 36.15; 62.3 and n. 43; 120.12 and n. 90; and Hume's 'Of Eloquence'.

104.30 **The figure . . .]** The remainder of this paragraph and the final two-thirds of the next paragraph are effectively identical to three passages in *THN* 3.3.4.2, 4.

105.9 **Sallust[B]]** The reference is to Sallust, *War with Catiline*[B] 53.6 and 54.1–6. Sallust declared Caesar[B] and Cato[B] men of 'towering merit'. Sallust viewed Caesar as generous, gentle, forgiving, compassionate, good-natured, and a refuge for the unfortunate, as well as a person who attempted to prevent the passions from overwhelming good judgement. Sallust described Cato as austere, steadfast, and a 'scourge for the wicked' and praised Cato's integrity and absolute refusal of bribery. Cato, on balance, is given the more favourable judgement because he was less ambitious for fame and more consistently virtuous than Caesar. See also ann. 119.22.

n. 67.1 **Love and esteem]** The first half of this note is virtually identical to *THN* 3.3.4.2 (note), and the middle portion resembles the discussion in *THN* 2.2.10.3–4.

105.22 and n. 68 **poet]** Footnote reference: John Armstrong,[B] *The Art of Preserving Health* 4, lines 267–8. Armstrong appears to be delineating central features of virtue rather than defining the word 'virtue'. He observes that virtue requires wisdom ('sense'), spirited feeling, humanity, and strength and beauty in one's inner life (*Art*, 114). Armstrong was Hume's friend. James Boswell reports that on 17 Dec. 1775 Hume described *Art of Preserving Health* as 'the most classical poem in the English language' and ventured the judgement that Armstrong had failed to receive the 'encouragement which he deserved as a man of genius' (Boswell, *Ominous Years*, 200). Hume was less enthusiastic, however, about another of Armstrong's writings. On 13 Mar. 1770 (*Letters*, 2: 218), he wrote to William Strahan that, 'I am sorry to hear that Dr Armstrong has printed his Tragedy among his Miscellanies. It is certainly one of the worst pieces I ever saw; and totally unworthy of his other Productions.'

106.1 **gaming]** Playing games of chance for stakes was a subject of both intellectual and moral interest in the 18th c. Chance was investigated by mathematicians such as Abraham de Moivre, whose *Doctrine of Chances* was published in 1718. He computed the variety of chance in different circumstances with the practical goal of determining where the advantage lies in gaming (preface, ii–v). See also Hume's *THN* 2.3.10.9 and 'Of Tragedy' 3–4.

106.4 and n. 69 **Achæus**[B]] Footnote reference: Polybius, *Histories* 8.20–1. Achaeus was executed for seeking military independence from Antiochus. Polybius[B] writes: 'Thus did Achaeus perish, after taking every reasonable precaution and defeated only by the perfidy of those whom he had trusted, leaving two useful lessons to posterity, firstly to trust no one too easily, and secondly not to be boastful in the season of prosperity, but being men to be prepared for anything' (8.21.10–11).

106.11 and n. 70 **Cicero**[B] **. . . Atticus**[B]] Footnote reference: Cicero, *Letters to Atticus* 9.10. Cicero wrote to Atticus that he missed Pompey[B] but could not condone Pompey's blunders: 'the ugliness of his flight and his carelessness have estranged my love'.

106.23 and nn. 71–72 **Cicero's *Offices***] Footnote references: Cicero, *De officiis* 1.6; Cicero, *De oratore* 2.84.343–4. Cicero[B] regarded the term 'virtue' as broad in scope, but he observes in *De officiis* 1.6.18–19 that everything virtuous relies at some point on one or more of the four cardinal virtues, which are interwoven, but distinguishable. The passage from Cicero in n. 72 may be translated:

> Virtue merits praise in itself and is essential to anything else that can be praised; it has, however, several sides to it, some of which are more appropriately praised than others. For there are some virtues that are exhibited in people's conduct and with a certain courtesy and humanity, and others that appear in some faculty of mind, or in magnanimity and strength. Clemency, justice, friendliness, honesty, fortitude in common dangers—these are the virtues we enjoy hearing extolled in eulogies, because they are all considered advantageous not so much to those who possess them as to the whole human race; whereas wisdom, magnanimity (which regards all human affairs as slight and nugatory), strength and invention of intellect, and even eloquence, though they elicit no less admiration, give less pleasure, because they seem to adorn and protect those on whom we bestow the praise rather than those in whose presence it is bestowed. Nevertheless these kinds of virtues should be included in our praises, because mankind likes to hear praised both what gives joy and pleasure, and whatever there is in virtue that is cause for admiration.

106.26 **cardinal virtues**] In Plato,[B] *Republic* 427E, the classical four cardinal virtues—temperance, courage, justice, and wisdom—are invoked to express the goodness of the soul. Later, Cicero[B] (*De officiis* 1.5–27) lists the cardinal virtues as temperance, fortitude, justice, and wisdom (the latter including prudence). St Augustine follows St Ambrose in adding the four cardinal virtues of Greek antiquity to the Christian virtues of faith, hope, and love (*Morals* 15). Aquinas discusses 'the cardinal virtues' in *Summa Theologica* II-I.61, citing Ambrose and Augustine and listing temperance, justice, prudence, and fortitude. Hutcheson briefly discusses the cardinal virtues in *Short Introduction* 1.3, arguing that 'the Antients' conceived of the cardinal virtues as four classes (prudence, justice, temperance, and fortitude) from which all 'branches of virtue' are derivable. In *THN* 3.3.4.4 Hume maintains that 'the antient moralists in particular made no scruple of placing prudence at the head of the cardinal virtues'.

106.27 and n. 72 **one head]** Social duties are all alike under the heading of virtues in Cicero,[B] but he says virtue has several divisions. He includes divisions such as eloquence and strength and originality of intellect.

n. 72.18 ***The Whole Duty of Man***] Footnote reference: Anon., *The Whole Duty of Man*. This work was a widely circulated, English Anglican book of devotion on Christian ethical and religious duty. According to James Boswell, Hume said he studied its austere list of vices as a boy (*Boswell in Extremes*, 11). In a letter to Francis Hutcheson of 17 Sept. 1739 (*Letters*, 1: 34), Hume said, 'Upon the whole, I desire to take my Catalogue of Virtues from *Cicero's Offices* [*De officiis*], not from the *Whole Duty of Man*.' Although the lists of virtues in Cicero[B] and *Whole Duty* differ significantly, they also share many items in common, and the list of vices is similar. Unlike Cicero, however, *Whole Duty* gives a distinctly Christian analysis of the virtues, and adds virtues such as 'Meekness' and 'Humility' that presumably Cicero and Hume (see *THN* 3.3.2.13) would not include on their lists. See at *EPM* 9.3, where Hume comments on 'celibacy, fasting, penance, mortification', etc.

107.1 **Aristotle's Ethics]** Aristotle[B] discusses the virtues listed by Hume at the following points in his *Nicomachean Ethics*: *Courage*, 1115^{a}7–1117^{b}23; *Temperance*, 1117^{b}24–1119^{b}19; *Magnificence*, 1122^{a}19–1123^{a}33; *Justice*, 1129^{a}1–1138^{b}14; *Friendship*, 1155^{a}1–1172^{a}15. The other virtues on Hume's list are often translated differently. *Prudence* or practical wisdom is first discussed at 1140^{a}24–^{b}30. *Magnanimity* or pride, also translated 'greatness of soul (mind)', is discussed at 1123^{a}34–1125^{a}35; *Modesty* or 'shame' at 1128^{b}10–36. *Manly openness* ('manly freedom' in all but the last of Hume's editions of *EPM*) or 'liberality' is discussed at 1119^{b}21–1122^{a}17. In speaking of 'titles of chapters' Hume presumably means Latin titles in the bilingual edition he used. (Aristotle had commonly been studied in Latin translations.)

107.7 **Epictetus[B]. . . Stoics . . . Solomon[B]**] The Stoics, among them Epictetus, suggested (sometimes above all else) that the good or wise person is not controlled or enslaved by the passions (Arrian, *Discourses*). The 'parables of Solomon' in Proverbs (see 1: 1–6) lay emphasis on wisdom, instruction, understanding, judgement, justice, and equity. On Epictetus and Stoicism, see ann. 53.12. Hume's essay 'The Stoic' should also be consulted, together with his discussion of Epictetus and the Stoics in the early paragraphs of the (withdrawn) essay 'Of Moral Prejudices'. In the latter, Hume paraphrases Epictetus (*Encheiridion* 16, in *Discourses*, 2: 494–7) on a similar recommendation regarding how to handle an afflicted friend. In 'Of Polygamy and Divorces' 11, Hume presents a less generous interpretation of Solomon.

107.12 and n. 73 **David[B]**] Footnote reference: Ps. 49: 18. This psalm is concerned with the role of riches in human life: riches and the praise of others are seen as screens behind which some people hide. The author, by tradition, is King David of Israel. There is no direct condemnation of wealth. The psalmist recommends that one:

> Be not afraid when one becomes rich,
> when the glory of his house increases.
> For when he dies he will carry nothing away;
> his glory will not go down after him.
> Though, while he lives, he counts himself happy,
> and though *a man gets praise when he does well for himself*,
> he will go to the generation of his fathers, who will never
> more see the light. (Ps. 49: 16–19. Italics added.)

107.13 and n. 74 **Greek poet]** Footnote reference: Euripides, *Fragments*. The passage from Euripides[B] may be translated, 'I hate the practitioner of wisdom who is not wise in his own eyes'. The identical passage, in Greek, is found in Plutarch,[B] *Lives*, 'Alexander' 53.2 and Cicero,[B] *Letters to his Friends* 13.15.2. Cicero credits Euripides. However, only Plutarch, not Cicero or Lucian[B] (see below), has Greek identical to that quoted by Hume. In the 1st edn. of *EPM* (1751 [113]), Hume cites a different source in n. 74: 'Incert, apud Lucianum, Apologia pro mercede conductis.' This reference is to an unnamed tragedy quoted in Lucian's *Apology for the 'Salaried Posts in Great Houses'*. In the 2nd edn. Hume lists the same source (1753 [117]), but provides a correction in the errata (1753 [258]): 'for *Incert apud Luc. &c*. read *Euripid*'. Hume evidently had discovered, before correcting proofs for the 1753 edn., that the proper source of the Greek is a fragment of an unknown play by Euripides. The fragment (*Fragmenta*, fr. 905 [652]) is given different numbers in different editions.

107.14 **Plutarch[B]]** The reference is to Plutarch's *Lives* (his 'history') and *Moralia* (his 'philosophy').

107.20 and n. 75 **Hannibal . . . Livy]** Footnote reference: Livy, *History* 21.4. Hannibal[B] served in Spain under Hasdrubal.[B] See ann. 49.34 regarding Hannibal's most critical defeat, at the hands of Scipio.[B] Livy[B] regards Hannibal as having many virtues that fit him equally well for the contrary offices of commanding and obeying. Entrusted by Hasdrubal with dangerous enterprises, he exhibited courage, confidence, and daring. Livy attributes to him virtually superhuman qualities of endurance and a long list of virtues, but also lists faults and vices. Hume's description is a close paraphrase of Livy, involving virtually no interpretation.

107.32 **perfidy more than *punic*]** breaching trust or promise even more than is entailed by the usual Carthaginian traits (according to the Romans) of faithlessness, treachery, and falsehood. 'Punic' also means Carthaginian.

107.34 and n. 76 **Alexander . . . Guicciardin]** Footnote reference: Francesco Guicciardini, *La storia d'Italia* 1.2. Hume's description of Guicciardini's[B] portrait of Alexander VI[B] is a close paraphrase of the text, amounting to a direct translation (*History*, 90). Hume comments further on this passage from Guicciardini in a letter to Hutcheson of 17 Sept. 1739 (*Letters*, 1: 33 f.).

108.6 and n. 77 **Polybius[B] . . . Timæus[B] . . . Agathocles[B]]** Footnote reference: Polybius, *Histories* 12.15.5–12. Hume's description of Polybius' discussion is again a close paraphrase. Timaeus was exiled by Agathocles, tyrant of Syracuse. In his *History* (bks. 34–8), Timaeus spoke harshly of Agathocles and thereafter was criticized by Polybius for ignorance and dishonesty. Polybius argued that Agathocles possessed impressive personal characteristics unmentioned by Timaeus. Polybius tendered the following judgement: 'It is just as mendacious for a writer to conceal what did occur as to report what did not occur' (12.15.9). Machiavelli[B] used Agathocles as his chief example of coming to power by crime; following Justinus' history, Machiavelli (*Prince* 8) reached conclusions similar to Timaeus'. Hume discusses Agathocles' vicious side further in his essay 'Of the Populousness of Ancient Nations' (n. 84), citing Diodorus Siculus[B] as his source.

108.19 and n. 78 ***whether virtue could be taught*]** Footnote references: Plato,[B] *Meno* 70 A ff.; Seneca, *Moral Essays* 8, 'De otio' 4, esp. sect. 2; Horace,[B] *Epistles* 1, ep. 18, line 100; Aeschines Socraticus, *Dialogues* 1. In Plato's *Meno*, Meno asks Socrates[B] at the outset, 'Can you tell me . . . whether virtue can be taught, or is acquired by practice, not teaching? Or if neither by practice nor by learning, whether it comes to mankind by nature or in some other way?' (*Meno* 70 A). In 'On Leisure', Seneca[B] maintains that leisure allows cultivation of the virtues and contemplation of philosophical questions about virtue, including 'whether it is nature or art that makes men good' (2: 186–9). Horace suggests that virtue may be a natural gift. The quotation in n. 78 appears in this context, as part of an indirect question, and may be translated: 'Whether virtue is procured by teaching, or is the gift of nature'. The reference to Aeschines Socraticus[B] is to the early pages in Dialogue 1, 'De virtute'. This text intimates that divine chance may account for the ability of individuals to be virtuous.

108.37 **sanctions of reward and punishment]** This reference is to moral theologians who accept the premiss that God rewards those who follow divine commands of moral conduct and punishes those who fail to do so. See also ann. 79.27.

109.12 **vulgar system]** In *THN* 1.3.12.5–6 and 1.4.2.36 (and elsewhere) Hume portrays the vulgar as unphilosophical and unreflective people who judge by first appearances, but he notes that we all fall into this class in some of our judgements. On 'vulgar systems of morality', see *THN* 2.1.7.7 and 3.1.1.27. 'Vulgar system' is also applied to religion in *NHR*.

A DIALOGUE

110 **A Dialogue]** This dialogue shows a resemblance to the dialogues in Baron de Montesquieu,[B] *Persian Letters*. The dialogue style, some of the questions, and one of the characters (Usbek) are especially reminiscent. Montesquieu and Hume both explore national characteristics and cultural relativity (see Dial. 25)—themes that

Hume independently explores in his essay 'Of National Characters'. The fictitious characters and locations in Hume's dialogue are often modelled on specific historical figures and locations. At Dial. 13 Hume reveals that he is referring to certain 'GREEKS, especially the ATHENIANS, whom I have couched, all along, under these bizarre names I employed'. Hume's perspective on aspects of this dialogue are provided in his correspondence with Gilbert Elliot in 1751 (*Letters*, 1: 152); see Burton, *Life and Correspondence*, 1: 321–37.

110.28 **perfect character]** Cf. the traits Hume gives to Alcheic with those he earlier gave to his character Cleanthes when describing him as 'a model of perfect virtue' (*EPM* 9.2). See also his model of perfect character in *THN* 3.3.3.9, and, from a perspective beyond moral character, *EHU* 1.5.

111.27 **assassination of USBEK]** Cf. Hume's comments about a 'noble' action of assassination to his comments immediately below about Caesar,[B] Brutus,[B] Cassius,[B] Harmodius,[B] and Aristogiton[B] (at Dial. 15–16 and n. 80).

112.9 **hanged himself]** Cf. Hume's comments on the morality of suicide in his essay 'Of Suicide'. See also Dial. 17, 22, 35; and Hume's comment on 'ancient maxims' at n. 41.

112.14 **VITZLI]** Perhaps modelled on Zeus, or a composite of Zeus and Jupiter.

113.2 **MINGRELIANS, and TOPINAMBOUES]** These peoples were considered primitive and corrupt, based on the reports of travellers. The Mingrelians lived along the Black Sea coast. Pierre Bayle[B] described them as the cruellest and most impudent people on earth, regularly engaging in murder, assassination, lying, use of concubines, adultery, bigamy, incest, and infanticide. Concerning their religion, they were said to have more reverence for relics and images (icons and idols) than for any true God (*Œuvres diverses,* 1: 648–9).

The Topinamboues or Tupinombas were a cannibalistic Indian tribe in Brazil known for ferocity in battle and for the vengeance with which they killed, ate, and displayed the bodies of their enemies. To capture and slay an enemy was an honour, and they ate their enemies not from hunger but from hate and jealousy. A detailed account is found in the writings of Hans Staden, a Dutchman held captive by this tribe (in 1557) and later freed by the French. Staden depicts them as cunning in all forms of wickedness and as constantly at war with their enemies (Staden, *True History*, 127–63).

John Locke[B] mentions the customs of both the Mingrelians and the Tupinombas and lists several sources of his information (*Essay* 1.3.9).

113.9 and n. 79 **amours of the Greeks]** Legislation against seduction, procuring, and sexual abuse was prevalent in ancient Hellenic culture and included controls discouraging pederasty (sexual relations between two males, but a term often used when one of those involved is a minor) and injustice to slaves. However, neither prostitution nor homosexual conduct was illegal in Athens. Hume discussed these questions in a letter to Gilbert Elliot of 18 Feb. 1751 (*Letters*, 1: 152):

The Origin I assign to Paederasty from the Frequency of the gymnastic Exercises amongst the Greeks is founded. (1) On the plain Testimony of Cicero. But I cannot readily point you out the Passage. (2) We may observe, that in that full, natural, undisguis'd Picture of ancient Manners drawn by Homer in his two Poems, there is not the smallest Traces of this Vice. The Friendship betwixt Achilles & Patroclus was pure. They were both middle-ag'd Men, & Patroclus was the elder. Besides, Homer takes Care to lay them apart, & gives each of them a Wench in his Arms. The more antient Greeks therefore were free from this Corruption. Now Thucydides says that the Introduction of the gymnastic Exercises was late. The first Antients had always part of their Body cover'd in their Exercises. (3) Plato says, by way of Reproach both to the Barbarians & Asiatic Greeks, that they were ignorant of Paederasty & the gymnastic Exercises. He speaks of them as connected. Tho' this Question be foreign to my Subject in the Dialogue, I know not but I had better add a Note containing these Arguments.

The Greeks seem rather to have been restrain'd in the Use of Women. A Commerce with a Slave was reproachful. Even wenching or a Commerce with a Courtezan was somewhat scandalous & its Punishment was to render a Man incapable of all public Offices; at least, he was not allow'd to speak to the People. This appears from the Oration of Demosthenes contra Androt. However, I own, this is not reconcilable with many Passages in Antiquity; particularly, that Solon establish'd public Stews by Law. I have put this down amongst my *Greek* Doubts. I find Alcibiades much reproach'd for his wenching by Isocrates, never for Paederasty.

As Hume appears to have noticed, no passage in Cicero explicitly supports these claims, but Plato's *Symposium*, cited in n. 83, does present themes about 'Greek loves'. In a nuanced speech by Pausanias, Plato distinguishes between *heavenly* and *popular* (or common) forms of love, with the objective of finding the type of love that deserves to be praised (180 D ff.). He discusses men who 'love women as well as boys' and love of the body and the soul (181 B). Relationships between boys and their lovers and the attitudes in Athenian society toward homosexual and bisexual relations are also mentioned (183 B–E).

113.9 **exposing of their children]** Hume discusses this practice and mentions sources in his essay 'Of the Populousness of Ancient Nations' 40–2.

113.17 and n. 80 **traitors and assassins]** Footnote references: Appian, *Roman History* 2.16.111–17; Suetonius, *Lives of the Caesars* 2, 'The Deified Julius' 78–84. The authors in n. 80, Appian[B] and Suetonius,[B] provide accounts of the events leading to Caesar's assassination, including reasons for public dissatisfaction. Suetonius discusses the oath taken by Senators, before Caesar's death, to watch over their honoured Caesar.[B] Aristogiton[B] and Harmodius[B] were Athenian tyrannicides. They attempted to kill the tyrant Hippias and his brother Hipparchus. The scheme foundered when only Hipparchus was killed. Harmodius was slain at the scene; Aristogiton was captured and executed. Three years later the tyranny was overthrown,

and the two tyrannicides were honoured by the populace as vanguards of liberation. Statues in their honour were erected in the Agora, and they were elevated in poetry to the status of epic heroes. In his essay 'Of Some Remarkable Customs' 5, Hume cites Demosthenes,[B] *Contra Aristogiton*, as a source of his information. Thucydides[B] and Herodotus[B] maintained that misinformation surrounded this worship of Aristogiton and Harmodius inasmuch as the act of killing Hipparchus made the tyranny of Hippias worse and played no direct role in the liberation of Athens. (Thucydides 1.1.20; 6.19.54–60; Herodotus 5.55; 6.109; 6.123.)

113.26 **Themistocles[B] . . . Eurybiades[B]]** Hume's account of the exchange between Themistocles and Eurybiades closely paraphrases Plutarch[B] (*Lives*, 'Themistocles' 11.2–3). The two military leaders had met to determine the best strategy to thwart the Persian threat. Eurybiades was the commander-in-chief of the combined Hellenic forces, Themistocles the pre-eminent strategist. Eurybiades argued for retreat, and Themistocles resisted. Sharp words were exchanged. Eurybiades was impressed by Themistocles' intensity and allowed him to restate his case.

113.31 and n. 81 **Socrates[B] . . . Xenophon[B]]** Footnote references: Xenophon, *Memorabilia* 3.14.1. By 'my last story' Hume is referring to his story of Alcheic and his club at Dial. 11. Hume says that he 'exactly copied' Xenophon's account, which reports that when some of the members of an assembled dining-group brought more meat than others, Socrates would either distribute the food of the least advantaged members equally among all or put it into the common stock. Wealthy diners who brought fine meals then felt obliged to put their food into the common stock.

114.27 **nation . . . vogue and esteem]** The nation is probably France (either medieval or modern France). See ann. 31.16–19 on an immoral gallantry and the court or parliament of love.

115.17 **their favourite morality]** The nation may again be France, and Hume may be building on a similar discussion by Montesquieu[B] of the 'laws of honour' in France, including duelling, through which the French regulated their affairs (*Persian Letters* 90–1). Hume may also be contrasting the themes of assassination mentioned at Dial. 8 and 15 and n. 80; assassination would not shock the Greeks, but the reasons for it might.

115.18 **sword . . . own breast]** On suicide, see Dial. 10 and 17; see also Hume's comment on 'ancient maxims' at n. 41. The point is discussed in more detail in 'Of Suicide'.

115.32 **barbarous partiality]** The barbarous partiality is the extreme favouritism of the eldest son, an example of the rights of primogeniture held in medieval times to have been respected by God. These feudal rules of inheritance were brought into England at the time of the Norman Conquest, another link to medieval France.

115.34 and n. 82 **Saturnalia]** Footnote reference: Lucian,[B] *Saturnalia* 10–39. In *Saturnalia*, the character Cronosolon wrote laws granting equal treatment to slave

and freeman and to poor and rich, but the laws were in effect only during the course of a merrymaking festival honouring Saturn (the Saturnalia).

116.14 **national character]** Hume's essay 'Of National Characters' considers several of the themes about national characteristics in this paragraph. The essay begins by noting that:

> The vulgar are apt to carry all *national characters* to extremes; and having once established it as a principle, that any people are knavish, or cowardly, or ignorant, they will admit of no exception, but comprehend every individual under the same censure. Men of sense condemn these undistinguishing judgments: though at the same time, they allow, that each nation has a peculiar set of manners, and that some particular qualities are more frequently to be met with among one people than among their neighbours. (par. 1)

Regarding the Athenians, Hume comments that 'the Athenians were as remarkable for ingenuity, politeness, and gaiety, as the Thebans for dulness, rusticity, and a phlegmatic [lethargic] temper. . . . The Athenians were the only Ionians that ever had any reputation for valour or military atchievements' (par. 12). This essay contains several comparisons between the Greeks and the citizens of other nations, including France. See also Hume's cryptic comment in *THN* 1.3.13.7 on the French.

117.6 **Greek loves]** chiefly, homosexual practices.

n. 83 **Plat. symp.]** Footnote reference: Plato,[B] *Symposium*, 182 A–85 C.

117.15 **canon law]** In the Roman Catholic Church, the authoritative body of law makes no distinction between the marriage of full-blood and half-blood relatives; all such marriages are proscribed. However, stepchildren are not blood relatives and may marry. The Athenians went far in the other direction because marriages within the wider family were common: half-brothers married half-sisters, uncles married nieces, etc.

117.17 and n. 85 **bereaved . . . of that life]** Footnote reference: Plutarch, *Moralia*, 'On Affection for Offspring' 5, 497 E. Plutarch[B] writes that: 'Since they consider poverty the worst of evils, they cannot endure to let their children share it with them, as though it were a kind of disease'. See also 'The Education of Children' 8 E (*Moralia*, 1: 38–41). For an earlier reference by Hume to Athenian practices of infanticide, see Dial. 13.

117.31 **gallantry]** Cf. the use of this term in ann. 31.16–19 with Hume's definition in n. 93.

118.11 **self-murder]** More than one famous Athenian held that suicide should be forborne (with allowable exceptions), and more than one celebrated French writer defended the permissibility of suicide.

The Hellenic city-states generally prohibited suicide by law and deprived people who committed suicide of funeral rites. Philosophers often accepted the prohibition, but discussed exceptive cases. Plato,[B] in *Phaedo* 61 B–62 E, portrays Socrates[B] as sym-

pathetic to the view that suicide is not a proper act, but does not rule out suicide in desperate circumstances; and in *Laws* 873 C–D, Plato mentions valid exceptions. Aristotle[B] seems to say that the suicide—particularly the person who acts in anger—does what the law forbids and acts contrary to virtuous conduct and the city-state's interest (*Nicomachean Ethics* 1138[a]9–14).

Michel de Montaigne[B], in 'Custom of the Island of Cea [Kea]', mentions customs in which free poison was distributed to all who wished to kill themselves. Montaigne holds that 'I am not bound to the laws against murder if I take my own life' and that 'unbearable pain and a worse death' are the most excusable motives for suicide (*Essays* 2.3). Montesquieu[B] also discussed the morality of suicide in *Persian Letters* 76. He suggests, as Hume would later argue in his essay 'Of Suicide', that suicide does not disturb the order of Providence more than do other human acts.

118.25 and n. 86 **Horace**[B]] Footnote reference: Horace, *Epistles* 1, ep. 7, lines 26–8; also *Odes* 1.33, lines 5–6. Horace praises 'black locks on a narrow brow'—a reference to the beauty of a low forehead.

118.25 and n. 87 **Anacreon**[B]] Footnote reference: Anacreon, *Anacreontea*, ode 16, lines 9–11. Anacreon describes the woman his heart adores:

> Her eyebrows neither join nor sever,
> But make (as 'tis) that selvage never
> Clearly one nor surely two.

n. 87 **Petronius**[B]] Footnote reference: Petronius, *Satyricon* 126. Petronius describes a woman 'more perfect than any artist's dream'. She had a small forehead and her eyebrows 'almost met again close beside her eyes'.

118.26 **Apollo . . . Venus**] In Hellenic religion, Apollo was an Olympian god generally associated with the higher aspects of civilization, including music, poetry, the healing arts, and prophecy. In Roman religion, Apollo was portrayed in art as the perfection of strength, beauty, and youth. In Roman religion, Venus was goddess of vegetation (and of birth and growth in general) and was later associated with the Hellenic Aphrodite. Greek sculptors and painters presented her as the ideal of female beauty.

118.27 **Scipio**[B] **. . . Cornelia**[B]] Scipio and his heroic actions, especially his manœuvres in defeating Hannibal,[B] are discussed in ann. 49.34. His routing of the Carthaginian army alleviated an inordinate Roman fear of Hannibal. Plutarch[B] reports that Cornelia was renowned for purity and excellence of character, especially as a mother who cultivated the character of her children. In *THN* 2.2.2.20 Hume notes that Cornelia reproached her sons 'that they ought to be asham'd she shou'd be more known by the title of the daughter of *Scipio*, than by that of the mother of the *Gracchi*. This was, in other words, exhorting them to render themselves as illustrious and famous as their grandfather'. The story is also found in Plutarch (*Lives*, 'Tiberius and Caius Gracchus' 1.4–5 [10: 146–7; and see also 150–1, 206–7, 238–41]).

119.4 **military virtues]** The importance of military virtues is discussed in Machiavelli, *Prince* 15, *et passim*; Pufendorf, *Duty of Man* 2.11.13 and *On the Law of Nature and Nations* 8.4; and Cicero,[B] *De officiis* 1.18.61–1.23.81. In *THN* 3.3.2.15 Hume expresses reservations about the cultural influences of military virtues, especially 'military glory' and related forms of merit.

119.6 and n. 88 **Tully]** Footnote reference: Cicero, *Tusculan Disputations* 2.27.65. Tully—i.e. Cicero[B]—is maintaining that barbarians—e.g. the Cimbri in ancient Europe (Germany) who inhabited the Cimbrian Peninsula in Jutland (Denmark) and the Celtiberians of mountainous regions of ancient Spain—are good at enduring suffering on the battlefield, but find their tolerance and resistance to pain more limited when they are sick, whereas Greeks endure sickness even if they are not very courageous on the battlefield.

119.22 **Labeo[B] . . . Cato[B]]** Labeo was known for an independence of mind and innovation in law, even speaking freely against the emperor. Observers thought Labeo might be censured for this independence. Distinguished in law, philosophy, and literature, he was known as a formidable opponent and a person of high moral integrity. Cato and the qualities that earned him highest approbation—integrity, austerity, steadfastness, wisdom, elocution, and opposition to the wicked—are discussed in ann. 105.9. Hume discusses 'the virtue and good intentions of Cato' in his essay 'That Politics may be reduced to a Science' 19. A similar theme is found in *EHU* 10.9.

119.25 **luxury]** For the context and implications of this mention of luxury, see ann. 11.31 and 82.33.

119.32 **four sources of moral sentiment]** the four types enumerated in shorthand in the previous sentence: (1) Qualities useful to others (Sects. 2–5); (2) Qualities useful to ourselves (Sect. 6); (3) Qualities immediately agreeable to ourselves (Sect. 7); (4) Qualities immediately agreeable to others (Sect. 8).

119.35 **shut up the women . . . the fair sex]** Athenian women were systematically excluded from social intercourse. Men regarded women as subordinate and properly in service to their husbands. Girls and women remained at home as much as possible and aloof from political activity and their husband's private affairs. The husband was free to engage in public encounters, gymnastic exercise, professional life, and the like. Xenophon[B] describes girls as seeing and saying as little as possible and characterizes the duty of a wife as remaining indoors, sending out the servants, and the like (*Oeconomicus* 7.30–43 [423–9]). Plutarch[B] characterizes a woman's duty similarly in 'Advice to Bride and Groom' 139 C–140 B (*Moralia*, 2: 304–9). A dramatic characterization of male perspectives on women and the isolation of women appears in Aristophanes' *Thesmophoriazusae*, lines 395–421, 785–94.

See Hume's correspondence with Gilbert Elliot (*Letters*, 1: 152), where Hume amplifies his views. In his essay 'Of the Original Contract' 16, Hume says that in Athens, though 'the most extensive democracy, that we read of in history', yet women, slaves, and foreigners were effectively socially isolated and not allowed to

vote. In *Persian Letters* Montesquieu[B] offers detailed discussions of the women of Persia and their differences from European women and customs, discussions that resemble those found here in *EPM*.

120.5 **laws of modesty and decency]** See ann. 68.28 and *THN* 3.2.12.1 ff.

120.6 and n. 89 **oration of Lysias[B]]** Footnote reference: Lysias, *Orations* 32 (33 in older editions), 'Against Diogeiton' 11–12. Hume's description of the account in Lysias is a close paraphrase. The widowed mother cheated into poverty is driven by the severity of her situation into the untraditional act of speaking to a group of men (*Against Diogeiton*, 666–7).

120.12 and n. 90 **Demosthenes[B]]** Footnote reference: Demosthenes, *Against Onetor* 1.33–6. According to Plutarch,[B] Demosthenes lost his father at age 7, and the guardians of his father's estate dissipated much of his patrimony, impeding his early education. At age 17 he successfully prosecuted both his guardians and a debtor to his father's estate, but recovered only a small fraction of the patrimony (*Lives*, 'Demosthenes' 4.1–2; 6.1). In *Against Onetor* (1: 148–51) Demosthenes discusses the conspiracy of Onetor[B] and Aphobus[B] to rob him of his patrimony. Onetor's wife, Aphobus' sister, was still married when she left her husband Timocrates; she thereafter lived exclusively with Aphobus, without marrying Onetor or anyone else. Demosthenes recounts how he solicited a deposition from a physician and testimony from female slaves who had witnessed the woman living with Aphobus. The outcome of the trial is unknown. In 'Of the Populousness of Ancient Nations' 20, Hume further discusses Demosthenes' prosecution of his tutors. He there cites *Against Aphobus*, rather than *Against Onetor* (the source in n. 90).

120.25 **intrigues of women]** Helen, celebrated as the fairest woman in the world, was the precipitating cause of the legendary great war between Hellenes and Trojans in the *Iliad*. Clytemnestra was the wife of Agamemnon, who fought in the Trojan War while entrusting his family to Aegisthus, who subsequently influenced Clytemnestra to infidelity. They then murdered Agamemnon. Though each set of events 'proceeded from the intrigues of women', both Helen and Clytemnestra were led into their actions by manipulative and powerful males.

120.26 **neighbouring nation]** France (as the following example of Henry III[B] indicates).

120.29 **Harry the third[B]]** Henry III suffered a gradual loss of popularity during a fatal power struggle with Henri de Lorraine, duc de Guise. When Henry III had the duc assassinated, Paris was swept by violence. Henry turned to Protestants for assistance, provoking a Papal bull that excommunicated him. The duchesse de Montpensier, sister to the duc and a powerful member of the Catholic League, enlisted the aid of a fanatical Dominican monk, Jacques Clément, who gained a private audience with the king and fatally stabbed him. The duchesse—who had publicly sworn revenge—then rode through the streets of Paris in an open carriage crying, 'The tyrant is dead!' See also ann. 64.36.

120.37 and n. 91 **maxim of La Fontaine**[B]] Footnote reference: Jean de la Fontaine, *Contes et nouvelles en vers*, 'La coupe enchantée'. The subject of La Fontaine's 'La coupe enchantée' is female infidelity and male cuckoldry (the theme of numerous books, often comedies, in the 17th and 18th c.). La Fontaine, using sarcasm, explores the possibility that cuckoldry might be good. A jealous husband resorts to sorcery and must drink from 'la coupe enchantée' (the enchanted goblet) in order to determine whether his sorcery has caused him to cuckold himself (in the form of another). La Fontaine's disdain of such consuming covetousness is summarized in the comment quoted by Hume. The correct text of La Fontaine is

> Quand on l'ignore, ce n'est rien,
> Quand on le sçait, c'est peu de chose.
>
> (When one is unaware of something, it is nothing,
> When one does know it, it is a small matter. (*Fables*, *Contes*, 495))

La Fontaine's *Contes*, in which 'La coupe enchantée' appears, was among three French books judged 'indecent' by curators of the Advocates' Library in Edinburgh, after Hume purchased the works as Keeper of the Library (1754). Hillyard, 'The Keepership of David Hume'; Mossner, *Life*, 252–3; Burton, *Life and Correspondence*, 1: 395.

n. 92.2 **women of condition . . . wenching . . . and *Ancillarioli*]** women of social position, rank, or good character . . . hunting after whores or working-class women. 'Ancillarioli' is the plural of 'ancillariolus'—a rarely used Latin term denominating a low sort of person who pursues maidservants or slave girls. Footnote references: Seneca, *Moral Essays*, 'De beneficiis' 9.4. Martial, *Epigrams* 12, epigram 58. Seneca[B] and Martial[B] (see n. 92) use the term to report comments by married women who describe their husbands as addicted to base pleasures and affairs with maidservants.

n. 93.1 **gallantry . . . of complaisance]** For further analysis of 'gallantry', see Dial. 32, the Glossary, and Hume's Index, where he contrasts gallantry of complaisance and gallantry of intrigues. Gallantry as *complaisance* is the habit or action of making oneself agreeable to others through politeness, courtesy, deference, and the like. See, further, Hume's essays 'Of the Rise and Progress of the Arts and Sciences' 37–43 and 'Of Essay-Writing' 8. Hobbes[B] made 'complaisance' his 'fifth law of nature' in *Leviathan* 15.17. Hutcheson called it a 'virtue of social conversation' (*Short Introduction* 1.6.3). Gordon in *Cato's Letters* 121 (131) associated it with good breeding (see ann. 67.15) and distinguished it from 'forced complaisance'.

122.4 ***artificial* lives]** See Dial. 56–7. 'Artificial' here has the meaning of 'singular' or 'very different' from 'the rest of mankind'—in particular, human customs, practices, or conventions amounting to a unique style of life. Diogenes[B] and Pascal,[B] as explained below, lead such artificial lives.

122.25 **Diogenes**[B]] Diogenes denounced all personal ambition for wealth and honour, especially any dependence upon luxuries. Many picturesque, legendary stories surround his life. His eccentricity, liveliness, and beliefs in 'the mortality of

the soul' are discussed by Hume in his withdrawn essay 'Of Moral Prejudices' (*Essays*, 1742 edn. [35–6]). In correspondence of 1 July 1739 (*New Letters*, 6) Hume reported that he 'met with' one of the stories of Diogenes in Cicero;[B] the story is in *Tusculan Disputations* 1.43.103–4.

122.27 **Dominics or Loyolas]** Saint Dominic[B] founded the Dominican Order. Saint Ignatius of Loyola[B] founded the Jesuit Order. In n. 13 Hume refers to the Jesuits and says we may wish to consult 'the authority of Mons. Bayle . . . article Loyola'.

122.28 **Pascal[B]]** Pascal gave up serious work in mathematics after an intense religious conversion. He devoted himself almost exclusively to Jansenist Christian ideals, including the goal of living humbly and plainly, while serving the poor. 'The most ridiculous superstitions . . .' refers to Pascal's obdurate Christian commitments and practices, including his self-effacement, his view of himself as helpless and sinful, and his indifference to friends and practical affairs, values expressed throughout his *Pensées* (see e.g. Sellier no. 249 [Levi, 76]). Hume had read *La vie de M. Pascal*, by Pascal's elder sister, Gilberte Périer. She reported that even on his death-bed, Pascal had little on his mind except the plight of the poor and chastised himself for doing too little to serve them (p. 70).

123.24 **religious superstition or philosophical enthusiasm]** religious superstition such as that found in Pascal[B] and philosophical enthusiasm such as that found in Diogenes.[B] Hume often discusses enthusiasm and superstition as forms of corrupt, implausible, ardent, or fervent religious belief. 'Enthusiasm' typically refers to a form of belief and is frequently attributed to Protestants; 'superstition' typically refers to a practice such as prayer, sacrifice, and ritual and is frequently attributed to Roman Catholics. See ann. 15.4, 'Of Superstition and Enthusiasm', and *NHR* 13–14.

GLOSSARY

This Glossary treats terms in the text and notes of *EPM*. It is confined to potentially puzzling words and phrases whose meanings may be difficult to locate. Terms that are appropriately defined in most current concise dictionaries are excluded from this list. The Glossary also does not attempt to capture all meanings of the terms listed. Only relevant meanings in light of the Glossary's purpose are presented.

Synonyms are used rather than formal definitions whenever they are simpler and adequate to the task of eliminating confusion. If Hume provides a definition in one of his works, his definition is preferred. Hume's metaphors are also occasionally treated. A few of Hume's terms are handled in the editor's annotations, which supplement the Glossary.

Each term in the Glossary is followed by its section-and-paragraph locations (*not* by page and line). The Appendices and 'A Dialogue' are given appropriate abbreviations and are also cited by paragraph numbers. When a term is used in *EPM* more than ten times with the listed meaning, then the designation *passim* is used to indicate frequent usage; section-and-paragraph numbers are not provided for these entries. Abbreviations listed at the head of this volume are again used in this Glossary. Verb (*vb.*), noun substantive (*n.*), and adverb (*adv.*) are distinguished if clarity is served.

More than one meaning is listed for many terms. If a term is equivocal, the distinct meanings are segregated by numbers ((1), (2), . . . (*n.*)), and the passages in Hume's text where the proper meanings occur are listed separately under each number. More than one synonym is often listed. Alternative synonyms or definitions are helpful if it is not clear which term most adequately captures Hume's meaning.

The following sources have been consulted repeatedly:

Nathan Bailey (ed.), *Dictionarium Britannicum* (1730; fac. Hildesheim: Georg Olms, 1969).

Ephraim Chambers (ed.), *Cyclopædia; or, An Universal Dictionary of Arts and Sciences* (London, 1728).

Thomas Dyche and William Pardon, *A New General English Dictionary*, 3rd edn. (1740; fac. Hildesheim: Georg Olms, 1972).

John Harris, *Lexicon technicum* (London: 1704–10; fac. New York: Johnson Reprint, 1966).

Samuel Johnson, *A Dictionary of the English Language* (London, 1755); several editions.

Oxford English Dictionary, primarily the 2nd electronic edition (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992).

Although editors of glossaries often cite such authoritative sources in the individual entries, these works have been used so extensively below that constant citation

would be intrusive and repetitious. For example, the *OED* and Dyche and Pardon have been consulted for almost every entry.

Searches have also been made of texts in the history of modern philosophy to see how other philosophers use these terms. The Intelex PastMasters series has been particularly helpful. Finally, I have profited from the previous work of many other editors and owe a particular debt to David and Mary Norton, Edwin Curley, and P. H. Nidditch.

abstruse: deep, demanding, and theoretical. 5.17; Appx. 1.10; Appx. 2.7.

address: bearing of a person; manner. 3.19; 6.21; 7.27; 9.12; Appx. 4.4; Dial. 49.

admirable: wonderful. 7.5.

affect: given to; like. 6.30.

amiable: worthy; estimable. 1.6.

artificial: singular or very different—in particular, as applied to human customs, practices, or conventions amounting to a unique style of life and a set of governing norms. Dial. 52–3; Dial. 57. See Hume's comment in n. 64.

ascendant: powerful influence. Dial. 53.

aspect: sight; appearance; contemplation. 5.18; 5.24.

bad grace: unseemly behaviour; ungracious behaviour. 9.14.

character: (1) trait or quality of a person. *passim*. (2) distinguished status or position. *passim*.

chicanes: trickery; uses of subterfuge. n. 12.

civilians: authorities on the civil law. Appx. 1.2; n. 65.

claimed: required; needed. 3.24.

cloaths: clothes. 3.2; 3.14; 5.38; 6.33.

closet: a study or private room (**in the closet**: in a private place). Dial. 53.

come about: come back to; reach to. 4.11.

competent fortune: sufficient wealth. 6.32.

complication: combination; joining or mixing; conjunction. 1.10; Appx. 1.6; Appx. 1.16.

condition: social standing; position. 6.31; 6.32; n. 92.

constitution: the states, qualities, dispositions, and principles that make up a living being's nature. 1.3; 3.25; n. 17; 5.3; n. 26; 9.10; Appx. 1.21; Appx. 2.12.

converse: deal; have to do. 5.42.

correspondent: corresponding. 1.7; 5.18; 5.32; 9.11.

council: counsel. n. 22.

damp: pall; fog. 6.22; Appx. 4.3.

deceitful: misleading (deceptive), but without intent to deceive. 6.22.

delicate: perceptive; sensitive; keen. 5.14; 5.37; 5.39; 7.19; 9.12.

determined: ruled; governed; provided reasons for. 3.22; 3.47; 6.2; Appx. 1.9.

dispersed: diverse; disparate. 9.4.

distemper: sickness; disease. Dial. 39.

education: beliefs acquired by acculturation, exposure, or habituation; 'opinions and notions of things, to which we have been accustom'd from our infancy' (quoting *THN* 1.3.9.17). 3.36; 3.47; 5.4; 7.18; 9.18.

empire: authority; supreme political control. 7.6; 7.9; 7.12.

engage: (1) gain; secure. 2.1. (2) influence; persuade. 1.1; 2.5.

experience: (1) empirical testing; experimental trial. *passim*. (2) observation; accumulation of data as the basis of conclusions. *passim*.

fallacious: deceitful; deceptive; misleading. Appx. 2.7; Dial. 18.

fond (and **fondness**): kind; tender. 2.6; 5.40; 7.19; Appx. 2.9.

frame: *n*. construction; nature; state. 3.25; 5.45; 7.19; 9.4; 9.6; Appx. 1.21; Appx. 2.12; Appx. 2.13.

full: fully. 6.33; 9.16.

gallantry: amorous relationship or intrigue in love affairs, often involving adultery. 4.17; Dial. 32; Dial. 47; n. 92; n. 93.

hurt: disadvantage. 3.6.

impudence: defect of civility; foolishness. 8.8; Appx. 4.3.

inconvenience: unsuitableness; incongruity; inconsistency with rule. 3.18; n. 13; Appx. 3.6.

indulgence: admiration; appreciation. 2.19; Dial. 18.

interested: self-interested; self-promoting. 9.14; Appx. 2.4; Appx. 2.7; Appx. 2.12. See also ann. 9.14.

issue: end; discharge. 9.4; Appx. 1.5; Dial. 9.

landlord: owner and resident; host. 5.19; 8.2.

lawful: morally permissible. 1.5; 3.35; 3.36; 3.37.

law-topics: legal themes, rules, and considerations. 3.46.

make a figure: establish a reputation. 6.19.

mean: undistinguished; of low degree or small value; inferior in rank. 7.12.

meanness: lack of dignity, spirit, or greatness of mind. n. 34; n. 42; Appx. 4.4; Appx. 4.20; Dial. 19.

miscarriages: mistakes; failures. 6.8.

modification: mode. 5.16; Appx. 2.2; Appx. 2.6.

municipal: state (not limited to local government of a town or city). 3.37; 3.45; Appx. 1.2; Dial. 29.

nay: term used to introduce a more precise, better formulated, or correct statement than one previously made. n. 13; 5.37; 9.15; Dial. 56.

nicety: sensitive feeling; scrupulousness of mind. 8.8.

oeconomy: (1) organization or management of affairs. 6.21; Appx. 4.2. (2) organization, structure, or arrangement in the various parts of something. 9.13

on a balance: on the same level. n. 13.

order: type; species; class. 1.9; 2.11; Appx. 1.21.

ornaments: finery; attire. 3.2; Dial. 51.

parts: talents; capacities; high intellectual ability or cleverness. 6.8; Appx. 4.5; Dial. 54.

peevish: foolish; perverse. 6.21.

penetration: the intellectual faculty or virtue of discovering something by gaining access to its inner content. 9.2; Appx. 4.2.

perfection: accomplishment of a high order. 3.39; 6.21; 9.10.

philosopher (natural philosopher): person versed in or who examines natural science. 6.6; Appx. 2.7.

poinard (also sp. poniard): dagger. 2.19; 7.9.

positive: absolute; categorical. n. 13; 9.13.

prescribe: expire or terminate owing to the culmination of an established period of time; lapse. 3.33; Appx. 3.7. See also 3.41.

pretence: (1) rationale. 5.16. (2) declaration. n. 57; Appx. 2.1.

pretend (also **pretension**): claim; maintain; assert. *passim*. See also pretend to.

pretend to: lay claim to; assert responsibility for. 7.25.

private connexions: close personal relationships, as with near friends. n. 25.

prosecution: the pursuit of. 3.29; n. 13.

purity (of manners): separation of the standards of manners for men and women. 4.8; Dial. 46.

quadrate with: square with; correspond to. Appx. 1.10.

rake into: investigate; gather a heap of information. 9.14.

rally: play and jest; banter or play with words. Dial. 12.

rent-roll: list of lands or tenements belonging to a person; total of incomes or estates, as indicated by rolls of lands, renters, and resulting incomes. 6.34.

run over: review; think about. 5.37; Dial. 1.

schools: scholastic philosophers or the subject-matter taught in medieval and early modern European universities. 9.2.

scope: purpose; aim. 4.16.

scruple: (1) *n*. dispute; doubt. Appx. 3.6; Dial. 15; Dial. 31. (2) *vb*. doubt; question the truth of. 3.32; 6.26; Appx. 4.8.

secrecy: keeping confidences; confidentiality. 6.21; 9.12; 9.24; Appx. 4.2.

secretly: privately. 5.11; 6.14.

security: confidence; assurance. 3.8; 3.14; 3.15; 3.23; n. 13; 5.7; 6.9; 6.14; Dial. 31.

sensibly: substantially; appreciably. 5.17.

specious: plausible and attractive; seemingly allowable and just. 1.5; 3.26; 3.27; Appx. 1.5.

spleen: depression; melancholy; spite. 5.40; 6.21.

still: *adv*. regularly; consistently. 3.39; 5.13; 5.23; 5.37; 6.15.

stock-jobbers: buyers and sellers of stocks. 4.7.

stupidity: incomprehension. 6.16; Appx. 4.3.

suffrage: approbation; support. 9.13.

superficies: outer surface of a body, as apparent to the eye; top, surface, or outside. Appx. 2.4.

tameness: gentleness. Dial. 19.

terms of composition: compromises; concessions on previously accepted doctrines. Appx. 4.21.

violence: intensity of influence; passionate quality; commanding effect. 3.8; 3.14; 9.21.

vogue: common or general approbation of a person. Dial. 19; Dial. 25.

vulgarly: commonly; in common speech. 6.34; 9.5; 9.20.

wanton: frisky; unrestrained. 5.6.

wrested: twisted; wrung. 7.21.

EDITORIAL APPENDIX

EMENDATIONS AND SUBSTANTIVE VARIANTS

Hume regularly modified his works as he issued new editions. This editorial appendix records all substantive variations between the editions of *EPM*. Formal or 'accidental' changes are recorded only as necessary; they are recorded in full in an electronic edition published separately. These accidentals involve changes in typographic convention, spelling, and punctuation and are recorded in this Appendix whenever their history has a bearing on the editor's emendation of Hume's text. All changes of the copytext introduced by the editor, whether substantive or accidental, are recorded in this appendix. Interested readers can therefore determine exactly how the critical text differs, both substantively and formally, from the copytext on which it has been based. They can also trace every substantive variation between the original text and every other edition authorized by Hume.

This appendix is divided into three parts. Part 1 contains a brief explanation of the different kinds of changes made in the original text in order to construct the critical text. (More extensive explanations of the practices of editors are found in the volumes on Hume's *Treatise of Human Nature* and *Enquiry concerning Human Understanding*.) Part 2 lists unreported silent changes and describes systematic emendations. Part 3 is a combined register of non-systematic emendations and substantive variants. This classification of emendations as either *systematic* or *non-systematic* creates three (imperfectly distinguishable) forms of textual change, each reported separately:

1. Systematic changes of form made silently.
2. Systematic changes of form made collectively and reported in block.
3. Non-systematic changes of form and substance made individually and reported individually.

Part 2 of this appendix (systematic changes handled as a group) treats 1 and 2. Part 3 (non-systematic changes handled individually) treats 3.

Systematic changes involve groups of identical or very similar changes that occur at more than one place. As a rough rule, systematic changes are of secondary importance in interpreting the text by comparison to non-systematic changes. All non-systematic emendations are reported in the register in the form of shaded entries. Full information about modifications made by Hume (or his printer) is supplied in the register for each non-systematic change.

Reference numbers are to page (or note) and line in the text, not to section and paragraph.

PART 1

THE RATIONALE AND EVOLUTION OF THE CRITICAL TEXT

Hume prepared ten editions of *EPM*. An editor must select from among these a copytext as the basic document for the construction of the edited critical text. As a copytext is progressively emended, it is converted into the critical text. The resultant text normally resembles the copytext more than it resembles any other text of the same work, although in principle an eclectic critical text can deviate widely from the copytext. No one edition of a work in Hume's corpus is sufficiently flawless that corrections are unnecessary; but even if one were flawless by the standards operative at the time it was produced, printing practice evolved throughout Hume's lifetime in ways of which he was undoubtedly aware. A modern editor must be no less alert to this evolution.

The copytext for *EPM* (and for almost all titles in Hume's *Essays and Treatises on Several Subjects*) is the 1772 edition. The general editors selected it for several reasons. This edition is the culmination of more than two decades of diligent attention by Hume, his printer, and even his booksellers. The author was in close touch with his printer, William Strahan, and immediately upon the publication of the 1772 edition, Hume wrote a note of appreciation to his bookseller, Thomas Cadell, for a 'very correct' edition:

> I am very well pleasd with regard to the Paper and Print. I have carefully perusd the Essays, and find them very correct, with fewer Errors of the Press, than I almost ever saw in any book; and I give you, as well as Mr Strahan, thanks for the care that has been taken of them.[1]

Hume's correspondence regarding the 1772 edition (presented in the critical edition of *EHU*) provides a record of his attention to and satisfaction with this edition that is unparalleled for any other edition of *ETSS*.

Printer's errors that produced corruptions in *EPM* occurred even in the transition from the first edition (1751) to the second edition (1753). Printer's errors or other corruptions were virtually eliminated in subsequent editions, although, as will be seen below, many inconsistencies persisted. Through the years Hume made innumerable changes in both formal and material elements that he judged to be improvements in 'correctness'. He stipulated policy to his printer on matters regarding which he had firm views and generally oversaw his later editions with as much care as the first or other early editions.

None the less, there is good reason to believe that the printed texts are more inconsistent than Hume's manuscript practices and therefore suspicion falls on the compositors as a major source of some, perhaps most, of the inconsistencies in the

[1] 3 June 1772, to Thomas Cadell, *Letters*, 2: 262.

texts.[2] The evidence for this judgement is presented in the critical edition of *A Treatise of Human Nature*, which reports on the results of a study of Hume's early correspondence and his manuscript practices. This evidence supports the judgement that Hume had settled preferences that were not always reflected in his published texts.

Evidence collected by the general editors of the present critical edition also indicates that many of the practices adopted in the printed texts derive from compositorial practices that Hume did not use in his writing but to which he presumably consented. The use of capitals joined with small capitals for persons and places (displacing the italics in the early editions of *EPM*, which were probably renderings of his manuscript underlining) is an obvious, if trivial, example. Hume may or may not have liked some of these practices; some appear not to have been *his* practices, and a few directly conflict with his known practices.

Accordingly, analysis of the copytext—as regards orthography, punctuation, upper and lower case, the use of italic, and the like, supplemented by the previously mentioned evidence of Hume's manuscript practices—leads to the conclusion that many inconsistencies in the copytext were the joint product of the compositors' forms and preferences in collision with Hume's competing preferences. Faced with an unavoidable choice of preserving or eliminating these pointless inconsistencies, their elimination was usually the reasonable course, for reasons that the editors explain in other volumes in this edition.

So far as substantive changes are concerned, the editing is exceptionally conservative. Hard choices occasionally had to be made when the editor was not satisfied that a single most defensible reading could be determined; but these cases were very few in number. Also rare were errors in the copytext, which have always been corrected. Inconsistencies in Hume's text, by contrast to errors, presented a different and more challenging set of issues. Here decisions were heavily dependent on both the available data and familiarity with the text. (See the general editors' statement of the principles for the elimination of inconsistencies in other volumes in this edition.)

PART 2

SYSTEMATIC CHANGES

As a general rule, all instances of modifications of the copytext are reported by page and line numbers, either in block reports in the last half of Part 2, or individually in the register in Part 3. Exceptions to this general rule are changes made silently. These changes are largely typographical and will be discussed first.

[2] Based on what is known about the journeyman printers of London, it is possible that differing compositorial forms were introduced during the typesetting of a single work. These possibilities are increased when an edition of several works is under production. This hypothesis accounts for the sections of single works in *ETSS* in which different spellings are introduced, and thereafter vanish.

Systematic Changes of Form Made Silently

Changes of form that are made silently are limited to the following:

1. Single quotation marks have sometimes been exchanged for double quotation marks, or vice versa, thereby silently correcting what appears to have been an oversight or printing error.

2. No effort has been made to retain certain typographical publishing and formal practices that were commonly used in the in eighteenth century. Practices eliminated include:

   a. Pointing ('.') following section and part titles.
   b. The long 's' ('ſ').
   c. Catchwords.
   d. Booksellers' advertisements (announcements).
   e. Typographical or decorative ornaments.
   f. Some roman numbers (here changed to arabic).
   g. Unnumbered note markers, including asterisks (*), daggers (†), double daggers (‡), and the like.
   h. Inverted commas or quotation marks running along the margin.
   i. Concluding a work or volume with 'FINIS'.

3. Footnote markers have been placed to the right, rather than to the left, of punctuation marks, reversing the practice in the copytext. Whereas the copytext uses both footnotes and endnotes, the critical text of *EPM* prints all notes as footnotes, precisely as Hume and his printer had done in every edition until 1770.[3] These footnotes are numbered consecutively, by individual work, whereas Hume and his printer had used asterisks, daggers, and the like.

4. Accents on letters have occasionally been added or deleted. For example, some accents in French omitted by Hume or by his compositor in some editions have been restored on the basis of one or more editions of Hume's works other than the copytext. In contrast, the a grave (à)—commonly, but not always, used in *ETSS* when printing the Latin terms 'a priori' and 'a posteriori'—has been removed.

5. This edition continues the practice of capitalizing whole words (cap/small-cap combinations) in the beginning line of all works and its unique component parts and all sections in a book-length work (the two *Enquiries* only, in the case of *ETSS*). However, the size of the first letter, normally a two-line capital, has been disregarded. (See change 7 below for a related and abandoned practice.) To the extent this edition follows the Appendix and Part arrangements of the 1777 edition, rather than the copytext, capitalized introductory words follow the 1777 edition.

6. In a note Hume occasionally neglected to place a non-indented, direct quotation in either quotation marks or in italics, although it was his general practice to use

[3] Hume stated a preference for on-page notes over endnotes in a letter to his printer, while commenting on Gibbon's *History*: 'All these Authorities ought only to be printed at the Margin or the Bottom of the Page.' 8 Apr. 1776, to William Strahan, *Letters*, 2: 313.

one of these two forms to distinguish quotations. Quotation marks have been added in eight such cases. In a related set of cases, quotation marks have displaced italics or have been added to an attributed proverb or maxim. These changes are reported in block below. Because it was not Hume's practice to use any form of notification to distinguish quoted Greek from anonymous maxims and the like, direct quotation in Greek remains unchanged.

7. The typographical practice of capitalizing whole words in introducing footnotes was executed with remarkable inconsistency throughout *ETSS* and has been discontinued.

8. By contrast, the practice of capitalizing in full the first word under each letter in Hume's Index has been continued, although some of the words capitalized in the critical edition were not capitalized in the copytext or in any other edition. This comprehensive Index to *ETSS* has been abridged for the present volume so that only the entries for *EPM* are included. The remaining parts of the Index are published in other volumes of the critical edition. Numbering of sections and paragraphs, capitalization, and punctuation has been systematically adapted and made consistent; and all errors have been corrected. In the register three forms of entry peculiar to Hume's Indexes have not been considered variants to be reported: (1) page numbers, (2) commas to set off entries, and (3) lines of the form '——' used to repeat an entry found on an immediately previous line. In addition, no report is made of new capitals for the opening entries under several letters, as the abridging Hume's comprehensive Index of *ETSS* required. (The function of the capitalization practices in the Index other than for opening entries under each letter is not well understood. It may have been Hume's way of giving emphasis, as it often is elsewhere.)

Systematic Changes of Form Reported in Block

Systematic changes of form reported in block derive from formal inconsistencies eliminated from the copytext. The resulting emendations have no effect on substantive meaning. These emendations are of interest principally for the information they convey about the conventions accepted by Hume or his printer. These corrections are classified under the following headings:

1. Orthography (Spelling and Abbreviation).
2. Punctuation.
3. Italic and Roman Type.
4. Upper and Lower Case.
5. Errors in Typography (Misprints).
6. Errors in Greek (Mistranscriptions).

Displacements of forms in the copytext (items 1–4), are reported using the abbreviation *displ.* (for 'displaces'). Misprints in the copytext (item 5), are reported using the abbreviation *mispr.* (for 'misprinted'). Any apparent misprint that conceivably might be classified as a substantive change is reported in the register, rather than in

this block form. Displacements not resulting from the elimination of an inconsistency in the copytext are reported in the register, not in block.

1. Orthography

Inconsistent orthography has been eliminated by adopting the principal forms in the copytext, other *ETSS* editions, and other publications and manuscripts, as explained in Part 1 of this appendix.

Primary Spelling-Abbreviation Displaces Secondary Spelling or Abbreviation. (1) lib. *displ.* l.: n. 62, n. 11.15. (2) Lucian. *displ.* Luc.: n. 30. (3) mathem. *displ.* math.: n. 6. (4) Plutarch. *displ.* Plut.: n. 2, n. 85. (5) Section *displ.* Sect. *or* Sect: n. 8, n. 9, n. 42.7, n. 48, n. 58, n. 84.

Spelling or Nomenclature Modified: Proper Names and Titles. (1) Æschines *or* Æschines *displ.* Æschynes *or* Eschines: 36.15, 288.A. (2) Cromwell *displ.* Cromwel: 49.18. (3) Quintilian *or* Quintil. *displ.* Quinctilian *or* Quinctil.: n. 52, 291.Q.

Spelling Modified: Other than Proper Names and Titles. (1) biass *displ.* byass or bias: 45.5, 69.27, 69.28, 70.3. (2) burden(ing) *displ.* burthen(ing): 41.20, 51.34. (3) cheerful(ness)(ly) *displ.* chearful(ness)(ly): 91.32, 57.4, 59.5, 59.15, 73.9, 78.18, 96.11. (4) choose *displ.* chuse: 75.8. (5) committing *displ.* commiting: 52.27. (6) (un)controul(ed) *displ.* (un)control(led): 76.20. (7) dependen(ce)(t) *displ.* dependan(ce)(t): 93.30, 9.31, 22.4, n. 12.8, 76.1, 88.29, 115.1. (8) desert *displ.* desart: 57.1. (9) enflamed *displ.* inflamed: 15.4, 50.12, 62.16. (10) enforc(ing) *displ.* inforc(ing): 3.8. (11) enhance *displ.* inhance: 96.23. (12) ensure *displ.* insure: 35.4. (13) enterpriz(e)(ing) *displ.* enterpris(e)(ing): 47.16, 49.14, 49.29, 49.32, 49.35, 53.19. (14) entitle *displ.* intitle: 9.16, n. 16.5. (15) landscape *displ.* landskip: 54.17. (16) nowise *displ.* no wise: 38.3, 111.14. (17) passed *displ.* past: 36.13. (18) pirate *displ.* pyrate: 31.9. (19) (un)practice(d) *displ.* (un)practise(d): 73.5, 115.28. (20) satir(e)(ist) *displ.* satyr(e)(ist): 6.16, 95.4, 11.35, 72.22. (21) splendour *displ.* splendor: 65.6, 65.37. (22) style *displ.* stile: 40.35, 103.11. (23) subsistence *displ.* subsistance: 19.10, 29.14. (24) surprizing *displ.* surprising: 119.4, 339.10. (25) torn *displ.* torne: 111.33.

'A' Displaces 'An' before Certain U-Words and H-Words. In the 1772 copytext 'a' and 'an' were inconsistently employed before three word-forms beginning with the letters 'u' and 'h': 'uniform(ity)', 'utility', and 'hundred'. The 1777 edition corrected in favour of 'a' *all but one* of these inconsistencies in *ETSS* (occurring in *EHU*). The 1777 edition rule has been followed, eventuating in a change in *EPM* at 29.15.[4]

[4] Changes in 1777 did not extend to u-words and h-words that *consistently* used 'an' in the copytext. The use of 'an' with these words has not been altered. These words in Hume's late philosophical writings include 'Helen', 'hypothesis', 'hyperbola', 'hour', 'harangue', 'heroic', 'historical', 'honest', 'universal', 'upward', 'uninterrupted', 'unpardonable', 'uncertainty', 'unknown',

Hyphenated Form Displaces Unhyphenated Form. (1) good-nature *displ.* good nature: 104.13. (2) ill-will *displ.* ill will: 99.16. (3) self-love *displ.* self love: 37.16. (4) son-in-law *displ.* son in law: 73.1.

Unhyphenated Form Displaces Hyphenated Word. (1) counterbalance *displ.* counter-balance: 93.29. (2) counterpart *displ.* counter-part: 113.10. (3) fair sex *displ.* fair-sex: n. 93. (4) good manners *displ.* good-manners: 67.5, 67.20, 112.17, 118.6. (5) good offices *displ.* good-offices: 38.29, 84.27, 85.9, 85.13. (6) good sense *displ.* good-sense: 53.20, 121.14. (7) human kind *displ.* human-kind: 77.6. (8) male sex *displ.* male-sex: 119.37. (9) outlines *displ.* out-lines: 26.18, 45.7.

Apostrophe Added or Deleted. (1) persons' *displ.* persons: 36.14. (2) till *displ.* 'till: 87.40.

2. Punctuation

Inconsistent punctuation has been eliminated by adopting the principal usage in the copytext, other *ETSS* editions, and other publications and manuscripts, as explained in Part 1 of this appendix. The bulk of the changes occur in the notes, which appear to have been hastily prepared or set and never carefully checked. The *ETSS* rule was to use a comma after an unabbreviated name and a period (not followed by a comma) after an abbreviated name. Correction of inconsistencies of punctuation under this rule has sometimes involved a prior editorial decision about inconsistency of abbreviation.

Comma or Period Added before a Title, after a Title, or after an Author in the Notes. (1) Plutarch,: n. 15.8. (2) Quintilian,: n. 21. (3) Sallust.: n. 32. (4) Plutarch.: nn. 23, 40. (5) Plato,: n. 78. (6) Seneca,: nn. 78, 92. (7) Suetonius,: n. 80.

Comma Displaces Period, or Period Displaces Comma, after a Title, Author, or Page in the Notes and Index. (1) pacis,: n. 63.11. (2) *Art of preserving Health*,: n. 68. (3) Æschines Socraticus,: n. 78. (4) de beneficiis,: n. 92. (5) Martial,: n. 92. (6) kinds,: 288.B. (7) others,: 292.U.

Question Mark Added or Deleted. (1) est. *displ.* est?: n. 11.14. (2) influence? *displ.* influence.: 56.38.

Line Added in the Index for the Repetition of an Indexed Term. before to ourselves: 292.U.

3. Italic and Roman

Inconsistent use of italic and roman type has been eliminated by adopting the principal usage in the copytext, other *ETSS* editions, and other publications and

'unavoidable', 'unconquerable', 'uneasiness', 'unlimited', 'unreserved', 'undisputed', 'utter', 'unusual', 'unequal', 'undisturbed', 'unjust', 'ultimate', 'usurper', 'ungrateful', 'unmixed', 'upstart', 'unexperienced', and 'uneasy'.

manuscripts, as explained in Part 1 of this appendix. Roman forms sometimes replace italic equivalents, and vice versa. Most of these inconsistencies consist of small oversights. Other cases, however, involve a larger inconsistency, such as failing to italicize a question or a statement in cases typically italicized in *ETSS*. The normal but not uniform practice of Hume's writings was to print mentioned words or terms in italic. This rule has been followed if and only if the context is undoubtedly one of mentioning rather than using.

Italics Removed from Proper Names, Titles, and Latin Wording in the Notes. (1) cap.: n. 72.15. (2) De orat.: n. 72.15. (3) lib.: n. 72.15. (4) PLATO: n. 78. (5) PLUTARCH, de vitioso pudore: n. 15.8. (6) Pro SEXT.: n. 11.15. (7) SENECA, de otio sap.: n. 78.

Italics Removed from Words and Punctuation in the Text. (1) italics removed from an exclamation mark: 10.28. (2) italics removed from a question mark: 118.34. (3) convention: 98.5.

Roman Forms for Group Names Displace Italic Equivalents. (1) CYNICS *displ. Cynics*: 53.12. (2) JESUITS *displ. Jesuits*: n. 13.18. (3) STOICS *displ. Stoics*: 53.12.

Quotation Marks Added or Displace Italics for Quotations. (Names in small capitals are replaced below by ellipses in the report of the scope of quotation marks, because these names were not italicized in the original.) (1) "You forget," . . . "you forget the most eminent of my praises, while you dwell so much on those vulgar advantages, in which fortune had a principal share. You have not observed, that no citizen has ever yet worne mourning on my account.": 8.20. (2) "Scite enim istud & dicitur & dicetur, Id quod utile sit, honestum esse: quod autem inutile sit, turpe esse.": n. 15.3. (3) "Nisi utile est quod facimus, stulta est gloria,": n. 15.7. (4) "Nihil eorum quæ damnosa sunt, pulchrum est.": n. 15.8. (5) "Alas!" . . . "with what regret must I leave my friends in this city, where even enemies are so generous!": 36.9. (6) "Go on, my boy!" . . . "acquire the confidence of the people: You will one day, I foresee, be the cause of great calamities to them:": 42.40. (7) "Cum alacribus, saltu; cum velocibus, cursu; cum validis recte certabat.": n. 32. (8) "Virtue I love," . . . "without austerity: Pleasure, without effeminacy: And life, without fearing its end.": 60.9. (9) "Were I . . . ," . . . "I would accept of these offers made by . . ." . . . "So would I too," . . . "were I . . .": 60.19. (10) "Go!" . . . "go tell your countrymen, that you left . . . compleating the conquest of the world.": 60.22. (11) "Myself," . . . "Myself, I say, and it is enough.": 61.3. (12) "Is it not glory enough for you," . . . "that you die with . . . ?": 61.7. (13) "I am still your emperor.": 61.14. (14) "The . . . ," . . . "dressed their hair with a laudable intent: Not for the purpose of loving or being loved: They adorned themselves only for their enemies, and in order to appear more terrible.": 62.19. (15) "The marquis of . . . ," . . . "is the second.": 69.21. (16) "Would you," . . . "have, on a like occasion, been guilty of that crime?" "By no means," . . . "And can you then imagine," . . . "that" . . . "would be guilty?": 69.35.

(17) "In the same manner," . . . "as want of cleanliness, decency, or discretion in a mistress are found to alienate our affections.": 106.10. (18) "You fancy," . . . "that . . . is your mortal enemy: I love to extinguish quarrels; and I must, therefore, tell you, that I heard him talk of you in the most obliging manner.": 110.17. (19) "Strike!" . . . "strike! but hear me.": 113.29. (20) "that if one knows it, it is but a small matter; if one knows it not, it is nothing.": 120.37.

Italics Added to Titles or Parts of Titles. (1) *The Art of preserving Health*: n. 68. (2) *Dictionary*: n. 13.21. (3) *Enquiry*: n. 84.

Italics Added to Questions, Sub-Sentential Questions, Maxims, Definitions, and Statements in a Report. (1) *I hate a drinking companion, . . . who never forgets.*: 31.13. (2) *Whether a quick or a slow apprehension be most valuable? Whether one, that, at first view, penetrates far into a subject, but can perform nothing upon study; or a contrary character, which must work out every thing by dint of application? Whether a clear head or a copious invention? Whether a profound genius or a sure judgment?*: 52.11. (3) *a sense of common interest*: 98.5.

Italics Added to Mentioned Words. (1) *Ancillarioli*: n. 92.4. (2) *inheritance* and *contract*: 25.28. (3) *pride*: n. 66.1.

4. Upper Case and Lower Case

Inconsistent upper and lower case has been eliminated by adopting the principal usage in the copytext, the other *ETSS* editions, and other publications and manuscripts, as explained in Part 1 of this appendix. The conventions of the copytext for lower case and upper case (both large and small capitals) were often violated in the notes, but rarely in the text (except in the headings of *NHR*).

Initial Lower Case Letter Displaces Upper Case. (1) bell. civ. *displ.* Bell. Civ.: n. 80. (2) concil. *displ.* Concil.: n. 30. (3) epist. *displ.* Epist.: n. 82. (4) ex *displ.* Ex: n. 83. (5) gods *displ.* Gods: 10.30. (6) ira *displ.* Ira: n. 62. (7) lib. *displ.* Lib.: n. 63.12, n. 92.4. (8) mathem. *displ.* MATH.: n. 6. (9) nat. *displ.* Nat.: n. 5. (10) officiis *displ.* Officiis: n. 3. (11) quæst. *displ.* Quæst.: n. 88. (12) quoted *displ.* Quoted: 289.D. (13) rep. *displ.* Rep.: n. 15.4.

Lower Case Displaces Small Capitals. (1) *Ancillarioli displ.* ANCILLARIOLI: n. 92.4. (2) mathem. *displ.* MATH.: n. 6.

Initial Upper Case Letter Displaces Lower Case. (1) Appendix *displ.* appendix: 90.1. (2) *Art . . . Health displ.* art . . . health: n. 68. (3) Dictionary *displ.* dictionary: n. 13.21. (4) La *displ.* la: 290.L. (5) Lord *displ.* lord: 37.26. (6) Sect. *displ.* sect.: n. 42.7. (7) Sixth *displ.* sixth: 107.34. (8) Supreme *displ.* supreme: 18.38. (9) (*1st*) *Whether displ.* whether: 52.11. (10) The Contents page was also modified: Self-Love *displ.* Self-love; and Regard *displ.* regard.

Small Capitals Displace Lower Case. (1) Cynics *displ. Cynics*: 53.12. (2) Germ. *displ.* Germ.: n. 44. (3) Jesuits *displ. Jesuits*: n. 13.18. (4) Longin. *displ.* Longin.: n. 39. (5) Oneterem *displ.* Oneterem: n. 90. (6) Sext. *displ. Sext*.: n. 11.15. (7) Soc. *displ.* Soc.: n. 81. (8) St. *displ.* St.: n. 36.3. (9) Stoics *displ. Stoics*: 53.12.

5. Typographical Errors (Misprints)

(1) in vain *mispr.* vain: 3.9. (2) seasons *mispr.* season: 13.12. (3) jure, *mispr.* jure: n. 11.5. (4) agrarian *mispr.* agarian: 20.29. (5) an *mispr.* any: 33.9. (6) correspondent *mispr.* corespondent: 38.16. (7) virtues. *mispr.* virtues: n. 26.9. (8) who . . . passage, "abandoned *mispr.* "who . . . passage, abandoned: 60.24. (9) buffeted *mispr.* buffetted: 61.10. (10) between *mispr.* betwen: n. 65.8. (11) Guicciardin *mispr.* Gu cciardin: 107.34. (12) rather less *mispr.* ratherless: 115.30. (13) Index: Page '380' should have been printed '330' under 'Montaigne quoted' (this error has been corrected to section-paragraph 8.9). (14) Index: Page '331, *Note* [S]' was incorrect under 'nature, State of . . . imaginary'. (This error was caused by carrying over the pagination of the 1770 edition; the error has been corrected to section-paragraph-note at 3.15, n. 11.) (Note: Some changes mentioned elsewhere in this editorial appendix may be typographical errors not reported here. See, for example, the section on "Hyphenated Form Displaces Unhyphenated Form".)

6. Errors in Greek

The use of accents and breathings in Greek type has been normalized, but wording and spelling judged acceptable in the printed editions of Hume's day has been retained. Errors in foreign languages other than Greek are reported in the register, but it is more informative to report corrections in Greek in a single location. It is difficult to determine whether these errors are typographical or derive from failures to consult the texts from which they were drawn. The errors should make no substantive difference to the reading of Hume's text or the authors he is quoting.

(1) n. 15.3: *καλόν*, *τὸ displ. καλον. το* (2) n. 15.10: *οὐχ ἕτερον displ. ουκ ετεραν*. (3) n. 30.2: *συνάγοντες displ. συναγαγοντες*. (4) n. 74: *οὐχ displ. οὐκ*

PART 3

NON-SYSTEMATIC CHANGES: A REGISTER OF NON-SYSTEMATIC EMENDATIONS AND SUBSTANTIVE VARIANTS

The final part of this appendix is the register of non-systematic changes of form and substance reported individually, together with a list of all substantive variants. Being distinctive, these emendations are not candidates for systematic reports, and no overlap or redundancy between the two lists has been permitted (except where a report in Part 3 incorporates a change mentioned in Parts 1 or 2). Emendation is

infrequent, but is often substantive. The changes, with few exceptions, derive from the authority of some edition of *ETSS*, principally the 1777 edition.

Terms, Symbols, and Practices in the Register

Each entry in this register begins with a page-line reference to the critical text. These numbers are followed by the relevant portion of the critical text, hereafter referred to as the *lemma*. The lemma is followed by a bracket (]), which is followed by one or more additional portions of text, each portion separated by a vertical line (|). The abbreviations and symbols used in this string are as follows:

] separates the critical text (printed to the left of the ']') from variants in the collated editions (printed to the right of the ']'). The first entry (in order of years) that shows a difference from the lemma entry is always reported in full.

| separates a variant (or other unit) from other variants (or units) of the same entry.

Abbreviated Dates: The editions of *EPM* authorized by Hume were published between 1751 and 1777. (See the Introduction for a history of the editions.) The relevant dates are abbreviated as 51, 53, 58, 60, 64, 67, 68, 70, 72, 77. Items of the form '67' indicate that a variant reading is found in the 1767 edition. Items of the form '51–60' indicate that a particular variant reading is found in all editions published from 1751 to 1760.

~ means identical in all respects, accidental and substantive. These swung dashes are always followed by an abbreviated date. For example, '~ 64–77' indicates that the texts of all editions appearing from 1764 to 1777 are in every respect exactly like the lemma.

In accordance with the above, an entry of the form

3.17 and according] ~ 51–60 | according 64 | ~ 67–77

indicates that at page 3, line 17, the critical text reads 'and according' and that from 1751 to 1760 the text found at that point in the critical text reads 'and according', as it did in every year except 1764, when it read 'according'.

* denotes an otherwise unregistered difference *in accidentals* in the listed editions. Thus, items of the form 51*60 indicate that a variant substantive reading from 51 to 60 is accompanied by a variant accidental not revealed in the record shown here. 'Belief 51*60' indicates that whereas the 51 edition includes the word 'Belief' in precisely that form, at least one later edition appearing by 1760 includes in the same location this same substantive, but in a different accidental form. (In any entry following the '] ' or ' | ' symbols, the accidentals printed at that point in the register are those found in the first year in the string of dates.) Although accidentals are not directly reported in the register, accidental differences in otherwise identical substantives are always noted by the marker '*'. The bulk of these variant accidentals involve differences in capitalization, but there are also many differences in punctuation. The asterisk is never used in a manner that masks either a substantive or an acci-

dental in the copytext; the reason why such obscuring is impossible is explained under the next entry (shading, or redlining).

Shading (or redlining). Entries are shaded whenever they contain emendations of the copytext that have not already been reported in block above. (Forms reported in the block reports are not, as such, listed or shaded below.) The lemma in a shaded entry (the critical text) displays the corrections made to the 1772 copytext. Unshaded entries record variations between editions and contain no emendation (other than those already reported in block). In shaded entries, by contrast to unshaded ones, changes in accidentals are often relevant to understanding and evaluating an emendation. Accordingly, in shaded entries only, asterisks (*) are not permitted. The copytext therefore can never be obscured as to differences in accidental forms. The form '~' is preserved for pure identity, accidental and substantive, so that the reader can easily see which editions may have served as a model for the emendation. Also, the exact form in the first year in which any accidental change occurred is always preserved.

Er refers to an entry made by Hume in the errata of an edition. Items of the form '57***Er***' indicate that the errata of an edition (57 in this example) is the source generating a particular variant. The year of a single edition is always specified next to the ***Er*** form. Thus, 'weakness 58***Er***' means that the errata in 58 instructs the reader that the correct reading is 'weakness' (and not that 'weakness' is the incorrect reading). A report of the form '*Essay* I 51| *Section* I 51***Er***–53' means that the printed text in 51 reads '*Essay* I' and that the errata in 51 instructs the reader that the correct reading is '*Section* I'.

. . . Ellipses indicate that material has been omitted from the span of text presented as the lemma. Ellipses are used exclusively in lemmas.

¶ designates the beginning of a paragraph. Changes of paragraph are considered accidental variants; none the less, they are reported with this symbol.

{ } Material inside these braces indicates a relevant authority, other than routine judgements made by the present editor, for an emendation of the copytext. The following are types of relevant authority: (1) the person responsible for suggesting the need for a change, (2) the publication in which the change was first made, (3) an authoritative published text of an author quoted by Hume. Thus, items of the form {SBN} or {GG} indicate that in emending the text the present editor has concurred with a particular previous editor known to have made the same emendation; {TXT} indicates that a check of an authoritative publication quoted by Hume shows that the source has been misquoted and that the editor has changed Hume's text. Such emendation is rare. Normally these emendations are supported by the printed quotation found in one or more of Hume's early editions, or in *A Treatise of Human Nature*, from which Hume extracted some quotations in his later work. In using 'TXT', an external source may not play any role in the change made to Hume's text. However, if the wording in Hume's version is unintelligible or grammatically incorrect, then a carefully selected external source may suffice to support an emendation. (Usually

several such sources have been consulted.) The following abbreviations have been used:

{TLB} signifies the present editor, Tom L. Beauchamp.

{GG} signifies the edition of Hume's *Philosophical Works* prepared by T. H. Green and T. H. Grose. Details regarding a facsimile edition are found in the Reference List.

{SBN} signifies the edition of the two *Enquiries* prepared by L. A. Selby-Bigge and revised by P. H. Nidditch. References are to the edition listed in the Reference List.

{TXT} signifies an authoritative text of a work quoted by Hume. These texts have been consulted to correct quotations, following the rules specified above. Sources consulted are in the Catalogue of Hume's References (pp. 280–7), although several additional editions have sometimes been consulted in order to confirm that a correction is required.

Few shaded (redlined) entries in the register cite a relevant authority when there has been an emendation of the copytext. The reason is that the bulk of the substantive changes derive from the authority of the 77 edition or some edition prior to 72. Whenever a redlined string contains a form such as '~ 77' or '~ 58–68', the reader can assume that the editions cited are the authorities for the change. Usually, however, these authorities are supported by other data. Often other editions contain the same form, and commonly there is evidence internal to the copytext that the change reflects a standard internal form.

Authorities are also listed for emendations involving punctuation changes, but they are not listed for the following types of changes:

1. Spelling and Abbreviation
2. Italic and Roman
3. Upper and Lower Case
4. Arabic and Roman Numerals.

These changes commonly derive from inconsistencies in the texts. With the exception of arabic and roman numerals, these changes are reported in the block reports above. They are, in a few cases, repeated more than once, because they are intrinsic to other variants that are reported in the register. These changes have rarely been introduced by previous editors (all of whom used a different copytext). In cases involving a second listing in the register, redlining is not used, because the primary presentation has already been furnished in the block reports.

No exhaustive search of all posthumous editions of the works of Hume by his various editors has been undertaken in order to locate authorities for these changes; however, it has been established that all previous editions of these works are inconsequential for purposes of systematic emendation of types 1–4.

If material is not in the copytext, but is in one or more of the other editions, the earliest text is used as the basis of the first presentation in a string of years in the reg-

ister. For example, if the material appears in 51*60, the 51 edition and no other is the text displayed. The reason the earliest form is always shown first is to show the original form of publication.

Entries of text in the register do not include an item of punctuation unless the punctuation itself is a variant or is needed to locate or make sense of the variant. If there is no contrasting punctuation in another edition, the punctuation is irrelevant to a display of variation. Misprints in editions of *EPM* other than the copytext (of which there are many clear cases) are excluded from the list of variants.

Some portions of Hume's writings appeared first as main text and in later editions as notes or appendices, or vice versa. This material is here printed and collated as text material if it is text in the 72 edition and as notes if it appears in the 72 notes. The general rule on note material is that, whenever possible, the location in the register is determined by the location in the 72 edition. However, the location of appendix material, for reasons described previously, is determined by the location in the 77 edition.

The editor has attempted to simplify the forms used in the list below to make it as readable as possible, thereby eliminating some of the tedious or arcane notations used in other critical editions. Preference has also been given to short, simple entries, avoiding longer strings of text with more content. This general rule favouring simplicity and atomic units is occasionally overridden, usually by placing two short variants together as a larger and more meaningful unit. A few entries are explained in prose, without employing the above abbreviations.

Sections, Appendices, and Dialogue
(Editions: 51, 53, 58, 60, 64, 67, 68, 70, 72, 77)

Front **A half-title occurs only from 58 to 77**.

Section 1

3.1 men] Persons 51*70 | ~ 72–77
3.2 persons, entirely disingenuous] Persons, 51*53 | persons, entirely disingenuous 58*77
3.3 believe] believe at all 51–53 | ~ 58–77
opinions] Opinion 51*70 | ~ 72–77
3.12 denied] refused 51 | deny'd 53*77
3.13 among] in the latter Class, amongst 51*53 | ~ 58–77
3.16 between] betwixt 51–53 | ~ 58–77
3.20 between] betwixt 51–53 | ~ 58–77
3.26 weariness] Weariness 51*58 | weakness 58***Er*** | ~ 60–77
3.29 be] are 51–70 | ~ 72–77
3.31 induction] Deduction 51*53 | ~ 58–77
3.33 to] in 51 | ~ 53–77

4.1 be] are 51–70 | ~ 72–77
4.9 the understanding] human Understanding 51 | human understanding 53–70 | the human understanding 72 | ~ 77
4.10 between] betwixt 51–53 | ~ 58–77
4.11 of almost] almost of 51–70 | ~ 72–77
4.12 elegant] elegant and sublime 51–53 | ~ 58–77
4.20 produced] adduc'd 51 | produc'd 53*77
4.29 criminal trial] Trial of Criminals, 51*53 | trial 58–60 | ~ 64–77
the first object of the prisoner] their first Object 51*53 | the first object of the criminals 58–60 | ~ 64–77
4.30 him] them 51–60 | ~ 64–77
4.40 before-hand] *a priori* 51 | beforehand 53*77
5.8 nor] ~ 51–72 | or 77
set in motion the active powers of men] set the active Powers of Men in Motion and Employment 51*53 | ~ 58–77
5.9 truths] Truth 51 | ~ 53–77
5.10 which they] they 51 | ~ 53–77
and] and to 51 | ~ 53–77
5.18 to] against 51–70 | ~ 72–77
5.21 each side] both Sides 51 | ~ 53–77
produced] adduc'd 51 | produc'd 53*77
5.22 the one as well as the other] both of them 51 | ~ 53–77
5.23 in] to 51–58 | ~ 60–77
5.31 give] give Men 51*53 | ~ 58–77
5.34 complicated] accurate 51–58 | ~ 60–77
6.5 principles] Principle 51*53 | ~ 58–77
morals,] Morals, 51 | ~ 53–68 | morals 70–72 | ~ 77
6.6 curious] extremely curious 51–68 | ~ 70–77
6.7 researches] Enquiries 51 | ~ 53–77
6.8 discover] fix 51–58 | ~ 60–77
true] just 51–58 | ~ 60–77
6.9 either sentiment] Sentiment 51*60 | ~ 64–77
enters] ~ 51–53 | enter 58–60 | ~ 64–77
n. 1 1] First 51 | first 53–72 | ~ 77
6.10 In order to attain . . . thence to] **These sentences occur only from 64 to 77. They replace the following sentences, which occur only from 51 to 60:**

> Mean while, it will scarce be possible for us, 'ere this Controversy is fully decided, to proceed in that accurate Manner, requir'd in the Sciences; by beginning with exact Definitions of VIRTUE and VICE, which are the Objects of our present Enquiry. But we shall do what may justly be esteem'd as satisfactory. We shall consider the Matter as an Object of Experience. We shall call *every Quality or Action of the Mind*, virtuous,

which is attended with the general Approbation {*general Approbation* 51*58 | *approbation* 60} *of Mankind* {*Mankind* 51*58 | *the spectator* 60} And we shall denominate vicious, *every Quality, which is the Object of general* {*general* 51–58 | *his* 60} *Blame or Censure*. These Qualities we shall endeavour to collect; and after examining, on both Sides, the several Circumstances, in which they agree, 'tis hop'd we may, at last,

6.12 form] ~ 64 | forms 67–68 | ~ 70–77
6.17 sensibility, which, on this head,] sensibility on this head, which 64–68 | ~ 70–77
6.20 needs] need 64–68 | ~ 70–77
6.21 should] would 64–68 | ~ 70–77
6.31 thence] from thence 64–70 | ~ 72–77
6.32 censure] moral Blame 51*53 | moral censure 58–60 | ~ 64–77
6.34 the] this 51–58 | ~ 60–77
7.3 which are derived] deriv'd 51*70 | ~ 72–77
7.4 they] ~ 51 | that they 53–70 | ~ 72–77
attempt] begin 51–60 | ~ 64–77
7.5 which] that 51 | ~ 53–77
7.7 We shall begin . . . accounted for.] **This paragraph occurs only from 64 to 77.**

Section 2

8.pt 1] II. 51–72 | I. 77
Part 1 of Section 2 from 51 to 72 is positioned in 77 as Appendix 2 and hence in this edition is published as an appendix, with a new title. The number of parts in Section 2 of 77 is thereby reduced from three to two.
8.2 ESTIMABLE] VIRTUOUS 51–60 | ~ 64–77
engage] attract 51–53 | ~ 58–77
the] the Esteem, 51*60 | ~ 64–77
8.4 or their equivalents, are] are 51–70 | ~ 72–77
8.9 make them approach] approach them, 51*68 | ~ 70–77
8.12 ill-will] Malignity 51*68 | ~ 70–77
8.14 approbation and applause] Applause and Acclamation 51*70 | ~ 72–77
8.16 deeming] esteeming 51–53 | ~ 58–77
8.23 worne] *wore* 51–58 | *worne* 58***Er***–77
9.2 that] ~ 51–68 | that, 70–72 | ~ 77
9.6 danger and tempest] Tempest and Thunder 51*53 | danger and tumult 58–68 | ~ 70–77
9.22 around] around them 51 | ~ 53–77
9.pt 2] III. 51–72 | II. 77
9.25 namely,] *viz*. 51–68 | ~ 70–77

10.7 it] we 51–53 | ~ 58–77
be concluded] conclude 51–53 | ~ 58–77
10.9 to them?] ~ 51 | them. 53–70 | to them. 72 | ~ 77
10.10 a plant] Plant 51*70 | ~ 72–77
10.13 sentiment] Sentiments 51*53 | ~ 58–77
10.17 vestment] Garment 51 | ~ 53–77
10.22 manufacture] Manufactory 51*53 | ~ 58–77
10.23 order] Rank and Order 51*53 | ~ 58–77
10.26 romance] Romances 51 | romances 53–72 | ~ 77
10.32 unactive] inactive 51–68 | ~ 70–77
Even] And even 51–53 | ~ 58–77
n. 6 9.] {GG} | 8 51–68 | viii 70–77
11.6 either] whether 51 | ~ 53–77
11.12 sentiment] Sentiments 51*70 | ~ 72–77
11.13 Giving alms] Alms 51–53 | Giving alms 53*Er**77
11.18 extolled] prais'd 51*58 | ~ 60–77
11.19 sword or poinard] Poinard or the Poison 51 | ~ 53 | sword or poniard 58 | ~ 60–77
11.32 corruption] Corruption and Disorder 51*53 | ~ 58–77
11.35 or] and 51–72 | ~ 77
12.3 undeniable,] undeniable, *that* there is such a Sentiment in human Nature as disinterested Benevolence 51 | undeniable, *that* there is such a sentiment in human nature as disinterested benevolence 53–60 | undeniable, *that* there is such a sentiment in human nature as benevolence 64–72 | ~ 77
12.4 sentiment of benevolence] Possession of it 51 | possession of it 53–72 | ~ 77

Section 3

13.7 on the] on 51–58 | ~ 60–77
13.10 with] of 51–68 | ~ 70–77
13.12 ornaments] Ornaments 51*67 | ornament 68 | ~ 70–77
13.19 tenfold] a tenfold 51–70 | ~ 72–77
13.23 seizing] Seizure 51*60 | ~ 64–77
13.24 in] amongst 51–53 | among 58–70 | ~ 72–77
13.29 among] amongst 51–53 | ~ 58–77
13.31 as the property of] by 51 | ~ 53–77
man] one 51–53 | ~ 58–77
14.5 had never] never had 51–53 | ~ 58–77
14.6 ever been] been ever 51–70 | ~ 72–77
14.15 fellows] Fellow 51 | Fellows 51*Er**77
14.19 deed or] Deed or 51 | deed of 53 | ~ 53*Er*–77
know that] know 51–70 | ~ 72–77
already] before-hand 51 | ~ 53–77

14.24 between] betwixt 51–53 | ~ 58–77
14.25 between] betwixt 51–53 | ~ 58–77
14.26 the same] equal 51–70 | ~ 72–77
14.29 human race] Race of Mankind 51 | race of mankind 53–72 | ~ 77
14.30 would lie] lay 51 | ~ 53–77
be] was 51 | ~ 53–77
14.36 towards] ~ 51–67 | toward 68 | ~ 70–77
14.37 the mutual benevolence is among] is the mutual Benevolence amongst 51*53 | ~ 58–77
15.1 among] amongst 51–53 | ~ 58–77
Between] Betwixt 51–53 | ~ 58–77
15.4 when] where 51–70 | ~ 72–77
15.8 this] that 51–68 | ~ 70–77
15.9 entirely] altogether 51–53 | ~ 58–77
social state] Society 51 | ~ 53–77
15.13 these] ~ 51 | those 53–70 | ~ 72–77
15.15 greater] greatest 51–72 | ~ 77
misery] Sufferance 51*60 | ~ 64–77
15.20 perishing] starving 51–53 | ~ 58–77
15.21 preservation] Life 51*53 | ~ 58–77
15.22 lose their lives] perish 51–53 | ~ 58–77
15.27 the means] Means 51 | ~ 53–77
15.28 opens] open 51 | ~ 53–77
15.32 though effected by power and even violence] even without the Proprietor's Consent 51*70 | ~ 72–77
15.34 likewise] also 51 | ~ 53–77
fate] Fate 51*64 | lot 67–68 | ~ 70–77
16.2 To make] Make 51–58 | ~ 60–77
16.4 the dictates of self-preservation alone] alone the Dictates of Self-preservation 51*68 | ~ 70–77
16.13 among] amongst 51–53 | ~ 58–77
this] that 51–68 | ~ 70–77
16.31 equitable] equal 51 | ~ 53–77
17.5 Tempests] The Storms and Tempests 51*53 | ~ 58–77
17.11 among] amongst 51 | ~ 53–77
17.15 which] that 51 | ~ 53–77
17.18 we] as we 51–72 | ~ 77
17.21 known] ~ 51–67 | was known 68 | ~ 70–77
17.23 men's] their 51 | ~ 53–77
n. 11.4 passage.] beautiful Passage, which is the only Authority I shall cite for these Reasonings: Not imitating in this the Example of *Puffendorff*, nor even that of *Grotius*, who think a Verse from *Ovid* or *Plautus* or *Petronius* a necessary Warrant for every moral Truth; or the Example of Mr. *Woolaston*, who has

constant Recourse to *Hebrew* and *Arabic* Authors for the same purpose. 51*53 | passage, which is the only authority I shall cite for these reasonings: Not imitating in this example of PUFFENDORF, nor even that of GROTIUS, who think a verse from OVID or PLAUTUS or PETRONIUS a necessary warrant for every moral truth; or the example of Mr. WOOLASTON, who has constant recourse to HEBREW and ARABIC authors for the same purpose. 58–60 | ~ 64–77

n. 11.11 mœnibus] mænibus 51–72 | ~ 77

n. 11.14 nulla] *nulla* 51–53 | ~ 58–68 | nulla, 70–72

18.13 regard to] ~ 51–67 | regard 68 | ~ 70–77

18.30 bodily] brute 51–53 | ~ 58–77

18.32 women] they 51–68 | ~ 70–77

18.33 other] superior 51–53 | ~ 58–77

18.38 between] betwixt 51–53 | ~ 58–77

19.1 serve to] serve 51 | ~ 51***Er*** | serve 53–60 | ~ 64–77

manner of purpose] Manner of Purpose 51*67 | purpose 68 | ~ 70–77

19.6 none of which he is bound by any ties,] whom he is not bound, by any Ties, 51 | none of which he is bound 51***Er*** | ~ 53–77

19.14 becoming then] being 51–58 | being then 58***Er***–68 | ~ 70–77

19.17 larger] larger and larger 51 | ~ 53–77

19.20 in the] the 51–53 | ~ 58–77

enlargement] Encrease 51*68 | ~ 70–77

justice,] Property and Justice 51*60 | ~ 64–77

19.21 the extensive] ~ 51–67 | extensive 68 | ~ 70–77

19.23 the] all the 51–53 | ~ 58–77

19.31 among] amongst 51–53 | ~ 58–77

19.35 serve to] serve 51–70 | ~ 72–77

20.4 *on*] *in* 51–53 | ~ 58–77

20.16 practicable in themselves] practicable 51–53 | ~ 58–77

20.18 among] amongst 51–53 | ~ 58–77

20.27 least] least, 51–72 | ~ 77

20.28 it is] as 'tis 51–68 | as it is 70–72 | ~ 77

20.30 into] to 51–72 | ~ 77

20.33 at] at the 51–68 | ~ 70–77

20.35 possessions] the Possessions of Men 51 | Possessions 51***Er****77

men's] their 51 | Men's 51***Er****77

20.37 most extreme] extremest 51–72 | ~ 77

21.12 by a] ~ 51–67 | by 68 | ~ 70–77

21.13 or] ~ 51–67 | and 68 | ~ 70–77

21.23 which they] they 51 | ~ 53–77

21.29 The objects, which receive those appellations,] These Objects 51*60 | ~ 64–77

21.30 separated from us] separate 51 | separate from us 53–58 | ~ 60–77

21.33 among] amongst 51–53 | ~ 58–77
21.36 dissention] Quarrels and Dissentions 51*53 | dissentions 58–70 | ~ 72–77
21.37 preceding] precedent 51–70 | ~ 72–77
21.40 Does any one scruple] Is it ever scrupled 51 | Does any one scruple 53*77
22.3 All other] ~ 51–64 | All 67–68 | ~ 70–77
22.21 genius] great Genius 51*53 | ~ 58–77
learning] extensive Learning 51*53 | ~ 58–77
22.22 a] the best 51–53 | ~ 58–77
22.23 which abounds in ingenious and brilliant thoughts, and is not wanting in solidity] that, perhaps, has ever yet been communicated to the World 51 | which, perhaps, has ever yet been communicated to the world 53 | ~ 58–77
n. 12.1 *des*] ~ 51–60 | *de* 64–68 | ~ 70–77
n. 12.3 be reconciled] reconcile 51–68 | ~ 70–77
n. 12.5 Cudworth, Clarke,] Dr. *Clarke* 51*60 | Dr. Cudworth, Dr. Clarke 64–68 | ~ 70–77
n. 12.6 Section 1] *Essay* I 51 | *Section* I 51***Er***–53 | Section I 58–77
and Appendix] and *Appendix* 51*72 | Appendix 77
n. 12.8 other object,] Object 51*58 | other foundation of their authority, and no other object, 60–68 | ~ 70–77
n. 12.16 form to any deed] Form 51*70 | ~ 72–77
n. 12.17 commonly regarded] regarded 51–60 | ~ 64–77
23.8 and of] ~ 51–67 | and 68 | ~ 70–77
23.18 between] betwixt 51–53 | ~ 58–77
23.22 or] ~ 51–67 | and 68 | ~ 70–77
23.30 sentiments] Regards 51*68 | ~ 70–77
23.31 expose] subjects 51–70 | ~ 72–77
object] Objects 51*70 | ~ 72–77
23.35 worne] wore 51–53 | worne 58*77
24.3 and, by its becoming mine,] and 51–68 | ~ 70–77
24.9 between] betwixt 51–53 | ~ 58–77
24.15 nowise] no way 51–64 | ~ 67–68 | no way 70 | ~ 72–77
n. 13.8 use] uses 51–72 | ~ 77
n. 13.9 evidently show] show evidently 51–70 | ~ 72–77
that he] he 51 | ~ 53–77
n. 13.15 these] those 51–70 | ~ 72–77
n. 13.16 arise] arises 51–70 | ~ 72–77
n. 13.19 out] at 51–53 | ~ 58–77
proceeded] ~ 51–72 | proceed 77
n. 13.22 risen] rose 51–68 | ~ 70–77
high] strong 51–53 | ~ 58–77
n. 13.31 It . . . reasoning.] **These sentences occur only from 64 to 77.**
n. 13.37 thence observe] observe 64–70 | ~ 72–77
25.5 than] ~ 51–67 | that 68 | ~ 70–77

25.9 The dilemma seems obvious: . . . in society?] **These paragraphs occur only from 53 to 77.**
25.9 The dilemma seems obvious: . . . and other passions, arises] IF justice arose 53–60 | ~ 64–77
25.13 which nature . . . it follows] without any reflection, even on those obvious interests of society, which absolutely require that virtue; it must follow 53–60 | ~ 64–77
25.18 can] will 53–60 | ~ 64–77
25.19 escaped the observation of] escap'd 53*70 | ~ 72–77
25.20 proposition to say] ~ 53–64 | proposition 67–68 | ~ 70–77
25.23 these] those 53 | ~ 53***Er***–77
25.24 required] demanded 53–60 | ~ 64–77
25.29 hundred] thousand 53–68 | ~ 70–77
a thousand] innumerable 53–68 | ~ 70–77
26.17 How great soever] HOWEVER great 53*68 | ~ 70–77
26.18 chief outlines] great lines 53–70 | chief out-lines 72–77
26.20 walls,] walls and 53*68 | ~ 70–77
diversified] infinitely diversify'd 53*68 | ~ 70–77
26.22 discover] bespeak 53–60 | ~ 64–77
26.23 former] latter 53 | ~ 53***Er***–77
26.28 concerning] of 53–70 | ~ 72–77
26.33 motives] views 53 | ~ 58–77
26.40 public utility] utility 53–58 | ~ 60–77
27.1 *disorders?* Were the distinction or separation of possessions entirely useless, can any one conceive, that it ever should have obtained in society?] *disorders*? 53 | *disorders? Were the distinction or separation of possessions entirely useless, can any one conceive, that it ever should have obtained in society?* 58*77
27.12 benevolence, friendship] Benevolence, Friendship 51*67 | benevolence 68 | ~ 70–77
27.16 a great] ~ 51–64 | great 67–68 | ~ 70–77
27.18 This is . . . rule of philosophizing.] **This sentence occurs as a footnote from 51 to 68 and as text from 70 to 77.**
indeed is NEWTON's chief] is Sir *Isaac Newton's* second 51*68 | ~ 70–77
n. 14 **Note 14 occurred as a longer footnote from 51 to 58, parts of which occur as text from 70 to 77.**

Section 4

28.7 law,] Laws, 51*70 | ~ 72 | law 77
28.13 among] amongst 51–53 | ~ 58–77
28.17 person] Persons 51*70 | ~ 72–77
28.21 among] amongst 51–53 | ~ 58–77
entirely] altogether 51–53 | entirely 58*77

28.22 among] amongst 51–53 | ~ 58–77
28.23 other princes] others 51–68 | ~ 70–77
28.24 between] betwixt 51–53 | ~ 58–77
28.26 between] betwixt 51–58 | ~ 60–77
28.27 subsist] flourish 51–53 | ~ 58–77
29.5 most extreme] extremest 51–72 | ~ 77
29.9 and] ~ 51–67 | or 68 | ~ 70–77
29.11 regarded as no less, or even as] equally criminal, or even 51–68 | regarded as equally criminal, or even as 70–72 | ~ 77
29.16 that such] such 51 | ~ 53–77
n. 15.10 SEXT.] Sext. 51–53 | ~ 58–60 | SEPT. 64–67 | ~ 68 | SEPT. 70–77
29.19 **A note occurs at this point from 51 to 60 that occurs as text from 64 to 77.**
29.20 These rules . . . society.] **These sentences occur as a footnote from 51 to 60 and as text from 64 to 77.**
29.23 this] ~ 51–64 | this holds 67–68 | ~ 70–77
29.28 fortune, which] Fortune 51 | fortune which 53*77
expedient,] Invention 51 | invention 53–68 | invention, 70–72 | ~ 77
30.3 foreseeing] thinking, 51*68 | ~ 70–77
30.6 such frequent] so many 51–53 | so frequent 58–60 | ~ 64–77
30.7 licence] Licences 51*53 | ~ 58–77
30.8 among] amongst 51–53 | ~ 58–77
or] ~ 51–64 | or were 67–68 | ~ 70–77
30.9 between] betwixt 51–53 | ~ 58–77
30.12 ATHENIAN] *Greek* 51*58 | ~ 60–77
30.14 ATHENIANS] *Greeks* 51*58 | ~ 60–77
30.15 women's] Women's 51*68 | woman's 70 | ~ 72–77
30.17 women] Women 51*60 | woman 64 | ~ 67–68 | woman 70 | ~ 72–77
30.18 correspondence] Intercourse 51 | ~ 53–77
between] betwixt 51–53 | ~ 58–77
30.20 between] betwixt 51–58 | ~ 60–77
30.26 foresee] see 51–72 | ~ 77
30.27 of one's author] one's Authors 51*68 | of one's authors 70 | ~ 72–77
30.38 which] that 51 | ~ 53–77
30.39 familiarities,] Familiarities 51*64 | intimacies, 67–68 | ~ 70–77
commendable] commonly very laudable 51 | commonly very commendable 53–68 | ~ 70–77
31.1 the pursuit of health and pleasure brings] Health and Pleasure bring 51 | the Search for Health or Pleasure brings 51*Er* | ~ 53–77
31.6 which] that 51 | ~ 53–77
31.8 rules] Rules and Maxims 51*53 | ~ 58–77
31.11 among] amongst 51–53 | ~ 58–77
31.16 Among] AMONGST 51–53 | AMONG 58*77

31.19 formerly decided] decided formally 51–60 | decided formerly 64–70 | ~ 72–77
31.34 between] betwixt 51–53 | ~ 58–77
31.32 the way] way 51–70 | ~ 72–77
31.24 at least] or at best 51–53 | ~ 58–77
n. 16.1 yield] yields 51–72 | ~ 77
n. 16.2 yield] ~ 51–64 | yields 67–68 | ~ 70–77
n. 16.5 among] amongst 51–53 | ~ 58–77
32.4 among] amongst 51–53 | ~ 58–77
32.5 regulated] supported 51–53 | ~ 58–77
principles] Principles and Regulations 51*53 | ~ 58–77
32.6 among] amongst 51–53 | ~ 58–77

Section 5

33.5 eulogy] Elogy 51 | ~ 53–77
33.7 which he] he 51 | ~ 53–77
33.11 more] infinitely more 51–68 | ~ 70–77
33.16 figure of a human creature] human Figure 51*60 | ~ 64–77
33.18 who] that 51 | ~ 53–77
33.20 sentiments] Sentiments 51 | ~ 53–70 | sentiment 72–77
n. 17.5 be] to be 51–70 | ~ 72–77
n. 17.12 that which] what 51–70 | ~ 72–77
34.5 cannot give a] can give no 51 | ~ 53–77
34.13 art] Arts 51 | ~ 53–77
34.15 so far be] be so far 51–70 | ~ 72–77
34.22 on] ~ 51–53 | in 58–60 | ~ 64–77
constitution] Frame and Constitution 51*53 | ~ 58–77
34.23 had never] never had 51–53 | ~ 58–77
34.25 any] ~ 51–60 | an 64–68 | ~ 70–77
34.27 logic] Logics 51 | ~ 53–77
34.28 obviate] get rid of 51–68 | ~ 70–77
practical and more] more practical and 51–70 | ~ 72–77
34.33 public utility] Utility 51*58 | ~ 60–77
35.6 applaud] value 51–70 | ~ 72–77
35.10 an] a very 51–68 | ~ 70–77
wholly] altogether 51–53 | ~ 58–77
n. 18.7 person] Persons 51*68 | ~ 70–77
35.15 is not this] this is not 51–68 | ~ 70–77
35.18 praise] Praises 51*58 | ~ 58*Er*–77
35.21 our present] ~ 51–67 | present 68 | ~ 70–77
35.24 interest] Interests 51*58 | ~ 60–77
35.32 which we] we 51 | ~ 53–77

36.6 statesman] Statesmen 51 | ~ 53–77
contest] Concurrence 51*60 | ~ 64–77
36.10 in] on 51–58 | ~ 60–77
36.34 which we] we 51 | ~ 53–77
36.36 morals] the moral Species 51*68 | ~ 70–77
36.37 between] betwixt 51–53 | ~ 58–77
37.1 Experience] Experience and Custom 51*53 | ~ 58–77
forms] form 51–53 | ~ 58–77
37.3 that principle] these Principles 51*53 | ~ 58–77
37.10 one great source] the great Secret 51 | the great source 53–60 | ~ 64–77
37.12 the community] Community 51 | the Community 51*Er*77
37.14 might] might, perhaps, 51–53 | ~ 58–77
37.19 mankind] Society 51*70 | ~ 72–77
whether] if 51–53 | ~ 58–77
were] was 51–64 | ~ 67–68 | was 70 | ~ 72–77
that we] we 51 | ~ 53–77
37.22 pretence] Pretext 51*60 | ~ 64–77
37.24 between] betwixt 51–53 | ~ 58–77
37.26 Lord] my Lord 51*68 | lord 70–77
37.27 right way] Way we should follow, 51*53 | ~ 58–77
37.28 in which] wherein 51 | ~ 53–77
37.29 separate] ~ 51 | separated 53–70 | ~ 72–77
in which] wherein 51 | ~ 53–77
38.1 entirely] altogether 51–53 | ~ 58–77
38.3 nowise affects] does no way affect 51–53 | no way affects 58–68 | no wise affects 70–77
usefulness, therefore,] therefore Usefulness 51*70 | ~ 72–77
38.12 suffering] Sufferance 51 | ~ 53–77
38.15 either] merely 51–68 | ~ 70–77
sensual or speculative] speculative 51–68 | ~ 70–77
38.17 affect] ~ 51–53 | affects 58 | ~ 60–77
38.22 are] is 51 | ~ 53–77
to] ~ 51–58 | with 60 | ~ 64–77
38.25 satisfaction] Satisfaction and Enjoyment, 51*53 | ~ 58–77
38.30 enjoyment] Satisfaction 51*53 | ~ 58–77
39.5 pleasures] Enjoyments 51*53 | ~ 58–77
39.14 breast] Breasts 51*64 | ~ 67–68 | breasts 70 | ~ 72–77
39.30 characters] Personages 51*60 | ~ 64–77
39.31 cruelty,] Cruelty 51 | cruelty 53 | ~ 58 | cruelty 60–67 | ~ 68 | cruelty 70–72 | ~ 77
39.39 Few] No 51*68 | ~ 70–77
are] is 51–68 | ~ 70–77
40.2 reader] Readers 51 | ~ 53–77

40.8 favourite] Choice 51 | choice 53–72 | ~ 77
40.10 which] that 51 | ~ 53–77
day] Moment 51*60 | ~ 64–77
40.11 entirely] altogether 51–53 | ~ 58–77
40.13 bring every affection near to us] approach every Object 51*60 | approach every affection 64–68 | ~ 70–77
40.14 representation] Description 51*60 | ~ 64–77
40.17 fate] Fortunes 51*70 | ~ 72–77
40.18 is] are 51–70 | ~ 72–77
40.21 interest] Interests 51*70 | ~ 72–77
appears] appear 51–70 | ~ 72–77
40.22 interest] Interests 51 | ~ 53–77
40.27 which are described] described 51*70 | ~ 72–77
40.33 threatens] ~ 51 | threaten'd 51*Er* | ~ 53–77
these] ~ 51–60 | those 64 | ~ 67–77
41.1 tyrant] inhuman Tyrant 51 | ~ 53–77
41.20 Cloaths which] Cloaths, that 51 | ~ 53–77
41.21 which] that 51 | ~ 53–77
41.22 feelings] Sentiments and Feelings 51*68 | ~ 70–77
person] Persons 51*70 | ~ 72–77
41.23 spectator] Spectators 51 | ~ 53–77
41.24 judgment] Sentence 51*53 | ~ 58–77
41.25 character] Characters 51 | ~ 53–77
n. 22.3 arise] arises 51–72 | ~ 77
n. 22.6 which he] he 51 | ~ 53–77
n. 22.8 a] the smallest 51–68 | ~ 70–77
42.8 interest] Interest 51*53 | interests 58–60 | ~ 64 | interests 67–68 | ~ 70–77
42.9 in] of 51–72 | ~ 77
42.11 who] that 51 | ~ 53–77
42.19 tread] tread just 51–58 | ~ 60–77
42.20 surely] ~ 51–53 | certainly 58 | ~ 60–77
42.37 with] 'tis said, with 51–53 | ~ 58–77
42.40 cried] cries 51–53 | ~ 58–77
43.4 humanity] Humanity 51*64 | benevolence 67–68 | ~ 70–77
43.11 entirely] altogether 51–53 | ~ 58–77
43.15 who] that 51 | ~ 53–77
43.16 to him] him 51–70 | ~ 72–77
43.25 yet] and yet 51–68 | ~ 70–77
that it] it 51–58 | ~ 58*Er*–77
43.27 eye] Senses 51*58 | ~ 60–77
43.28 such a] such 51–70 | ~ 72–77
n. 24.10 peaches] Fruit 51*70 | ~ 72–77
n. 24.11 they] it 51–70 | ~ 72–77

n. 24.12 between] betwixt 51–58 | ~ 60–77
44.2 shall] will 51 | ~ 51*Er*–77
44.19 situation different] different Situation 51 | different situation 53–72 | ~ 77
44.20 us {2nd appearance}] us on any reasonable Terms 51*53 | ~ 58–77
44.21 ourselves] Ourself 51*70 | ~ 72–77
44.23 unalterable] inalterable 51 | ~ 53–77
44.27 intimately] immediately 51–70 | ~ 72–77
n. 25.4 done to] to 51–58 | ~ 60–77
45.8 between] betwixt 51–53 | ~ 58–77
45.9 with those who are] to those 51–58 | with those 60–70 | ~ 72–77
45.12 vigour] Force and Vigour 51*53 | vigor 58*77
45.18 recital] Narration and Recital 51*53 | ~ 58–77
45.24 of] of all 51–60 | ~ 64–77
be] is 51–72 | ~ 77
45.25 not, in a great measure,] not 51–60 | ~ 64–77
45.31 virtues,] Virtues of 51 | ~ 53–77
45.32 a] the 51–67 | one 68 | the 70–72 | ~ 77
45.33 our fellow-creatures] Society 51 | ~ 53–77
45.34 that, in] in 51–60 | ~ 64–77
of] or Judgment of 51*53 | ~ 58–77
45.35 the] that the 51–60 | ~ 64–77
45.38 order] Concord 51*53 | ~ 58–77
does always, by] by 51–58 | ~ 60–77
45.39 engage] engages 51–58 | ~ 60–77
46.1 deeply] deep 51–68 | ~ 70–77
46.5 were] was 51–68 | ~ 70–77
46.7 is] itself is 51–53 | ~ 58–77
46.10 were] was 51–68 | ~ 70–77
46.11 nature] Natures 51*58 | Nature 58*Er**77
46.14 interest] Interests 51*58 | ~ 60–67 | interests 68 | ~ 70–77

Section 6

47.pt PART 1] PART II. 51–60 | PART I. 64–77
47.1 that] ~ 51–68 | that, 70–72 | ~ 77
47.4 among] amongst 51–53 | ~ 58–77
47.5 these qualities were never esteemed by any one] no one ever esteem'd these Qualities, 51*58 | ~ 60–77
47.7 as] them as 51–58 | ~ 60–77
47.11 degree] Degrees 51 | ~ 53–77
47.12 characteristic] Characteristic 51*67 | character 68 | ~ 70–77
47.16 we] as these we 51*68 | ~ 70–77
47.28 is {1st appearance}] are 51 | ~ 53–77

47.30 whom we] we 51 | ~ 53–77
n. 26.6 makes] make 51*53 | ~ 58–77
48.7 framed so] so fram'd 51*70 | ~ 72–77
48.9 than even] even than 51–58 | ~ 60–77
48.13 between] betwixt 51–53 | ~ 58–77
between] betwixt 51–53 | ~ 58–77
48.14 to] on 51 | ~ 53–77
48.16 for] as to 51 | to 53 | in 58–60 | ~ 64–77
48.21 or] and a 51–53 | ~ 58–77
48.24 between] betwixt 51–53 | ~ 58–77
49.5 that makes] which makes 51–53 | which make 58–64 | which makes 67–70 | ~ 72–77
49.7 as strong] equal 51 | ~ 53–77
49.10 approved of] approv'd 51*70 | ~ 72–77
49.15 which we] we 51 | ~ 53–77
49.28 is not swayed by] gives nothing to 51–68 | ~ 70–77
49.34 security] Boldness 51*53 | ~ 58–77
49.37 had] ~ 51–58 | and 60 | ~ 64–77
reversed] inverted 51–60 | ~ 64–77
50.2 perseverance] Assiduity 51 | assiduity 53–72 | ~ 77
50.9 as,] that 51–68 | that, 70 | that 72 | ~ 77
50.10 large] larger 51–53 | ~ 58–77
50.11 small one] smaller 51–58 | ~ 60–77
50.14 deposited] reposited 51 | ~ 53–77
a] ~ 51–64 | the 67–68 | ~ 70–77
50.16 fortune] Fortunes 51*68 | ~ 70–77
in] ~ 51–67 | on 68 | ~ 70–77
50.21 other] ~ 51–64 | over 67 | ~ 68–77
50.25 Qualities often derive . . . into execution?] **These paragraphs occur only from 60 to 77.**
50.27 but after those virtues are once established upon this foundation,] but 60–72 | ~ 77
50.30 no less than] as well as 60 | ~ 64–77
50.33 one] the 60–68 | ~ 70–77
50.35 regard] consideration 60 | ~ 64–77
sex] sense 60 | ~ 64–77
50.36 becomes] is 60 | ~ 64–77
51.3 behave] behaves 60–70 | ~ 72–77
51.7 execution] practice 60 | ~ 64–77
51.8 few are] all Men are not equally 51*53 | ~ 58–77
51.9 One considerable] Of which one chief 51–53 | One chief 58–72 | ~ 77
want] common Want 51*53 | ~ 58–77
51.10 them] us 51–53 | ~ 58–77

51.11 them] us 51–53 | ~ 58–77
51.16 determinations] Determinations 51*67 | determination 68 | ~ 70–77
51.18 to us] us 51–70 | ~ 72–77
51.24 disorder] Debauchery 51*53 | ~ 58–77
determined] determin'd 51*67 | determinate 68 | ~ 70–77
51.29 which] that 51 | ~ 53–77
51.35 extremely] infinitely 51–68 | ~ 70–77
of] ~ 51–67 | of their 68 | ~ 70–77
52.1 another] and another 51–68 | ~ 70–77
52.5 strength] Strength 51*64 | force 67–68 | ~ 70–77
52.16 that we] we 51 | ~ 53–77
52.19 undertaking] of his Undertakings 51 | ~ 53–77
52.27 writing] Paper 51*58 | ~ 58***Er***–77
52.28 scarcely] scarce 51–68 | ~ 70–77
failure] Want of Success 51*70 | ~ 72–77
52.35 among] amongst 51–53 | ~ 58–77
53.2 which she] she 51 | ~ 53–77
53.6 prevailed] been display'd 51 | appear'd 53*68 | ~ 70–77
53.7 those] these 51–60 | ~ 64–77
53.8 with regard to] on the Article of 51*53 | ~ 58–77
53.18 merit] Virtue 51*60 | ~ 64–77
53.21 endowments] Virtues 51*60 | ~ 64–77
53.27 perfections] Endowments 51*60 | ~ 64–77
53.29 claim to] Claims of 51*70 | ~ 72–77
53.30 laudable qualities] Virtues 51*53 | ~ 58–77
54.1 which we] we 51 | ~ 53–77
54.2 virtues,] Virtues of 51*53 | ~ 58–77
54.3 conduct] Conduct and Behaviour 51*53 | ~ 58–77
54.12 from] ~ 51–53 | by 58 | ~ 60–77
for] of 51–70 | ~ 72–77
54.13 entirely] altogether 51–53 | ~ 58–77
54.19 natural,] ~ 51–68 | natural 70–77
54.20 among] amongst 51–53 | ~ 58–77
54.pt PART 2] PART III. 51–60 | PART II. 64–77
54.24 fortify] strengthen 51–53 | ~ 58–77
54.25 It will . . . exterior circumstances.] **These sentences occur only from 60 to 77.**
54.27 a man] men 60 | ~ 64–77
54.28 origin, whether it arise from his mental endowments, or from the situation of his exterior circumstances.] origin. 60 | origin, whether it arises from his mental endowments, or from the situation of his exterior circumstances. 64 | origin, whether it arises from his mental endowments, or from his exterior circumstances. 67–68 | origin, whether it arises from his mental

endowments, or from the situation of his exterior circumstances. 70–72 | ~ 77

54.31 which they] they 51 | ~ 53–77
structure] Fabric or Structure 51*53 | ~ 58–77
54.32 suitably] suitable 51–68 | ~ 70–77
54.34 that] which 51–70 | ~ 72–77
54.35 namely,] *viz.* 51 | to wit, 53–68 | ~ 70–77
55.3 entirely] altogether 51–53 | ~ 58–77
or] ~ 51–67 | and 68 | ~ 70–77
55.17 according to the present theory.] **The following note occurs at this point in 51 only:**

> To the same Purpose, we may observe a Phænomenon, which might appear somewhat trivial and ludicrous; if any Thing could be trivial, which fortify'd Conclusions of such Importance; or ludicrous, which was employ'd in a philosophical Reasoning. 'Tis a general Remark, that those we call good *Women's Men*, who have either signaliz'd themselves by their amorous Exploits, or whose Make of Body or other Symptoms promise any extraordinary Vigour of that Kind, are well receiv'd by the fair Sex, and naturally engage the Affections even of those whose Virtue or Situation prevents any Design of ever giving Employment to those Talents. The Imagination is pleas'd with these Conceptions, and entering with Satisfaction into the Ideas of so favourite an Enjoyment, feels a Complacency and Good-will towards the Person. A like Principle operating more extensively, is the general Source of moral Affection and Approbation.

n. 33.2 between] betwixt 51*53 | ~ 58–77
n. 33.4 all be so liable to] be so liable to all 51–68 | ~ 70–77
n. 33.7 others] each other 51–70 | ~ 72–77
n. 33.8 is often] is 51–70 | ~ 72–77
55.23 already been] been already 51–70 | ~ 72–77
56.2 paid to] pay'd 51*68 | ~ 70–77
56.3 communicated to the spectator] communicated 51 | ~ 53–77
56.4 authority] Command 51*70 | ~ 72–77
56.5 for] to 51–70 | ~ 72–77
56.9 respect] esteem and respect 51–53 | ~ 58–77
56.24 which] that 51 | ~ 53–77
56.26 being introduced to] coming into 51–53 | ~ 58–77
56.27 respect] Respect and Deference 51*53 | ~ 58–77
56.28 that he] he 51 | ~ 53–77
56.29 he would] would 51 | ~ 53–77
56.32 men] Man 51*53 | ~ 58–77
56.36 ourselves] ourself 51–70 | ~ 72–77

57.1 The bill of a banker] A Banker's Bill 51*58 | ~ 60–77
57.8 that] the 51 | that the 53–58 | ~ 60–77
57.10 those] these 51–60 | ~ 64–77
n. 34.1 extraordinary] very extraordinary 51–58 | ~ 60–77
n. 34.6 has in it] has 51 | ~ 53–77
n. 34.7 This] ~ 51–67 | The 68 | ~ 70–77
n. 34.8 with] along with 51–58 | ~ 60–77
57.15 difference {1st appearance}] Differences 51*70 | ~ 72–77
makes] make 51–70 | ~ 72–77
57.16 does not measure] measures not 51–53 | ~ 58–77
57.22 is] ~ 51–53 | are 53*Er* | ~ 58–77
57.28 authority] Command 51*70 | ~ 72–77
58.1 latter,] other 51 | ~ 53–77
58.4 proportionable] ~ 51–58 | proportional 60–72 | ~ 77

Section 7

59.3 every one] ~ 51–53 | the whole circle 58–60 | ~ 64–77
59.4 one] one, I say, 51–53 | ~ 58–77
59.6 good-will] Affection and Good-will 51*53 | ~ 58–77
59.7 no one] none 51 | no-one 53*77
59.12 as] that 51–60 | ~ 64–77
59.14 enjoyment] Satisfaction and Enjoyment 51*53 | ~ 58–77
59.16 is] are 51–68 | ~ 70–77
mental qualities] Virtues 51*58 | ~ 60–77
59.19 procure] conciliate 51–53 | ~ 58–77
59.23 satisfaction] Delight and Satisfaction 51*53 | ~ 58–77
59.24 us] our Notice and Observation 51*53 | ~ 58–77
59.27 attend] attends 51 | ~ 53–77
n. 35.3 between] betwixt 51–58 | ~ 60–77
60.1 **In the errata for the 51 edition there is an apparently erroneous entry: 'this Passage'.**
gives of] gives 51 | ~ 53–77
60.4 contribute] contribute any thing 51–72 | ~ 77
entertainment] Pleasure and Entertainment 51*53 | ~ 58–77
60.5 for] of 51–70 | ~ 72–77
60.11 instance] Instance 51*68 | instances 70 | ~ 72–77
60.12 sentiment] Sentiments 51 | sentiments 53–72 | ~ 77
60.13 virtue] Worth and Virtue 51*53 | ~ 58–77
60.15 though a syllable be not uttered] without uttering a Syllable 51*53 | tho' a syllable be not uttered 58*77
60.23 that you] *you* 51 | *that you* 53–77
60.15 this] the 51 | ~ 53–77

60.25 among] amongst 51–53 | ~ 58–77
60.27 possible, that] possible 51 | possible that 53*77
60.28 among] amongst 51–53 | ~ 58–77
60.29 should] would 51–70 | ~ 72–77
61.2 her numerous and implacable] so many 51–68 | ~ 70–77
61.6 turned] turn'd about 51–53 | ~ 58–77
61.7 with] *along with* 51–53 | *with* 58–77
61.10 constrained] and constrain'd 51*58 | ~ 60–77
61.13 wholly] altogether 51–53 | ~ 58–77
n. 41.4 became] ~ 51–67 | becomes 68 | ~ 70–77
61.23 features] Features 51*72 | feature 77
61.24 members] Members 51*72 | member 77
n. 42.1 a virtue] a Virtue 51*72 | virtue 77
n. 42.5 esteem] Estimation 51*58 | estimate 60–70 | ~ 72–77
n. 42.6 happens),] happens) 51–72 | ~ 77
61.26 duly considers of the matter] considers the Matter justly 51*53 | duly considers the matter 58–70 | ~ 72–77
61.28 wholly] altogether 51–53 | ~ 58–77
62.3 shining] glorious 51–68 | ~ 70–77
62.9 should seize] ~ 51–67 | seized 68 | ~ 70–77
62.13 most lively] highest 51 | ~ 53–77
62.14 ever] even 51 | ~ 51***Er***–77
62.18 and of] and 51 | ~ 53–77
62.20 purpose] *Purposes* 51 | *purposes* 53–70 | *purpose* 72–77
loved] *belov'd* 51–53 | *beloved* 58–72 | *loved* 77
62.21 and in] *and in* 51–67 | *in* 68 | *and in* 70–72
62.24 scalping their enemies, dressed the skin] fleaing the Skin from the Heads of their Enemies, whom they have slain, dress it 51*53 | fleaing the skin from the heads of their enemies, whom they had slain, dressed it 58–68 | ~ 70–77
62.25 used] use 51–53 | ~ 58–77
had the] has 51–53 | ~ 58–77
those] these 51–60 | ~ 64–77
was] is 51–53 | ~ 58–77
among] amongst 51–53 | ~ 58–77
62.27 as well as] ~ 51–64 | as 67–68 | ~ 70–77
62.29 among] amongst 51–53 | ~ 58–77
who] which 51 | ~ 53–77
62.31 most] ~ 51–67 | more 68 | ~ 70–77
62.34 were] are 51–68 | ~ 70–77
62.35 when] wherein 51 | in which 53–70 | ~ 72–77
62.36 whether he were a robber or not] if he was a Robber or not 51 | whether or not he was a robber 53–64 | whether he was a robber 67–68 | whether or not he was a robber 70–72 | ~ 77

62.37 which] that 51 | ~ 53–77
n. 47.2 straight] {TXT} | strait 51–77
63.6 every] each 51–68 | ~ 70–77
63.9 by far,] much 51 | far 53–60 | ~ 64–77
63.19 and his] and 51–72 | ~ 77
which he] he 51 | ~ 53–77
63.24 of which] which 51 | ~ 53–77
ever] of ever 51 | ~ 53–77
63.26 Among the ancients] In Antiquity 51*70 | ~ 72–77
in] of 51–70 | ~ 72–77
63.28 in] of 51–70 | ~ 72–77
63.29 have had] ~ 51–67 | have 68 | ~ 70–77
63.34 these] ~ 51–72 | those 77
64.1 to promote] to 51–58 | ~ 60–77
64.3 paid to] pay'd 51*60 | ~ 64–77
64.6 enters] enter 51–70 | ~ 72–77
64.9 tear] Tears 51*70 | ~ 72–77
64.10 starts] start 51–70 | ~ 72–77
eye] Eyes 51*70 | ~ 72–77
apprehension] Observation 51 | ~ 53–77
64.28 bounds] Bounds and Measure 51*58 | ~ 60–77
64.29 at] at the 51–68 | ~ 70–77
64.30 esteem] Regard and Esteem 51*53 | ~ 58–77
64.36 IVth of FRANCE,] IVth; 51*68 | ~ 70–77
65.2 the tender passions] that Passion 51 | ~ 53–77
65.7 strikes] strike 51–68 | ~ 70–77
65.14 reigns] Reign 51*60 | ~ 64–77
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65.15 between] betwixt 51–53 | ~ 58–77
65.16 writ] wrote 51–68 | ~ 70–77
65.24 it] us 51–53 | ~ 58–77
all kinds] every Kind 51*60 | ~ 64–77
65.26 satisfaction] Pleasure and Satisfaction 51*53 | ~ 58–77
66.3 several species] Species 51*70 | ~ 72–77
merit] Virtue 51*58 | ~ 60–77
valued for] prais'd from 51*58 | ~ 60–77
66.6 kind similar] similar Kind 51*53 | ~ 58–77
66.7 a public] public 51–58 | ~ 60–77

Section 8

n. 50.1 the nature, and, indeed, the] the 51–60 | ~ 64–77
n. 50.2 *who*] *that* 51 | ~ 53–77

n. 50.4 the case with] the 51–68 | ~ 70–77
67.1 mutual] common 51–72 | ~ 77
67.7 Among] Amongst 51–53 | ~ 58–77
67.9 interruption] mutual Interruption 51 | mutual interruption 53–72 | ~ 77
67.12 consideration of] Regard to 51 | ~ 53–77
67.13 extremely enhance] enhance extremely 51–70 | ~ 72–77
67.23 who] that 51 | ~ 53–77
67.25 sole] simple 51–53 | ~ 58–77
68.1 most of] all 51–58 | ~ 60–77
68.6 often observed] observ'd 51–53 | ~ 58–77
among] amongst 51–53 | ~ 58–77
68.11 in] of 51–68 | ~ 70–77
the] a 51–53 | ~ 58–77
68.12 the] a 51–60 | ~ 64–77
68.13 turn] Share 51 | ~ 53–77
68.15 is a sort] are a Set 51*70 | ~ 72–77
68.16 marvellous] Marvelous and Extraordinary 51*53 | marvelous 58*77
68.17 most delighted] delighted 51–58 | ~ 60–77
what] nothing but what 51–58 | ~ 60–77
68.20 really agreeable] agreeable 51–53 | ~ 58–77
68.24 endowments] Qualities 51*60 | ~ 64–77
68.26 set] ~ 51–67 | give 68 | ~ 70–77
68.27 on] ~ 51–67 | to 68 | ~ 70–77
68.35 for] to 51–70 | ~ 72–77
68.38 every man's] each Man's 51*67 | men's 68 | ~ 70–77
69.1 Men have, . . . duties adjusted.] **These paragraphs occur as a footnote from 51 to 60 and as text from 64 to 77.**
69.2 Aristotle.[51]] **Note 51 occurs only from 70 to 77.**
69.4 peculiar] particular 51–64 | ~ 67–68 | particular 70 | ~ 72–77
69.7 a much] ~ 51–67 | a 68 | ~ 70–77
countries,] Countries 51 | countries 53–72 | ~ 77
69.15 wholly] altogether 51–53 | ~ 58–77
69.16 not indulge themselves in self-praise, or even speak much of] never praise themselves, and not even speak much of 51 | not indulge themselves in self-praise, nor even speak much of 53–67 | not indulge 68 | not indulge themselves in self-praise, nor even speak much of 70 | ~ 72–77
69.18 among] amongst 51–53 | ~ 58–77
69.19 of] *de* 51–72 | *of* 77
69.22 it is] 'tis even 51 | 'tis 53*77
69.27 sentiment] Sentiments 51*70 | ~ 72–77
regarded, especially in young people] regarded, especially in young People 51*67 | regarded 68 | ~ 70–77
69.33 shining] most shining 51–68 | ~ 70–77

69.34 ATHENIAN] *Athenian* General 51*68 | ~ 70–77
69.35 have, on a like occasion,] *on a like Occasion, have* 51 | *on a like occasion have* 53–58 | *on a like occasion, have* 60–72 | *have*, *on a like occasion*, 77
69.37 guilty?[52]] **The reference to Quintilian in note 52 was presented in the text in 51–68. Note 52 occurs as a footnote in this form only from 70 to 77. It occurs in the text from 64 to 68 and as part of a longer footnote from 51 to 60.**
70.1 great excellency] very great Virtue 51*60 | very great excellency 64–68 | ~ 70–77
70.3 towards] to 51 | ~ 53–77
70.4 is a quality] is 51 | ~ 53–77
70.5 namely,] *viz.* 51*68 | ~ 70–77
70.12 find] finds 51–70 | ~ 72–77
and] ~ 51–64 | and a 67–68 | ~ 70–77
70.13 with] altogether with 51–53 | ~ 58–77
70.16 honours,] Honours 51 | honours 53 | honors 58 | honours 60–72 | ~ 77
70.18 besides] ~ 51–60 | beside 64*68 | ~ 70–77
70.20 in] to 51–72 | ~ 77
70.21 expect, that] expect 51 | expect that 53*77
70.23 which you] you 51 | ~ 53–77
things which] Things, that 51 | things, which 53*77
70.24 which you] you 51 | ~ 53–77
70.31 which we] we 51 | ~ 53–77
70.36 Among] Amongst 51–53 | ~ 58–77
71.6 inexplicable] unaccountable 51 | ~ 53–77
71.7 spectator] Spectators 51 | ~ 53–77
he] they 51 | ~ 53–77
71.8 grace, an ease, a] Grace, a 51*70 | ~ 72–77
71.12 between] betwixt 51–53 | ~ 58–77
71.14 accomplishments] Virtues 51*60 | ~ 64–77
71.20 any] ~ 51–64 | an 67 | ~ 68–77
which he] he 51 | ~ 53–77
71.25 manners and characters] Morals 51*60 | ~ 64–77

Section 9

72.ttl Conclusion] CONCLUSION *of the Whole*. 51*64 | CONCLUSION. 67–77
72.2 reasoning] Reasonings 51*70 | ~ 72–77
PERSONAL MERIT] VIRTUE OR PERSONAL MERIT 51–60 | ~ 64–77
72.3 mental qualities] Qualities 51 | ~ 53–77
72.19 examination] Scrutiny and Examination 51*53 | ~ 58–77
72.24 every discourse] each Conference 51*53 | each discourse 58–68 | ~ 70–77
73.3 me,] me much, 51–68 | me 70*77
73.14 which you] you 51 | ~ 53–77

73.15 cried] {SBN} | cry 51–72 | cry'd 77
73.20 allowed to be a part of] admitted under the Denomination of Virtue or 51*58 | ~ 60–77
73.23 penance] Penances 51*70 | ~ 72–77
73.25 serve to] serve 51 | ~ 51*Er* | serve 53–70 | ~ 72–77
73.32 among] amongst 51–53 | ~ 58–77
73.34 a place] Place 51*60 | ~ 64–77
scarcely] scarce 51–68 | ~ 70–77
74.3 part] Party 51*70 | ~ 72–77
74.5 scarcely] scarce 51–68 | ~ 70–77
74.11 along] ~ 51–53 | together 58–60 | ~ 64–77
74.12 insufficient] hardly sufficient 51–53 | ~ 58–77
74.18 those] ~ 51–60 | these 64–67 | ~ 68 | these 70–72 | ~ 77
74.20 wise] way 51–60 | ~ 64–77
74.24 almost an] almost 51–60 | ~ 64–77
74.33 of the] of 51–58 | ~ 60–77
74.34 applause or censure] Censure or Applause 51 | ~ 53–77
75.6 expects,] expects 51*67 | expects that 68 | ~ 70–77
75.10 mean] means 51–72 | ~ 77
75.12 of {1st appearance}] in 51–58 | ~ 58*Er*–77
75.14 wholly] altogether 51–53 | ~ 58–77
75.15 public good] the Good of Mankind 51 | the good of mankind 53–60 | the public good 64–72 | ~ 77
tendency] Tendencies 51*70 | ~ 72–77
75.17 vanity or ambition] Ambition or Vanity 51 | ~ 53–77
75.18 blame or praise] Conduct and Behaviour 51*60 | ~ 64–77
75.23 or] and 51 | ~ 53–77
75.28 greater] greatest 51–72 | ~ 77
75.32 who] that 51 | ~ 53–77
75.35 sentiments] Sentiments 51*72 | sentiment 77
75.37 wholly] altogether 51–53 | ~ 58–77
76.3 are] is 51 | ~ 53–77
not] and not 51–68 | ~ 70–77
76.5 mankind] Mankind 51*64 | men 67–68 | ~ 70–77
76.6 these] only these 51–68 | ~ 70–77
me alone] me 51–68 | ~ 70–77
and] or 51–58 | ~ 60–77
76.7 There is no circumstance . . . that is not] No Conduct, in any Man, which has a beneficial Tendency, but is 51*60 | There is no circumstance of conduct in any man, provided it have a beneficial tendency, that is not 64*77
76.10 regarded as wholly indifferent by] altogether indifferent to 51 | regarded as altogether indifferent by 53 | ~ 58–77
76.11 between] betwixt 51–64 | ~ 67–77
76.12 species] different Species 51 | ~ 53–77

76.12 great] strong 51–53 | ~ 58–77
76.13 terms, in order] Terms 51 | ~ 53–77
76.17 expected] ~ 51–64 | expected and required 67–68 | ~ 70–77
76.18 determined to be] determin'd 51–53 | ~ 58–77
n. 57.14 pretences] Pretexts 51*60 | ~ 64–77
76.21 of all] all 51 | ~ 53–77
76.28 have] has 51 | ~ 53–77
77.9 cherished] foster'd 51–53 | ~ 58–77
77.10 on] ~ 51 | to 53–58 | ~ 60–77
77.15 a great] great 51–60 | ~ 64–77
77.21 ourselves] ourself 51–70 | ~ 72–77
77.24 every] each 51–68 | ~ 70–77
77.27 which] that 51 | ~ 53–77
77.28 with which we are acquainted] we are acquainted with 51 | ~ 53–77
77.31 ourselves; and in order to attain this end,] ourselves, in order to which 51–53 | ourselves, and to obtain this end, 58–70 | ~ 72–77
77.34 that we may] in order to 51–70 | ~ 72–77
77.36 which] that 51 | ~ 53–77
77.39 objects] all Objects 51*53 | ~ 58–77
77.40 mankind] Others 51 | ~ 53–77
78.4 PERSONAL MERIT] VIRTUE 51–60 | ~ 64–77
78.13 this] that 51–58 | the 60 | ~ 64–77
78.14 virtues and accomplishments,] Virtues, 51*60 | virtues and accomplishments 64*77
78.16 qualities] Virtues 51*60 | ~ 64–77
78.24 company] Circumstances 51*60 | ~ 64–77
78.35 personal merit] Virtue 51*60 | ~ 64–77
78.36 entirely] Altogether 51*53 | ~ 58–77
79.6 Having explained the moral *approbation* attending merit or virtue, there] THERE 51 | Having explain'd the moral *approbation* attending virtue, there 53*60 | ~ 64–77
79.7 briefly to consider] to consider briefly 51–70 | ~ 72–77
interested *obligation*] *Obligation* 51 | ~ 53–77
it] Virtue 51 | ~ 53–77
79.15 interests] Interest 51*53 | ~ 58–77
79.28 have] had 51–72 | ~ 77
79.30 suffering] Sufferance 51 | ~ 53–77
79.34 trouble, which] Trouble 51 | trouble which 53*77
80.1 admit] admits 51–72 | ~ 77
80.6 theory of morals] Morality 51 | morality 53–60 | theory of morality 64–72 | ~ 77
80.7 duties, which] Duties 51 | ~ 53–77
80.8 The] And the 51–53 | ~ 58–77

80.9 system] Theory, 51 | theory, 53–60 | system, 64–72 | ~ 77
80.13 pains, which] Pains 51 | ~ 53–77
80.16 of] of the 51–68 | ~ 70–77
80.23 any other consideration] other Considerations 51*70 | ~ 72–77
80.24 for the] the 51–70 | ~ 72–77
80.31 disgust and aversion] Aversion and Disgust 51 | ~ 53–77
80.37 lest] that 51 | ~ 53–77
80.38 interfere, in a greater and more immediate degree] have a greater and more immediate Interference, 51*60 | ~ 64–77
80.39 sacrifice] Sacrifices 51*70 | ~ 72–77
81.3 between] betwixt 51–70 | ~ 72–77
selfish and *social*] *social* and *selfish* 51 | ~ 53–77
81.5 that there] there 51 | ~ 53–77
81.8 benevolence] Beneficence 51 | ~ 53–77
81.9 another] other 51–70 | ~ 72–77
81.12 which he] he 51 | ~ 53–77
81.15 that he] he 51 | ~ 53–77
81.16 or] and 51–53 | ~ 58–77
81.17 and] or 51–58 | ~ 60–77
81.26 are we] ~ 51–67 | we are 68 | ~ 70–77
81.38 allowed] acknowledg'd 51*53 | ~ 58–77
82.5 thought] judg'd 51*70 | ~ 72–77
82.7 think] thinks 51–70 | ~ 72–77
82.8 which] that 51 | ~ 53–77
82.9 rebel not] does not rebel 51 | rebels not 53–70 | ~ 72–77
82.10 feel] feels 51–70 | ~ 72–77
82.15 review] Review 51*58 | view 60–68 | ~ 70–77
82.19 abilities] Ability 51 | ability 53–72 | ~ 77
82.20 with] only with 51 | ~ 53–77
82.29 a view to] the View of 51 | ~ 53–77
82.30 between] betwixt 51–53 | ~ 58–77
satisfaction] Satisfactions 51*70 | ~ 72–77
82.31 above all] especially 51 | ~ 53–77
82.32 between] betwixt 51–53 | ~ 58–77

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83.2 started] stated 51–53 | ~ 58–77
83.4 unfit] totally unfit 51–53 | ~ 58–77
83.6 decisions of praise or censure] moral Determinations 51*53 | determinations of praise or censure 58–68 | ~ 70–77
83.7 One principal] The chief 51–60 | ~ 64–77
83.9 decisions] Determinations 51*68 | ~ 70–77

83.11 possessor] Possessors 51*70 | ~ 72–77
83.13 may occur] occur 51–60 | ~ 64–77
n. 59 3] II 51–72 | III 77
83.17 useful] beneficial and useful 51–53 | ~ 58–77
83.26 the questions] Questions 51*60 | ~ 64–77
83.27 history] Histories 51*70 | ~ 72–77
84.3 tendency] Tendencies 51*70 | ~ 72–77
84.12 between] betwixt 51–58 | ~ 60–77
84.16 so] as 51–53 | ~ 58–77
84.20 wholly] altogether 51–53 | ~ 58–77
84.23 impossible that] impossible 51–70 | ~ 72–77
84.24 this] that this 51–70 | ~ 72–77
84.27 together] along 51–53 | ~ 58–77
84.29 or neglect] or Neglect 51*67 | and neglect 68 | ~ 70–77
84.30 in what] wherein 51 | ~ 53–77
85.7 discovered] discoverable 51–58 | ~ 60–77
85.10 Between] Betwixt 51–58 | ~ 60–77
85.12 a] ~ 51–64 | that a 67–68 | ~ 70–77
85.14 often highly] highly 51 | ~ 51***Er***–77
85.15 matter] Matter, 51 | matter, 53–72 | ~ 77
85.22 that I] I 51 | ~ 53–77
85.29 In what] Wherein 51 | ~ 53–77
85.30 you] you'll 51–70 | ~ 72–77
85.35 reply] ~ 51–53 | replied 58–60 | ~ 64–77
85.37 with] to 51–53 | ~ 58–77
85.38 which we] we 51 | ~ 53–77
86.2 to wit,] *viz*. 51–70 | ~ 72–77
86.3 thence] from thence 51–72 | ~ 77
86.9 all the] the whole 51–60 | ~ 64–77
86.10 situations] Situation 51*60 | ~ 64–77
the {2nd appearance}] his 51–53 | ~ 58–77
86.12 relations] Relations, 51 | relations, 53–72 | ~ 77
86.13 appearing] apparent 51–53 | ~ 58–77
86.14 bottom] the bottom 51–53 | ~ 53***Er*** | the bottom 58–68 | ~ 70–77
between] betwixt 51–53 | ~ 58–77
86.16 thence] from thence 51–70 | ~ 72–77
86.19 their] ~ 51–53 | the 58–60 | ~ 64–77
86.21 All the] The whole 51–60 | ~ 64–77
86.24 must suspend] suspend 51 | ~ 51***Er***–77
86.25 were] was 51–70 | ~ 72–77
86.33 all the] the whole 51–60 | ~ 64–77
86.34 previously] antecedently 51–68 | ~ 70–77
86.37 between] betwixt 51–58 | ~ 60–77

87.1 which he] he 51–53 | ~ 53*Er*–77
87.2 between] betwixt 51–53 | ~ 58–77
87.3 previously] antecedently 51–72 | ~ 77
87.4 prevailed in his savage heart] in his savage Heart, prevail'd 51*53 | prevailed in his savage heart, 58*77
87.5 that] a 51–58 | ~ 60–77
87.6 in a] ~ 51–53 | a 58–60 | ~ 64–77
87.19 wholly] altogether 51–53 | ~ 58–77
87.21 all the] the whole 51–60 | ~ 64–77
87.28 are] are all 51–53 | ~ 58–77
87.30 produces] operates 51–70 | ~ 72–77
87.37 each of these] ~ 51–67 | these 68 | ~ 70–77
87.38 in any] any 51–58 | ~ 60–77
87.40 to] of 51–72 | ~ 77
88.2 arise] arises 51–53 | ~ 58–77
88.8 suffering] Sufferance 51*68 | ~ 70–77
88.11 in what] wherein 51 | ~ 53–77
88.14 is] ~ 51–64 | are 67–68 | ~ 70–77
88.16 acknowledge] acknowledge 51*64 | confess 67–68 | ~ 70–77
88.18 entirely] altogether 51–53 | ~ 58–77
88.21 which] that 51 | ~ 53–77
88.24 and] or 51–53 | ~ 58–77
parent] Parent, from whose Seed it sprung 51*53 | ~ 58–77
88.25 merely in] in any abstract 51–70 | ~ 72–77
88.36 *necessary*] *requisite* 51–60 | ~ 64–77
88.39 a] the 51–53 | ~ 58–77
89.1 or] ~ 51–64 | and 67–68 | ~ 70–77
89.4 which it] it 51 | ~ 53–77
89.5 that there] there 51 | ~ 53–77
89.8 and of] and 51 | ~ 53–77
89.16 attaining] obtaining 51–70 | ~ 72–77
89.19 us to] ~ 51–67 | to 68 | ~ 70–77
89.23 Supreme] Supreme 51*64 | divine 67–68 | ~ 70–77
89.25 which bestowed on] who bestow'd on 51 | which bestow'd on 53*58 | which bestowed 60 | ~ 64–77

Appendix 2

90.ttl APPENDIX 2 Of Self-Love] PART I. 51–72 | APPENDIX II. Of Self-love. 77 **This Appendix number and Appendix title occur only in 77. The material in the Appendix occurs in 51 to 72 as Part 1 of Section 2. This material is repositioned in 77 as Appendix 2 with the new title.**
90.1 among] amongst 51–53 | ~ 58–77

90.3 further] farther 51–60 | ~ 64–77
90.4 encourage] foster and encourage 51–53 | ~ 58–77
90.6 and that,] and 51–60 | and that 64–68 | ~ 70–77
bottom] the Bottom 51*68 | ~ 70–77
90.10 that belies] to belye 51–53 | ~ 58–77
90.13 should] will 51–70 | ~ 72–77
90.14 wholly] altogether 51–53 | ~ 58–77
90.15 precipitate] ~ 51–53 | precipitant 58–68 | ~ 70–77
90.16 among] amongst 51–53 | ~ 58–77
90.18 a hasty] ~ 51–64 | hasty 67–68 | ~ 70–77
90.24 system] fair System 51*53 | ~ 58–77
90.27 own gratification] Gratification 51 | own Gratification 51*Er*77
90.31 considerations] Views and Considerations 51*53 | ~ 58–77
bottom] the Bottom 51 | ~ 53–77
91.1 concludes,] ~ 51–68 | concludes 70–77
91.7 among] amongst 51–53 | ~ 58–77
91.8 moderns] Moderns 51*72 | modern 77
91.9 irreproachable] most irreproachable 51–72 | ~ 77
91.10 restraint] Restraints 51*53 | ~ 58–77
91.16 moulded, by a particular turn of imagination,] moulded 51–60 | ~ 64–77
91.17 appearances] Shapes and Appearances 51*53 | ~ 58–77
91.24 gratifications] pitiful Gratifications 51*53 | ~ 58–77
91.26 bottom] the Bottom 51*53 | ~ 58–77
thought] Imagination 51*60 | ~ 64–77
91.27 between] betwixt 51–53 | ~ 58–77
91.31 subtile] refin'd 51–53 | ~ 58–77
91.35 means of which a] which Differences one 51 | which Differences a 51*Er*53 | ~ 58–77
91.40 consequence] great Consequence 51*53 | ~ 58–77
92.1 unsuitable] improper 51–70 | ~ 72–77
n. 60.1 and the] and 51–70 | ~ 72–77
n. 60.7 to wit,] *viz*. 51–70 | ~ 72–77
n. 60.8 this enquiry] these Essays 51 | this Enquiry 51*Er*77
92.3 as it is] being 51–58 | as it is 60–77
92.4 notions,] Notions and Opinions; 51*53 | notions; 58*77
92.10 those of the] the 51 | ~ 53–77
92.21 in order to] to 51 | ~ 53–77
92.23 simplicity] Simplicity and Uniformity 51*53 | ~ 58–77
92.31 of the] the 51–58 | ~ 60–77
92.32 which] that 51 | ~ 53–77
93.7 faculties, necessarily] Faculties 51*53 | ~ 58–77
93.8 activity] Energy and Activity 51*53 | ~ 58–77
93.10 other motives] others 51 | other Motives 51*Er*77

93.11 more prevalent] of greater Force and Influence 51*53 | more prevalent 58*77
93.13 who] ~ 51–72 | that 77
93.14 that] who 51–60 | ~ 64–77
93.16 who] that 51 | ~ 53–77
93.27 between] betwixt 51–53 | ~ 58–77
93.28 of] for 51 | ~ 51*Er*–77
93.35 satisfaction] Complacency or Satisfaction 51*53 | ~ 58–77
93.40 general] generous 51–58 | ~ 60–77
94.22 that acquisition] it 51 | Fame 51*Er* | ~ 53–77
94.24 gives me] gives 51–58 | ~ 60–77
94.29 appetite] Appetites 51*70 | ~ 72–77
94.30 scarcely] scarce 51–68 | ~ 70–77
94.33 in] of 51–68 | ~ 70–77
94.37 combined] conjoin'd 51–53 | conjoined 58–72 | ~ 77
94.40 we] ~ 51 | which we 53–58 | ~ 60–77
n. 62.1 ponunt." VIRG.] ~ 51–72 | ponunt. 77

Appendix 3

96.ttl 3] II. 51–72 | III. 77
Some Farther] *Some farther* 51*64 | FARTHER 67–68 | SOME FARTHER 70–77
96.2 to mark] mark 51 | ~ 53–77
between] betwixt 51–53 | ~ 58–77
96.5 chiefly keeps] keeps chiefly 51–70 | ~ 72–77
96.6 moving] that moves 51–60 | ~ 64–77
96.7 consequences] Consequences 51*64 | consequence 67–68 | ~ 70–77
96.11 cheerfully embraces] embraces cheerfully 51–68 | embraces chearfully 70 | chearfully embraces 72–77
96.13 were] was 51–72 | ~ 77
96.16 the safety or happiness alone] alone the Safety or Happiness 51*64 | alone the safety and happiness 67–68 | alone the safety or happiness 70 | ~ 72–77
96.20 and without any] or 51–60 | and without the 64–72 | ~ 77
96.29 greater] greatest 51–72 | ~ 77
96.30 are the attendants] is the Attendant 51*53 | ~ 53*Er*–77
96.32 productive of] attended with 51–53 | ~ 58–77
96.33 individual] several 51–60 | ~ 64–77
in many instances,] often 51–68 | ~ 70–77
97.3 instruments] Instruments 51*72 | instrument 77
97.9 a] its 51–70 | ~ 72–77
97.13 necessary] requisite 51–60 | ~ 64–77
97.17 encrease proportional] proportional Encrease 51*60 | encrease proportional 64*77

97.20 is] does 51–68 | ~ 70–77
supported] support itself, 51–68 | ~ 70–77
97.21 corresponding] correspondent 51–58 | ~ 60–77
97.25 person] Persons 51*53 | ~ 58–77
which] that 51 | ~ 53–77
97.26 any] every 51–60 | ~ 64–77
which] that 51 | ~ 53–77
97.35 does] ~ 51–72 | do 77
97.39 justice] all Justice 51*53 | ~ 58–77
98.6 remarks] observes 51–60 | ~ 64–77
98.8 which tends] that tend 51 | that tends 51*Er* | ~ 53–77
98.14 Did] Were 51 | ~ 53–77
terminate] to terminate 51 | ~ 53–77
consequences] particular Consequences 51*60 | ~ 64–77
act] particular Act 51*60 | ~ 64–77
98.15 his self-love] Self-love 51*58 | ~ 60–77
98.26 so loose a signification] such Signification 51*60 | such a loose signification 64–70 | ~ 72–77
98.27 vain] to little Purpose 51*70 | ~ 72–77
99.3 as] ~ 51–60 | so 64–68 | ~ 70–77
99.5 throughout] thro' 51–67 | through 68–72 | ~ 77
99.6 the human] human 51–64 | ~ 67–68 | human 70 | ~ 72–77
n. 64.3 among] amongst 51–53 | ~ 58–77
n.64.5 among] amongst 51–53 | ~ 58–77
99.9 Among] AMONGST 51–53 | ~ 58–77
99.16 ill-will] Jealousy and Ill-will 51 | jealousy and ill-will 53 | ~ 58–77
99.20 judicature] Judicature 51*64 | justice 67–68 | ~ 70–77
99.25 which] that 51 | ~ 53–77
99.26 affirmed] asserted 51–70 | ~ 72–77
99.27 that in] in 51 | ~ 53–77
99.29 bring] brings 51–72 | ~ 77
99.33 object] View 51*60 | ~ 64–77
100.2 party] Party 51*67 | side 68 | ~ 70–77
n. 65 **Note 65 occurs only from 53 to 77.**
n.65.1 be] must be 53 | ~ 53*Er*–77
n.65.12 alteration,] {GG} | alterations, 53–64 | alterations 67–68 | alterations, 70–77
n. 65.23 those] these 53–58 | ~ 60–77
n. 65.32 to the] the 53–70 | ~ 72–77
n. 65.43 between] betwixt 53–58 | ~ 60–77
virtues of another species.] **A note occurs at this point in 60 only. It is collated as text at 102.4.**
100.3 We may . . . a behaviour.] **This paragraph is omitted in the original**

printing of 51; however the paragraph is found in later issues of 51, where L3 was cancelled, the leaf reset, and this paragraph inserted. Substantive (but not accidental) variants in the later issues of 51 are identical to those listed immediately below for 53.
just] ~ 53 | justly 58–60 | ~ 64–77
101.1 every] any 53 | ~ 58–77
101.2 reckon on] lay my account with 53–68 | ~ 70–77
101.4 displease me] ~ 53–67 | displease 68 | ~ 70–77
101.7 previously] antecedently 53–72 | ~ 77

Appendix 4

102.ttl APPENDIX 4 Of Some Verbal Disputes] PART I. 51–60 | APPENDIX III. Of SOME VERBAL DISPUTES. 64–72 | APPENDIX IV. Of SOME VERBAL DISPUTES. 77 **Appendix 3 from 64 to 72 is positioned from 51 to 60 as Part 1 of Section 6 under the section title (*Of* QUALITIES *useful to Ourselves*). This material is repositioned in 77 as Appendix 4. The title of the Appendix was added in 64.**
102.4 It was in order to avoid . . . cannot possibly be of any importance.] **No portion of these sentences occurs from 51 to 58. The following sentences occur in their place from 51 to 58—here reprinting 51:** Thus, were we here to assert or to deny, *that all laudable Qualities of the Mind were to be consider'd as Virtues or moral Attributes*, many would imagine, that we had enter'd upon one of the profoundest Speculations of Ethics; tho' 'tis probable, all the while, that the greatest Part of the Dispute would be found entirely verbal.
It was in order to avoid . . . [¶] . . . contradistinguished from the other.] **No portion of these sentences occurs in 60. The following sentences occur in their place in 60 only:** Thus, were we to seek an exact definition or description of those mental qualities, which are denominated *virtues*; we might be somewhat at a loss, and might find ourselves at first involved in inextricable difficulties.
102.15 *defects*,] *defects* 64–72 | ~ 77
102.17 exactly separate] separate exactly 64–72 | ~ 77
102.20 prove only] only prove 64–70 | ~ 72–77
102.23 *First*, I do not . . . be of any importance.] **No part of these six sentences occurs in 51–58; the first of the six sentences is not found in 60. All six sentences occur in 64–77.**
102.24 virtues] virtue 64 | ~ 67–68 | virtue 70 | ~ 72–77
102.29 this appellation, though] the appellation of virtues, tho' 60 | ~ 64–77
102.30 not at all] nothing 60 | ~ 64–77
103.15 A moral, philosophical discourse needs not . . . of the same dialect.] **This sentence is part of a footnote in 51–58, but located in the text in**

60–77. The following is the collation of variants in this sentence: A moral, philosophical discourse needs not] 'Tis needless for a moral, philosophical Discourse to 51*53 | ~ 58–77. **This same 51–58 footnote contained an additional prior sentence and an additional subsequent sentence not found in the 60–77 editions. In 51*58 the prior sentence reads:** It seems to me, that in our Language, Courage, Temperance, Industry, Frugality, *&c*. according to popular Stile, are call'd *Virtues*; but when a Man is said to be *virtuous*, or is denominated a Man of Virtue, we chiefly regard his social Qualities. 51*58 **In 51*58 the subsequent sentence reads as follows:** The *Sentiments* of Men, being more uniform, as well as more important, are a fitter Subject of Speculation: Tho' at the same Time, we may just observe, that wherever the social Virtues are talk'd of, 'tis plainly imply'd, by this Distinction, that there are also other Virtues of a different Nature. 51*58

But on the whole, . . . estimation of them.] **These four sentences occur only from 64 to 77; they do not occur in 51–58, which include, as a footnote, the material cited immediately above. 60 includes, as a footnote, only the first of these sentences.**

103.17 But on the whole, it] It 60 | ~ 64–77

though it is always allowed, that there are] in our language there are always said to be 60 | ~ 64–77

103.18 yet,] but 60 | yet, 64*77

103.19 called] said to be 60 | ~ 64–77

103.20 valuable.] valuable. They are called the *virtues* by way of excellence. 60 | ~ 64–77 **The footnote in 60 ends here. In place of the next three sentences (It is, at the same time . . . estimation of them.), the main text of 60 (and only 60) includes the following sentence:** It may happen, that, in treating of ethics, we may sometimes mention laudable qualities, which the ENGLISH tongue does not always rank under the appellation of virtue; but we do it only because we are at a loss how to draw the exact line between the one and the other; or at least because we consider the question as merely grammatical.

103.27 virtues] virtue 64–70 | ~ 72–77

103.28 It seems indeed certain] FIRST. It seems certain 51–60 | It seems certain 64–70 | ~ 72–77

n. 66.3 which] that 51 | ~ 53–77

103.35 and {1st appearance}] or 51–60 | ~ 64–77

104.3 foolish conduct] Ill-conduct 51*60 | ~ 64–77

104.4 has] have 51 | ~ 53–77

brought] ~ 51–67 | drawn 68 | ~ 70–77

104.8 by] ~ 51–67 | to 68 | ~ 70–77

104.10 abilities] Ability 51 | ability 53–72 | ~ 77

104.11 we commonly] commonly 51–64 | ~ 67–68 | commonly 70–72 | ~ 77

104.18 extol] praise 51–60 | ~ 64–77
in] of 51–70 | ~ 72–77
104.30 figure which] Figure 51 | ~ 53–77
104.31 reception which] Reception 51 | ~ 53–77
104.38 wisdom] Wit 51*58 | ~ 60–77
104.39 these qualities,] them 51–53 | ~ 58–77
105.1 destitute] devoid 51–72 | ~ 77
105.2 are] be 51–70 | ~ 72–77
which] that 51 | ~ 53–77
105.3 disputing] doubting 51–58 | ~ 60–77
105.4 be] are 51–72 | ~ 77
virtues] Virtue 51 | virtue 53–72 | ~ 77
denomination of virtues?] **A note occurs at this point from 51 to 58. It is collated as text at Appx. 4.2.**
105.10 and most limited sense] Sense 51*58 | ~ 60–77
105.13 should] could 51–68 | ~ 70–77
the other we should be ambitious of] ~ 51 | of the other we should be ambitious 53–60 | ~ 64–77
105.15 temperance or] natural Abilities or Temperance or 51*58 | ~ 60–64 | temperance and 67–68 | ~ 70–77
industry or frugality] Industry 51*58 | ~ 60–77
105.17 these endowments] the natural Abilities 51*58 | ~ 60–77
105.18 no more] ~ 51–70 | more 72–77
n. 67.3 impression;] {TLB} | Impression, 51 | impression, 53–77
n. 67.7 these] ~ 51 | those 53 | ~ 58–77
n. 67.9 this enquiry] these Essays 51 | this Enquiry 51*Er**77
n. 67.14 which we] we 51 | ~ 53–77
106.15 But] But *secondly*, 51–60 | ~ 64–77
106.18 This leads . . . make, to wit, that the] To avoid, therefore, all frivolous Subtilities and Altercations, as much as possible, we shall content Ourselves with observing, *first*, that, in common Life, the Sentiments of Censure or Approbation, produc'd by mental Qualities of every Kind, are very similar; and *secondly*, that all 51*58 | And the more fully to justify our practice in this particular, we shall endeavour to make it appear, *first*, that in common life, the sentiments of censure or approbation, produced by mental qualities of every kind, are nearly similar; and *secondly*, that all 60 | This leads . . . make, *viz.* that the 64–70 | ~ 72–77
At this point all editions (51–77) again have material in common, as collated below. However, the material from 51 to 60 occurs at an earlier point in the text (at Appx. 4.4 in the present text), as did the 51–60 material collated at 106.18 above.
106.19 made no material distinction among the different species . . . their moral reasonings.] in treating of them, make little or no Difference amongst

them. 51*53 | in treating of them, make little or no difference among them. 58–60 | ~ 64–77

At this point, all editions (51–77) have material in common, as collated below; the material in 51–60 now occurs at the same point in the text, not at the earlier point in the text noted above (Appx. 4.4).

106.23 Cicero's] his 51–60 | ~ 64–77

n. 72 **Note 72 occurs only from 64 to 77.**

n. 72.13 laudanda] {TLB} | laudenda 64–77

n. 72.15 84] {GG} | 89 64–77

107.3 openness,] Freedom 51 | freedom, 53–72 | ~ 77
among] amongst 51–53 | ~ 58–77

107.7 scarcely] scarce 51–68 | ~ 70–77

n. 74 Euripides.] Incert, apud Lucianum, Apologia pro mercede conductis. 51*53 | Euripid. 53*Er*77

107.17 which] that 51 | ~ 53–77

107.22 commanding] Command 51*70 | ~ 72–77

107.23 obeying] Obedience 51*70 | ~ 72–77

107.27 facing] affronting 51–53 | ~ 58–77

108.10 in] ~ 51–53 | in an 58–60 | ~ 64–77

108.12 sovereign] kingly 51–70 | ~ 72–77

n. 78.2 18. Æschines Socraticus. Dial. 1.] 18. 51–53 | 18. Æschines Socraticus. Dial. I. 58*77

108.24 than of] than 51 | ~ 53–77

108.25 And here . . . imperceptible.] **These lines occur only from 64 to 77.**
occurs] recurs 64 | ~ 67–68 | recurs 70 | ~ 72–77
purposed] proposed 64–72 | ~ 77

108.27 ancients] antient 64*68 | ~ 70–77
later] latter 64–70 | ~ 72–77

108.29 to be among] among 64–68 | ~ 70–77

108.35 Philosophers, or rather divines under that disguise] BUT modern Philosophers 51*60 | ~ 64–77

109.9 the bottom] the Bottom 51*53 | bottom 53*Er* | ~ 58–77
of the] the 51 | ~ 51*Er*–77

109.10 easily lead us] lead us easily 51–70 | ~ 72–77
and it is of . . . excellencies.] **These lines occur only from 60 to 77.**

109.11 appellations] denominations 60–72 | ~ 77

109.14 affinity] analogy 60–72 | ~ 77

A Dialogue

110.5 a people extremely civilized and intelligent] an extreme civiliz'd, intelligent People 51 | a people extremely civiliz'd and intelligent 53*77

110.7 country] State 51*70| ~ 72–77
110.8 whose inhabitants have] whose 51–70| ~ 72–77
110.9 morals,] Morals, are 51*70| ~ 72–77
110.10 among] amongst 51–53| ~ 58–77
that I] I 51| ~ 53–77
110.19 obliging] {TLB}| *advantageous* 51–72| *obliging* 77
110.23 between] betwixt 51–53| ~ 58–77
110.24 among] amongst 51–53| ~ 58–77
110.26 by ALCHEIC to live with him] to live with *Alcheic* 51*70| ~ 72–77
accepted of] accepted 51–72| ~ 77
110.30 give to] give 51–70| ~ 72–77
110.31 found that] found 51–72| ~ 77
110.33 mistress] Flame 51*53| ~ 58–77
111.1 already] ~ 51–53| readily 58–60| ~ 64–77
111.5 afterwards told] told afterwards 51–70| ~ 72–77
111.8 had] and 51| ~ 51***Er***–77
which he had] he had 51| ~ 53–67| which he 68| ~ 70–77
111.14 nowise] no way 51–58| no ways 60| no wise 64–67| no way 68| no wise 70–77
111.18 bound] oblig'd 51*70| ~ 72–77
111.21 ease in his circumstances] his Ease 51*60| his ease in his circumstances 64–68| ~ 70–77
111.30 heir] his Heir 51*53| ~ 58–77
111.32 all together] ~ 51–53| all together, 58–67| altogether 68| all together, 70–72| ~ 77
111.33 torn] tore 51–53| torne 58–67| ~ 68| torne 70–77
111.36 ALCHEIC's] *Alcheic* 51–53| ALCHEIC 58–72| ~ 77
112.5 gained to] gain'd 51*70| ~ 72–77
112.9 applauded] applauded by every one 51| ~ 53–77
112.11 ALCHEIC] he 51| *Alcheic* 53*77
112.12 all his] ~ 51–58| all 60| ~ 64–77
112.13 scarcely] scarce 51–68| ~ 70–77
112.14 among] amongst 51–53| ~ 58–77
112.21 my mess] mine 51–53| ~ 58–77
112.23 smiled] star'd 51| smil'd 53*77
112.25 for] to 51–70| ~ 72–77
112.28 an] a 51| ~ 53–77
112.31 said] says 51–70| ~ 72–77
were] was 51–70| ~ 72–77
112.33 had] that had 51| ~ 53–77
112.36 scarcely] scarce 51–68| ~ 70–77
112.37 were] was 51–72| ~ 77

112.39 said] says 51–70 | ~ 72–77
were] was 51–68 | ~ 70–77
113.1 scarcely] scarce 51–68 | ~ 70–77
113.2 among] amongst 51–53 | ~ 58–77
113.3 aware that] aware 51 | ~ 53–77
113.9 amours of the GREEKS] *Greek* Love 51*68 | ~ 70–77
n. 79.1 law] Laws 51*53 | ~ 58–77
n. 79.2 an act of] of 51 | ~ 53–77
113.20 which you] you 51 | ~ 53–77
n. 80.3 de bell. civ. lib. 2] {GG} | Bell. Civ. Lib. 3. 51–53 | Bell. Civ. lib. 3. 58–68 | Bell. Civ. lib. iii. 70–77
113.26 remind you] put you in mind 51–72 | ~ 77
113.28 debate] a Debate 51*70 | ~ 72–77
113.31 the ironical SOCRATES] *Socrates* 51–53 | ~ 58–77
113.32 will] would 51–72 | ~ 77
113.34 made it] made 51–58 | ~ 58*Er*–77
might] may 51–60 | ~ 64–77
114.1 might {2nd appearance}] may 51–60 | ~ 64–77
114.7 among] amongst 51–53 | ~ 58–77
114.10 topic;] Topic; 51 | ~ 53–70 | topic: 72–77
114.13 between] betwixt 51–53 | ~ 58–77
114.15 in which] wherein 51 | ~ 53–77
114.22 but may] which may not 51–70 | ~ 72–77
114.25 suits] serves 51 | ~ 53–77
114.27 that there] there 51 | ~ 51*Er*–77
in which] wherein 51 | ~ 53–77
114.28 In which] Wherein 51 | ~ 53–77
114.32 games: In which] Games. Wherein 51 | games. In which 53*68 | game: In which 70 | ~ 72–77
114.35 gave] ~ 51–58 | give 60–70 | ~ 72–77
115.1 ATHENIANS] *Athenians* were 51–53 | ~ 58–77
115.8 say] says 51–70 | ~ 72–77
115.26 continue] continu'd 51*60 | ~ 64–77
among] amongst 51–53 | ~ 58–77
erect jails, where . . . several of his children;] shut up several of their Children in a perpetual Prison (where every Art of plaguing, and tormenting them is carefully study'd and practis'd) 51*53 | ~ 58–77
115.29 he owns] they own 51–53 | ~ 58–77
115.30 his] their 51–53 | ~ 58–77
115.33 singular] particular 51 | ~ 53–77
115.35 throughout] thro' 51–58 | through 60–72 | ~ 77
115.36 throughout] thro' 51–58 | through 60 | thro' 64–67 | through 68–72 | ~ 77
accompanied] and accompany'd 51 | accompany'd 53*77

116.3 exalts] exalt 51–58 | ~ 60–77
116.7 and] and at 51–72 | ~ 77
116.11 further] farther 51–58 | ~ 60–77
116.12 people whom] People 51 | ~ 53–77
116.15 exception] Exceptions 51 | ~ 53–77
116.17 meant] ~ 51–67 | mean 68 | ~ 70–77
116.19 were] was 51–70 | ~ 72–77
116.25 These two people] These two national Characters 51 | The national characters of these two 53 | ~ 58–77
in their national character of any] of any 51 | of any people 53 | ~ 58–77
116.26 and] or 51–53 | ~ 58–77
116.28 between] betwixt 51–53 | ~ 58–77
those] these 51 | ~ 53–77
116.30 between] betwixt 51–53 | ~ 58–77
between] betwixt 51–53 | ~ 58–77
116.39 and a] and 51–58 | ~ 60–77
116.40 resemble each other] concur 51–53 | ~ 58–77
117.8 among] amongst 51–53 | ~ 58–77
117.12 between] betwixt 51–53 | ~ 58–77
117.14 for] of 51–70 | ~ 72–77
117.16 extreme] Extremity 51 | ~ 53–77
117.19 poverty which] Poverty 51 | ~ 53–77
death] a Death 51*60 | ~ 64–77
117.25 putting of] putting 51–70 | ~ 72–77
117.29 picture which] Picture 51 | ~ 53–77
118.3 any] any other 51–70 | ~ 72–77
118.9 but which] but 51 | ~ 53–77
118.15 conclusions which] Conclusions 51 | ~ 53–77
118.19 reasoning] Reasonings 51 | ~ 53–77
118.20 and] and a 51–58 | ~ 60–77
Though] As 51 | Tho' 53*77
have] as have 51 | ~ 53–77
118.21 though many changes] and such Changes as 51 | ~ 53–77
n. 86.1 33] {GG} | 3 51–77
n. 87.2 126] {GG} | 86 51–77
118.32 can] can there 51–70 | ~ 72–77
be assigned] be 51–53 | ~ 58–77
118.33 extolling a] extolling 51 | ~ 53–77
119.9 pain] Suffrance 51 | ~ 53–77
119.12 different] opposite 51–68 | ~ 70–77
119.13 among] amongst 51–53 | ~ 58–77
119.14 between] betwixt 51–53 | ~ 58–77
119.15 that] ~ 51 | which 53–70 | ~ 72–77

119.16 ideas] Idea 51*68 | ~ 70–77
119.19 better suit] suit better 51–70 | ~ 72–77
119.27 sentiments] Sentiment 51*53 | ~ 58–77
119.28 which] that 51 | ~ 53–77
119.31 or the] ~ 51–67 | or 68 | ~ 70–77
119.33 any one] one 51–53 | ~ 58–77
119.37 transacted] canvass'd 51–53 | ~ 58–77
119.38 almost wholly] absolutely 51–53 | ~ 58–77
120.1 that] ~ 51 | which 53–70 | ~ 72–77
120.10 The] Her 51–53 | ~ 58–77
opening of] Opening 51*70 | ~ 72–77
120.16 past] last past 51–70 | ~ 72–77
120.22 assured] certain 51–53 | ~ 58–77
purity of manners] Purity 51*70 | ~ 72–77
120.24 a] ~ 51 | an 53 | ~ 58–77
scarcely] scarce 51–68 | ~ 70–77
120.25 which] that 51 | ~ 53–77
120.28 expect success] succeed 51–53 | ~ 58–77
120.32 between] betwixt 51–53 | ~ 58–77
n. 91.2 l'ignore] ne le sçait pas 51–68 | ~ 70–77
121.2 between] betwixt 51–53 | ~ 58–77
and the] and 51 | ~ 53–77
121.5 respect[92]);] Respect[92]) 51 | respect[92]) 53–72 | ~ 77
121.9 the one sex only] only the one Sex 51*70 | ~ 72–77
Their] The 51–58 | ~ 60–77
121.12 approve of] esteem 51 | ~ 53–77
other of] other, 51 | other, of 53*77
121.13 esteem] Respect 51 | ~ 53–77
121.28 vary not] vary 51–53 | ~ 58–77
121.29 any] no 51–53 | ~ 58–77
121.31 which] that 51 | ~ 53–77
122.2 adhere] stick 51 | ~ 53–77
122.5 which, in different ages and nations,] which 51–53 | ~ 58–77
122.10 or] and 51 | ~ 53–77
122.11 which] that 51 | ~ 53–77
122.16 when] that 51–70 | ~ 72–77
122.18 as] that 51–72 | ~ 77
122.31 was an endeavour] was 51 | was an endeavour 53*77
122.35 infirmities] Necessities 51*70 | ~ 72–77
123.10 licentious] very licentious 51–70 | ~ 72–77
123.15 general] universal 51 | ~ 53–77
123.19 which] that 51 | ~ 53–77

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Analogies, slight, have] ~ 58–67 | slight ones, their 68 | ~ 70–77
Charles, XII.] the 12th 58–70 | ~ 72–77
Natural, is natural] natural 58–70 | ~ 72–77
Peripatetics, Mediums] ~ 58–67 | Medium 68 | ~ 70–77
Property, defined] ~ 58–68 | defended 70–77

BIOGRAPHICAL APPENDIX

This appendix includes biographical sketches for all and only people mentioned by Hume in the text and the notes of *EPM*. He mentions most of these figures by name, but occasionally he uses an indirect, yet definite reference, such as 'the poet who said', followed by a direct quotation.

Biographical data are not supplied in this appendix for persons mentioned by the editor and not referred to by Hume. Basic facts on editor-introduced persons are presented upon their first appearance in the editor's annotations and introduction.[1] Titles such as 'Count' and 'Duke' have been used only if customary in a presentation of the name.

The abbreviations 'RL' (Reference List) and 'Cat.' (Catalogue) are placed at the end of each biographical portrait if the person's works are cited in one or both of these bibliographical appendices. The abbreviation 'q.v.' refers the reader to another entry in the biographical appendix. 'c.' abbreviates both century and centuries.

Achaeus (3rd c. BC), Seleucid military commander under Antiochus III. Military success prompted Achaeus to proclaim independence from Antiochus, but his soldiers resisted. He was eventually betrayed to Antiochus and executed.

Aeschines of Corinth and Athens (4th c. BC), orator and diplomat. He went with Demosthenes (q.v.) to Megalopolis to negotiate with Philip II (q.v.). His feuds with Demosthenes eventuated in prosecutions.

Aeschines Socraticus of Athens (5th–4th c. BC), friend and disciple of Socrates (q.v.). Three extant Socratic-style dialogues once attributed to Aeschines are now considered spurious. [RL; Cat.]

Agathocles of Thermae (4th–3rd c. BC), Sicilian-born tyrant of Syracuse. After launching an attack on Carthage and suffering defeat (310 BC), he returned to find Syracuse in revolt. He survived and won other victories against Carthage.

Agrippina (1st c. AD), mother of Nero (q.v.), sister of Caligula, and aspirant to the throne. She married and poisoned Emperor Claudius, her uncle, in a plot to exclude his son Britannicus from the throne in favour of Nero, her son by an earlier marriage. Nero eventually killed her.

Alcibiades of Athens (5th c. BC), politician and military commander, student of Protagoras and Socrates (q.v.). He had important Athenian military positions. Accused of mutilation of busts of the gods and profanation of the Eleusinian mysteries, he

[1] The hundreds of sources consulted while writing this appendix could not be individually acknowledged. However, the editor acknowledges a special indebtedness to *The Oxford Classical Dictionary*, in both its first and second editions, for information on the large number of classical figures mentioned by Hume.

fled from Athens to Sparta and Persia and became an enemy of Athens. Eventually he rejoined the Athenian army.

Alexander III, known as Alexander the Great (4th c. BC), Macedonian king and military leader, student of Aristotle (q.v.). His empire extended through North Africa to the Middle East and the eastern Mediterranean coasts. His rule eventuated in a Hellenization of occupied territories.

Alexander VI, born Rodrigo Borja, Italianized Borgia (1431–1503), Pope. He is generally depicted as a quintessentially degenerate and biased pope. Several times a father by his mistress, he adored his children. He appointed his son Cesare cardinal and later made him a military leader.

Anacreon of Teos, Asia Minor (6th–5th c. BC), lyric poet and musician. He was known for his short lyrics celebrating wine, love, and other pursuits of pleasure. The term 'Anacreontics' was coined for poetry of his style. [RL; Cat.]

Anthony, or Antonius, Marcus, known as Mark Antony (1st c. BC), Roman military commander and close associate of Julius Caesar (q.v.). He achieved status and recognition by the defeat of Brutus (q.v.) and Cassius (q.v.) at Philippi in 42 BC. He was later defeated by Octavian (see Augustus) and committed suicide.

Aphobus of Athens (4th c. BC), cousin and guardian of Demosthenes (q.v.) and trustee of the estate of Demosthenes' father. *Against Aphobus* recounts Demosthenes' legal suit against Aphobus for reckless disregard of the testator's directive to invest a large portion of the principal in the estate. The court ordered Aphobus to pay damages, but he tried to avoid payment with the assistance of his brother-in-law, Oneter (q.v.).

Appian of Alexandria (1st–2nd c. AD), historian of Rome. He wrote a twenty-four book history of Roman conquests, of which eleven books (together with a few fragments) have survived. [RL; Cat.]

Aristogiton of Athens (6th c. BC), youth who, with Harmodius (q.v.), attempted to assassinate the tyrant Hippias and his brother Hipparchus. Aristogiton was captured and executed. The youths were later called liberators, and statues in their honour were placed in the Athenian agora.

Aristotle of Stageira (4th c. BC), Hellenic philosopher known for his contributions to several fields of knowledge. He was a student of Plato (q.v.) at the Academy and the teacher of Alexander the Great (see Alexander III). He left Theophrastus in charge of his school, which became known as the Peripatetic School. [RL; Cat.]

Armstrong, John (1709–79), British physician, poet, and essayist. His didactic poetry in *The Art of Preserving Health* was published in several editions. His collected prose and verse was published in 1770 as *Miscellanies*. [RL; Cat.]

Atticus, Titus Pomponius (2nd–1st c. BC), Roman historian and bibliophile. He is known for his editing and preservation of a collection of letters from his friend Cicero (q.v.). He preserved the writings of his contemporaries by having his slaves copy their works.

Augustus, title for Gaius Octavius, in full Gaius Julius Caesar Octavianus, known as Octavian (1st c. BC–1st c. AD), first emperor of Rome. He was nephew and chief heir of Julius Caesar. His defeat of Mark Antony (q.v.) and Cleopatra in 31 BC left him sole ruler of the realm.

Bacon, Francis, Baron Verulam, Viscount St Albans (1561–1626), philosopher, essayist, barrister, and Lord Chancellor of England. He devised a plan to organize the sciences on a grand scale. His *Novum organum* was part of this research plan. [RL; Cat.]

Barea Soranus, Q. Marcius (1st c. AD), Roman proconsul in Asia. He incurred Nero's (q.v.) wrath and in 66 AD was accused of plotting against Nero. He was condemned on the basis of fabricated evidence submitted by his former teacher, the Stoic Egnatius Celer.

Bayle, Pierre (1647–1706), French philosopher, encyclopaedist, and critic. His controversial *Dictionnaire historique et critique* had a deep influence on 18th-c. thought. [RL; Cat.]

Boileau-Despréaux, Nicolas (1636–1711), French literary critic, poet, and translator of Longinus (q.v.). He published his *Réflexions critiques sur quelques passages de Longin* as a defence of the ancients during a turbulent literary quarrel. Boileau was led by his Jansenist beliefs into controversies with the Jesuits. [RL; Cat.]

Brutus, Marcus Junius (1st c. BC), Roman senator, military commander, and conspirator in the assassination of Julius Caesar. He had supported Caesar, but Cassius (q.v.) enticed him, according to ancient reports, into the act of assassination.

Burrus, or Burrhus, Sextus Afranius (1st c. AD), Roman commander of the Praetorian Guard. He and Seneca (q.v.) were tutors of Nero (q.v.) and later served him in high government posts. As Nero's adviser, he refused to sanction certain assassinations that Nero ordered.

Caesar, Gaius Julius (1st c. BC), Roman commander, author, orator, and statesman. He formed the first triumvirate with Pompey (q.v.) and Crassus and later became dictator. His commentaries on the Gallic war provide a chronicle of its first seven years and a history of the civil war. Brutus (q.v.), Cassius (q.v.), and other conspirators assassinated him. [RL]

Cardinal de Retz. See Retz, Jean François Paul de Gondi.

Cassius, in full Gaius Cassius Longinus (1st c. BC), Roman military commander and leader of the conspiracy against Julius Caesar (q.v.).

Castiglione, Baldassare (1478–1529), Italian diplomat, courtier, cleric, poet, and writer. His *Il Cortegiano*, a manual of etiquette and model behaviour for the aristocratic classes, was a success throughout Europe. [RL; Cat.]

Catiline, in full Lucius Sergius Catilina (1st c. BC), Roman politician, praetor, and governor of Africa. He organized a conspiracy against the republic that Cicero (q.v.) thwarted. Cicero's Catilinian orations register his formal denunciation.

Cato, Marcus Porcius, known as Cato the Younger (1st c. BC), Roman Stoic philosopher and tribune. He sided with Cicero (q.v.) against Catiline (q.v.) and with Pompey (q.v.) against Julius Caesar (q.v.). He earned a reputation for conscientious fairness, moral character, and eloquence.

Charles XII (1682–1718), king of Sweden from 1697 to 1718. He invaded Denmark and defeated the Russians, the Saxons, and the Poles, but was subsequently defeated by Peter the Great.

Cicero, Marcus Tullius, also known as Tully (lst c. BC), Roman orator, statesman, and author. He was a quaestor in Sicily and later, on behalf of the Sicilians, successfully accused their former propraetor Verres (q.v.) of criminal extortion. Cicero suppressed Catiline's (q.v.) conspiracy but later fled and was declared an exile for activities against Catiline's group. Recalled by Pompey (q.v.), Cicero sided with him against Caesar (q.v.). He also opposed Antony (q.v.) and the second triumvirate. In addition to orations and correspondence, he wrote poetry and works on rhetoric, epistemology, moral philosophy, political theory, and theology. [RL; Cat.]

Clarke, Samuel (1675–1729), English philosopher and theologian. Clarke was a Fellow at Cambridge, served in several parishes as rector, and became chaplain to Queen Anne. She appointed him rector of St James, Westminster. He published sermons and treatises on metaphysics, ethics, theology, and physical theory. [RL; Cat.]

Condé, Louis II de Bourbon, known as the Great Condé (1621–86), leader of the aristocratic uprisings known as the Fronde and renowned military commander in the wars of Louis XIV. Turenne (q.v.) defeated him to conclude the third war of the Fronde; but later the king placed him in command, with Turenne, of the forces that invaded the Netherlands.

Corneille, Pierre (1606–84), French dramatist. He was famous for his tragedies, of which *Médée* was the first. He dwelled on themes of duty, heroic struggle, patriotism, pride, vengeance, and religious enthusiasm. [RL; Cat.]

Cornelia (2nd c. BC), Roman matron, daughter of the elder Scipio Africanus (q.v.), and mother of the tribunes Tiberius and Gaius Gracchus. She is known for her devotion to the education of her twelve children, only three of whom reached maturity.

Cromwell, Oliver (1599–1658), English military commander and revolutionary leader during the English civil wars (1642–52). He rose to be the dominant figure in English political life and dismissed the ineffectual parliaments of the period. He ruled as a virtual dictator, suppressing some groups, including the Irish and the Levellers.

Cudworth, Ralph (1617–88), English philosopher, rector, and professor of Hebrew. His two major works are *The True Intellectual System of the Universe* and *A Treatise concerning Eternal and Immutable Morality*. [RL]

Cyrus I, known as Cyrus the Great and Cyrus the Elder (6th c. BC), king and founder of the Achaemenid Persian empire. His defeat of Croesus of Lydia and other victories gave him vast new territories, where citizens sometimes greeted him as an honoured liberator.

Darius I, known as Darius the Great (6th–5th c. BC), king of Persia under whose reign the wars began between Persia and the Hellenic city-states. The Hellenic forces defeated his forces in 490 at Marathon.

Darius III (4th c. BC), last Persian king in the Achaemenid dynasty. Alexander the Great (see Alexander III) dethroned him after two crushing defeats in 333 and 331. While fleeing, Darius was killed by his cousin.

David (*circa* 10th c. BC), king of Israel and Judah. He conquered Jerusalem—subsequently called 'the city of David'—making it his capital.

Demosthenes of Athens (4th c. BC), orator and statesman. He opposed the territorial ambitions of Philip II (q.v.), as recorded in the *Philippics*. He became the leader of a patriotic party and delivered his celebrated oration *On the Crown* in response to Aeschines (q.v.). See also Aphobus. [RL; Cat.]

Dicaearchus of Aetolia (3rd–2nd c. BC), secret agent of Philip V. Acting as a pirate, he brought resources to Philip by plundering wealthy cities. Stories of religious sacrifice, treachery, and lawlessness followed him in these exploits.

Diodorus Siculus of Agyrium (Agira) (1st c. BC), historian. He composed his *Historical Library* as a world history in forty books, covering the earliest times to Caesar's Gallic wars. Only the first five and the eleventh to the twentieth books have survived. [RL; Cat.]

Diogenes of Sinope (4th–3rd c. BC), Cynic philosopher legendary for his eccentric behaviour and opposition to social conventions. He left no philosophical system.

Dominic, St (12th–13th c. AD), Spanish priest, founder of the Dominican order, and *Magister sacri palatii* (the Pope's Theologian).

Du Cerceau, Jean Antoine (1670–1730), French poet and Jesuit priest. He tutored and wrote in several academic disciplines, including Latin and French poetry, theatre, history, and debate. [RL; Cat.]

Epaminondas of Thebes (5th–4th c. BC), military commander and statesman. He defeated the invading Spartans at Leuctra in 371 BC, ending a Spartan supremacy attained thirty years before in the Peloponnesian War and liberating Arcadians and Messenians from Spartan enslavement.

Epictetus of Hierapolis (Phrygia) (1st–2nd c. AD), Stoic philosopher. A former slave, his teachings on ethics and theology attracted many pupils, among them Arrian, who recorded and preserved notes of lectures published as the *Discourses* and the *Manual*. [RL]

Epicurus of Samos (4th–3rd c. BC), philosopher and founder of Epicureanism. He moved to Athens and established a school intended to rival the Academy. Only frag-

ments of his reputedly extensive writings remain, but Diogenes Laertius recorded information about his life and teachings.

Euclid of Alexandria (4th–3rd c. BC), leading mathematician of antiquity. His *Elements* is an axiomatic treatment that presents plane geometry, the theory of numbers, irrationals, and solid geometry. [RL]

Euripides of Salamis (5th c. BC), dramatic poet, writer of Greek tragedy. He wrote approximately seventy-five plays, of which eighteen are extant. Other fragments remain. [RL; Cat.]

Eurybiades of Sparta (6th–5th c. BC), fleet leader and commander of the allied forces in the Peloponnesian League in the wars with Persia.

Fabius Maximus, in full Quintus Fabius Maximus Verrucosus (3rd c. BC), Roman military commander, consul, and dictator. He engaged in battles with Hannibal (q.v.) on whom he inflicted a major loss by recapturing Tarentum. However, it was the bolder plan of Scipio (q.v.)—opposed by Fabius Maximus—that subdued Carthage.

Fénelon, François de Salignac de La Mothe (1651–1715), French author, educator, and archbishop of Cambrai. His *Les Aventures de Télémaque fils d'Ulysse*—a mythological tale about the adventures of Odysseus' son—was popular even as a children's book. The work satirizes defects in French monarchs. As a result, Fénelon was confined to his diocese in his later years. [RL; Cat.]

Flavius Vegetius Renatus. See Vegetius.

Fontenelle, Bernard le Bovier de (1657–1757), French figure of letters, playwright, and leading Cartesian. Among his many works are *Dialogues des morts*, which imitates the style of Lucian (q.v.), *Histoire des oracles*, which criticizes certain forms of superstition and orthodox religious belief, and *Entretiens sur la pluralité des mondes*, which attempts to popularize Copernican and Cartesian astronomy. [RL; Cat.]

Gracián y Morales, Baltasar (1601–58), Spanish Jesuit, college rector, and professor of scripture. His *El héroe* served as a manual of proper conduct and essential qualities for social leaders. [RL; Cat.]

Gratian. See ann. p. 170.

Grotius, Hugo (1583–1645), Dutch jurist and political figure. His *De jure belli ac pacis* is a prominent landmark in natural and international law. [RL; Cat.]

Guicciardini, Francesco (1483–1540), Florentine historian and statesman in the pontifical and Medicean service. His influential *Della historia d'Italia* chronicles events from the last decade of the 15th c. to 1532. [RL; Cat.]

Hannibal (3rd–2nd c. BC), Carthaginian military commander and statesman. A brilliant strategist, he was celebrated for victories against the Romans in the Second Punic War (218–201 BC), especially for crossing the Alps with his troops to invade Rome. Scipio (q.v.) decisively defeated him at Zama.

HARMODIUS of Athens (6th c. BC), tyrannicide killed in the attempt to assassinate the tyrant Hippias. See ARISTOGITON.

HARRY III, or HENRI III. See HENRY III.

HARRY IV, or HENRI IV. See HENRY IV.

HASDRUBAL (3rd c. BC), Carthaginian military commander and politician. He was the son-in-law of Hamilcar Barca, whom he succeeded as commander in Spain. He was also the brother-in-law of Hannibal (q.v.), who served under Hasdrubal after Hamilcar's death.

HENRY III, *French* HENRI III (1551–89), king of France from 1574 to 1589. As Duke of Anjou he helped instigate the massacre of the Huguenots. He barred Henry of Navarre from succession because of his Protestant beliefs. He then lost the 'War of the Three Henrys', and Henry of Navarre succeeded him (as Henry IV, q.v.).

HENRY IV, *French* HENRI IV (1553–1610), king of France from 1589 until 1610. Beforehand Henry of Navarre, he became the first of the Bourbon kings. He was Protestant until he converted to Roman Catholicism. He later retracted his abjuration, then again converted to Catholicism. He issued the Edict of Nantes, giving some measure of religious freedom to Protestants and ending the Wars of the Huguenots.

HERODOTUS of Halicarnassus (5th c. BC), historian of Persia and the Hellenic world. His history in nine books covers the Persians and the Persian invasion of the Hellenic states. He provides narrative reports of incidents and biographical details. [RL; Cat.]

HOBBES, THOMAS (1588–1679), English philosopher and translator of classical literature. He wrote scientific and mathematical treatises, but is known primarily for his ethical and political theory, especially in *De cive* and *Leviathan*. After 1666, when Parliament threatened action against his moral and political theory, he was unable to obtain permission for further publication on these subjects. [RL; Cat.]

HOMER (8th c. BC), poet assigned by ancient tradition as the author of the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey*, two paradigms of epic poetry. [RL; Cat.]

HORACE, in full QUINTUS HORATIUS FLACCUS (1st c. BC), Latin poet and satirist. Horace flourished under the emperor Augustus (q.v.), his friend and supporter. His works are *Satires*, *Epodes*, *Odes*, *Epistles*, and *Art of Poetry*. [RL; Cat.]

IPHICRATES of Athens (4th c. BC), military commander known chiefly for his successes against Sparta. He led Athenian attempts to recover Amphipolis (367–364 BC), but was unsuccessful.

ISOCRATES of Athens (5th–4th c. BC), rhetorician and orator. A student of Gorgias and follower of Socrates (q.v.), he was renowned as a teacher of oratory and writer of speeches. His school produced celebrated orators of 4th-c. Athens. A rival of Demosthenes, he was among the early supporters of union with Philip II (q.v.). [RL]

JULIUS CAESAR. See CAESAR.

JUVENAL, in full DECIMUS JUNIUS JUVENALIS (1st–2nd c. AD), Roman satiric poet. His satires of indignation are directed against forms of moral degeneration, criminal behaviour, and folly in Rome. [RL; Cat.]

LABEO, MARCUS ANTISTIUS (1st c. BC–1st c. AD), Roman jurist, scholar, and praetor. He was an innovative interpreter of Roman law and reputed to have been the founder of the Proculian school of jurists. Some ancient sources report that he wrote approximately 400 books; only fragments remain.

LA FONTAINE, JEAN DE (1621–95), poet and fabulist. His fame today rests primarily on his *Fables.* He disavowed his licentious *Contes et nouvelles en vers* (in which 'La coupe enchantée' appeared) after a serious illness and a religious conversion. [RL; Cat.]

LA ROCHEFOUCAULD, FRANÇOIS DE (1613–80), French moralist and writer known for his appraisals of human motivation expressed in brief epigrams, as found in his *Maximes*. [RL; Cat.]

LIVY, in full TITUS LIVIUS (1st c. BC–1st c. AD), Paduan historian of Rome. He composed his history in 142 books, covering the period from the origins to *circa* 9 BC. Only thirty-five books and fragments are extant. [RL; Cat.]

LOCKE, JOHN (1632–1704), English philosopher, physician, and political figure. After academic appointments, he took up medicine and political affairs. The Earl of Shaftesbury gave him minor political appointments from 1672 until the Earl fell from power in 1675. Locke then went to France and contacted leading scientists and philosophers. After coming under political suspicion in England, he fled in 1683 to Holland, where he took refuge until 1689. His best-known works, *An Essay concerning Human Understanding* and *Two Treatises on Civil Government*, were both first published in 1690. [RL; Cat.]

LONGINUS, the name assigned by tradition to the unknown author of *On the Sublime*, which contains internal evidence of being written in the 1st c. AD. There was a long attribution of this treatise to Cassius Longinus (3rd c. AD), from whom the name was derived. The book discusses style and literary criticism. [RL; Cat.]

LOYOLA, ST IGNATIUS (1491–1556), Spanish priest and founder of the Society of Jesus (Jesuits).

LUCIAN of Samosata (2nd c. AD), Hellenic satirist, rhetorician, poet, and wit. He satirized the religious beliefs of his period and the pretensions of schools of philosophy. He also wrote biographical and rhetorical works, but his development of the satiric dialogue is his major contribution. [RL; Cat.]

LYSIAS of Athens (5th–4th c. BC), manufacturer of shields, author, and orator. The rulers in Athens persecuted him and caused him to flee. Upon returning, he gave speeches against unscrupulous merchants and politicians, criminals, those who engage in sacrilege, those who evade military service, and the like. [RL; Cat.]

MACHIAVELLI, or MACHIAVEL, NICCOLÒ (1469–1527), Florentine statesman, political theorist, and historian. He held several government posts until dismissed from office

after the Florentine republic fell (1512). His two major works address fundamental themes about political power. [RL; Cat.]

Malebranche, Nicolas (1638–1715), French philosopher and theologian. At age 22, Malebranche joined a cell of the Congregation of the Oratory in Paris. After training in biblical studies and Aristotelianism, he discovered the philosophy of Descartes. Cartesian doctrines prompted *De la recherche de la verité*, his first and most influential work. [RL; Cat.]

Mark Antony. See Anthony, or Antonius, Marcus.

Martial, in full Marcus Valerius Martialis (1st c. ad), Roman poet. Raised and educated in Spain, he migrated to Rome, where he wrote poetry for almost thirty-five years. He is known for his epigrammatic depictions of aspects of social life. [RL; Cat.]

Maurice, known as Maurice of Nassau (1567–1625), Prince of Orange, Count of Nassau, military leader, and stadtholder of the northern, Protestant portion of a divided Netherlands. He expelled the Spaniards from the northern Netherlands but not from the south. A truce was arranged against his wishes in 1609 with no provision for reunification. He later renewed the war with Spain, without notable success.

Montaigne, Michel Eyquem de (1533–92), French essayist, philosopher, and courtier. He is primarily known for his *Essais* and for the scepticism they manifest. [RL; Cat.]

Montesquieu, Charles Louis de Secondat, Baron de (1689–1755), French political philosopher. A lawyer by training, he held the judicial office of President of the Bordeaux Parliament, but his interests were also scholarly. He wrote *Lettres Persanes* as a satire of French society and *L'Esprit des lois* as a political theory, a jurisprudential theory, and an investigation into the varieties of governments, laws, and customs. [RL; Cat.]

Nero, in full Nero Claudius Caesar Drusus Germanicus (1st c. ad), Roman emperor. Nero installed his former teachers Seneca (q.v.) and Burrus (q.v.) as heads of government. When they retired, Nero's reign turned tyrannical. He murdered both his mother and his wife.

Newton, Isaac (1642–1727), English mathematician, natural philosopher, experimental scientist, and writer on biblical and theological subjects. The body of science in his *Mathematical Principles of Natural Philosophy* and *Optics* includes rules of method, the method of fluxions, the law of the composition of light, and the laws of universal gravitation. [RL; Cat.]

Onetor (4th c. bc), brother-in-law of Aphobus (q.v.). After Demosthenes (q.v.) successfully sued Aphobus for reckless treatment of money in a trust fund, Aphobus attempted to block Demosthenes from collecting a court award by claiming to have mortgaged his farm to Onetor. *Against Onetor* records Demosthenes' suit against Onetor.

Ovid, in full Publius Ovidius Naso (1st c. BC–1st c. AD), Roman poet. Although a popular poet in Rome, he was banished for an unknown offence against the political authorities.

Palladio, Andrea, born Andrea di Pietro (1518–80), Italian architect and founder of the Palladian style. His *I quattro libri dell'architettura* was influential in shaping architecture throughout northern Europe. [RL; Cat.]

Parmenio (4th c. BC), Macedonian military commander and leading counsellor of Philip II (q.v.) and Alexander the Great (see Alexander III). Philip held him in highest esteem, and Alexander made him second in command in the invasion of Asia. However, Alexander killed Parmenio and his son after he suspected a plot by the son.

Pascal, Blaise (1623–62), French mathematician, philosopher, physicist, and theologian. After an intense religious experience, he resolved 'total submission to Jesus Christ'. Pascal then went to Port-Royal, where he became involved in the life of the community and wrote theological treatises. His *Lettres provinciales* and *Pensées* present his religious views. [RL]

Pericles of Athens (5th c. BC), statesman, commander, and orator. He was a military and political leader in the Peloponnesian War against Sparta and founder of Athenian colonies. Although renowned for an incorruptible character, he was tried for embezzlement and found guilty during a particularly difficult period in Athenian society.

Perrault, Claude (1613–88), French physician, engineer, and architect. He wrote analytical works on architecture and designed several structures in Paris. [RL; Cat.]

Petronius Arbiter, Gaius (1st c. AD), Roman satirist and consul who fell from Nero's (q.v.) favour. The *Satyricon* attributed to him is a prose-and-verse presentation of Roman life in his time. [RL; Cat.]

Phaedrus (1st c. AD), Roman fabulist indebted to the Aesopic fables. [RL; Cat.]

Philip II (4th c. BC), Macedonian king, military commander, and father of Alexander the Great (see Alexander III). *Circa* 359–2 he captured several territories and caught the attention of Demosthenes (q.v.), who delivered speeches that warned the Athenians of Philip's ambitions. In 338 Philip conquered the combined forces of Athens and Thebes and took the Peloponnesus. He was assassinated when poised to command joint Macedonian and Greek military units against Persia.

Phocion of Athens (4th c. BC), commander and statesman. He had a lengthy and distinguished military career. His reputation for patriotism and good character allowed him to command extensive political influence. However, when democracy was restored, influential Athenians charged him with treason and put him to death.

Plato of Athens (5th–4th c. BC), philosopher, founder of the Academy, and teacher of Aristotle (q.v.). He wrote a series of dialogues on philosophical subjects, often featuring the life, death, character, and philosophy of his friend Socrates (q.v.). [RL; Cat.]

Plutarch of Chaeronea (1st–2nd c. ad), biographer, moral philosopher, and historical scholar. His biographies of leading figures in the Graeco-Roman world are basic sources of biographical data about the ancients. Among his philosophical writings are short essays on moral philosophy, defences of Platonism, and treatises in opposition to Stoicism and Epicureanism. [RL; Cat.]

Polybius of Megalopolis (2nd c. bc), Greek historian of Rome. Deported to Rome under political suspicion, he was later introduced to Roman military activities on the front lines. Five books and fragments of his forty-book *History* have survived. Polybius sought to understand the causes of major political and military events in order to instruct political and military leaders. [RL; Cat.]

Pompey, in full Gnaeus Pompeius Magnus (1st c. bc), Roman military commander and statesman. He formed the first triumvirate with Julius Caesar (q.v.) and Crassus. After differences with Caesar erupted, a civil war broke out and Pompey was decisively defeated.

Prince of Orange. See Maurice.

Quintilian, in full Marcus Fabius Quintilianus (1st c. ad), rhetor and teacher. Patronized by Vespasian and Domitian, he taught and wrote about oratory in Rome for twenty years. His *Institutio oratoria* prescribes the training of an orator from childhood. [RL; Cat.]

Quintus Fabius Maximus Verrucosus. See Fabius Maximus.

Retz, Jean François Paul de Gondi, known as Cardinal de Retz (1614–79), political leader and archbishop of Paris. In an attempt to win political support, the queen-regent had Retz appointed cardinal, but his political affiliations led to his imprisonment. He later escaped and travelled extensively. His life and times are reported in his *Mémoires*.

Rochefoucauld. See La Rochefoucauld.

Saint-Évremond, Seigneur de, the title of Charles Marguetel de Saint-Denis (1613–1703), French author. After exile for his views, he went to England where he remained for the rest of his life at the courts of Charles II, James II, and William III. He there wrote moral, historical, and literary works, as well as a comedy. [RL; Cat.]

Sallust, in full Gaius Sallustius Crispus (1st c. bc), Roman historian and politician. He was elected tribune and became a partisan of Caesar. His *War with Catiline* dealt with the conspiracy of Catiline, primarily from Cicero's (q.v.) perspective. His *History* was an annalistic tracing of events from 78 bc; fragments remain. [RL; Cat.]

Sannazaro, or Sannazarius, Jacopo (1458–1530), court poet of the House of Aragon. His early work *Arcadia* is a pastoral romance published in Italian. He published the later *Eclogue piscatoriae* in Latin. [RL; Cat.]

Scipio Africanus, Publius Cornelius (3rd–2nd c. bc), Roman military commander and consul. He completed the conquest of Spanish territories and defeated both

Hasdrubal (q.v.) and Hannibal (q.v.). His stunning defeat of Hannibal in 202 BC made him a celebrated hero and effectively brought the second Punic War to an end.

SENECA, LUCIUS ANNAEUS, known as SENECA THE YOUNGER (1st c. AD), Roman Stoic philosopher, literary writer, and political figure. He wrote philosophy, a comedy, a treatise on natural science, and several tragedies. He was tutor to Nero (q.v.), but later withdrew from this powerful position. He was suspected of a Stoic plot against Nero, who commanded him to commit suicide. [RL; Cat.]

SEXTUS EMPIRICUS (2nd–3rd c. AD), physician, philosopher, and recorder of the Pyrrhonian tradition. His works contain the most comprehensive statement of the ancient sceptical tradition and include criticisms of many other philosophers. [RL; Cat.]

SHAFTESBURY, ANTHONY ASHLEY COOPER, THIRD EARL OF (1671–1713), English philosopher and politician. He received an early education under the direction of John Locke (q.v.), entered parliament at 24, and succeeded as third Earl four years later. He wrote primarily on moral subjects, under a strong influence by ancient philosophers. *Characteristicks of Men, Manners, Opinions, Times* was his major publication. [RL; Cat.]

SHAKESPEARE, WILLIAM (1564–1616), English poet and dramatist, author of a string of successful plays written for an acting company he helped form. Most of his plays, including *Julius Caesar*, were not published in his lifetime because dramatic copyright did not exist. [RL; Cat.]

SOCRATES of Athens (5th c. BC), philosopher. He wrote no philosophy and little is known about his life until the events surrounding his death that followed his condemnation for impiety and the corruption of the youth of Athens.

SOLOMON (*circa* 10th c. BC), son of David and Bathsheba and third king of Israel and Judah. He is the reputed author of three books of the Bible and three non-biblical writings.

SOLON of Athens (7th–6th c. BC), lawgiver and political reformer. He made constitutional reforms involving innovative structures of governance and issued a new code of law that overthrew most of Draco's laws and established the duties of magistrates.

SORANUS. See BAREA SORANUS.

SPENSER, EDMUND (1552–99), English poet and author. Before age 30, Spenser was secretary to the lord deputy of Ireland. Subsequently, he spent a major portion of his career there. He was intensely attached to Ireland, but the book *A View of the [Present] State of Ireland* advocates firm and even severe techniques of colonial governance to reform the Irish. His authorship of this work has been questioned. [RL; Cat.]

SPINOLA, AMBROGIO DI, titled MARQUÉS DE LOS BALBASES (1569–1630), Genoan general in the service of Spain (Genoa's ally). He commanded in the Dutch Republic against Maurice of Nassau (q.v.) until a peace treaty in 1609. Although a master of

siege warfare and a formidable opponent, Spinola was unable to conquer the Dutch forces.

Suetonius, in full Gaius Suetonius Tranquillus (1st–2nd c. ad), Roman lawyer, biographer, and historian. His *Lives of the Caesars* contains portraits and entertaining anecdotal material about the first twelve caesars, including intimate details of their private lives. [RL; Cat.]

Swift, Jonathan (1667–1745), English satirist, pamphleteer, and Church of Ireland priest best known for his *Gulliver's Travels*. He wrote for *The Examiner*, *The Tatler*, *The Spectator*, and *The Intelligencer*, authored several Tory pamphlets, and became involved in both London literary life and Irish politics. He was a passionate opponent of English rule in Ireland. [RL; Cat.]

Tacitus, Cornelius (1st–2nd c. ad), Roman orator, politician, and historian. He was praetor, consul, and proconsul in Asia. *Germania* is an ethnological report on the behaviour of tribes north of the Rhine and the Danube. His *Histories*, from the reign of Galba to that of Domitian, and the later *Annals* are histories of various rulers of the Roman empire. [RL; Cat.]

Themistocles of Athens (6th–5th c. bc), statesman and naval commander. He collaborated with the Spartan commander-in-chief, Eurybiades (q.v.), and other commanders in a decisive victory over the Persians at Salamis in 480 bc. He later reconstructed the walls of Athens and made other moves to contain Sparta. Those in Athens who sought friendlier terms with Sparta drove him from power.

Thrasea Paetus, Publius Clodius (1st c. ad), senator and republican leader of the opposition under Nero (q.v.). A Stoic, he was admired in his circle for his adherence to virtue. Accused of disloyalty as a traitor and public enemy, he was given a 'choice of death'. According to Tacitus (q.v.), Thrasea terminated his life in a noble manner.

Thucydides of Athens (5th c. bc), military commander and historian of the early wars between Athens and Sparta. He commanded an expedition sent to Amphipolis to defend it, but he failed to prevent the city's capture. His history stops in the middle of the narrative of events in 411. [RL; Cat.]

Tiberius, in full Tiberius Julius Caesar Augustus (1st c. bc–1st c. ad), Roman emperor. He served as military commander, consul, and tribune before becoming the adopted son of Augustus (q.v.). When Augustus died, Tiberius reigned from 14 to 37 ad. Plagued by mental instability, he has often been depicted as cruel and abusive.

Tigellinus, Ofonius (1st c. ad), Roman politician, prefect of the praetorian guard. Although exiled for adultery with Agrippina (q.v.), he remained in favour with Nero (q.v.). He has often been depicted by historians as a person of low morals who had a disastrous influence on Nero.

Timaeus of Tauromenium, Sicily (4th–3rd c. bc), historian. His father was once tyrant of Tauromenium. When Agathocles (q.v.) came to power, Timaeus fled and lived in exile for five decades in Athens. His *History* examined Sicily and surrounding regions.

TIMOLEON of Corinth (4th c. BC), nobleman, statesman, and military commander. He is remembered primarily for his several successful attempts to remove tyrants and restore political autonomy in Syracuse and Sicily.

TIMON of Athens (5th c. BC), notorious misanthrope. Classical literature contains (possibly apocryphal) stories about his misanthropic tendencies.

TULLY. See CICERO.

TURENNE, VICOMTE DE, the title of HENRI DE LA TOUR D'AUVERGNE (1611–75), French marshal and military strategist in the wars of Louis XIV. He became maréchal de France in 1644. His campaigns in Germany led to the Peace of Westphalia in 1648. In 1652 he defeated Condé (q.v.) and recovered Paris for the king. Later he accepted a command with Condé and prepared the way for the treaty of the Pyrenees in 1659.

VEGETIUS RENATUS, FLAVIUS (4th–5th c. AD), author on military subjects. His *Epitoma rei militaris* influenced military strategists in the Middle Ages and early modern period. [RL; Cat.]

VERRES, GAIUS (1st c. BC), Roman politician. As governor of Sicily (73–70 BC), he plundered property and revealed a rapacious character. Cicero (q.v.) prosecuted him in 70 (*The Verrine Orations*). Cicero's evidence of misconduct led Verres to abandon his defence and go into exile.

VIRGIL, or VERGIL, in full PUBLIUS VERGILIUS MARO (1st c. BC), Roman epic, didactic, and idyllic poet. He wrote, in order of composition, the *Eclogues* (or *Bucolics*), the *Georgics*, and the *Aeneid*. [RL; Cat.]

VITELLIUS, AULUS (1st c. AD), Roman emperor in 69 AD. Although proclaimed emperor by his army, his reign was quickly ended by poor management of troops, debauchery, and incompetent political administration.

XENOPHON of Athens (5th–4th c. BC), military leader, historian, and essayist. He became a follower of Socrates (q.v.) and lived in Athens during the troubled period that eventuated in Socrates' death, as Xenophon records in his *Memorabilia* and *Apology*. He wrote several works on history, polity, financial management, and military affairs. [RL; Cat.]

XERXES I (6th–5th c. BC), king of Persia and son of Darius I (q.v.). He assembled a massive army and drove to Athens, where he burned the city. He was subsequently defeated at Salamis. His commanders were later defeated at Plataea and Mycale.

ZOROASTER, *Persian* ZARATHUSHTRA (10th–6th c. BC), Persian founder of Zoroastrianism. Little has been documented about his life, but he has been depicted as a reformer who protested against nature-worship, animal slaughter, and priestly cults.

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CATALOGUE OF HUME'S REFERENCES

This catalogue is a short-title index of Hume's references (in the text and notes) to authors and works, annotated as necessary. Every written work and associated author to which Hume refers, explicitly or obliquely, is listed here.

Citations by the editor are normally to the reference list, which contains a few editions listed in the catalogue. Occasionally, an item in the catalogue is cited in the annotations, but, in general, the catalogue is a register of *Hume's* references, and the list of references is a register of the *editor's* references. All works in the catalogue were published prior to the first edition of *EPM*. All titles in the catalogue also appear in the reference list, where twentieth-century editions are standard.

The following symbols are used:

- ° This symbol (on 32 titles) signifies the existence of evidence that the listed edition was owned by Hume: the edition either appears in the Hume Library[1] or bears an authentic David Hume bookplate.[2]
- + This symbol (on 4 titles) signifies that either a specific edition or type of edition of a work has been cited or quoted by Hume. These editions have been identified by Hume's mention of a specific editor, translator, page number, and the like, or by the fact that only one edition was, or was likely to have been, available to him.[3]
- ◆ This symbol (on 4 titles) signifies that chronologically suitable editions of classical works verify that Hume's references to parts, sections, and the like of a title rely on superannuated numbering divisions and are therefore obsolete rather than mistaken references.[4]

[1] 'Hume Library' signifies the library of Hume's nephew, David (Baron) Hume (1757–1838). This library contained some books previously owned by Hume, possibly the bulk of his library. See David Fate Norton and Mary J. Norton, *The David Hume Library* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh Bibliographical Society, 1996).

[2] The presence of a David Hume bookplate is not itself sufficient to establish that the volume belonged to Hume. Baron Hume evidently used the bookplate after Hume's death, and there were two states of the bookplate, one a copy of the other. See Brian Hillyard and David Fate Norton, 'The Hume Bookplate: A Cautionary Note', *The Book Collector*, 40 (1991), 539–45. Bookplates also have been known to be fraudulently attached by modern speculators.

[3] Hume occasionally cites an editor or translator of a classical work for which there exists more than one edition edited or translated by this person. Use of the '+' symbol for these editions is confined to specific classic editions of Leunclavius, Serranus, and a few others. In cases in which a specific edition can be identified with some probability, the nature of the evidence is indicated in a parenthetical annotation.

[4] These control editions are listed only if Hume has cited a work whose parts, sections, line numbers, and the like have not been continued in modern editions. When Hume's numbering divisions match modern systems, no specific edition is listed in the catalogue.

Many entries are not accompanied by one of these symbols. The particular edition of a work cited in notes or quoted by Hume often cannot be determined with precision even when an author is directly quoted by him.[5] In these cases, only titles and basic bibliographical information about publication dates and editions are provided.

Titles in original languages and translations into English are provided for classical and non-classical works. Greek titles are followed by a transliteration, a Latin version, and an English translation. An attempt has been made to supply more accurate translations than those found on the title-pages of many published sources in English. The reader therefore should not expect the translation to follow conventional English renderings. Edition titles for collections and more inclusive works—such as *Quae exstant opera*—are not translated. Hume himself did not cite the titles of collected works, though he used such works.

Spelling, punctuation, and accents in this catalogue sometimes vary from forms that are now customary. This catalogue remains faithful to the prevailing forms in the eighteenth century, or earlier, as appropriate.[6]

The names of translators and editors of texts have been supplied wherever possible. Their names are reported as displayed on the title-pages, except that Latin syntax has been altered as necessary. As a result of this rule, the catalogue contains some inconsistency in the presentation of names and titles.

The names of cities, as printed on title-pages, have occasionally been translated into modern forms. Thus, 'Lugdunum Batavorum' is reported as Leiden, 'Lutetia' as Paris, etc.

In almost all cases, the date of first publication and information about lifetime and posthumous editions are supplied. Occasionally conclusive evidence could not be obtained regarding the date of first publication of essays or short works that were later published as parts of books. The first documented date of publication is provided in these cases.

Aeschines Socraticus. *Διάλογοι (Dialogoi) / Dialogi / Dialogues*. Note 78

Anacreon. *Μέλη (Melē) / Carmina / Songs*. Note 87.

° *Carmina*, ed. Willielmus Baxter, London, 1695.

Appian. *Ῥωμαϊκά (Rhōmaïka) / Romanae Historiae / Roman Histories*. Note 80.

Aristotle. *Ἠθικὰ Νικομάχεια (Ēthika Nikomacheia) / De moribus ad Nicomachum / Nicomachean Ethics*. Appx. 4.12; note 51.

[5] If no specific edition is traceable to Hume, the editor has not cited an edition that was available for Hume to use even if it seems plausible that he might have used that edition. Also, Hume generally does not specify whether he used an existing English translation in the case of foreign language works that had been translated.

[6] The fact that two or more inconsistent forms appeared during the century has on several occasions forced a judgement about which form to use: e.g. the French words *vérité* and *opéré* appeared in different editions with no accent, with one accent, and with two accents. In the present catalogue French accents have not been modernized, but if the preferred 17th- or 18th-c. form could not be determined, an appropriate rule consistent with modern usage has been followed.

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Boileau-Despréaux, Nicolas. *Réflexions critiques sur quelques passages de Longin / Critical Reflections on Some Passages in Longinus*, 1st pub. 1694, other posth. edns. Note 39.

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Castiglione, Baldassare. *Il Cortegiano / The Courtier*, 1st pub. 1528, other lifetime and posth. edns. Sect. 9.2.

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Cicero, Marcus Tullius.

De natura deorum / On the Nature of the Gods. Note 5.

De officiis / On Duties. Sect. 8.12; notes 3, 71.

De oratore / On the Orator. Note 72.

Epistolae ad Atticum / Letters to Atticus. Note 70.

In Catilinam / Against Catiline. Appx. 1.16.

In Verrem / Against Verres. Appx. 1.16.

Philippica / Philippics. Note 29.

Pro Sestio / In Defence of Sestius. Note 11.

Tusculanae disputationes / Tusculan Disputations. Note 88.

° *Lettres de Ciceron à Atticus*, ed. Nicolas Hubert Mongault, 6 vols., Amsterdam, 1741.

° *Opera*, ed. Pierre Joseph Olivet, 9 vols., Paris, 1740–2.

Clarke, Samuel. *A Discourse Concerning the Unchangeable Obligations of Natural Religion, and the Truth and Certainty of the Christian Revelation*, 1st pub. 1706, other lifetime and posth. edns. Note 12.

Corneille, Pierre. *Medée / Medea*, 1st pub. 1639, other lifetime and posth. edns. Sect. 7.7.

° *Le théâtre de P. Corneille*, 5 vols., Paris, 1714.

Demosthenes.

Κατὰ Ὀνήτορος (Kata Onētoros) / In Onetorem / Against Onetor. Note 90.

°+ *Orationes duae & sexaginta*, ed. Aldo Manuzio and Scipione Forteguerri, 2 vols. in 1, Venice, 1504.

Περὶ τοῦ στεφάνου (Peri tou stephanou) / De corona / On the Crown. Note 43.

Diodorus Siculus. *Βιβλιοθήκη ἱστορική (Bibliothēkē historikē) / Bibliotheca historica / Historical Library*. Notes 7, 31.

° *Bibliothecae historicae libri XV*, trans. Laurentius Rhodomanus, 2 vols. in 1, Hanau, 1604.

Du Cerceau, Jean Antoine. *Recueil de poësies diverses / Collection of Various Poems*, 1st pub. 1715, other lifetime and posth. edns. Sect. 5.30.

Euripides. *Fragmenta / Fragments*. Note 74.

Fénelon, François de Salignac de La Motte. *Les avantures de Télémaque fils d'Ulysse / The Adventures of Telemachus, Son of Ulysses,* 1st pub. 1699, other lifetime and posth. edns. (Some early edns. undated.) Sect. 7.15.

Fontenelle, Bernard le Bovier de. *Entretiens sur la pluralité des mondes / Conversations on the Plurality of Worlds*, 1st pub. 1686, other lifetime and posth. edns. Note 61.

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Gratian. See Editor's ann., p. 170 (ann. 73.17).

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° *De jure belli et pacis*, Amsterdam, 1667.

Guicciardini, Francesco. *Della historia d'Italia / The History of Italy*, 1st pub. 1561 (first 16 books), 1564 (last 4 books), both posth., other posth. edns. Sect. 5.33; note 76.

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Herodotus. *Ἱστορίαι (Historiai) / Historiae / Histories*. Note 45.

Hobbes, Thomas. *Leviathan, or The Matter, Forme, & Power of a Common-wealth Ecclesiasticall and Civill,* 1st pub. 1651, other lifetime Latin edns., other posth. edns. Appx. 2.2–3; note 11.

Homer.

Ἰλιάς (Ilias) / Ilias / Iliad. Dial. 46.

Ὀδύσσεια (Odusseia) / Odyssea / Odyssey. Sects. 6.8, 7.4, 7.15.

Horace (Quintus Horatius Flaccus).

Carmina / Odes. Notes 57, 86.

De arte poetica / The Art of Poetry. Note 20.

Epistolae / Epistles. Sect. 7.1; notes 78, 86.

° *Opera*, ed. Usher Gahagan, London, 1744.

Juvenal (Decimus Junius Juvenalis). *Satyrae / Satires*. Note 4.

° *Decii Junii Juvenalis et A. Persii Flacci satyrae*, ed. Usher Gahagan (published with the *Satyrae* of A. Persius Flaccus), London, 1744.

La Fontaine, Jean de. *La coupe enchantée / The Enchanted Goblet*, 1st pub. 1669 (in part), 1671 (in whole), other lifetime and posth. edns. Note 91.

° *Contes et nouvelles en vers*, 2 vols. in 1, Amsterdam, 1685.

La Rochefoucauld, François de. *Maximes / Maxims,* 1st pub. 1664, other lifetime and posth. edns. Note 66.

Livy (Titus Livius). *Historiae ab urbe condita / Histories Since the Founding of the City*. Note 75.

° *Historiarum ab urbe condita libri qui supersunt omnes*, ed. Arn. Drakenborch, 7

vols., Amsterdam and Leiden, 1738–46.

Locke, John. *An Essay Concerning Humane Understanding*, 1st pub. 1690, other lifetime and posth. edns. Appx. 2.2–3.

[Longinus]. *Περὶ ὕψους (Peri hupsous) / De sublimitate / On the Sublime*. Notes 37, 38. (Incorrectly attributed to Longinus.)

º *De sublimitate commentarius*, ed. Zacharias Pearce, Amsterdam, 1733.

Lucian.

Θεῶν ἐκκλησία (Theōn ekklēsia) / Deorum concilium / The Parliament of the Gods. Note 30.

Ἰκαρομένιππος ἢ Ὑπερνέφελος (Ikaromenippos ē Hupernephelos) / Icaromenippus / Icaromenippus, or the Sky Man. Note 30.

Τὰ πρὸς Κρόνον (Ta pros Kronon) / Saturnalia / Saturnalia. Note 82.

Τίμων ἢ Μισάνθρωπος (Timōn ē Misanthrōpos) / Timon / Timon, or the Misanthrope. Note 30.

Lysias. *Πρὸς Διογείτονα (Pros Diogeitona) / Adversus Diogitonem / Against Diogeiton*. Note 89.

º◆ *Orationes XXXIV*, ed. Iodocus Vander-Heidius, Hanover, 1615.

Machiavelli, Niccolò. *Discorsi sopra la prima deca di Tito Livio / Discourses on the First Ten Books of Livy*, posth. pub., 1531. Sect. 6.9.

º *Opere*, 4 vols., The Hague, 1726.

Malebranche, Nicolas. *De la recherche de la verité / On the Search for Truth*, 1st pub. 1674–5, other lifetime and posth. edns. Note 12.

º *De la recherche de la verité*, 3rd edn., 3 vols., Lyon, 1684.

Martial (Marcus Valerius Martialis). *Epigrammata / Epigrams*. Note 92.

º *Epigrammata*, Antwerp, 1568.

Montaigne, Michel Eyquem de. *Essais / Essays*, 1st pub. 1580, 3rd vol. 1588, other lifetime and posth. edns. Sect. 8.9.

Montesquieu, Charles Louis de Secondat, Baron de.

De l'esprit des loix / The Spirit of Laws, 1st pub. 1748, anon., other lifetime and posth. edns. Note 12.

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º *De l'esprit des loix*, 2 vols., Leiden, 1749.

º *Lettres Persanes*, 2 vols. in 1, Cologne, 1730.

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+ *Opera quae extant omnia*, ed. Henr. Stephanus, trans. Ioannes Serranus, 3 vols., Geneva, 1578. [Annotation: there is more than one Serranus edition, which is the translation used by Hume. This edition is listed as an example.]

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o ◆ *Historiarum libri qui supersunt*, ed. Jacobus Gronovius, trans. Isaacus Casaubonus, 3 vols., Amsterdam, 1670.

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o *Institutionum oratoriarum libri duodecim*, ed. Carolus Rollin, London, 1738. [Annotation: the Hume Library lists this work edited by Rollin in an edn. of 1735, but this date is in doubt because no copies have been discovered or elsewhere referenced. A 1736–7, two-volume Rollin edn. does exist.]

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Eloge de monsieur de Turenne / Eulogy of Monsieur de Turenne. Sect. 6.9.

Jugement sur César, et sur Alexandre / Judgement on Caesar and on Alexander. Sect. 7.6.

Lettre à M. Le Comte Magalotti / Letter to the Count of Magalotti. Note 36.

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Sallust (Gaius Sallustius Crispus). *Bellum Catilinae / The War of Catiline*. Appx. 4.6.

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Sannazaro, Jacopo.

Arcadia, 1st pub. 1502 (unauthorized), 1504 (authorized), other lifetime and posth. edns. Sect. 5.29.

Galatea, Eclogue II, 1st pub. 1526 (pseud., Synceri), other lifetime and posth. edns. Sect. 5.29.

Seneca, Lucius Annaeus.

De beneficiis / On Benefits. Note 92.

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Sextus Empiricus.

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Πυρρώνειοι ὑποτυπώσεις *(Purrōneioi hupotupōseis) / Pyrrhoniae institutiones / Outlines of Pyrrhonism*. Note 15.

+◆ *Opera*, trans. H. Stephanus and G. Herveto, Geneva, 1621. [Annotation: an edn. by P. and J. Chouët, using a rare numbering system followed by Hume.]

Shaftesbury, Anthony Ashley Cooper, third Earl of. *Characteristicks of Men, Manners, Opinions, Times*, 1st pub. 1711, other posth. edns. Sects. 1.3, 1.4.

◦ *Characteristicks of Men, Manners, Opinions, Times*, 3rd edn., 3 vols., London, 1723.

Shakespeare, William. *Julius Caesar*, 1st stage performance, 1599, all edns. posth. Sect. 7.3.

◦ *The Works of Shakespear*, ed. Alexander Pope, 6 vols., London, 1723–5.

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Suetonius Tranquillus, Gaius. *Vita Caesarum / Life of the Caesars*. Note 80.

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◦ *Works*, 12 vols. London, 1736.

Tacitus, Publius Cornelius.

Germania / Germania. Note 44.

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Vegetius (Flavius Vegetius Renatus). *De re militari / On Matters of the Military*. Note 32.

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◦ *Opera*, London, 1744. [Annotation: Hume may have owned more than one relevant edition of Virgil. See Norton and Norton, *The David Hume Library*.]

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Xenophon.

Ἀπομνημονεύματα *(Apomnēmoneumata) / Memorabilia / Memorabilia*. Note 81.

Κύρου παιδεία (Kurou paideia) / Historiarum de Cyri maioris institutione / The Childhood of Cyrus (Cyropaedia). Appx. 3.4.
Περὶ ἱππικῆς *(Peri hippikēs) / De re equestri / On the Art of Horsemanship*. Sect. 6.24.
[+] *Quae exstant opera*, ed. Antonius Stephanus, trans. Joannes Leunclavius, 2 vols. in 1, Paris, 1625. [Annotation: There is more than one Leunclavius edition. It is unknown which among the several Leunclavius folios Hume used. The above edition is listed as an example.]

HUME'S INDEX

This index is Hume's, except for the substitution of sections, appendices, paragraphs, and note numbers for his pages and note markers. It has been derived from the full index for *Essays and Treatises on Several Subjects* and includes only *EPM* entries. Despite the reduction to include only *EPM* entries, the present index follows the copytext's convention of capitalizing each first entry under a letter. Inconsistent capitalization of first words in the entries (using small capitals in some instances and lower case in parallel instances) has been corrected and standardized throughout the index. However, Hume's spellings are retained in all entries.

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